Geography

Location
Carana is located on the east coast of the 8\textsuperscript{th} Continent between the 8\textsuperscript{th} and 10\textsuperscript{th} latitudes. The total area of Carana is 120 000 sq km with 300 km coastline. Carana has land boundaries of 1500 km with its neighbouring countries.

Topography
Carana is topographically divided into two major areas; the plains in the eastern and central parts of the country and the highlands in the West and Southwest areas. In general terms, the terrain in Carana increases in elevation from East to West from sea level to a height of 1200 m.

The undulation is mostly flat and smooth with insignificant areas of rocky, steep terrain.

The terrain along the coastline is flat with no cliffs or rocks. The water is calm with only a few areas suitable for deep-water ships.

Hydrography
The three main rivers in Carana, the Kalesi, Mogave and Torongo, flow from the western highlands in an easterly direction and discharge in the ocean. The Kalesi River discharges in a large delta with surrounding swamp lands. Though all major rivers are in principle navigable, the Torongo is the only waterway used for transportation. Two dams along the Kalesi and Mogave are used to produce electricity. Carana has no large natural lakes.

Climate and Weather
The climate in Carana is hot and humid. Close to the equator, Carana has no distinct winter and summer. The average daily temperature during the dry season is 36 degrees C; the average nightly temperature is 22 degrees C. The rainy season runs from early October to December with an average precipitation rate of 250 mm a month.

Vegetation
Carana was originally completely covered by jungle and dense bush land. Over the last century, the central and eastern areas have been cleared and cultivated, being used for agricultural purposes. Even though the soil in Carana is fertile, the intensive use of the land as pasture has left large areas barren and useless for agricultural purposes.

Approximately 20 % of the total area is currently in use for growing grain, millet, vegetables and fruit. The west and south of the country is still covered by jungle and dense bush land. Small areas in the jungle are used for agricultural purposes.

Natural Resources
Carana is rich in natural resources, which are not equally dispersed throughout the country. In the jungle covered mountains of the west, rare wood and timber are the main natural resources. Diamonds are found along the Kalesi River in the provinces of Mahbek and Barin. Copper is mined in the highlands west of Mia. Coal is mined in the province of Hanno.

The soil in Carana is naturally fertile. The rivers and coastal waters are rich in fish.

Population

General Facts

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>14 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Distribution</td>
<td>&lt;15: 44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 to 18: 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 to 60: 39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;60: 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>5.1 children per woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
<td>1.06 females/male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td>9.1 deaths per 100 live births</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>Total population: 45.3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male: 42.1 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 47.9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>In Carana there are more than 20 original languages or tribal dialects spoken. The official and administrative language is French.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic Distribution

The population of Carana consists of more than 15 ethnic groups. Most of these groups are small in number and socially and politically irrelevant. The three major ethnic groups, the Falin, Kori and Tatsi represent 90 percent of the population. The Kori (38%) live in the west and are the dominant ethnic group in the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. The Falin (49%) are the ethnic majority in the country and live in the east and centre of Carana. The Tatsi (13%) live in the south.

The political boundaries result from the colonial time and do not represent the ethnic distribution in the region. The Falin make up 10% of the population of Sumora, the Kori make up 38% of the population of Katasi and the Tatsi make 45% of the population of Rimosa.

History
Colonial Period
The State of Carana was founded in 1904 as an Italian colony. After a period of colonial wars, the Italians were defeated by French troops, and in 1919, Carana became a French colony. Since the French administration focused on the exploitation of the natural resources and accepted the tribal structure in the country, as well as the role of local authority, the period between 1919 and 1951 was relatively calm and peaceful. The following period from 1951 to 1955 was characterised by rapidly evolving civil unrest based on the increasingly popular movement for national liberation. From 1952, unrest and riots were frequent and developed into more organised actions and violence against the colonial power. In 1954, the French lost control of most of the country outside the capital and the main coastal cities. To retain a minimum level of control, the French were forced to agree to certain forms of cooperation and to an autonomous State of Carana.

In 1955, the legal status of Carana changed from a French colony to a republic of the French community. In 1962, Carana gained independence. As a result of a long period of French colonial rule, a strong French influence on nearly all-cultural, social and economic aspects of the country is still visible, and in some areas dominate. Important parts of the infrastructure, particularly the railway and road systems were built during the French colonial period and have not been improved until now. The architecture of the political/administrative system in Carana also reflects the strong French influence imposed over recent decades.

Post Colonial Developments
After the liberation of Carana, Joseph Uroma (the leader of the largest of the liberation movements and with a power base derived from the backing of the Falin majority in the east of the country) came to power and immediately tried to cut all ties with France. He attempted to establish a communist system with the assistance of Russia and Cuba. With significant economic and military support, he successfully established his regime and suppressed all other liberation movement parties and opposition groups. During the first years of his governance, Uroma received broad public support and enhanced powers. As a result of the deteriorating economic situation and the inability of the Uroma regime to establish effective governmental functions, public support declined and opposition to his leadership increased. In 1971, Uroma was expelled from power and killed. Christian Hakutu, the former Chief of the Falin dominated Army, replaced him. Hakutu re-established the links with France and promised massive social and economic reform. Even though he received intensive support from western countries, Hakutu was unable to solve the economic problems and stabilise the country. In 1975, Hakutu was removed from power by a coup and replaced by a military junta under Colonel Tarakoni, also Falin. The military government of Tarakoni was also unable to solve the economic and humanitarian issues but was quite successful in maintaining public order in the country.

In 1983, the economic situation had deteriorated to such a degree that only a massive injection of international aid could prevent the country from falling in to a humanitarian crisis. During the crisis opposition groups evolved and challenges to the Tarakoni regime became more frequent. After years of instability, and under
international pressure free elections were conducted (observed by UN electoral
delegates) in 1986.

The PDC (Parti Democratique de Carana) won the elections and Jackson Ogavo
(PDC leader) became the first elected president of Carana. Initially the
government was reasonably representative of the ethnic balance of the country,
although still dominated by the Falin, and it followed democratic principles that
were later enshrined in the 1991 constitution. During the early years some
economic and social reforms were realised but over time, Ogavo’s focus changed
and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and
enhancing his own power base. Since 1995 he has expanded the influence of the
central government on all economic and social activities by laws and
administrative rules. The replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government
ministers with members of Ogavo’s Falin tribe led to an increasingly repressive
approach, administrative and economic inefficiency and corruption.

Since 1998, the previously developing economy has been in decline and regional
humanitarian crises occur on a regular basis.

**Current Situation**

As a result of the economic situation and the discrimination of Kori and Tatsi by
the government, political opposition groups and rebel movements evolved in the
late 1990s. The government suppressed most of these groups, resorting to the
military and gendarmerie to suppress any attempt to challenge Ogavo’s regime.

In 2000 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and
better organised rebel groups known as MPC (Movement Patriotique de Carana)
and formed a well structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC achieved
some local success in the west over the Carana Defence Force (CDF), gaining
increasing support from the local population in the west of the country; in 2005 this culminated in the CDF losing control of significant parts of the western highlands. Though the MPC’s military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels lacked a coherent political policy and failed to capitalise on their success; their only stated objective was to remove Ogavo from power.

Low level but frequent MPC operations in the west increasingly tied down the CDF, leaving it with little real capability in the south of the country in Leppko province, and creating an opportunity for elements of the Tatsi minority to attack government institutions. Initially this amounted to little more than a few localised incidents but it quickly escalated into general looting followed by particularly brutal reprisals against ethnic Falin. Realising that the government could do little against them, a number of these small rebel groups united and called themselves ICSC (Independent Combattants du Sud Carana).

**Relations with Neighbouring Countries**

The relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good. Even though the Falin make up only 10% of the population of Sumora they are strong politically. In the recent past, the government of Sumora has tended to support the position of President Ogavo.

The relations between Carana and Katasi are strained. Carana accused Katasi several times of supporting the MPC rebels with money, weapons and fighters; these allegations were not without foundation and have been corroborated by reports from a number international organisations, although the scale of support remains unclear. Nonetheless it is sufficient to ensure that Carana lays the blame for its inability to deal with the MPC at Katasi’s door.

The relations between Carana and Rimosa are neutral. There is, however, a perennial civil conflict in Rimosa. Rimosa has been in the grips of a civil war between two rival ethnic groups, the majority Pleionians, who hold nearly all positions of power in the Rimosan government, and the minority Elassonians, who claim that they suffer discrimination and persecution. Most of the interethnic fighting in Rimosa has taken place in northern Rimosa, near the border of Carana. There, a shadowy rebel army calling itself the Elassasonian Liberation Front (ELF) has waged a guerrilla-style campaign against government forces and pro-government Pleionian militias. The ELF is said to have links with the ICSC in Carana.

Carana, and the other countries of the 8th Continent, identify closely with their neighbours in Africa and all are members of an expanded African Union. Since early 2006 the AU has attempted to mediate between the groups in Carana and
in February of that year it did succeed in bringing the main groups to the negotiating table, aided by MPC attempts to establish greater political credibility. Unfortunately the opportunity for peace slipped away as harder line elements of the MPC, frustrated at the slow progress of the talks, broke away and aligned themselves more closely with the ICSC, and were subsequently implicated in atrocities committed against the Falin civilian population. Efforts continue to revive the talks.

Political System

Government

Carana is governed under a constitution adopted by public referendum in 1991. It is a presidential republic with a president as head of state, elected for a five-year term. The head of the government is the Prime Minister who is appointed by the President. The Prime Minister appoints the ministers and heads of the government departments.

A Parliament with 256 elected members has broad authority and was intended to be representative of the ethnic balance of the country.

Although the constitution supports a democratic political system President Ogavo has gradually suppressed any effective opposition and since about 1996 Carana has effectively been a one party state. Today the only legal political party is the PDC (Parti Democratique de Carana). All members of parliament are members of the PDC or have close ties to the PDC.

Administration

Carana is administratively divided into eight provinces. The Capital is Galasi. The Province Capitals are Galasi, Maroni, Sureen, Alur, Faron, Folsa, Amsan and Corma.

The President appoints the governors who are the administrative heads of the provinces, and report directly to the President. The administrative system of Carana is a centre-orientated administration. The central government controls most governmental issues.
The provinces are divided into a number of districts. The political and administrative role of these districts is not defined in the constitution. Most district boundaries were established by the French colonial administration. Side by side with the formal administrative structure, there exists a traditional system built around chiefdoms. A chief governs each chiefdom. Chiefs exercise considerable de-facto authority, particularly in rural areas, and preside over traditional courts applying unwritten customary legal codes, which vary across ethnic and religious groups.

Judicial System
Carana’s judicial system is based around a supreme court, provincial courts and district courts. All politically sensitive cases are the responsibility of the Supreme Court or the provincial court. The government appoints judges in these courts. Governors appoint judges to the District Courts. Government control over the district courts varies, depending on the region. In some regions, local traditional authorities have considerable influence over the district courts.

