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## Reintegration and Reconstruction in Post-war South Sudan

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*Reintegration and  
Reconstruction inPost-war  
South Sudan*

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## Foreword

This publication is one of IPSTC's contributions to understanding the conflict situation in South Sudan. The role of the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) as a regional center of excellence is to contribute to the preparedness of the Eastern Africa region in addressing peace and security challenges. This demanding and extensive task comprises two essential aspects; namely the ability to raise awareness about problems that may affect the region, and the identification of possible ways to address them.

The complex conflict situation in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa calls for knowledge based policy making on pertinent issues of peace and security. Specifically the post conflict situation in South Sudan calls for profound research and analysis of the current conflict dynamics. Given the fragility of the new nation and the immense challenges of providing security and basic services to the entire country and initiating development amidst scarce resources; South Sudan requires reliable knowledge of conflict prevention, management and resolution.

*Reintegration and Reconstruction in Post War South Sudan*; argues that reintegration must fit into more comprehensive social and economic development systems and processes. With ex-combatants, returning to their communities, reconciliation should be addressed more systematically at both the inter-communal and intra-community levels.

The International Peace Support Training Center has made considerable contribution in research and training on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. The research products inform the design of our training modules.

I would like to thank the Government of Japan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for supporting the research and publication of this booklet.

IPSTC will continue to collaborate with development partners to publish high quality research products on topical issues of peace and security in the region.

Brigadier R. G. Kabage

Director  
IPSTC

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## Abbreviations

ADESO	African Development Solutions
CBO	Community-Based Organizations
CEPO	Community Empowerment Organization for Progress
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC	Bureau on Community Safety and Arms Control
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EES	Eastern Equatoria State
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IUNDDR	Integrated United Nations Disarmament and Demobilization Unit
JIU	Joint Integrated Units
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LSRHC	Livelihood Support to Returnees and Host Communities
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SSAF	South Sudan Armed Forces
SSDDRC	South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

## 1. Introduction

Realising stabilization in a post-conflict context requires policy makers to manage a host of competing social and economic challenges. These challenges are a critical part of the political economy of post-war recovery and are inevitable in any peace-building or state-building undertakings. In theory, reintegration may sound easy but in reality, problems manifest range from integration of vulnerable individuals (orphans, widows, wounded) to education of former combatants. One of the most challenging problem however, is prioritization. The welfare system works well if supported by a vibrant economy; the economy will be successful only if managed and run by skilled individuals; individuals will be skilled only if they received the proper education, and individuals will abandon violence and engage in an education process only if they have ways to survive. In other words, planning for reconstruction often looks like a “chicken-and-egg” problem. South Sudan has embarked on a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme in a fragile security environment characterized by a slow pace of economic recovery. Given the prevailing socio-economic situation in South Sudan, the reintegration approach with the greatest dividends remains enigmatic. It should be one that enables rapid state-building with promises of nationhood. It should also be one that nurtures quick reconstructing of society. This is the background against which this study was done.

Interest in reintegration has been given impetus by the DDR initiative. Since the DDR process started in 2009, four years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), some work has been done on the “DD” components of the process by both the South Sudan authorities under the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC), and by international counterparts under the Integrated United Nations DDR Unit (IUNDDR). However, it seems that there is need to put extra emphasis on the “Reintegration” component. The integrative process should underlie nation-building so as to realize a cohesive state with national values and a common vision of the future. Furthermore, “reintegration” of former combatants into the new national security forces may not always be a straight forward process, as it may require vetting the candidates for reintegration in order to weed out war criminals. As such, if the reintegration will be accompanied by transitional justice mechanisms, nation-building may take longer.

## 1.1 The Statement of the Problem

The process of state reconstruction is a complex undertaking in post-conflict societies. Reintegration is not simply about absorbing former combatants into government, private sector and civil society to enable them earn non-military livelihoods but also to generate a stable and sustainable society. For this reason, reintegration must fit into more comprehensive social and economic development processes. This study investigates the environment within which re-integration is being conducted in South Sudan.

## 1.2 Objectives of the Study

The study seeks to investigate the nature, extent and environment of reintegration in post-war South Sudan. By conceptualizing reintegration as a multi-faceted development process, it seeks to analyze the dynamics and difficulties of effective reintegration processes and systems in the nascent state. Specifically, its objectives are to:

- (i) Investigate the environment within which reintegration and reconstruction are being carried out in post-war South Sudan;
- (ii) Analyze the nature and extent of disarmament and demobilisation in South Sudan;
- (iii) Examine the nature of interaction and roles of the different actors and stakeholders in these processes; and
- (iv) Analyze the implications of reintegration and reconstruction for national development.

## 1.3 Research Questions

The overall research question that guided the study was what comes next after disarmament and demobilization? Other guiding research questions are:

- (i) What is the environment within which reintegration and reconstruction are being carried out in post-war South Sudan?
- (ii) What is the nature and extent of disarmament and demobilisation in South Sudan?
- (iii) What is the nature of interaction and roles of the different actors and stakeholders in these processes? and



- (iv) What are the implications of reintegration and reconstruction for national development?

## 1.4 Scope of the Study

This paper confines itself to post-war South Sudan but draws historical inferences from past experiences and events. It focuses on long-term reconstruction of the society and attempts to identify the difficulties encountered in harmonizing demobilization and reintegration and the challenges of rebuilding an economy capable of absorbing ex-combatants into alternative livelihoods. Given the current state of affairs in South Sudan, the study examines the realities of reintegration and what policy makers should take into account in the post-conflict reconstruction period. The overall implications of these two processes on national development are then analyzed.

## 2.0 Research Methodology

The research design was qualitative in nature. A qualitative research design seeks to understand and explain things from the actor's own frame of reference. People and institutions are studied in terms of their own definitions of the world, also termed as the 'insider perspective'. The justification for this was that insider information was sought and that the target respondents were largely actors in the DDR processes in South Sudan. These are mainly decision makers in the political, security and public administrative structures in the GOSS. Examples are the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC), and the South Sudan Bureau on Community Safety and Arms Control (CSAC). Other respondents were drawn from institutions involved in DDR such as the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Saferworld and other NGOs. Structured and unstructured interviews, literature review and observation comprised the main data collection methods while a questionnaire and the researcher's eye were the main tools used.

### 2.1 Sampling and Target Institutions

Being a qualitative study, the respondents were purposively selected from the following four broad categories:

- a) Ministries that manage and implement demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration policy (DDR Commission, SSDDRC; Bureau for CSAC; Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs);
- b) Operational actors charged with guaranteeing South Sudan's security and DDR process enforcers (Police Service and officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs);
- c) Actors outside the official establishment (Political Affairs Division at the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); NGOs; CBOs involved in DDR; community leaders, elders, church leaders); and
- d) Clients of the DDR process (ex-combatants and returnees specifically from the Eastern Equatoria State (EES)).

### 3.0 Theoretical Framework

The study borrowed from the theories of the state and nation. State and nation-building, reintegration and reconstruction are examined against human security and livelihoods theories.

#### 3.1 State-building and Social Reintegration

In investigating the environment within which reintegration operates in Southern Sudan, it is important to first have a general understanding of the definition of ‘reintegration’. As defined by the United Nations, reintegration is:

*“... the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.”<sup>1</sup>*

Sustainable disarmament and demobilization of combatants and those previously associated with armed forces and groups depends on the availability of social and economic reintegration opportunities. Failure to reintegrate those who have been demobilized undermines the achievements of the process, placing the DDR programme at risk. However, reintegration is a complex process since it also targets other members of society and their needs. Reintegration calls for consolidated efforts that treat it as a complex activity that targets different members of society who have undergone common social and political-security experiences. This activity should therefore seek to address amongst other factors short term stabilization (reinsertion). Reinsertion is defined by the United Nations as:

*“... the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer term process of reintegration. It is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes,*

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations,. “Note by the Secretary-General on Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations.” A/C.5/59/31, 24 May 2005.

*shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.”<sup>2</sup>*

In short term stabilization or reinsertion efforts, the main objective is to draw ex-combatants away from fighting or criminality until a peace mission is deployed or security sector or political reform is completed. This exercise accompanied the initial DDR processes and continues to this day.

The process targeting ex-combatants has the objective of providing this group with specifically designed, individually-focused sustainable solutions for long term reintegration<sup>3</sup>. Community based reintegration efforts provide communities with tools and capacities to support the reintegration of ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, refugees and other special groups<sup>4</sup>. The latter form of reintegration may not deal directly and solely with ex-combatants’ needs but with the needs of the community as a whole<sup>5</sup>. The process needs to be approached from a systemic perspective as provided by the United Nations frameworks. The United Nations Secretary General in 2005, while providing guidelines on administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations, defined reintegration as the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income<sup>6</sup>. This makes reintegration a social and economic process with an open time frame. It is also part of the journey towards national development and nationhood.

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> See United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center. *Introduction to integrated DDR standards*, 2005, Available at: <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs>, as accessed on 6<sup>th</sup> June 2012.

<sup>4</sup> See Willems R, Verkoren W, Derks M, Frerks G, & Rouw H. *Security promotion in fragile states: can local meet national? Exploring the connections between community security and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)*. (Utrecht & Nijmegen, Netherlands: Working Group on Community Security and Community-based DDR in Fragile States, 2009), August. Accessible in, [http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CLINGENDAEL\\_SecurityPromotionFragileSates.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CLINGENDAEL_SecurityPromotionFragileSates.pdf) as accessed on 28 July 2012, pp. 13-15

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., pp. 15-17.

<sup>6</sup> See Note by the Secretary General on the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing of the UN peacekeeping operations, 24 May 2005 (A/C.5/59/31)

Reintegration seems to mean different things to different organizations and stakeholders involved in the exercise. To some, it is a reunion or regrouping of a community that disintegrated due to war and displacement. However, in many parts of South Sudan returnee processes also involve integration of different groups for the first time. In South Sudan, reintegration is used rather loosely to cover both phenomena. This is also the position of the UNHCR which defines reintegration as the progressive establishment of conditions which enable returnees and their communities to exercise social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights, and on that basis to enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives<sup>7</sup>. The GOSS's has adopted the UNHCR's understanding of the same. The policy and legal document which provides the basis for the process is the Land Act of 2009<sup>8</sup> which defines integration as re-entry of formerly internally displaced persons into the social, economic, cultural and political fabric of their original community.

Out of its experiences in post-war situations, the UNHCR has realised that reintegration is not the simple reversal of displacement, but a dynamic process involving individuals, households and communities that have changed as a result of their experiences with armed conflict and consequent displacement from their livelihoods. New policy options distinguish returning refugees from IDPs and members of the resident population<sup>9</sup>. This is why this paper treats reintegration as a complex process involving returnees (IDPs, refugees and ex-combatants) who may have gone through disarmament and demobilization.

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<sup>7</sup> See UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR's role in support of the return and reintegration of displacement populations: policy framework and implementation strategy*, 11 February 2008, EC/59/SC/CRP.5, p. 1, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47d6a6db2.html> [accessed 25 May 2012]

<sup>8</sup> See Matijn ter Heege, Thea Hilhorst & Nicholas Porchet. *South Sudan; food security and land governance factsheet*. (Hague: Royal tropical Institute, 2011) In, <http://www.landgovernance.org/system/files/Sudan%20%20Factsheet%20landac%20april%202011.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 2

## 4.0 Reintegration in South Sudan

### 4.1 The General Picture

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 did mark a new beginning for war ravaged South Sudan. The establishment of the interim government of South Sudan (GOSS) and the formation of a government of national unity with the SPLM as a partner in the same year appeared to provide many windows of opportunity for the country in general. These developments encouraged the millions of IDPs and hundreds of thousands of refugees and other groups to return to their homes in South Sudan.

### 4.2 Re-integration through Forced Migration

In 2005, Sudan had more than 4 million IDPs, the largest internally displaced population in the world due to the wars in the South, Darfur and other parts of the country<sup>10</sup>. In addition, there were more than half a million Sudanese refugees, mostly in neighbouring countries for example in Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya.<sup>11</sup> Inter-communal and inter-ethnic conflicts, attacks by Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and intermittent famines and migration also contributed to displacement. The post-CPA return of migrants and refugees was voluntary but involved two different processes. One process saw individuals and families return on their own, which constituted the vast majority of the returnees and the other process saw an organized return system supported by the different organizations such as IOM, UN, GOS and GOSS.<sup>12</sup> The intensity of the return and consequent demands of resettlement, reintegration and livelihood building have posed many logistical, political and socio-economic challenges to the newly established RSS, local communities and institutions, and the international agencies concerned. The GOSS and local communities are struggling to cope with the ever-increasing demands on resources and organisational and human capacities that

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<sup>10</sup> See N. Shanmugaratnam. Resettlement, resource conflicts, livelihood revival and reintegration in *South Sudan: a study of the processes and institutional issues at the local level in Magwi County*. (In. NORAGRIC Report No. 58. Aas: Department of International Environmental and Development Studies, Noragric-Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2010) December. p.1

<sup>11</sup> Okoth-Obbo George. *UNHCR pursues return of 70,000 refugees to South Sudan*. Nairobi: Panapress. 12 January, 2006, Accessible through, [www.panapress.com/UNHCR-pursues-return-of-70,000-refugees-to-South-Sudan-12-577852-101-lang1-index.html](http://www.panapress.com/UNHCR-pursues-return-of-70,000-refugees-to-South-Sudan-12-577852-101-lang1-index.html) [accessed on 4 September 2012].

<sup>12</sup> Op. Cit., Shanmugaratnam, 2010. p 1.

accompany the return migration in different parts of the country, although the magnitudes of these demands vary from area to area.

This challenge is further complicated in areas which have been experiencing return migration while still having considerable numbers of IDPs, who are not keen to return to their original homes for various reasons. These areas are also characterised by resource conflicts between the IDPs and the non-displaced local communities. Such resource conflicts are particularly serious where the IDPs practice pastoralism in areas in which the local communities have long been engaged in settled arable farming. These conflicts have become more widespread and intensified with the return of the internally displaced and refugees to these areas which they fled during the war and which were once their homes. The returnees often found their lands occupied by IDPs who moved into their villages and towns after they fled them.<sup>13</sup> The conflicts often turn ethnic especially where the IDPs and locals belong to different ethnic groups. In other areas, the traditional institutions are under severe stress due to the unprecedented scale and complexity of the problems they have to deal with.