Under the constitution, the judicial system is designed to counter the political weight of the government. However, as a result of the judiciary’s politicisation under the one party system, its independence is highly questionable. In addition, the judiciary sector has for years lacked institutional capacity and resources and suffered from limited territorial coverage and endemic corruption. Basic administrative tools are missing, and, as a result, the case management flow does not work properly and response times for cases are extremely long. Salaries of judicial staff often are unpaid for months, leading to absenteeism and graft. Legislation remains outdated and often discriminatory against women and other vulnerable groups. There is no functioning juvenile justice system, and no public defence counsel service. The legal education system, centred on the University of Galasi Law School, has come to a standstill.

Media
There are approximately 20 daily newspapers, 2 radio stations and 2 television channels in the country. The radio stations are operated by state cooperatives while most newspapers are privately owned. Two newspapers are government owned and the Catholic Church publishes another. Additionally there are some low power, community radio stations and locally printed media with local and very limited distribution.

In principle, the Ministry of Information controls all media. The censorship is very limited in the case of the small, local media but nearly absolute in the case of the official radio stations and main newspapers.

Economy

Economic System
The economy in Carana is based on a free market system with free enterprise but with strong government participation and influence. The government controls the mining sector and all foreign trade activity; however, rebels control some principle diamond mining areas.

**Basic Economic Data (of 2005)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>9.3 $ billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>520 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP composition by sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919 to 2001: average 3% per year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002: -4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003: -2.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004: -2.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005: -6.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>Total: N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In urban areas more than 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFr (Carana Franc)</td>
<td>100 CFr = 1.5 $</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Banking and Monetary Economy**

The Central Bank of Carana is responsible for the national currency reserve, the international currency exchange and all government monetary transactions.

Constitutionally the Central Bank is responsible for the currency value and economic growth. In reality, the Central Bank is more a government institution than an instrument for economic growth and stability.

The government owned BEC (Banque Economique de Carana) is the only monetary institution operating on a countrywide basis. The BEC is represented in all provincial capitals and some of the larger towns.

Some private international banks have branches in the capital.

**Mining**

The mining of diamonds and copper is an important contributor to the GDP. Along with rare wood, timber and cotton, diamonds and copper are the main export of Carana. Coal is mostly used in the country for production of electricity.

Prior to 1996, the mining industry was controlled by private enterprise but since then the government has progressively taken control of the industry.

**Manufacturing**

Manufacturing contributes 16% to the GDP. The main activities in this sector are the food and fish industries, production of goods for local markets, and the processing of timber and textiles. The manufacturing sector suffers from a lack of
infrastructure, skilled workers and an inefficient administration. Widespread corruption is an additional burden for the development of this sector.

**Agriculture**
Approximately 31% of the total land area of Carana is used for agricultural purposes. The goods produced include fruits, corn, and grain. This produce is sold mostly on the local market.

Cotton is the only significant agricultural commodity that is exported.

Most of the agricultural land exists as small farm lots and are owned by the local population. Cotton is the only commodity produced on large farms using employed labour.

**Foreign Trade**
Carana’s main exports are timber, diamonds, copper, cotton and to a lesser extent fish, fruit and woodcrafts. Carana’s main imports are industrial products, vehicles, food, and petroleum products.

Carana has established trade relations with its neighbours, and with France. Until 1996, Carana had a positive trade balance.

**Infrastructure**

**Roads**
Carana had a well-developed road network, capable of supporting commercial traffic, with practically all major towns connected. However, the years of civil war, harsh weather, minimal investment and maintenance have degraded it significantly with the result that the going varies considerably from region to region, with bridges being a particular problem in some places.

As well as the paved roads, there is an intricate network of unpaved roads and tracks. The bridges throughout this network are generally wooden construction and are rarely capable of sustaining heavy vehicle movement.

**Railroads**
Carana has two railroad tracks with a total length of 280 km. The entire track system and loading facilities were built during the French colonial period. One track connects Galasi with the coal mining area east of Sureen. The second track connects Maldosa and Mia, and was built to transport copper to the harbour in Turen. A lack of maintenance has resulted in the rail system being in bad shape, although it is still operational.

**Harbours**
Carana has three deep-water harbours with varying capacities. The harbour at Galasi is the most developed and best-equipped harbour in the country, with a RoRo capability and working cranes.

The harbour in Cereni does not have a RoRo capability but is equipped with loading systems for containers for heavy goods.

The harbour in Maldosa was originally built for the loading of copper. It has railroad access but limited facilities for loading containers and heavy equipment.

**Airports**
Carana has two international airports in Galesi and Corma. Both airports are operational, capable of taking wide bodied aircraft, and used by international airlines. However their cargo handling capacity is limited.

Additionally there are 25 airfields around the country. Not all of these airfields have paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airfield varies considerably.

**Electricity**
Carana could be relatively self sufficient in the production of electricity; this is generated by two coal power plants and two hydro-electric power stations. The weakness lies in the distribution network which is only able to support Galasi, the provincial capitals, and some other cities. The rural areas have no access to the electricity system. Some small local water power plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

**Water and Sanitation**
Only the capital and some larger cities have a water supply system for the central area of the city. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. The quality of water provided by the few supply systems does not meet western hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population. The water quality in the rural areas differs for the cities but is mostly satisfactory. The quality of water causes real problems in the crowded suburbs and IDP camps, particularly in and around the capital.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Carana. This can cause disease and health problems in the urban areas.

**Telecommunications**
There is no telecommunications system outside of Carana’s capital. The wire based telephone system covers less than 20% of the city and is unreliable. Consequently cellular coverage is expanding and generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country, and some of the remoter border areas that can access nodes in neighbouring countries.

Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications, particularly in the more remote areas.
Military and Security

Security Overview
Though there have been several conflicts with neighbouring countries in the past few decades, and while relations with Katasi remain strained the likelihood of conflict is low. There is no current external military threat to Carana.

The main internal security problems are the ongoing armed conflict between armed groups and the government and the high level of crime in urban areas, resulting from the poor economic situation.

An estimated 12,000 people have been killed in the last six months and anything up to 200,000 forced to flee their homes as a result of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the north and the south. Many civilians have been abducted by armed groups, mainly by rebel elements but also by the army is not above doing the same.

Military

Structure of the CDF
The CDF has a total strength of approximately 10,000 men (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). The chiefs of the service report direct to the president.

With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats the Navy plays a specialised but insignificant role in the Defence Force.

The Air Force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers has a limited strike capacity. This limited capacity allows the government to project its’ power over the entire country. However, this limited capacity is not sufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups.

The main service in the CDF is the Army. Structured in four area commands it represents the power of the central government all over the country. The areas of responsibility these commands do not necessarily match the administrative and provincial boundaries, but reflect the location of the headquarters and troops rather than the real responsibility for a certain precise, defined area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Command</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Assigned Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Maroni</td>
<td>2 Inf Bn, 1 Airborne Bn, 1 Arty Bn, 1 Engr Bn, 1 AAA Btry, MP, Mil Band</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Alur</td>
<td>2 Inf Bn, 1 Arty Btry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Folsa</td>
<td>1 Inf Bn, 1 Engr Coy, 1 Recon Coy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Corma</td>
<td>2 Inf Bn, 1 Recon Coy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Major Equipment
The French Government provided most of the existing military equipment during the 1980s and early 1990s. Since this time, equipment maintenance has often suffered from a lack of spare parts and well trained mechanics. The level of equipment availability is estimated as low.

Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMX 13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Light Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamba</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AML 60/90</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>APC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>105 mm Artillery Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 mm Brandt</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 mm Brandt</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCL M 40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>106 mm Recoiless Launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhard M 3 VDA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L 60</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Air Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Jet C</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ground Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fokker 100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 421</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F 33 C Bonanza</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospital SA 330 H Puma</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospitale SA 316 Alouette</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Utility/Communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suscal A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150 to Coastguard Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC-84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>River Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presidential Guard
The Presidential Guard has strength equivalent to two infantry battalions and it is not part of the regular defence force. The commanders and most officers are Falin and recruited by President Ogavo. Members of the Presidential Guard have received intensive training and are entitled to several privileges. This unit is a
loyal elite force with the task to protect the President. It is also used for special purpose tasks. In the recent past, the Presidential Guard was used several times, together with Gendarmerie units, to fight against the rebel groups, and has a reputation for being particularly brutal.

Police
The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and Gendarmerie. CNP are located in population centres and are controlled by the provincial administration. The Gendarmerie is part of the Ministry of Interior and maintains the police presence in rural areas and is responsible for border security. However, in recent years the Gendarmerie was used more often to suppress opposition political groups than for rural security or border control. In addition, CDF units often exercise police tasks, representing government power in the internal security role.

In recent years, CNP and Gendarmerie have suffered a critical shortage of qualified personnel, logistical and financial resources, and training. In addition, they have been plagued by heavy politicisation, corruption and mismanagement. Police presence in Carana is very low. The estimated number for CNP and Gendarmerie officers amounts to 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,400 citizens. Out of this number, only 5 per cent are female officers.

Land and marine border policing, immigration, customs, port authority and other related sectors of internal security have ceased to function. In recent months, evidence of organised criminal activities, especially drug and human trafficking have come to light, in some cases involving collusion or active participation by law enforcement officials.

Crime rates particularly in population centres are high and there are numerous reports of abuses perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies. This inefficiency and erosion of professional standards has led to a widespread loss of credibility in the eyes of the population.

Rebel Groups

MPC
The MPC has a total strength of 6000 fighters and 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. The level of public support is high in the west. The MPC is structured into groups of 700 men. Each of these groups is lead by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. The groups have no internally defined military structure, but a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the commanders is high and discipline is very good.

The official HQ of MPC is in Alur but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions.
As a result of the broad public support for the rebels, and the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well accepted by the population in the west.

ICSC
The ICSC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the CDF, while others are from the civil war in Rimosa. The movement has been successful in recruiting young men from the local population. This is mostly due to recent rebel successes along with the poor economic situation. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training.

The total strength is estimated to be around 2000 fighters. The public support for ICSC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Southern region because of many acts of violence against the population.

Humanitarian Situation

Nutrition
Although all basic food is available at the market, large numbers of the population cannot afford the necessary food for sufficient nutrition. In the rural area most people can compensate for inflation and unemployment through backyard agriculture. The problem zones are the slums in the urban areas and the IDP camps. In these problem zones the poor nutritional situation becomes increasingly disastrous as time goes by. A humanitarian emergency situation, which will affect approximately 2 million people, is expected during the next year.

Health
Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. The rudimentary health system that exists in the cities is barely able to provide the basic medical support. There is no health insurance system and medical support is not accessible to large parts of the population.

One of the main humanitarian concerns in Carana is the acute lack of functioning medical facilities in the rebel held south and west. There is a serious lack of general supplies required for assistance to displace and vulnerable populations in the IDP camps.

If the situation in the large cities continues to worsen, the threat of epidemics will increase.