The gravity of the problem can be seen in Eastern Equatoria state and in particular Nimule Payam and Magwi Payam. These are areas which historically had a large number of their residents displaced with large scale cross border migration to neighbouring Uganda where they spent many years as refugees before returning in small and big streams to their native areas after the CPA. While there were mass exoduses of the native Acholi and Madi communities to Uganda during 1989-96, there were influxes of IDPs into Magwi County from other war ravaged parts of South Sudan. In 1991, large numbers of displaced Dinka pastoralists from Bol (in Jonglei state) migrated to Magwi. Most of the Dinka finally settled in and around Nimule at the Southern end of the county in 1994<sup>14</sup>. The Dinka were able to occupy large areas of Nimule quite easily as most of its native Madi people had already moved across the border to Uganda. However, resource conflicts and social tensions emerged between the new pastoralist migrants and the

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<sup>13</sup> See Pantuliano Sara, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Paul Murphy and Mosel Irina. *The long road home: opportunities and obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and refugees returning to Southern Sudan and the three areas*. (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008). September. Pp 1-4. Accessible through, <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3337.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> See International Organization for Migration (IOM) & South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC). *Sudan spontaneous return tracking report*. May, 2009, Accessible in, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)AOC9931...12575F90040D732/\\$file/SSRRC-iom+Tracking+of+spontaneous+returnees+May+09.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)AOC9931...12575F90040D732/$file/SSRRC-iom+Tracking+of+spontaneous+returnees+May+09.pdf)

remaining inhabitants who were traditional farmers. The Dinka IDPs occupied the lands in and around Nimule town and along the road to Uganda. They acquired cattle and practised their traditional herding which affected farming by locals. The resource conflicts and tensions escalated after the refugees returned and claimed their lands<sup>15</sup>. Resettlement, reintegration and livelihood security thus became systemic issues.

### 4.3 Challenges of Reintegrating Victims of Forced Migration

As contentious issue in the reintegration and reconstruction environment remains how to treat IDPs and refugees. The immediate priority is to provide livelihood security to these vulnerable groups. However, there exists a high level of human and livelihood insecurity across South Sudan and lack of capacity of government to address the situation. Both government and development agencies are stressed in their efforts to address general human security concerns. These inadequacies may be attributed to the many years of war and lack of development. However, there has been progress in terms of reintegrating and repatriating victims of forced migration by different aid and humanitarian agencies. For instance, UNHCR supported the GOSS in the repatriation of more than 135,000 refugees<sup>16</sup> through four repatriation corridors between 2005 and 2008. This was a major undertaking involving tripartite agreements with 5 different neighbouring countries.

On the food and livelihood security component of the reintegration, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has been extending support in the supply of seeds and tools to returnees<sup>17</sup>. Several International Non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have been providing assistance in resettlement, livelihood revival<sup>18</sup> and establishment of health and other social

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<sup>15</sup> See Ibid. N. Shanmugaratnam 2010. P 2

<sup>16</sup> See Duffield M., Diagne and V Tennant. *Evaluation of UNHCR's returnee integration programme in Southern Sudan*, UNHCR policy Development and Evaluation Service, Geneva, 2008.

<sup>17</sup> See Tesfai Muna. *FAO distributes seeds and farming equipment to returnees*, 2011, In. [http://mirayafm.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=5699%3Afao-distribut-crop-seeds-a-farming-equipment-to-returnees&catid=85%3A85&Itemid=278](http://mirayafm.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5699%3Afao-distribut-crop-seeds-a-farming-equipment-to-returnees&catid=85%3A85&Itemid=278). 19 April. Accessed on 20 October 2012.

<sup>18</sup> For example, the African Development Solutions (ADESO) is an NGO in Africa that works hand in hand with African communities to prevent, manage, and overcome situations that adversely affect their wellbeing. ADESO does this by working through five programme areas: integrated food security, education, water and sanitation, natural resource management and humanitarian response interventions. There is also within the organizational undertakings a Livelihood Support to Returnees



services in different parts of South Sudan. On the other hand, one could argue<sup>19</sup> that the GOSS and development partners were not well prepared in terms of professional and financial resources to deal with the needs of large-scale resettlement and reintegration in different areas. This situation was noted by the Commissioner in charge of South Sudan's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) in interviews with the author. The severity of the problem has been expressed by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) which have been involved in assisting the vulnerable population. The IFRC notes that over 390,000 people of South Sudanese origin crossed the border from Sudan to South Sudan between 2010 and early June 2012.<sup>20</sup> The United Nations estimates show that on average, about 25% of these were government assisted and 30-75% was spontaneous. A smaller number are unknown<sup>21</sup>. The exceptions are Central Equatoria and Jonglei where up to 75% are mentioned as government assisted. The IFRC reports that after passing through the transit sites for screening and registration, no further onward assistance is provided except the allocation of small plots of land at their "final destination". A further 100,000 are expected in the near future.<sup>22</sup> The nascent GOSS was driven by the assumption that the forced migration victims would be willing to return to their original areas of residence. The local leadership at Payam and county levels was also not equipped and capable to facilitate the resettlement and management of the reintegration process.<sup>23</sup> Government and traditional institutions still lack the capacity to effectively handle the resettlement and reintegration of large populations of returnees. For example, the Internal

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and Host Communities (LSRHC) started in July 2011 in response to the increased need for food assistance following the return of former refugees to South Sudan. For more insights on ADESO's work, see, <http://www.adesoafrika.org>, as accessed on 24 July 2012.

<sup>19</sup> See The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) . Sudan; 4.9 million IDPs across Sudan face ongoing turmoil-a profile of the internal displacement situation, (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 27 May 2010); and also, Oxfam. *Rescuing the peace in Southern Sudan*, Joint NGO Briefing paper January 2010.

<sup>20</sup> See International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), *Emergency appeal: South Sudan-population movement*, 2012, accessed in, [www.ifrc.org/docs/Appeals/12/MDRSS001EA.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Appeals/12/MDRSS001EA.pdf). 27 July. As accessed on 18 August 2012. p. 2 .

<sup>21</sup> See UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). *2012 UNHCR country operations profile-South Sudan: working environment*, 2012, accessible in, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4e43cb466.html>, as accessed on 18 August 2012.

<sup>22</sup> op. cit. UNHCR 2012. p. 2

<sup>23</sup> Further insights on the plight of returnees and their reintegration dilemmas can be accessed in, IRIN. *South Sudan-Sudan: thousand still stranded despite airlifts*, 2012, source-<http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=95647>.

Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) observed that authorities in South Sudan have so far focused exclusively on return to areas of origin as the only durable re-integrative solution for IDPs and refugees.<sup>24</sup>

#### 4.4 Re-integration of Ex-Combatants

Besides helping former combatants return to civilian life, reintegration had the twin concerns of reducing the number of armed ex-combatants among the civilian population and reducing the size of the national army<sup>25</sup>. Under the DDR process, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA were each to shed 90,000 members although this decision was taken without reliable estimates of the overall size of the SPLA and the Southern militias. International actors hoped that the programme would contribute to confidence building between Khartoum and Juba and reduce the risk of conflict flaring up again.<sup>26</sup> The DDR was initially supported technically and financially by external actors<sup>27</sup>. The key international counterpart was the Integrated United Nations DDR (IUNDDR) unit comprising the UNDP, UNMIS, UNICEF and UNPA.