The WHO (World Health Organisation) has reported 70 cases of cholera in Carana to date.

Refugees and IDPs
As a result of the fighting in the west between the CDF and MPC, and the ICSC in the south, many people were displaced from their homes. An estimated
100,000 people fled the country, taking refuge in the neighbouring countries of Sumora (approximately 40,000 refugees), Katasi (approximately 40,000 refugees) or Rimosa (approximately 20,000 refugees). Another 100,000 fled their homes but remained within Carana; these internally displaced persons (IDPs) mostly headed east to the capital and other coastal cities, where most are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in or near urban areas. Conditions of health, sanitation and hygiene in these areas are dangerously poor and continuing to worsen.

News of the arrival of an AU mission has buoyed the hopes of the nearly 200,000 refugees and IDPs that they will soon be able to return home. UNHCR, however, has expressed concerns about whether the conditions are indeed favourable for refugees to return with safety and dignity. Both sides are reported to have used mines; just last week a farmer was injured by an AP mine beside a dirt road near the Carana-Katasi border. Finally, those who fled Carana lost all their possessions, and in some cases were branded as “cowards” and “traitors” by those who stayed; thus there is fear that not only will returnees have no homes to return to, but they risk being exposed to stigmatisation and abuse within their communities.

Finally, the country of Rimosa, sharing a border of approximately 200 km with Carana, has suffered from civil conflict between two rival ethnic groups, the majority Pleionians and the minority Elassonians. As a result of this conflict, approximately 30,000 Elassonian refugees have fled the country to take refuge in southern Carana. Most of these Elassonian refugees are sheltered in Camp Epikyndinos, approximately 50 km from the Rimosan border. Camp Epikyndinos is maintained by UNHCR and two NGO implementing partners, Refugees International and Care for the Children.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AICF</td>
<td>Action Internationale Contre la Faim</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIC</td>
<td>African Union Mission In Carana</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Refugee Committee</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AZ</td>
<td>Assembly Zones</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEC</td>
<td>Banque Economique de Carana</td>
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<td>CAO</td>
<td>Chief Administrative Officer</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Commission for the Consolidation of Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Carana Defence Force</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
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<td>CNP</td>
<td>Carana National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMPOL</td>
<td>Commissioner of Police</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>(United Nations) Civilian Police Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Continent Regional Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation &amp; Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration &amp; Repatriation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarised Zone</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>DRCC</td>
<td>Demobilisation and Resettlement Commission Committee</td>
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<td>ELF</td>
<td>Elassasonian Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Field Communication Office</td>
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<td>HOM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICSC</td>
<td>Independant Combattants du Sud Carana</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>JC</td>
<td>Joint Commission</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Commission for the Ceasefire</td>
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<td>JLT</td>
<td>Joint Liaison Team</td>
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<td>MDM</td>
<td>Medecins du Monde</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILOBS</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multi National Force</td>
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<td>MODUK</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence of UK</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>MPC</td>
<td>Movement Patriotique de Carana</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Military Planning Service</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Medecins sans Frontieres</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>PDC</td>
<td>Parti Democratique de Carana</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front (generic term)</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>SRCC</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission</td>
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<td>TOA</td>
<td>Transition of Authority</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKDEL NATO</td>
<td>UK Delegation in NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKMIS GENEVA</td>
<td>UK Mission in Geneva</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational and Scientific Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations International Development Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNNY</td>
<td>United Nations Headquarters New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WV</td>
<td>World Vision (NGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZOS</td>
<td>Zone of Separation</td>
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</table>
Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the 6917th meeting of the Security Council, held on 26 October 2007, in connection with the Council’s consideration of the item entitled “The question concerning Carana”, the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

“The Security Council expresses its grave concern to the ongoing deterioration of the political, security and humanitarian environment in Carana, and the serious consequences for the population of this country and the region. It deplores the loss of life that has already occurred, and fears that the failure, thus far, to reach a political settlement may result in further bloodshed, and calls for an immediate end to hostilities.

“The Security Council commends the Commission of the African Union (AU) and the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) for their role in mediating between the parties and urges them to use their influence to promote a peaceful solution, stressing that the crisis in Carana can be resolved only through a negotiated political solution in which all parties, both those involved in the conflict and within the region, work actively to achieve such a solution.

“The Security Council firmly condemns the continued use force to influence the political situation in Carana and calls for a return to the principles of the 1991 constitution, and urges all parties to agree terms for a lasting peace agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and reestablishes confidence among the parties.

“The Security Council also expresses its concern at the humanitarian consequences of the crisis in Carana. It calls upon the international community to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to those in need in all the countries of the subregion that are affected by the Caranian crisis. It also calls on all parties to provide unhindered access to the affected populations.”

“The Security Council condemns the deaths of innocent civilians and human rights abuses in Carana and calls for such incidents to be fully investigated. The Council calls upon the Government and all other parties to respect human rights and take immediate steps, with support from the international community, to reverse the climate of impunity, particularly in the context of the use of children in armed conflict.
"The Security Council also expresses support for the speedy deployment of the African Mission in Carana to facilitate, including through concrete sustainable and effective measures, and in cooperation with the CRC, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict. The Council appeals for adequate and sustained international assistance to the African Mission in Carana, while underscoring the importance of providing the donor community with as many details as possible to enable it to make determinations regarding the best way to assist the mission."

“The Security Council will continue to monitor closely the situation in Carana and remains seized of the matter.”
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
125th Meeting
3 JANUARY 2008
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

PSC/PR/Comm.(xxx)
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), meeting at its 125th meeting, on 3 January 2008, adopted the following communiqué on the deployment of the AU Mission in Carana (AMIC):

Council,

1. Takes note of the report of the Chairperson on the Situation in Carana [PSC/PR/10(2007)];

2. Expresses its utmost concerns at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population throughout Carana, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons;

3. Stresses the urgent need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the population of Carana

4. Deplores all violations of human rights, particularly atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread abduction of men, women and children, the use of land-mines and sexual violence against women and children,

5. Commends the efforts of, and reiterates its full support for, the Continent Regional Coalition, the United Nations Secretary-General, and the leaders of the region to promote peace and stability in Carana,

6. Takes note with appreciation of the reports of the United Nations Commission on Human rights Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Carana,

7. Deplores all violations of human rights, particularly against the civilian population, and urges the new transitional Government of Carana to take all necessary measures to put an end to impunity and to ensure that the continued promotion and protection of human rights,

8. Emphasises the need for all parties to safeguard the welfare and security of humanitarian workers and United Nations personnel in accordance with applicable rules and principles of international law,
9. **Is mindful** of the need for accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and urges the transitional government once established to ensure that the protection of human rights and the establishment of a state based on the rule of law and of an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities,

10. **Takes note** of the Political Agreement reached by some of the key parties on 28 December 2007 and urges all parties to work without delay towards a broad political consensus on the nature and duration of the political transition,

11. **Welcomes** the human rights commitments contained in that Agreement,

12. **Reaffirms** that the primary responsibility for implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the ceasefire agreement rests with the parties, and urges the parties to move forward with implementation of these agreements immediately in order to ensure the peaceful formation of a new transitional government,

13. **Notes** that lasting stability in Carana will depend on peace in the sub-region, and emphasises the importance of cooperation among the countries of the sub-region to this end, as well as the need for coordination of efforts of the International Community’s efforts to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security in the sub-region,

14. **Determines** that the situation in Carana continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, to stability in the 8th Continent sub-region, and to the peace process for Carana,

15. **Decides** to establish the African Mission in Carana (AMIC), for a period of 6 months and further decides that AMIC will consist of up to [6,800] military personnel, including up to [200] military observers and [160] staff officers, and up to [1250] civilian police officers including formed units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Carana, and the appropriate civilian component; in this respect, AMIC, which shall be adequately equipped to project the appropriate posture, shall undertake the following tasks:

   - to support for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement:
     - to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;
     - to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties military forces;
to develop, as soon as possible, preferably within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution, in cooperation with the United Nations, relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, an action plan for the overall implementation of a voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and woman; and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;

- to carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDRR programme;

- to provide security at key government installations, in particular ports, airports and other vital infrastructure;

- Protection of African Union Staff, facilities and Civilians:

- to protect African Union personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, without prejudice to the efforts of the government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within their capabilities;

- Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:

- to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;

- to monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and internally displaced persons, abductees, women, children and demobilised child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;

- to ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within AMIC to carry out human rights promotion, protection, and monitoring activities;

- Support for Security reform:
to assist the new Carana transitional government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;

- to assist the new transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

- Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:

- to assist the new transitional government in conjunction with other international partners, in the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both national and local level;

- to assist the government in restoring proper administration of natural resources;

- to assist the new transitional government in preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than end 2009;

- to assist the new transitional government in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;

16. **Demands** that the parties cease hostilities throughout Carana and fulfil their obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and cease fire agreement;

17. **Calls upon** all parties to co-operate fully in the deployment and operations of AMIC, including through ensuring the safety, security, and freedom of movement of African Union personnel, together with associated personnel, throughout Carana;

18. **Encourages** AMIC within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to support the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;

19. **Requests** the new transitional Government to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the Chairperson within 30 days of adoption of this resolution,
20. **Calls upon** all parties to ensure, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need and delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees.

21. **Demands** that all parties cease all use of child soldiers, that all parties cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Caranian population, and stresses the need to bring to justice those responsible;

22. **Reaffirms** the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-building and recalls the need to address violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare, and encourages AMIC as well as the Caranian parties to actively address these issues;

23. **Reiterates** its demand that all States in the region cease military support for armed groups in neighbouring countries, take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any actions that might contribute to further destabilisation of the situation in the region, and declares its readiness to consider, if necessary, ways of promoting compliance with this demand;

24. **Calls on** the international community to consider how it might help future economic development in Carana aimed at achieving long-term stability in Carana and improving the welfare of its people;

25. **Stresses** the need for an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of AU radio stations to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of AMIC among local communities and the parties;

26. **Calls on** the parties to engage for the purpose of addressing the question of DDRR on an urgent basis and urges the parties, in particular the government of Carana, and rebel groups MPC and ICSC, to work closely with AMIC, relevant assistance organizations, and donor nations, in the implementation of a DDRR programme;

27. **Calls on** the international donor community to provide assistance for the implementation of a DDRR programme, and sustained international assistance to the peace process, and to contribute to consolidated humanitarian appeals;

28. **Requests** Member States that are in a position to do so to provide financial and logistical support to enable AMIC to effectively discharge its mandate. Further expresses its gratitude to all AU Partners for their past support and appeals to them.
to engage all potential contributors within the international community to provide necessary additional support to ensure a sustainable long term effort.

29. **Requests** the Commissioner for Peace and Security to provide regular updates, including a formal report every 90 days to the Peace and Security Council on the progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and this resolution, including the implementation of AMIC's mandate;

30. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.
PEACE AGREEMENT  
( KALARI TREATY )

The parties therefore agree to the following:

ARTICLE I

1.1 A ceasefire is hereby established throughout the territory of Carana, between the belligerents as defined. The ceasefire shall enter into force upon signature and the implementation will be effected as soon as possible.

1.2 Cessation of hostilities covers all warlike acts by air, land and sea, as well as all acts of sabotage and incitement of ethnic hatred, and requires disengagement of opposing forces as defined hereafter,

1.3 The final cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within seventy-two hours after the signing of the ceasefire.

ARTICLE II

2.1 The disengagement of forces shall mean the immediate breaking of tactical contact between the opposing Military Forces of the Parties to this Agreement at places where they are in direct contact by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

2.2 Where immediate disengagement is not possible, a framework and sequence of disengagement is to be agreed by all Parties through the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC).

2.3 Immediate disengagement at the initiative of all military units shall be limited to the effective range of direct fire weapons. Further disengagement to pull all weapons out of range, shall be conducted under the guidance of the JCC

2.4 CDF forces will withdraw all armored vehicles and weapons larger than Caliber .50in from Tereni, Koloni, Mahbek and Leppko provinces
2.5 All resupply of weapons, ammunition or other lethal logistical supplies will cease by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

2.6 A complete ban on any mine-laying operations will come into effect by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

2.7 Any attempt to hinder or prevent operations to remove mines will be considered a breach of the terms of the ceasefire agreement.

2.8 Upon the cease-fire taking effect, all Parties shall provide ICRC/Red Crescent with relevant information concerning their prisoners of war or persons detained because of the war. They shall subsequently accord every assistance to the ICRC/Red Crescent representatives to enable them to visit the prisoners and detainees and verify any details and ascertain their condition and status.

2.9 On the coming into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall release persons detained because of the war or taken hostage within three days of the signing of the Cease-fire Agreement and the ICRC/Red Crescent shall give them all the necessary assistance including relocation to any provinces within Carana or any other country where their security will be guaranteed.

2.10 All domestic and external propaganda between the parties and any other action aimed at inciting ethnic hatred will cease by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

2.11 All acts of violence against the civilian population will cease by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement. This includes acts of revenge; summary executions; torture; harassment; detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, or political affiliation; arming of civilians; use of child soldiers; sexual violence; sponsoring or promotion of terrorists or genocidal ideologies.

ARTICLE III

3.1 The verification and control of the ceasefire will be overseen by an African Union mission that will include the establishment of a Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) chaired by the AU, and Joint Liaison Teams (JLTs) that will function at national, provincial and local levels.
3.2 The JCC will be composed of appointed representatives of all parties and the AU. It shall be established immediately upon signing the Peace Agreement.

3.3 All parties will provide details to the JCC giving the strength and locations of their forces. In view of the sensitivity of such information the head of the JCC is to make provision for its appropriate handling. All CDF soldiers and MPC and ICSC members shall be registered.

3.4 The JCC shall be based in Galasi and shall be headed by the AU, which will define its tasks and duties. Rules of procedure will be drafted in consultation with the parties and these will be promulgated through the JCC.

3.5 The JCC will establish the JLTs and make appropriate arrangements for reporting and dealing with issues that they bring to its attention, specifically any issues requiring arbitration between the parties or violations of the ceasefire.

3.6 The Joint Liaison Teams will be composed of representatives of all signatories, and led by officers of the AU. The Joint Liaison Teams will be responsible to the JCC.

3.7 The JLTs will facilitate communication between parties in order to reduce the likelihood of violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and to clarify alleged violations of the agreement. They will thereby assist in building confidence amongst signatories and help create trust in the peace process.

**ARTICLE IV**

4.1 A Government of National Reconciliation will be set up immediately following the ceasefire to ensure a return to peace and stability. It will be charged with strengthening the independence of the justice system, restoring the administration and public services and rebuilding the country.

4.2 The Government of National Reconciliation will be led by a consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next Presidential election, in which he will not be able to stand as a candidate.

4.3 The Government of National Reconciliation will undertake to conduct free and fair elections within 18 months of the signing of this agreement,
4.4 The Government of National Reconciliation will immediately set up a National Human Rights Commission to ensure protection of rights and freedoms in Carana. The Commission will be made up of delegates of all parties and be chaired by a person accepted by all.

4.5 The Government of National Reconciliation will endeavour to facilitate humanitarian operations to aid the victims of the conflict throughout the country. Based on the report of the National Human Rights Commission, it will take steps to compensate and rehabilitate victims.

4.6 The Government of National Reconciliation will establish a National Commission to oversee disarmament of former combatants and restructuring of military and police forces.

ARTICLE V

5.1 The Government of National Reconciliation will, immediately upon taking office, attend to rebuilding an army committed to the values of integrity and republican morality. The government will restructure the defence and security forces and may, for this purpose, receive the counsel of outside advisers.

5.2 In order to contribute to restoring security of persons and property throughout the national territory, the Government of National Reconciliation will organise the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all forces. It will ensure that no mercenaries remain within the country's borders.

5.3 Those ex-combatants of the CDF, MPC and ICSC who wish to be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria, and that the armed forces reflect the geo-political structure of Carana within the established strength, which shall not exceed 10,000.

(Signed)

FOR THE CDF

FOR THE MPC

FOR THE ICSC

12 February 2008
Report
Of the
African Union Technical Survey Team
For
Carana

Draft for Exercise

February 2008
Report of the AU Technical Survey Team for Carana

Political

Overview

Despite the signing of the Kalari Treaty (Peace Agreement), Carana remains a politically unstable country. The government has lost control over the western and the southern provinces of the country. Even in government-controlled areas, the Ogavo administration’s real power is very limited. An increasing level of public resistance is challenging the limited resources of the government’s security forces. Governmental administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent.

Political Parties

Carana is essentially a one party state represented by the Parti Democratique de Carana (PDC). Years of repression have destroyed any effective opposition, or driven it underground; any remaining opposition capability is so fragmented that it is unlikely to be viable for some time.

Those opposition groups that do exist tend to be relatively insignificant and on the fringe of political activity; these include some communist groups in the capital and Maldosa, as well as Kori ethnic minority groups on the coast. These groups are not organised and have little importance because of their specific interest and small following. Other groups having some political influence are the coal and copper miners’ trade unions, which are interest based.

With an eye on future elections, the leadership of MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long-term political role. Given the precedent set during the fighting, in terms of its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it has the potential to become an effective political force, and it enjoys broad public support in the west through its ability to be seen to address the concerns and needs of the people when the government had failed.

In contrast the Independent Combattants du Sud Carana (ICSC) lacks the structure or organisation that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the Ogavo administration and longstanding ethnic hostilities with the Falin minority in Leppko province. It has never made an attempt to capitalise on its potential and has probably missed the opportunity to do so in that it has never articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated when it sees itself marginalised.

Carana has no political diaspora or organised groups in exile.
Elections

While the Kalari Treaty calls for free and democratic elections within 18 months, the current situation makes an outcome very difficult. The road to this critical event will be challenging for AMIC, as well as for any successor UN mission.

After years of human rights violations, despotism, civil war and corruption, the public trust in governmental institutions and activities is almost non-existent. However, given the state of potential political opposition groups they will be hard pressed to organise themselves in time to conduct an effective election campaign; this could result in calls to delay the elections, the timeline for which was a crucial element in the peace negotiations, not to mention the likelihood of attempts to subvert the election process itself.

Another significant factor is the consequence of years of inefficient and corrupt administration which means that there is no accurate census material, the last national census having taken place in 1980. When combined with the large scale displacement of the population which has taken place in recent years it is clear that voter registration will be a long, complex and costly exercise.

If all parties honour the commitments of the Kalari Treaty, it can be assumed that the MPC will participate in future elections and evolve into a long-term political party in Carana. The long-term political role of the ICSC is uncertain. A further uncertainty is the potential of hitherto unidentified groups who were not signatories to the Kalari Treaty to emerge, either in an attempt to join the political process or to oppose it. In either case this may cause instability, and in the latter there is the inevitable possibility of opposition being in the form of armed resistance which presents significant security risks to the preparation and conduct of elections.

Government of National Reconciliation (GNR)

The Kalari Treaty calls for the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation pending the Presidential and national elections which will elect a new government.

Under the provisions for the GNR effective power will be in the hands of a consensus prime minister, Lucien Langata. Langata, or LL as he is known, was a member of the PDC and Finance Minister until he took a stand against corruption in the mid 90s. Narrowly escaping execution due to his popular following amongst the Falin, LL refused to leave Carana and President Ogavo has allowed him to live in relative obscurity. He is considered a popular and sensible choice and enjoys sufficient support across the country to have a reasonable chance of pulling the GNR together.
While nominally still President, Ogavo has been indicted for crimes against humanity and corruption. Unfortunately he was tipped off prior to the indictment being served and has disappeared. He was last seen in Jumi in late November 2007, since when his whereabouts are unknown. He is believed be still in Carana, protected by a group of hard line former members of the Presidential Guard, and clearly he has the potential to disrupt the peace process, a problem that is exacerbated by the fact that there is neither the will nor the capability within the former security forces to track him down.

**Constitution and Judicial System**

The Constitution and judicial system in Carana is based on modern democratic principals. The violations of human rights and other shortcomings have not been for want of a structure but abuse of the existing rules and flagrant exploitation by the Ogava regime.

Under the “State of Emergency” (see below) a system of mixed civilian/military courts, with very limited rights of appeal, has been put in place to try all treason, terrorist and similar cases. Carana courts regularly impose the death penalty for serious crime.

A number of human rights organisations have issued reports outlining arrests, detention and execution of people without due legal process. There are also reports of torture and uninvestigated deaths in the prisons. Many of the detainees are members of opposition political groups. Prison conditions generally give cause for concern. Official records of who is being held are impossible to obtain and the ICRC has little access, and that is limited to the main prison in the capital. There are reliable reports of children being held together with adults as well as men and women being held in the same facilities. In general, prisoners are treated harshly, conditions are poor, nutrition is inadequate and there is little or no medical assistance. No information whatsoever is available regarding the identity of prisoners held in military holding facilities. The rebels are also known to be holding many detainees.

**DDR**

The requirement to disarm is clearly stated in the Kalari Treaty.

It can be assumed that MPC will honor this commitment if all parties adhere to the Peace Agreement, especially in view of its political aspirations. The reintegration of MPC rebels into the CDF will be a critical issue.
Whilst there are no indicators that ICSC will not disarm in accordance with the Kalari Treaty, the lack of a proper organizational structure and the inherent lack of discipline within the various separate factions will make it a more difficult process. It is probable that some factions will see themselves being disadvantaged which may lead to freelance military activity which may be politically or criminally motivated.

By extension, the most difficult part in the DDR process will be the disarmament and reintegration of any other armed groups who have no allegiance to any group, are not signatories of the Kalari Treaty and whose focus is largely criminal.