The disarmament of DDR candidates was at these initial stages the responsibility of the country's two statutory armies, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA. Demobilization at this point was supported by UNMIS, while UNDP took the lead in supporting reintegration, cooperating closely with other international partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). UNICEF supported the reintegration of children associated with the armed forces and groups. Funding for DDR at the early stages of the implementation of CPA came from a number of sources: the then Government of National Unity (GNU); the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) especially for disarmament; the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations for the demobilization component; and other international donors for the reintegration component<sup>28</sup>. In July 2009, the SSDDRC estimated the

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<sup>24</sup> See IDMC 2009 op. cit., p. 7

<sup>25</sup> See Lacher Wolfram. *South Sudan: International State-Building and its limits*. SWP Research Papers. (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2012). P. 23

<sup>26</sup> See LeBrun Emile. *Failures and opportunities: rethinking DDR in South Sudan*. Geneva: Human Security Baseline Assessment, Small Arms Survey. 17 May, 2011, p.1.

<sup>27</sup> See the CPA 2005, annexe 1, paras 24.2, 24.3)

<sup>28</sup> See GOSS (Government of Southern Sudan) and SSDDRC (Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission). *SSDDRC Strategy Document*. Juba, 2008.

total budget required for the reintegration of the first group of ex-combatants in three areas (Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile), at USD 135 million. International donors allocated USD 53,439,993, which was to cover the costs for approximately 25,365 DDR participants. This left a deficit of USD 87,592,960 for the remaining candidates<sup>29</sup>. The SSDDRC requested additional funding from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund in July 2009, and USD 40 million was released for the first quarter of 2010.<sup>30</sup> With a large clientele, the DDR needed adequate funding to succeed. Another aspect of planning at the outset was that the CPA did not indicate a specific starting date for DDR except in reference to “Special Needs Groups”. Rather, the CPA encouraged parties to allow voluntary disarmament and demobilization of ‘non-essentials’, referring to child soldiers, the elderly and disabled during the first year.<sup>31</sup>

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers did in fact start before 2005 and has been on-going since<sup>32</sup>. It might also be the case that the anticipated progress and momentum since 2005 have been slow. Tracing the efforts from the early stages of the CPA implementation period it is worth noting that the Northern and Southern governments at the time established CPA-mandated DDR institutions to lead the process, including the National DDR Coordination Council, the SSDDRC, and the North Sudan DDR Commission. These institutions then forged new partnerships with the relevant UN agencies such as UNDP, UNMIS, and UNICEF, and developed programme plans and guiding strategies. This to some extent improved the planning aspects of the DDR process. However, action got delayed mainly due to the sensitivity of armed forces procedures and lack of clarity between the roles and responsibilities of the South Sudanese government and the UN.<sup>33</sup>

The process picked considerable momentum in 2009 from the efforts of the more proactive SSDDRC under the leadership of the Honourable William

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<sup>29</sup> See Brethfeld Julie. *Unrealistic expectations: current challenges to reintegration in Southern Sudan*. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey-SAS, 2010). P. 8.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>31</sup> See CPA. 2005, annex I, paragraph. 19.

<sup>32</sup> See SSDDRC & UNICEF. *Quarterly Update of Child DDR in Southern Sudan*, 2009, In. [http://www.unicef.org/sudan/resources\\_5883.html](http://www.unicef.org/sudan/resources_5883.html) as accessed on July 4 2012.

<sup>33</sup> See SAS (Small Arms Survey). *DDR in South Sudan*. Geneva: Human Security Baseline Assessment, HSBA, Small Arms Survey, 2011, Accessed in, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/ddr/HSBA-DDR-in-South-Sudan.pdf>, as accessed on 24 July 2012.

Deng Deng. Using the lessons learnt in the intricacies of DDR, his team helped and has been helping to drive the DDR agenda forward. Paradoxically, the global financial crisis of 2009/2010 also contributed to the sudden progress in DDR implementation. Since Sudan's economy still relies heavily on oil revenues which dropped significantly because of the crisis, the GOSS was eager to cut costs on army and government salaries through demobilization.<sup>34</sup>

According to the CPA, 90,000 soldiers from each of SAF and SPLA were to be demobilized in a phased approach.<sup>35</sup> Towards this end, the National DDR Strategic plan of 2007 proposed at least three phases but did not specify the start or end dates and suggested that the number of phases would depend on a number of factors including the redeployment of forces of SAF and SPLA and also the number of combatants identified during the process as per specified eligibility criteria. Phase I was therefore to involve 30,000 ex-combatants in the Three Areas, administered by the then Government of National Unity, and 34,000 ex-combatants in the South, overseen by the GOSS. In the Three Areas, the process began in February 2009, starting in Southern Blue Nile and moving on to Southern Kordofan. In the South, it started in June 2009 in Central Equatoria, and later in Lakes State<sup>36</sup>. Although both sides seemed committed to completing the first phase at least within the life cycle of the CPA implementation, it was highly unrealistic to expect the full 180,000 soldiers to be processed on time<sup>37</sup>.

The programme initiated by the CPA was conducted by the DDR commissions in conjunction with a DDR unit within the then United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) playing a lead role. The programme was designed to run from 2009 to 2012

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<sup>34</sup> This was noted by officials of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) during interviews with the author on August 2012 in Juba, South Sudan.

<sup>35</sup> See Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and South Sudan Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC). *Multi-donor trust fund: support to re-integration of ex-combatants and special needs groups*. (Juba: GOSS & SSDDRC). July, 2009.

<sup>36</sup> See Stephen, Juma John & Peter Lokale Nakimangole. Southern Sudan Government launches inaugural disarmament and reintegration exercise in Juba. In. Gurtong News. June 11, 2009. This is accessible online through, [http://www.gurtong.org/resourcecentre/weeklyupdates/wu\\_contents.asp?wkupdt\\_id=2971&vswuOrder=sor ter\\_YWCode&vswuDir=ASC](http://www.gurtong.org/resourcecentre/weeklyupdates/wu_contents.asp?wkupdt_id=2971&vswuOrder=sor ter_YWCode&vswuDir=ASC) as accessed on July 11 2012.

<sup>37</sup> See Gebrehiwot, Mulugeta. *The feasibility of disarmament and demobilization in Southern Sudan*. In Human Security Baseline Analysis (HBSA), 2009, <<http://smallarmssurveysudan.org.org/pdfs/HSBA-Sudan-conference-papers.pdf>>

with a budget of 430 USD for North and South together, of which the donors were to supply 385 million dollars<sup>38</sup>.

There were about 35,000 South Sudanese candidates for the first phase concentrating on special needs groups (women, children, old people and invalids) and soldiers demobilising at their own request. By May 2011, it is estimated that only 12,500 had been demobilised and by March only 5,000 had completed their reintegration training.<sup>39</sup> Up to 2012, the DDR process did not appear to have brought any tangible relief to SPLA and the administration in terms of finances and solid progress<sup>40</sup>. Also, some participants had already returned to civilian life several years before DDR started and there are questions on selection processes applied for eligibility to the DDR process. Faced with irregularities in the process and lack of coherent progress, the SPLA, SSDDRC, and the UNDP are known to have traded accusations. In particular, there were fears that donor funds were wasted on non-tangible foreign consultancy activities<sup>41</sup>.

The SPLA/M has been sceptical about the whole DDR programme. There is a feeling that the reintegration measures adopted so far are inadequate to neutralise former combatants with serious potential to cause instability and that there is need for change.<sup>42</sup> In the search for a pivotal role of the armed forces in the next phases, the SPLA and DDR Commission agreed to consider 150,000 combatants including 80,000 SPLA soldiers and 70,000 members of the police, fire brigade and wildlife services<sup>43</sup>. However, the donor community is cautious due to the failure of the previous phase.