**Human Rights**

Carana has ratified the following human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention Against Torture. It has also ratified the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The Constitution states that all laws must be consistent with Carana’s international human rights obligations. However, in reality, the Carana statute book contains many laws inherited from colonial period, which are incompatible with international human rights standards – for instance the Carana criminal procedure code. The Constitution also contains a Bill of Rights, which refers mostly to civil and political rights. It is silent as regards to other rights such as economic, social and cultural rights.

Currently, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Carana government has declared a “State of Emergency” which permits it to override the constitutional provisions, including the human rights elements. In 2006, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Carana. The Special Rapporteur has visited the country on a number of occasions and has sharply criticised all parties to the conflict for human rights abuses perpetuated against civilians. The Special representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict has also visited and highlighted the disturbingly large number of children used in combat roles by rebel elements as well as by the national army.

The Government does not have a human rights ministry – instead the lead responsibility for human rights is vested in the Minister of Justice. Since early 2007, Carana has had a National Human Rights Commission. The commission is not compliant with the international standards for a national human rights institution as set out in the “Paris Principles”. Carana has a number of active
human rights NGOs whose freedom to operate has been inhibited by the fear of reprisals, but with the change in the situation they are becoming increasingly vociferous. A number of international humanitarian NGOs are also represented in the country.

The Situation with regard to Women

In general, women are subjected to discrimination in most aspects of life. They are underrepresented in all parts of government and public institutions. FGM, though illegal, is practiced very extensively and there are anecdotal indications that levels of domestic violence, including sexual abuse, are very high. The conflict has greatly exacerbated the incidence of trafficking of women and children both internally, and to neighbouring countries.

The Situation with regard to Children

Abuse of children has been high. The combination of a number of factors ranging from the collapse of the birth registration process, the general poor economic conditions and a population of which 44% is under the age of 15 has meant a ready source of children to be coerced into becoming child soldiers and / or camp followers. There are also numerous reports of child prostitution and trafficking.

Security

Overview

The level of general security in Carana is low as a result of the intense fighting between government and rebel forces, the poor economic situation, the high number of displaced people, the low police presence outside of the capital and the wide spread dissatisfaction with the government. Civil unrest is wide spread and smaller uprisings occur on a regular basis. The level of crime is high. In general, the security situation in Carana must be assessed as “medium risk”. Some areas, such as the areas around Galasi, Akkabar and the Leppko province have to be assessed as “high risk”. Thousands of civilians have been abducted by armed groups, mainly rebel elements but the army is not above doing the same. Abductees of all ages are often coerced into the fighting forces and are also used as what amounts as slaves, including being forced to become “wives” of combatants. If they refuse they are killed. Rape and other forms of sexual abuse are commonplace and are used to intimidate.

Galasi

In Galasi the primary risk is the high level of crime in the suburbs and IDP camps around the capital. In the suburbs of Galasi gangs of youngsters, of up to 100 in
number, rule the streets. These gangs tend to be unruly but they can pose a threat, even to unwary military formations. They own no particular allegiance but there is precedent to suggest that they are prepared to work for the highest bidder; as such they are something of a ‘wild card.’ Within the IDP camps there is a high level of petty crime, mostly a result of poverty and hopelessness, but this has been on the decline recently since the appearance of vigilante groups who dispense their own form of summary justice.

Akkabar
In Akkabar the coal mine workers went on strike in November 2007 as they had not been paid for four months. What started as a justifiable industrial dispute soon escalated after a botched attempted by the police turned sour and several miners were killed. This led to the inevitable reaction from the miners, whose more extreme members attacked a number of government institutions, particularly police stations, and banks. Activity is sporadic and often spontaneous but it has increasing local support.

Leppko
The breakdown of government authority in Leppko province resulted in an increase in the number of uncontrolled-armed groups that, together with ICSC combatants, have preyed on the local population. Many of these groups are opportunist groups of former rebels from neighbouring Rimosa who have taken advantage of the unstable situation in Carana. Links between ICSC and these uncontrolled-armed groups are denied by former but several independent reports indicate such links exist.

Military

General Situation
Following the signing of the Kalari Treaty on 12 February 2008 the combatants generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains that they had made, and each fearful that the other side might renege on its commitments. This has resulted in stalemate in a number of areas and, while no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Therefore disengagement and a start to the disarmament process are a high priority.

CDF
CDF remained in their positions after the cessation of fighting. Four infantry battalions were deployed along the separation line between CDF and MPC, with an additional three infantry battalions deployed in the south around the area
claimed by ICSC. The airborne battalion, in conjunction with gendarmerie units, is deployed in the city of Maroni to handle the riots of the coal miners. The engineer units and the reconnaissance company are co-located in the north-west with the infantry units. The location of the artillery battalion and the air defence units is unknown.

The five Alpha Jets of the Carana Air Force can be assessed as non-operational. The helicopters have been used frequently for air patrols.

According to our own observations, the logistic situation for the CDF appears poor. Spare parts seem to be a particularly problem.

The CDF has a reputation of not respecting international humanitarian law, especially for abusive treatment of civilians.

MPC

Original assessment of the MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6000 to approximately 10,000. Approximately 5000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary. It is assessed that the remaining 5000 MPC rebels are sufficient to balance the presence of the CDF on the separation line and maintain the status quo, especially when backed up by the knowledge that they can quickly be reinforced. It is assessed that the underlying reason for this redeployment is to ensure that the front line MPC troops are logistically sustainable, and they certainly appear better prepared than many of their CDF counterparts.

The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 from whence they conduct patrols west of the separation line; while this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty it has the potential to act as a trigger for other action whether by mistake or by design.

After the end of fighting, the official HQ in Alur increased in importance and became a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in Alur.

The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but have repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of the child. As a result of broad public support, and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the west – other elements remain compliant out of fear for the MPC.

ICSC
During the fighting, ICSC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most ICSC rebels were living in their home villages and group only occasionally.

The loose structure of ICSC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that the number of active fighters has not changed and remains in the region of 2000-3000.

Hitherto the ICSC has focused its attention on the CDF and has relied upon the strong anti-government feelings in the south for most of its support, however there have been a number recent reports of several acts of violence against ethnic minorities in the south of the area adjacent to the border with Rimosa. It remains to be seen whether these have involved members of the ICSC, in which case it would be in violation of the Kalari Treaty, or whether they are the responsibility of other groups who are not signatories. Reports indicate the former although this has not been corroborated.

Unlike the MPC, the ICSC has not tried to establish administrative functions and exercises control in the region only by the rule of the force. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

Police

The concept of conventional policing is almost non-existent. In government controlled areas the police are seen as a means of enforcing government policy and protecting government interests. In the remainder of the country the nature of the police made it an early target as personnel were so closely identified with a repressive regime. Consequently many were killed, and others either fled or changed allegiances with the result that law and order was either maintained, or not, by the dominant group in any given area. Consequently some areas, such as those in which the MPC has asserted control, have some quasi capacity to maintain law and order and others, mainly in the south, have none at all.

Where police do exist they are poorly paid, or not paid at all, with the result that corruption remains endemic; police stations have little equipment and that which many do have is of military origin and entirely unsuitable for a democratic police force; and training has virtually ceased. To compound the problem the existing police structure so identified with President Ogavo that no member of it would be accepted in the MPC or ICSC controlled areas.

Economy
Prior to the civil war, the Caranian economy was already suffering from decade-long negative growth due to excessive governmental control, corruption and a lack of efficient public administration. It continued to deteriorate during the war which brought the production of copper to a halt and saw much of the diamond production hijacked by a number of groups. The flow of foreign currency reduced to a trickle, and what did exist was mostly used to buy weapons or misappropriated. Fighting in rural areas meant that the timber industry was reduced to approximately 20% of its pre-conflict capacity and agricultural production fell to approximately 40-50%. The net result has been an inflation rate that has been running somewhere around 300% and a significantly reduced supply of basic commodities.

The reality of this stark economic picture is an increasingly dire humanitarian situation which has only been prevented from becoming a major crisis by external aid and reliance on a subsistence economy. Inevitably the consequences are most acute in the major towns where increasing dissatisfaction threatens to erupt into violence.

**Infrastructure**

**Roads:**

Carana has an adequate road network with paved routes connecting most parts of the country, and key urban centres. In the west and the north, these roads also link to the networks in neighbouring Katasi and Sumora. Most paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season, but the majority are in need of significant maintenance. Carana has also a comprehensive network of secondary (unpaved) roads and tracks; these tend to be susceptible to damage during the rainy season when many become impassable.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which can carry trucks and heavy vehicles up to approx 20 tonnes but those along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction would need to be assessed individually before their use can be considered.

There is no comprehensive assessment that includes all unpaved roads and bridges, the former are mostly usable but needing significant maintenance, particularly in Hanno and Leppko provinces while the latter may be useable but individual routes would need to be assessed on a case by case basis.

**Railways:**
The two railway tracks running between Galasi and Akabar, and between Maldosa and Mia are both operational but degraded. Currently the Galasi to Akabar line can go no further than Maroni as the main railway bridge was destroyed by flooding in 2004 and has yet to be repaired.

There are rail yards at Galasi, Maroni, Akabar and Maldosa capable of handling containers, vehicles and other goods. The station in Mia is specialised for the transport of copper and has no handling facilities.

In common with the road network there has been little or no maintenance over the past few years, consequently the tracks are deteriorating and are likely to be subject to increasing restrictions both in terms of speed and capacity.

**Harbours:**

In Carana there are three deep-water harbours, and a number of smaller fishing ports. The smaller harbours have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels.

The main harbour in Galasi is well equipped, can handle large ships and has a RoRo and container capability. This harbour will not cause any limitations for deployment and support of a potential Mission.

The harbour in Cereni has no RoRo or significant container capability but is equipped with capable cranes and can take break-bulk ships up to approximately 600 ft in length. However there is only limited dock space without disrupting regular trade; this effectively limits capacity to no more than two ships over and above the routine shipping.

The harbor in Maldosa is geared to specialised handling for the export of copper but has a similar capacity to Cereni for the handling of regular transport ships. Only two wharves are equipped with cranes which will limit capacity, and there is very limited parking or storage space due to the harbour being in the town; this being said there is ample space on the western outskirts.

**Airports:** The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports have runways suitable for heavy transport aircraft.

- The airport in Galasi is well equipped for handling heavy material and has ample ramp space in excess of its routine requirements. Space for storing equipment and assembling vehicles in close proximity to the airport is
limited, but generally it meets most requirements for the deployment of personnel and equipment.

- Limitations on ramp space and cargo handling capacity restrict the capacity of the airport at Corma, however it has almost unlimited space close to the airport for storage / parking, and there are no significant limitations to the deployment of personnel.

The airports in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo.

All other airfields are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft without additional construction work. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport.

Fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.

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<td>-</td>
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</table>

Electricity:

In Carana, there are three power plants, the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and a coal power plant in Galasi. In recent years, Carana was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season. During the fighting most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. The coal miners’ rebellion in the Hanno area caused a shortage in coal and limited also the production of electricity. In the area supplied by the coal power plant, “brown-out” power shut-downs occur on a regular basis.

Since the power supply system is not designed as a network with redundancies, but organised on a regional oriented star pattern, the damage of one main line can cut supply to a large area.

The majority of the country is currently without regular power supply.
Water:

Potable water is available in most parts of the country but the quality of water varies. In the more arid areas south west of Maldosa and west of Galasi drinking water is drawn mostly from small ponds and slow flowing brooks, with the inevitable consequence that water quality is poor and the source of various water borne diseases. The wells in these regions are not deep enough to reach clean water.

The drinking water close to the coal and copper mining areas is highly polluted causing other health problems,

Near the major rivers there is ample water supply but it still needs purification.

Humanitarian

Refugees and IDPs

As a result of the fighting in the west between the CDF and MPC, and the ICSC in the south, many people were displaced from their homes. An estimated 100,000 people fled the country, taking refuge in the neighbouring countries of Sumora (approximately 40,000 refugees), Katasi (approximately 40,000 refugees) or Rimosa (approximately 20,000 refugees). Another 100,000 fled their homes but remained within Carana; these internally displaced persons (IDPs) mostly headed east to the capital and other coastal cities, where most are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in, or near, urban areas. Conditions of health, sanitation and hygiene in these areas are dangerously poor and continuing to worsen.

News of the arrival of an AU mission has buoyed the hopes of the nearly 200,000 refugees and IDPs that they will soon be able to return home. UNHCR, however, has expressed concerns about whether the conditions are indeed favourable for refugees to return with safety and dignity. Both sides are reported to have used mines; just last week a farmer was injured by an anti-personnel mine beside a dirt road near the Carana-Katasi border. Finally, those who fled Carana lost all their possessions, and in some cases were branded as “cowards” and “traitors” by those who stayed; thus there is fear that not only will returnees have no homes to return to, but they risk being exposed to reprisals and abuse within their communities.

Finally, the country of Rimosa, sharing a border of approximately 200 km with Carana, has suffered from civil conflict between two rival ethnic groups, the majority
Pleionians and the minority Elassonians. As a result of this conflict, approximately 30,000 Elassonians have fled the country to take refuge in southern Carana. Most of these Elassonian refugees are sheltered in Camp Epikyndinos, approximately 50 km from the Rimosan border. Camp Epikyndinos is maintained by UNHCR and two NGO implementing partners, Refugees International and Care for the Children.

**Nutrition**

As consequence of the economic crisis and the war, the price of food and basic goods increased dramatically. Even though all basic goods are available, large parts of the population cannot afford sufficient nutrition. The child mortality rate has dramatically increased during the last years.

The most affected areas are the north of Hanno, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni where the situation has already reached a crisis.

**Landmines**

During the conflict between CDF and rebels, landmines were used intensively by all parties, yet the nature of the conflict and the forces involved meant that very little documentation was maintained. Consequently mines pose a major and unpredictable threat to the population at large, aid agencies and any potential peacekeeping mission. There is an immediate need to identify the areas of highest risk, many of which are in the west of the country, and begin action to reduce the threat.

**The UN Country Team and Non-governmental Organisations in Carana**

Despite the troubles in Carana, the United Nations has maintained a presence in the country through several relief and development agencies. Additionally, a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operate in Carana. In many cases, these agencies and organisations have been on the ground working in Carana for at least 5-10 years.

**The UN Country Team in Carana consists of the following organizations:**

- **World Food Program (WFP)**
  Responsible for food distribution programmes and maintains offices in Galasi, Amsan, Corma, Folsa and Alur.
  The lead agency for programmes helping children; it has offices in Galasi, Folsa and Corma.

- **The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**
  Protects and assists refugees; it has offices in Galasi, Alur and Lora.

- **The World Health Organisation (WHO)**
  Coordinates international health programmes; it has an office in Galasi.

- **The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**
  A small team based in Galasi, who are responsible for monitoring and reporting on human rights issues throughout the country.

- **United Nations Development Program (UNDP)**
  Responsible for UN development activities. The UNDP Resident Coordinator chairs weekly UN country team meetings in Galasi, attended by the heads of all the agencies above.

**Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs):**
A total of twelve international and eighteen local NGOs operate throughout Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children’s issues and gender issues. Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC), mandated to assist victims of war, is present in Galasi, Amsan, Alur and Kika.

**Public Information**

In Carana, radio, TV and the major newspapers are controlled by the government. They are more an instrument of propaganda, than a free source of information. International newspapers are only available in Galasi. National newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns. For the past several months, the MPC has produced a regional newspaper and operates one radio station.

As a result of the war several radio and TV transmission stations were destroyed, leaving large areas without access to TV and radio programmes.

**Education**
Prior to the civil war, Carana had one of the best developed education systems in the region from primary through to tertiary levels. The effects of war and a declining economy have seriously degraded the system, reducing the overall number of schools, particularly at the primary level, and resulting in a general decline in the number of students across the board.

### Host Nation Support

#### Availability of Goods and Services

Notwithstanding the poor economic situation in Carana, most basic goods and supplies are still available, although both quality and availability can be erratic.

Fuel, construction material and food can be purchased, or contracted, in country although the rampant inflation rate and the potential of a UN deployment is leading to ever escalating prices.

Fuel and rations can be purchased in Galasi, Cereni, and Maldosa from international contractors.

There is an ample supply of timber which can be purchased from local dealers in the larger towns, but concrete and steel are only available in Galasi, Maroni, Corma and Maldosa. Basic construction work can be contracted in all larger towns.

Specialised construction materials such as plumbing parts, windows or doors are hard to get on the local market. In addition, furniture of adequate quality is largely unavailable.

Technical goods such as IT equipment, vehicles and spares are generally unavailable in country.

Transport services can be contracted in the Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa although a series of truck driver strikes during the last year has meant that service has become unpredictable and less reliable.

There are no vehicle or aircraft rental companies currently in Carana.

### Local Labour

Given the increased levels of unemployment following the war, there is no shortage of unskilled, or semi-skilled labour. Availability of skilled labour has reduced as many professional people left the country during the war. In the former two categories only approximately 30% have any English, using either French or local dialects.
Banking
The banking system is only operational in Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa and it does not support electronic cash transfer in any location. In some provincial capitals and in some other towns, rudimentary banking functions do exist but these are of little practical significance.

Availability of Real Estate
In all towns over 50,000 inhabitants, office and accommodation is available for rent, although much is sub-standard and suffering from a lack of basic maintenance and facilities, particularly water, sanitation and power.
Carana

Tech Survey

Annex One
Areas with reported cases of Cholera

Meningitis distribution area
Areas with reported cases of Cholera

Meningitis distribution area

Area of humanitarian crisis
As result of malnutrition
Military, Police and Personnel Requirements

Assumptions

- Availability of the troops themselves is not seen as a major issue.

- While there may be political pressures to keep numbers down the force must have the capability to do what is asked of it - initial estimates (still to be confirmed) indicate an overall force level in the region of 10,000 although it is accepted that the initial requirement to achieve stabilization may require somewhat less; this figure is based on:
  - Probable tasks which include observation and monitoring of a ceasefire, liaison with the parties, support to a disarmament programme, security of key locations, support to humanitarian assistance, protection of civilians, support to efforts to promote human rights, protection of AU personnel and facilities,
  - Size of Carana and areas of potential deployment to be capable of achieving the probable tasks
  - Longer term support to the elections which will need to be established as early as possible.

- Estimated force requirements do not make provision for:
  - Active participation in training as part of a security sector reform programme. It is assumed that any involvement would be advisory or liaison.
  - Border security,
  - Any form of arms embargo

- There will be a single integrated mission headquarters; this will be based in Galasi. It will:
  - Be headed by an SRCC, and two deputies, CAO, Force Commander and Police Commissioner,
  - Consist of 150 civilian international staff, 200 local staff, 95 military staff officers, a military HQ company of 120, a military police detachment of 45, and a Civilian Police Command element of 45.
  - Include a Join Operations Centre (JOC) and a Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC).

- There will be 160 Military Observers (MILOBs) operating within a single military chain of command with team leaders reporting directly to Sector Commanders through the sector Chief Operations Officer in each Sector HQ.
The proposed force structure is headed by a Force Headquarters commanded by a major general, force troops and two sectors - a more detailed breakdown is shown diagrammatically below:

The proposed deployment envisages one brigade sector of four battalions and one lighter one of two; each will have an engineer company; Sector West will have a level 2 medical facility and Sector East will draw on the level 3 in Galasi. Aviation will be controlled at Force headquarters level. MILOBS will be deployed in team sites in both sectors.

The two sector headquarters are based upon the standby brigades from two RECs.

**Force Generation**

The status of force generation is as follows

- Four TCCs have indicated that their nations would provide an infantry battalion in support of a mission in Carana, although the actual strength and capabilities have yet to be confirmed. Another five TCCs have indicated they are considering participation.

- Two TCCs have indicated that they could have their infantry units in Carana within 60 days of a decision to deploy. The remaining nations have indicated it would take them between 60 -120 days to arrive in mission.
One nation has indicated it could provide a heavy helicopter transportation unit (180) within 90 days of a decision to deploy.

Two other nations may be able to provide light transportation helicopter units (160) to be fully operational within 90 days of a decision to deploy.

Four nations have indicated that they have engineer units (157) that could be made available. One TCC can deploy its unit very quickly; 30 days.

Two nations have indicated that they could provide Level II Medical Units (35); one will not be ready until 120 days of a decision to deploy, the other could deploy by 30 days.

A TCC can provide a Level III Medical unit (90) by 90 days of a decision to deploy.

No TCCs have offered up signals units.

Four TCCs have indicated that they could man Medium Transportation Units (80) but donors would have to provide the vehicles and maintenance support. One TCC can provide unit and vehicles plus maintenance.

19 TCCs have offered to fill MILOB posts and the current total available is 97. Of these a number are believed to need further training as well as there being a requirement to train the additional numbers required. It is likely that only approximately 50 will be ready to deploy with 30 days of a decision.

Notwithstanding the offers of troops a number of potential TCCs have expressed concerns about funding and equipment availability. The lack of a signals unit is one major deficiency and the offer of helicopters is contingent upon donor support.

**Police**

At the integrated mission HQ a police command element of approximately 45 personnel is considered necessary.

Six nations have offered to provide formed police units (125) but most require training and some re-equipment to meet the required standard. It is assessed that two formed units could be deployed to Carana within 90 days of a decision to deploy.
With regard to individual personnel approximately 50 would be available within 30 days.

18 TCCs have offered CIVPOL personnel for Carana. It is estimated that TCCs could provide 100 police within 90 days and another 100 within 120 days.

There is a Carana Police Academy in Maroni, which has very basic infrastructure but no training aids or equipment.

Each province has a police HQ again with very little resources.