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<sup>38</sup> See UNDP and Republic of Sudan. *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project Document*. P.2 In <http://www.sd.undp.org/doc/prodocs/cp4DDR Project.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> See UNDP and SSDDRC, DDR Digest 2. No. 6, 13 May 2011, In, <http://www.ssddrc.org/uploads/publicationDocuments/DDRDigest2011,vol.2,Issue6.pdf>

<sup>40</sup> This situation was noted by a senior official in the Government of South Sudan's Ministry of Interior during an interview with the author in August 2012, Juba, South Sudan.

<sup>41</sup> See Kron Josh. *Peace Hovers in Sudan, But most soldiers stay armed*. (In, The New York Times, 30 December, 2010) accessed in <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/31/world/africa/31sudan.html?pagewanted=all> as accessed on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2012.

<sup>42</sup> See Small Arms Survey (SAS). *Failures and Opportunities: rethinking DDR in Sudan. Sudan Issue Brief 17*. (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2011), p.4

<sup>43</sup> See SSDDRC. 2011. The Insider DDR; your trusted informer. In, <http://www.ssddrc.org/uploads/DDR%20inside/DDR%20inside%-20December%202011-u.pdf>

## 4.5 Complexities of DDR Processes

Juba still considers the risk of renewed conflict with the Khartoum to be high<sup>44</sup>, and has over time built up its own military strength. The numerous internal conflicts weigh even heavier. Even after the integration of the militias from 2006 to 2007, the SPLA has continued to grow most recently by including renegades and parts of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). For example, in early 2011 and after the referendum process, Unity State began recruiting and conscripting 6,000<sup>45</sup> soldiers for the SPLA. Although this case was probably to compensate for the defections to Peter Gadet's SSLA, in such a scenario, only special needs groups can be demobilised, and even then, donor funds released for DDR in general could end up being used on recruitment<sup>46</sup>. In such situations the objectives of the government and the SPLA diverge. The long term focus of DDR is therefore lost with the process becoming a South Sudanese revenue collection avenue for continued military industry growth. It is unrealistic to expect former fighters to enter the private sector on nothing more than a couple of months training and modest material support. The South Sudan economy is also in itself quite nascent and questions of whether it could incubate the many clients of reintegration abound. A majority of the candidates are illiterate and lack any vocational training. The opportunities within an embryonic private sector are next to negligible. The slow and controversial internationally led DDR process in RSS has seen parallel processes emerge and solely executed by the SPLA leadership. For example, the SPLA has recently spearheaded the provision of tractors, land and also financial assistance towards the reintegration effort<sup>47</sup>.

## 4.6 A Critical Analysis of DDR Programme

The initial phase of the DDR process does not appear to have met its objectives. The Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment report on South Sudan noted that the phase had failed and had no discernible

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<sup>44</sup> These are common attributes deducted through different interview responses from official government institutions and offices, including nongovernmental practitioners who still have the 'North vulnerability' factor defining much of their policy decisions.

<sup>45</sup> See Sudan Tribune. *Unity state targets 6,000 new fighters into South Sudan Army*. 15 November, 2011, In, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Unity-state-targets-6,000-new>, 38588.

<sup>46</sup> See Lachar Wolfram, *Op. Cit.*, p. 24

<sup>47</sup> See Small Arms Survey (SAS) *Failures and Opportunities*, *Op. Cit.*, p.8

impact on human security in South Sudan.<sup>48</sup> However, no empirical evidence was adduced. Other critics have been more nuanced. The STHLM Policy Group<sup>49</sup>, for example, in its evaluation of the DDR process in December 2010, concluded that the DDR process was:

*“More of an expensive livelihoods support program for a limited group of people than a relevant contribution to peace and stability in southern Sudan...[and] that the DDR has not been effective in terms of contributing to the reduction of military capability, military expenditure, nor to confidence building measures.”*<sup>50</sup>

Another issue to consider is that the outcome of the DDR process in South Sudan was going to be dependent on multiple actors. Security considerations could also not be ruled out. The South Sudan government was concerned that armed conflicts in the border regions could trigger the possibility of military action from Khartoum.<sup>51</sup> In short, the DDR process was undertaken in an environment of adversity. The STHLM Policy Group further suggested that:

*“The CPA, which is de facto a ceasefire, was an insufficient basis for an actual process of demobilization of active-duty combatants... [and that] there is quite a strong feeling among many of the older SPLA members that the current design of the DDR does not provide them and the people they fought side-by-side with, sufficient support.”*<sup>52</sup>

Given the above, it is apparent that the SPLA, from a military-strategic perspective, might have earmarked its least valuable members for DDR. This group included certain disabled and wounded members, as well as women and children, popularly referred to as the “Special Needs Group”. There were also indications that these individuals were chiefly drawn from militia/armed groups who had previously been integrated into the SPLA but whose loyalty to the latter was unclear as many were not directly benefiting from SPLA

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<sup>48</sup> Small Arms Survey. *Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment: DDR in South Sudan*. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2011) September.

<sup>49</sup> The STHLM Policy Group is a Stockholm based, value-driven consultancy firm specializing in international peace, security and development. Further insights on the group can be accessed in, <http://www.sthlmgroup.se/en> as accessed on 12 August 2012.

<sup>50</sup> See STHLM Policy Group 2010. *South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report*. Stockholm: STHLM Policy Group. 65. 30 December.

<sup>51</sup> Interview with the Deputy Director for security, research analysis and policy formulation, Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control, August 2012, Juba, Central Equatoria State.

<sup>52</sup> See STHML Policy group. 2010. *South Sudan DDR Programme*, Op. Cit.

salary payouts. The SPLA members identified as ‘War Veterans and Wounded Heroes and Heroines’, who were widely respected within the SPLA, were not targeted for DDR. The effectiveness of UN-DDR work was also seemingly undermined by alleged inter-agency rivalries and tensions not only within Juba but also between Juba and Khartoum as well as between UNMIS and UN Headquarters in New York. It is reported that the UN had a tight grip on the financial resources allocated for DDR in South Sudan, which provided UN agencies with considerable leverage in determining the type, content and manner of support provided as well as the organizations and agencies that would be contracted to implement the processes and activities.<sup>53</sup>

The dominant role of the SPLA in the DDR equation, sanctioned by the UN and donor agencies, effectively diluted the ability of the DDR Commission to fulfil its oversight mandate. As the DDR process matured, the Commission increasingly found itself restricted to coordination, donor liaison and public relations roles. Since 2009, the majority of its activities have involved: hosting of information and sensitization workshops; strategy, stakeholder and donor meetings and conferences; research; procedural rather than substantive activities for example presiding over DDR ceremonies; distribution of public education material; and press conferences.<sup>54</sup> Relations between the Commission and the SPLA, as well as between the UN and the Commission were consequently strained on different occasions.<sup>55</sup> For example, indifference of the SSDDRC and UNDP over the management of the DDR process, and the manner in which financial resources were allocated was widely reported in the Sudanese print and electronic media. Transparency concerns were also mentioned.<sup>56</sup> Consistent with these concerns, officials at the SSDDRC were of the view that a number of donor agencies that have in the past provided financial support to the demilitarization process were at times inconsistent in terms of prioritizing

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<sup>53</sup> Interviews with officials of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC), and also corroborated through observed analysis of donor led DDR processes within the different SPLA Transformation initiatives. August 2012.

<sup>54</sup> See different activities in, South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, DDR digest, Vol.1, Issues 1-4 and vol.2, Issues 1-12.

<sup>55</sup> Interviews with Deputy Directors at the South Sudan Bureau on Community Security and Arms Control, August 2012.

<sup>56</sup> On DDR funds, transparency on disbursing the same and management of the process, see, article in, Sudan Tribune. ‘*Sudan threatens UN over auditing report on DDR funds*’, 28 December 2010, accessible in, <http://www.sudantribune.com/sudan-threatens-UN-over-auditing,37429>. As accessed on 24 July 2012.



DDR support<sup>57</sup>. It was noted by the Chairman of the SSDDRC that the reintegration process to date, is a prelude to a far more substantial DDR process, which is Phase Two. The objective of the second DDR phase is to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate 80,000 active SPLA/South Sudan Armed Force (SSAF) in addition to 70,000 former SPLA personnel that were absorbed into the South Sudan Police, Wildlife and Prison Services and Fire Brigade from 2005. Therefore the total number of individuals that are targeted phase two of DDR is 150,000<sup>58</sup>.

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<sup>57</sup> Interviews with the Chairman, SSDDRC and his Deputy, August 2012.

<sup>58</sup> Interview with the Chairman of the SSDDRC, August 2012, and also corroborated in GOSS. 2011. *Policy paper on demobilization, disarmament and reintegration*. Juba: South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. 23 September.

## 5.0 Local Economies, Livelihood Security and Reintegration

Can the South Sudan local economy (economies) sustain reintegration processes? This is the determining factor in the success of reintegration efforts in a post-war economy. From an economic development perspective, the South Sudan Development Plan, 2011, notes that there are significant constraints to development which have a bearing on post-conflict reconstruction processes like reintegration of large numbers of returnees, ex-combatants and internally displaced persons<sup>59</sup>.

The oil sector is critical as a source of public revenue and foreign exchange earnings, but it contributes little direct employment and production has been predicted to decline in the near future unless new discoveries are made. The dangers of over-reliance on the oil sector became evident between 2011 and 2012 when there was an impasse in oil production related due to border disputes between the North and South. The RSS was forced to adopt austerity measures that hurt virtually all sectors of the economy<sup>60</sup>. Diversification of incomes is therefore essential to achieve sustainable economic development and livelihoods for the broader population; provide opportunities for women and youth; create opportunities for returnees and former combatants; and produce basic goods for consumption<sup>61</sup>.

The South Sudan Development Plan suggests that developing the country's agricultural and livestock potential is the most feasible way to enable broad-based economic growth and food security in the short and medium terms. However, much rural sector activity is currently focused on low-input low-output subsistence agriculture instead of production for markets. Key areas of improvement identified by the plan include the need for improved agricultural inputs and techniques such as seeds and fertilizers, storage facilities and advisory services. Others are irrigation development, access to

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<sup>59</sup> See Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GOSS). South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all. (Juba: GOSS, 2011). August. P. 70.

<sup>60</sup> Interview with the Vice-Chair of the Abyei Border Commission, CEO of Kush-Inc and former Minister of Cabinet Affairs, RSS, at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and Rift Valley Institute sponsored International Conference on South Sudan boundary aspects and their effect on Security, Holiday Inn, Nairobi, April 2012.

<sup>61</sup> See GOSS. 2011. South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013, op. cit., p.70

markets; and transportation infrastructure. The punitive taxes and charges including bribes need to be removed. To achieve food security, crop and livestock pests and diseases will need to be controlled; public goods such as water and electricity provided, and research and extension services. Others are establishment of farmer or producer associations so as to ease market entry, raise farm-gate prices, minimize input costs and access credit at affordable rates and influencing farm-gate prices; and issues pertaining to property rights and access to land<sup>62</sup>.

Moreover, the rural agricultural sector will need to absorb high numbers of returnees and ex-combatants and provide opportunities for women and youth. This will be a significant challenge as people who are not settled may be reluctant to make investments and to cultivate land. Constraints on access to land and unclear property rights are likely to be a key impediment to these groups. Existing inequalities between men and women such as in control of resources, access to land and credit, extension services and basic education, need to be removed.<sup>63</sup> General insecurity and basic services will have to be provided.<sup>64</sup> Corruption, multiple taxation and administrative fees all affect reintegration and need to be addressed.<sup>65</sup>

The World Bank conducted a study between 2010 and 2011 looking into the nature and complexities of doing business in Juba. The study revealed that the poor infrastructure results in extremely high transport costs. Parts of South Sudan are cut off at certain times of the year due to poor roads. There is a lot of room for progress not only with the expansion of the roads network, but also river transportation. The unpredictable closing down of major roads due to insecurity imposes huge costs on traders, especially with respect to perishable agricultural products. Insecurity is a stumbling block for investment in general as it generates uncertainty and increased costs. Further, insecurity inhibits investment in agricultural infrastructure like irrigation schemes that are needed to upscale production and increase efficiency. This challenge in effect is felt more by vulnerable populations and more specifically the reintegration clients<sup>66</sup>.

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid. p 70.

<sup>63</sup> Interview with the Attorney General/ Head of Legal Administration, Eastern Equatoria State (EES), August 2012.

<sup>64</sup> See The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. *Doing Business in Juba*. (Washington DC: World Bank, 2011). Pp 35-36

<sup>65</sup> See Lamb Guy. 2012. Re-integration of ex-combatants and informal economies, op. cit., p 54

<sup>66</sup> See The IBRD/ The World Bank. 2011. *Doing Business in Juba*, op. cit., p 35.

It is also cited that inadequate electricity provision will become a serious constraint as the economy develops. The need for reliable power will be an important input to the agricultural value-chain, for example as an important component in agro-processing operations and by allowing for better storage of produce in urban centres, and possibly also as an input to irrigation<sup>67</sup>. The enforcement of existing laws to underpin good governance and transparency remains a significant challenge. A clear well-functioning regulatory framework will be essential if the market is to work efficiently with enhanced predictability and lessened risks, in turn creating an environment where the private sector has confidence to investment. This will be especially important for ensuring freedom of entry, for avoiding monopolies, and for reducing the cost of doing business in South Sudan.

A study by the GOSS National Bureau of Statistics analysing economic costs of check points on major trade routes in South Sudan reveals that in urban areas, young men and women entrepreneurs often face barriers in accessing land, credit, business skills and know-how and in gaining access to markets. It asserts that business support programmes should address these constraints in a comprehensive manner and by providing potential enterprises with access to supportive hubs and incubators through the provision of shared workspaces, value chains and pooling arrangements<sup>68</sup>. Linked to the above, the issue of multiple taxation and/or administrative fees is evident. The many official and unofficial road checkpoints collecting taxes, fees and charges are a big disincentive to those trying to get their produce to market. So are instances of double and multiple taxation of the same item. By increasing the cost of getting goods to the market, they inhibit investment and renewed growth<sup>69</sup>. The study also reveals that corruption can exacerbate other constraints to economic development. It can take various forms, such as unofficial fees or charges, inconsistent implementation of actual regulations or inconsistent application of the rule of law. Combating corruption that adversely affects business is part of the overall effort to fight corruption and will be important to encourage investment and growth<sup>70</sup>.