**Civilian Staff**

- Approximately 50 core staff are available to deploy to Carana by M+30.
Mission Directive

Carana - Planning for an African Union Operation

SITUATION

- The conflict in Carana has reached a stalemate in which the government can no longer control significant portions of the country and other elements have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the west an alternative structure is evolving in areas controlled by the MPC while the south is increasingly fragmented, lacking any structure and reverting to control by individual local leaders under the general banner of the ICSC. No single entity is capable of achieving a successful military outcome to the conflict, resources are tight, and ethnic tensions have been increasingly evident with atrocities being committed in a number of areas. The worst case scenario would see the stalemate that exists now sliding into a state of general anarchy, or see a de facto break up of the country under individual factions; while the latter may be a viable option in the eyes of the MPC it is not so in ICSC areas which would witness a probable end to of any sort of order. The ongoing Kalari peace process offers the only real option for sustainable peace, and is an essential precursor to any long term ability to address the root causes of the conflict.

- The CRC has played a significant role in moving the peace process forward and is increasingly optimistic that an agreement will be reached in the near future, key aspects of are likely to include:
  - Mechanisms for disengagement, implementation and monitoring of a ceasefire;
  - Confidence building measures, including the release of prisoners;
  - Respect for human rights;
  - The establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation;
  - Commitment to the longer term establishment of a democratically elected government;
  - Disarmament of armed groups;
  - Restructured military and police capacities.

- United Nations Security Council PRST of 26 October 2007 confirmed the Security Council’s readiness to support active African Union involvement to support the implementation of a ceasefire and establish the basis for a long term political settlement.

- A Strategic Directive was issued on 1 February 2008.

- The PSOD has assumed lead responsibility for planning the deployment of a peacekeeping mission.

- The operational imperative is to ensure that the African Union, in cooperation with the UN and other agencies, is prepared to act quickly and deploy an integrated mission as
soon as the terms of a ceasefire agreement are confirmed. The conditions for such a deployment are generally good but any delay will create an opportunity for disaffected groups to undermine the process, and result in a renewed cycle of violence with consequences both for the long term political situation and the immediate humanitarian problem.

- The plan produced under the PSOD’s leadership must synchronise the immediate stabilisation objectives within the overall framework of recovery, reconstruction and development which is essential for long term stability in Carana.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

- Strategic direction was given by the Directive which stated that:

  “The objective of the African Union should be to stabilise the situation in Carana by establishing a mission for a period of six months, thereby creating the conditions through which an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana are created, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and civilians at risk are protected.”

- This constitutes the African Union objective for Carana, the achievement of which will include:

  - The provision of advice and assistance to a transitional government to enable it to:
    - Re-establish rule of law,
    - Address the demands of re-establishing the 1991 Constitution,
    - Prepare for elections on whatever timescale is established by a peace agreement,
    - Address the economic needs of Carana,
    - Restructure its future armed forces,
    - Rectify the damage to the education system resulting from the conflict,

  - A peacekeeping force with the capability:
    - To monitor the ceasefire, report violations and take appropriate action to prevent breaches,
    - To provide protection to African Union personnel and facilities,
    - To provide protection to civilians at risk,
    - To provide assistance in support of programmes to disarm armed groups,
    - To provide support to humanitarian assistance which is defined as providing physical protection when necessary, or requested, and ensuring that the general environment is conducive to the ability to conduct humanitarian assistance,
    - To plan to support an election process to include the provision of logistic assistance and security during registration, campaigning and voting.
The provision of humanitarian assistance to address:
- Immediate needs arising from shortages of food and basic commodities,
- The needs of the 200,000 IDPs and refugees and to support their return,
- The shortcomings in the provision of medical care and support,

The re-establishment of acceptable standards of human rights to include:
- Recognition of individual rights,
- Recognition of the rights of children,
- Recognition of the rights of women,

STAKEHOLDERS

- Achieving the objective will require a concerted effort by all stakeholders. Close cooperation with the deployed UN Country Team, UN agencies, funds and programmes, governmental and non-governmental organisations is essential from the outset,

- In addition, it is essential to ensure that:
  - The Government of National Reconciliation is included, and that its responsibilities are clearly understood by all parties,
  - The CRC remains engaged as a full partner in the process,
  - Individual Member States, International Organisations and donors who are prepared to support the reconstruction effort are encouraged to do so, and engaged at an early stage.

ASSUMPTIONS

- Our efforts to consult key stakeholders reflect the basic assumption that the cooperation of the Government of National Unity is required for meaningful planning to take place, and that all parties agree not to put obstacles in the way of an African Union deployment, or oppose it.

- We have also made a number of other assumptions:

  - That military and police personnel required for an African Union operation in Carana will be forthcoming from troop and police contributing countries, and will be authorised to the necessary level which will be determined by the Technical Survey Team.
  - That essential donor funding will be both forthcoming and timely, sufficient to ensure availability of the necessary resources and full cooperation of potential troop contributors to support the rapid deployment of the stabilisation force,
  - That required capabilities for an African Union operation, particularly in the area of aviation and communications, will be available,
  - That only those tasks that are clearly indicated by this directive will be included in the planning; any additional tasks should be the subject of a separate recommendation and approved by the Commissioner for Peace and Security.
- That a peace agreement will be achieved as the result of the ongoing negotiations in Kalari, and that the terms will receive full and timely international support.
- That the current humanitarian operation currently taking place in Carana will continue.
- That efforts of the CRC will continue to ensure that ethnic sympathisers in neighbouring Sumora, Katisi and Rimosa do not interfere in the internal affairs of Carana.
- That appropriate mechanisms for planning a transition to a UN mission will be included within the planning process.

**CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS**

- It is not for this directive to lay down the criteria for success in every functional area but the following targets represent what we need to achieve:
  - Deployment of a Technical Assessment Mission within 14 days of the signing of a peace agreement,
  - Deployment of a peacekeeping mission within 90 days of a decision by the Peace and Security Council,
  - Stabilisation of the current humanitarian crisis within 6 months of a Security Council Resolution. Stabilisation will be deemed to have occurred when it is no longer necessary to provide emergency relief,
  - Transition arrangements to a UN mission in place on completing of stabilisation, although the timing of transition should be dictated by prevailing conditions,
  - Cessation of hostilities as specified by a peace agreement,
  - Implementation of the terms of a peace agreement as specified by that agreement,
  - Commencement of a programme of disarmament of armed groups within 3 months of a peace agreement, and completion within 10 months,
  - Completion of planning for support to an election process within 6 months of a Security Council Resolution,
  - Return of all IDPs and refugees within 2 years, and provision for displaced voters to participate in the election should it occur before they are able to return,

**CONSTRAINTS**

- The general state of the Caranian infrastructure presents significant operational and logistical challenges and road movement can become a major problem in the rainy reason, particularly in the more remote parts of the country; this will create a dependence on movement of goods and personnel by air, particularly by helicopter at certain times of the year.

- The timeline that is likely to emerge out of the peace negotiations envisages elections within 12 months; this is probably a fait accompli and will place us under significant pressure. On one hand we will need to have our plans to support the elections in place in
good time, and the other we must be prepared for the consequences should the elections slip. Planning will need to be carefully coordinated between the African Union mission and a United Nations successor mission.

- The preceding point is likely to be exacerbated by a Government of National Unity that will initially lack the capability to undertake its own responsibilities, both in preparing for elections but potentially in other areas such as disarmament and security sector reform.

PROCESS

- Planning for a possible deployment will be led by the African Union Commission.

- Notwithstanding the priority on stabilisation planning will be the need for an integrated approach; major benchmarks are:
  - Strategic Directive - complete
  - Mission Directive - complete
  - The Draft Plan
  - Report to the Peace and Security Council
  - Authorisation of the mission by the Peace and Security Council
  - Establishment of an integrated Mission Headquarter
  - Assumption of operational planning responsibilities by the Mission HQ, validation and endorsement of the Draft Plan,

TIMELINE

- Technical Assessment Mission: Within 14 days of the signing of a peace agreement,

- Submission of the report to the Peace and Security Council: 1 week after return of technical assessment mission.

- Mission Plan: 20 days after the submission of the report to the Peace and Security Council

- Peace and Security Council resolution

- Final draft Mission Plan: 3 weeks after Peace and Security Council decision

- Establishment of mission headquarters within 5 weeks of the Peace and Security Council resolution,
• Validation of the draft Mission Plan within 8 weeks of the Peace and Security Council resolution.

RESPONSIBILITIES & DEADLINES

• The PSOD is to lead planning activities until a SRCC is appointed for Carana. Once appointed the SRCC is responsible for ensuring the substantive integration of all relevant elements into the mission plan.

• The PSOD will provide the Commissioner for Peace and Security with an initial presentation for the Peace and Security Council on options for an integrated peace support operation in Carana immediately on the return of the technical assessment mission.

• The PSOD is to lead a technical assessment mission to Carana at the earliest opportunity.

• The PSOD is to produce recommendations on the structure, size and concept of an integrated peace support operation in Carana to the Peace and Security Council in a report within 7 days of return from the technical assessment, or as directed by the Commissioner for Peace and Security.

• The PSOD is to present a final draft for an integrated peace support operation in Carana within 28 days of return from the technical assessment mission, or as directed by the Commissioner for Peace and Security.

• The PSOD should develop a comprehensive public information strategy. The strategy will have the objective of promoting an understanding among local communities, the parties to the peace process and the public at large, with regard to the role of an African Union peace support operation in Carana.

SRCC

• Once a SRCC has been appointed s/he will assume the lead for planning for the mission in Carana.

Engagement with the UN system including UNCT

• The UNCT should be actively included, and contribute to, the planning process in order to ensure proper alignment, coordination and consistency in the development of
the UN long term objectives and to establish the conditions for a transition to a UN mission.

5 February 2008
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION CARANA (UNAC)

INTRODUCTION

1. This document, including all of its Annexes (A-D), constitutes the entire Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

2. This document provides the authority for the use of force and explains policy, principles, responsibilities and definitions of the ROE.

3. These ROE are directions to operational commanders, which delineate the parameters within which force may be used by designated United Nations military personnel during the UN peacekeeping operation, UNAC. They are founded on UN Security Council resolution 1544 22 July 2006. Where issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Where issued as permissions, they provide the authority for commanders to take certain specific actions if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the mission. The ROE allow for the use of the necessary degree of force to guarantee self-defence and define the circumstances under which the use of force by UNAC military personnel may be justified.

4. In addition to the main document, the key elements are attached as follows:
   a. Authorized Rules of Engagement (ROE) for UNAC: Annex A
   b. ROE for UNAC –DEFINITIONS & AMPLIFICATIONS: Annex B
   c. ROE for UNAC – DIRECTIONS & PROCEDURES: Annex C
   d. ROE for UNAC - WEAPON STATES: Annex D
   e. ROE for UNAC - SOLDIERS CARD: Annex E
AUTHORITY

5. The power and authority of UNAC is derived from Security Council resolution 1544 dated 22 July 2006 and must be exercised in a manner consistent with the UNAC mandate as described in this resolution.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

6. The area of operations for the application of these ROE is defined by the territory of Carana. This includes the adjacent territorial sea, superjacent airspace and any designated air and sea corridors to be utilized by UNAC.