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Government of South Sudan, National Bureau of Statistics. *South Sudan cost-to-market report: an analysis of check points on the major trade routes in South Sudan*. (Juba: National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). August. Pp 7-9

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. pp. 9-14.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. p 20.

Inadequate access to finance is a problem across the whole of South Sudan. There is a relatively small number of financial institutions offering services to individuals and businesses. The major constraints to expanded private-sector provision of financial services are: insecurity; and the need for better contract enforcement which is part of the broader legal and regulatory framework. As land is commonly one of the principle means for offering collateral, it depends on clear land titling and contract enforceability, which itself is currently affected by issues regarding the clarity of land tenure and property rights<sup>71</sup>. Resolution of these constraints will be important for banks to expand lending and business in South Sudan.

Meanwhile, alternative financial services that are less dependent on land title deposits as collateral for loans should also be explored<sup>72</sup>. Returnees, ex-combatants and other vulnerable individuals like women and youth are too easily excluded when the financial services sector overly focuses on commercial banking and property titles. Work on reducing the costs of doing business has shown that there are innovative ways of providing a range of inclusive financial products and services that meet the needs of women, youth, small traders, producers, family farms and reintegration clients<sup>73</sup>. These are the complex economic and development oriented factors that pose a challenge to reintegration support processes in South Sudan.

## 5.1 Reintegration and the Economy

A commissioned study by the World Bank, African Development Bank and Southern Sudan DDR Commission revealed that most of the clients of the DDR viewed themselves as unemployed<sup>74</sup>. This assertion further puts to task the DDR processes and their effectiveness in The Republic of South Sudan. However, the study reveals that there were positive developments. There was the prevailing view among the majority of former combatants that

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<sup>71</sup> See Shanmugaratnam. N. *Post-war development and the land question in South Sudan*. ( Aas: Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2008) Accessible in, [http://www.umb.no/statisk/noragric/publications/shan\\_lectures/shan\\_southsudan\\_landquestion.pdf](http://www.umb.no/statisk/noragric/publications/shan_lectures/shan_southsudan_landquestion.pdf), as accessed on 26 July 2012. Pp 1-12.

<sup>72</sup> Interview with Attorney General of Eastern Equatoria State, August 2012, Torit

<sup>73</sup> See GOSS. 2011. South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013, op. cit., p.71

<sup>74</sup> See World Bank, African Development Bank and South Sudan Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants in Southern Sudan: socio-economic study of communities of return*. August. 2010.

employment was synonymous with receiving a monthly salary or wage. This was reinforced in two ways. Firstly, following the CPA, SPLA members were provided with salaries and other benefits, although these were not regular. Over the past five years for example, the salaries of the lowest ranking SPLA members have ranged between US\$ 300 and US\$ 500 per month<sup>75</sup>. Another aspect is that certain government officials and senior SPLA officers, while considering the DDR process, were more focused on the benefits that would be provided to demobilized SPLA members.<sup>76</sup> Many were left with the impression that lucrative employment (and other remuneration) would await those who were demobilized. Nonetheless, formal sector employment is extremely limited even in government ministries and agencies. Such employment generally requires individuals to be literate, and conversant with English. These are skills that the vast majority of rank-and-file ex-combatants and special needs groups and individuals do not possess, due to decades of war, and a dysfunctional and largely ineffective education system<sup>77</sup>.

However, significant numbers of Special Needs Groups and ex-combatants have been enabled to pursue civilian livelihoods in post-war South Sudan. The greatest successes are cited as those in small informal businesses in urban areas, as well as in subsistence agriculture, predominantly in rural areas. On the other hand, it is also argued that even though many ex-combatants have been able to pursue civilian livelihoods, this had been achieved prior to reintegration support being provided. A 2011 report by Small Arms Survey questioned the design and rationale of the South Sudan DDR process.<sup>78</sup> Some DDR implementing partners such as GIZ had these dynamics prioritized in their policy considerations and sought, where possible, use of reintegration support to enhance the livelihood undertakings of former combatants. The GIZ reported in June 2011 that most of the

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<sup>75</sup> See Jon Bennett et al. Appendix 5, Aiding the peace, a multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peace building activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010, Final report, (London: ITAD Ltd, 2010) December.

<sup>76</sup> Interviews with Reverend Mark Aketch Chien-Acting Secretary General of the South Sudan Council of Churches and Hon William Deng Deng-Chairman of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and his Vice Chairman, August 2012, Juba.

<sup>77</sup> On the illiteracy and related concerns in South Sudan-connected to political decision making and peace in South Sudan see, Heleta Savo and Mwanika A Njuguna Philip. *Countdown to South Sudan elections; dynamics and challenges*. ISS Today Opinion Piece, 2010, accessible at the publications link, [www.issafrica.org](http://www.issafrica.org). as accessed on 29 July 2012.

<sup>78</sup> See Lydia Stone. *Failures and Opportunities; Rethinking DDR in South Sudan*, Sudan Issue Brief, No.17. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2011). May. Pp 5-7

beneficiaries that underwent GIZ-sponsored training were self-employed. Most of the self-employed DDR beneficiaries were involved in informal micro and small businesses such as selling fruit, bread, soft drinks, and managing restaurants/cafes. In addition, a highly successful fishing cooperative, which operated throughout the entire value chain, had been established. These successes appeared to be as a result of: prior pre-action analysis that had been carried out in the areas where GIZ support was being offered; appropriately targeted training (small business, vocational activities and agriculture); a comprehensive selection process of beneficiaries; and regular monitoring and evaluation.<sup>79</sup>

Interviews in Torit town with some special needs groups' respondents who had been beneficiaries of reintegration support revealed that the training support had assisted them in either becoming self-employed or finding employment in the informal sector<sup>80</sup>. Some beneficiaries had even been able to establish multiple small businesses. In some cases, ex-combatants have expanded their small businesses to include other ex-combatants; special needs group individuals or family members. It is also reported that a good number of ex-combatants remit a significant portion of their income to their families, including spouses and children, most of who live in rural areas. Some of the beneficiaries of vocational training support have been reported as having worked within the large UN system and presence in South Sudan on short-term contracts ranging from six to eight months as carpenters, plumbers, electricians and welders. These individuals earned between Southern Sudanese pounds 40 and 60 pounds per day.<sup>81</sup>

In relation to reintegration of clients in the rural areas, the efforts of the Food and Agricultural Organizations (FAO) towards the same shed some light on the extent of reintegration support. In the rural areas, ex-combatants and special needs groups' individuals primarily resorted to subsistence agriculture and livestock rearing. The FAO, as well as other implementing partners, provided considerable reintegration support in this regard. The FAO provided training to a good number of beneficiaries in the following enterprises: field crop production; vegetable growing; ox-ploughing; poultry;

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<sup>79</sup> See Leben Nelson Moro et al. Market Survey: economic opportunities for de-mobilized ex-combatants in Juba. Juba: GIZ. August. 2010.

<sup>80</sup> Interviews with returnee women in Torit who have settled down and formed a Women Group across Eastern Equatoria State-included interviews with the Secretary General of the Women Association of Eastern Equatoria State, the Deputy Secretary General in charge of finance and another member of the association. They were beneficiaries of reintegration support.

<sup>81</sup> See Leben Nelson Moro. 2010. *Failures and Opportunities*. op. cit.

bee keeping; fisheries; and small ruminants (goats) rearing. Beneficiaries were encouraged to train in multiple enterprises in order to have the option of diversified livelihood support. The most popular were: ox ploughing; field crop production; and small ruminants management. The livestock options were particularly popular due to the high cultural value attributed to these animals (particularly cattle).<sup>82</sup> FAO has undertaken follow-up visits with a good number of beneficiaries, and indicated that there had been mixed results in terms of achieving sustainable reintegration. Some beneficiaries had improved their standards of living by using the training and material support provided by FAO and other organizations. Others had been less successful. The key determinants of success were previous experience/skills with agriculture and livestock, and natural inclination towards entrepreneurship.<sup>83</sup>

## 5.2 Reintegration and Reconstruction: A Community View

An important component of reintegration is social and livelihood reintegration. As cited earlier in this paper, the World Bank, African Development Bank and Southern Sudan DDR Commission undertook a socio-economic study of the returnees. The study reveals that more community leaders and individuals perceived the engagement of DDR participants in community affairs as normal, rather than low or non-existent.<sup>84</sup> Another aspect of social reintegration is reconciliation especially within a post-war environment. The trauma arising out of war and the atrocities meted out to members of the community is a psycho-social concern that is handled by reconciliation and transitional justice mechanisms at the community level. This allows for progressive social reintegration of this sensitive group of returnees. In terms of returnees in general, and with the high numbers of South Sudanese streaming into the new republic, it is expected that communities might feel vulnerable to the exponential growth of the additional population which is placed in areas already facing a myriad of economic and livelihood challenges. The role of community re-integration at this point becomes an important medium through which societal acceptance is provided to returnees. Given the still largely traditional modes

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<sup>82</sup> See Lamb Guy. Reintegration of ex-combatants and informal economies. 2012, op. cit., p 61

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p 61.

<sup>84</sup> See World Bank, ADB and SSDDRC. *Socio-economic study of communities of return*. 2010, op. cit.



of societal relations, the DDR comes as a handy complement to the pre-existing community dispute resolution mechanisms.<sup>85</sup> Reintegration will also ease reconstruction as returnees get accepted back to their communities and this will in turn facilitate nation-building through justice and reconciliation.

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<sup>85</sup> Pantuliano, Sara, Margi Buchanan-Smith, Paul Murphy and Irina Mosel. 2008. *The long road home: opportunities and obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and Refugees to Southern Sudan and the three areas*. London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, p. 21.

## 6.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

In South Sudan, reintegration of former combatants is a strategic issue. The importance and significance of Other Armed Groups and of the potential for violence make reintegration a key factor for stability and development. The shift from an independence struggle to domestic and tribal feuds tends to perpetuate violence and to prevent durable and sustainable development. Absence of a solid social and economic base tends to make violence the most attractive way to survive and develop a livelihood. When addressing the “DDR” concept, one has to acknowledge that Disarmament and Demobilization happens on a different timescale than the Reintegration dynamics. In other recent conflicts – such as Kosovo or Libya – the rather short life of the hostilities combined with the existence of an economic base made the redirection of fighters into more peaceful activities rather smooth. The presence of infrastructure, know-how, and skilled personnel made the transition from wartime to peacetime seamless. In South Sudan, after more than twenty years of war, with almost no infrastructure, no real productive industry and one generation of children, who did not receive a formal education, the transition to peacetime sounds like an impossible task in the short run.

The fundamental question then is how to reintegrate former combatants in an economy that does not exist? The additional challenge is that combatants who are – or were – in some armed groups and do not have other skills than weaponry could probably be reintegrated – at least temporarily – into security forces. But, in South Sudan, because of budgetary constraints – and pressure from the international community – the security system is in a downsizing process. In other words, not only does the current status of the economy not allow a smooth reintegration, but the only feasible option in the short term is hampered by financial issues. The disarmament and demobilization of former combatants is a shorter process than the reintegration that requires the existence of a stable economic framework. In countries like South Sudan – but Somalia will face a similar problem – where the economy and the workforce has been destroyed by decades of war, reconstruction is a mid- to long-term issue that should start even before the peace process, in order to be ready to receive former combatants. This “time conundrum” is a specific challenge in situations like in Sudan, where the reintegration process is linked with a defined event (peace agreement). It is less a problem in areas where DDR programmes run within a working economy. Other regional experiences such as in Uganda and in DRC, which have undergone or are undergoing post-war recovery, reconstruction and

reintegration programmes may provide a good point of reference in terms of ‘proven’ practices but may not apply to the South Sudan case.

A key aspect of South Sudan post-conflict recovery phase is the simultaneous ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ processes. Though distinct, the two concepts have to be addressed simultaneously and interactively: the build-up of institutions must go hand-in-hand with the creation of a sense of national unity. It is a challenge in the sense that despite decades of fratricide conflicts, all communities have to understand that nation-building requires balanced investments and priorities that have to go beyond local communities’ interests. In other words, the development of the country may not provide immediate and tangible results at community level. Therefore, involving communities is of particular importance in Southern Sudanese society, in which nearly everybody—whether civilian or military—struggles with basic economic needs. Reconciliation has so far been limited to conflicts between communities, as part of local peace processes. With ex-combatants returning to their communities, this need will have to be addressed more systematically at both the inter- and intra-community levels. However complex and challenging the situation in Southern Sudan appears, realistic and pragmatic reintegration is an important and necessary part of the peace consolidation process. It also has a direct development effect on post-war or post conflict reconstruction. Therefore peace-security dividends have to be weighed against existing and well planned development initiatives of post-war building if reintegration is to be realized in South Sudan. It is therefore essential for government institutions, communities, as well as implementing organizations, the UN, and donors, to stay engaged, take heed of the complexities, and recognize the need for lean, efficient, and effective coordination and cooperation.

The emergence and the development of South Sudan already belong to History. The shortcomings of post-conflict reconstruction are apparent and require serious attention in a spirit of “damage limitation”. In the East African region, Somalia might be the next country to experience similar complex problems, and although the Somali context is significantly different from South Sudan some lessons can be drawn in terms of timing and process management. The importance of creating favourable conditions to the reintegration of future demobilized combatants at the very early stages of the peace process appears as a “must do”. In the same vein, the “frenzy” of the international community to demobilize combatants must also be questioned. Keeping combatant in some kind of institutional framework that can be used as a base to create skills that could be useful for the post-war country might be a viable solution, even if it may lead to a temporarily over-bloated

security system. In the absence of matching timelines for reconstruction and demobilisation of former combatants, the key problem remains to keep control over violence. The cost of maintaining a structure outside the normal security apparatus in order to educate its members, versus the risk of having disgruntled demobilized combatant that resort to violence to survive must be carefully weighted. The situation in Eastern Congo illustrates the complexity of this dilemma. But in any case, any initiative will fail if not part of a comprehensive plan to address the reduction of violence.

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## **The Paper**

The challenge of reintegrating or integrating different members of the South Sudanese society within a still nascent economy development space is a herculean task. The paper argues that reintegration must fit into more comprehensive social and economic development systems and processes. With ex-combatants returning to their communities, reconciliation should be addressed more systematically at both the inter-communal and intra-community levels. However complex and challenging the situation in Southern Sudan appears, realistic and pragmatic reintegration is an important and necessary part of the post conflict reconstruction or development architecture.

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