MISSION


EXECUTION OF ROE


a. General:

(1) The conduct of peacekeeping operations is guided by the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant principles of International Law.

(2) All UNAC military personnel must operate within the framework of this document which has been formulated in accordance with the parameters set out by relevant Security Council Resolutions.

(3) UNAC ROE provides direction to commanders at all levels, governing the use of force within the mission area. They define the degree and the manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that the application of force is controlled and legal. The ROE inform commanders of the constraints imposed and the degree of freedom they have in the course of carrying out their mission.
EXERCISE ONLY
UN RESTRICTED

(4) Throughout the conduct of peacekeeping operations, where force is to be used, all UNAC military personnel must comply with the international principles of proportionality, the minimum use of force and the requirement to minimize the potential for collateral damage.

(5) Contingents are only to use weapons authorized by the United Nations in accordance with the respective MOU.

(6) While the ROE may restrict the manoeuvre and operation of specific weapons systems, they do not:

I. Describe specific doctrine, tactics and procedures.

II. Address safety-related restrictions.

b. Self-Defence:

(1) Nothing in these ROE negates a Commander’s right and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for self-defence. All personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defence.

(2) Self-defence against a hostile force(s) may be exercised by individuals, or individual units under attack, as well as other UN military personnel who are able to assist those individuals or individual units under attack, or which are in imminent danger of being attacked.

c. Military Necessity. The principle of military necessity authorizes the use of only that force which is required to accomplish the mission. Military necessity does not authorize acts otherwise prohibited under international law.

d. Alternatives to the Use of Force: Whenever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort must be made to resolve a potential hostile incident by means other than the use of force (e.g. through negotiations or assistance including from local authorities).

e. Duty to Challenge and Warn. Before resorting to the use of force, every reasonable step must be taken to deter any person or group from displaying hostile intent or committing a hostile act. The procedure required by the UN to challenge and warn is given at Annex C.
f. **Duty to Observe Fire/Target Identification.** See Annex C, paragraphs 1 and 6.

g. **Duty to Use Minimum and Proportional Force:**

   (1) Any force used must be limited, in its intensity and duration, to that which is necessary and proportionate to achieve the objective. In some circumstances operational urgency may dictate the immediate use of deadly force.

   (2) The use of force should be commensurate with the level of the threat. However, the level of response may have to be higher in order to minimize the cost in terms of UN casualties and civilian casualties.

   (3) Commanders should, where appropriate, consider the use of alternatives to the use of physical force such as negotiation, psychological methods, and other non-lethal means, which may include the deployment or manoeuvre of larger forces in order to demonstrate resolve.

h. **Avoidance of Collateral Damage.** When force is used, all necessary measures are to be taken to minimize collateral damage.

i. **Duty to Report.** Each confrontation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of force, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible, whether it results in casualties and/or damages or not. More details are included in Annex C.

j. **Use of Force beyond Self-Defence.**

   (1) The use of force beyond self-Defence may be applied only where necessary to fulfill the UNAC mandate, in the particular circumstances listed below, consistent with the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1544 of 22 July 2006 and subject to the conditions set out in these ROE:

   I. Protection of UN, and other key, installations, areas or goods;

   II. Ensure security and freedom of movement of UNAC personnel;
III. Permit UNAC personnel to discharge their duties.

(2) The Force Commander, or the commander to whom the authorization has been delegated, retains direct control over the use of force in these circumstances.

9. **Applicability.** The ROE set out in this document apply to all armed military personnel assigned to UNAC as authorized by the Security Council.

10. **Responsibility of the Force Commander and Subordinate Commanders:**

    a. The implementation of the ROE is a command responsibility. The ROE are addressed to the Force Commander, who is then responsible for issuing them to all Subordinate Commanders.

    b. The Force Commander and his/her Subordinate Commanders are not permitted to exceed these ROE, but may, when and as appropriate, recommend more restrictive limits on the actions of assigned forces, for United Nations Headquarters (UN HQ) approval. The Force Commander will issue the ROE to all contingents as received from UNHQ. He/she will ensure that all military personnel understand and apply these ROE correctly. The Force Commander and/or the subordinate commanders may issue additional guidance on the ROE and may incorporate these ROE into appropriate orders or instructions. The subordinate commanders must inform the Force Commander of such instructions issued by them.

    c. All commanders must seek clarification if they consider the authorized ROE to be unclear or inappropriate for the military situation.

    d. It is the responsibility of the contingent commanders to ensure that all those under their command understand these ROE. To this end, the ROE must be translated in a clear and concise way into the language of each troop-contributing country. To assist in this process, they must issue to each individual an ROE Aide-Memoir (Blue Card), translated into the language(s) appropriate for each contingent.

    e. Training in the application of ROE is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. ROE training sessions must be conducted on a regular basis and as a minimum once per month and whenever UNAC military personnel, including individual
replacements or reinforcements as authorized by the Security Council, are deployed into the mission area.

f. The Force Commander shall issue a Detention and Disarmament Policy setting out his directives for implementing the ROE including:

(1) grounds for apprehension/detention;
(2) search procedure following apprehension;
(3) detention procedure following apprehension
(4) weapons confiscation and disarmament;
(5) treatment of detainees

11. **ROE Contravention.** The following procedures apply in dealing with a UNPKO ROE contravention:

   a. Any ROE contravention must be reported to UN HQ (DPKO), through the UN chain of command, by the quickest possible means.

   b. Flanking and subordinate commands should be informed where the consequences are likely to affect them.

   c. Remedial measures, including training, must be taken to avoid reoccurrence.

   d. Any contravention must be subject to a formal investigation. Any alleged contravention of the ROE must be investigated in accordance with the UNAC Standard Operating Procedures and the United Nations Directives for Disciplinary Matters involving Military members of National Contingents. The findings will be forwarded to United Nations Headquarters, which will provide relevant evidence and findings to the troop contributing country for follow-up and disciplinary action. The troop contributing country may also undertake its own investigation.

12. **Security Classification.** The ROE should be classified as **UN RESTRICTED.**
13. **ROE Changes.** These ROE can only be amended or changed with the authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

14. **Revocation.** N/A

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Jean-Marie Guéhenno  
Under-Secretary-General  
for Peacekeeping Operations  

22 August 2006

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**Annexes:**

A. Authorized Rules of Engagement for UNAC  
B. ROE for UNAC – Definitions and Amplifications  
C. ROE for UNAC – Supporting Directives and Procedures  
D. ROE for UNAC – Weapon States  
E. UNAC Soldiers Card
Security Council Resolution

1. The Security Council, by its Resolution 1544 (2006) decided to establish a United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) with effect from 22 July 2006. The successful completion of the UNAC mission will result in Carana achieving peace and security. The Security Council thereupon decided to establish by its Resolution 1544 (2006), a United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) which is mandated to establish UNAC, for a period of 6 months and further decides that UNAC will consist of up to 6,800 United Nations military personnel, including up to 200 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,250 United Nations police officers including formed police units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Carana, and the appropriate civilian component.

2. The UN Security Council by its Resolution 1544 (2006) appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Representative for Carana to direct the operations of UNAC and coordinate all United Nations activities in Carana.

UNAC Mandate

3. Under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1544 (2006), the UNAC mandate consists of the following elements:

   a. to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;

   b. to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties military forces;

   c. to develop, as soon as possible, preferably within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution, in cooperation with relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, an action plan for the overall implementation of a voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and
woman; and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;

d. to carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDRR programme;

e. to provide security at key government installations, in particular ports, airports and other vital infrastructure.

UNAC Objectives

4. To implement its mandate UNAC has the objective of giving full effect to the following four Programmes:

   a. Protection of United Nations’ Staff, facilities and Civilians,

   b. Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance,

   c. Support for Security reform, and


5. Protection of United Nations’ Staff, facilities and Civilians:

   a. to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, without prejudice to the efforts of the government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within their capabilities;

6. Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:

   a. to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;
b. to monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and internally displaced persons, abductees, women, children and demobilized child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;

c. to ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNAC to carry out human rights promotion, protection, and monitoring activities;

7. Support for Security reform:

a. to assist the new Carana transitional government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;

b. to assist the new transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

8. Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:

a. to assist the new transitional government in conjunction with other international partners, in reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both national and local level;

b. to assist the government in restoring proper administration of natural resources;

c. to assist the new transitional government in preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than end 2007;
d. to assist the new transitional government in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;

9. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council, by its Resolution 1544 (2006), authorized UNAC, for the duration of its mandate, to fulfill its tasks, and decided to review this issue and all other aspects of UNAC’S mandate after 6 months.

SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC

10. The following ROE have been authorized for use by UN Security Force (UNSF) in UNAC:

Rule 1 — Use of Force1

Rule No 1.1 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to defend oneself and other UN personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent, is authorized.

Rule No 1.2 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to defend other international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent, is authorized.

Rule No 1.3 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to resist armed attempts to abduct or detain oneself and other UN personnel, is authorized.

Rule No 1.4 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to resist armed attempts to abduct or detain other international personnel is authorized.

Rule No 1.5 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect United Nations installations, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act, is authorized.

1 Rule 1 should be read in conjunction with the Amplifications set out in Annex B.
Annex A

Rule No 1.6 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect key installations, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act is authorized.

Rule No 1.8 Use of force up to and including deadly force, in order to protect civilians under immediate threat of physical violence, is authorized.

Rule No 1.9 Use of force (not including the use of deadly force) to prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities, is authorized. In case of necessity to act in self-defence, use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized.

Rule No 1.10 Use of force, up to and including deadly force is authorized:

   a. In order to protect the security of UNAC personnel; and

   b. Against any individual and/or group who limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UNAC personnel.

Rule No 1.11 Use of force up to and including deadly force, to resist armed/forceful attempts to prevent UNAC personnel from discharging their duties is authorized.

Rule 2 — Use of Weapon Systems

Rule No 2.1 Use of explosives in order to destroy weapons, ammunition, mines and unexploded ordnance, in the course of the disarmament exercise, is authorized.

Rule No 2.2 Indiscriminate pointing of weapons in the direction of any person is prohibited.

Rule No 2.3 Firing of weapons other than for organized training and as authorized in these ROE, is prohibited.

Rule No 2.4 Firing of warning shots is authorized.

Rule No 2.5 Use of riot control equipment and agents is authorized.
Rule No 2.6 Use of lasers for survey, range finding and targeting is authorized.

Rule No 2.7 Use of Grenades and Grenade 40 mm HE is authorized only when necessary for immediate self defence or the immediate defence of others authorized to be defended under these ROE against a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.

Rule 3 — Authority to Carry Weapons

Rule No 3.1 Carriage of loaded personal weapons is authorized.

Rule No 3.2 Overt carriage by individuals of hand-held support weapons such as machine guns, light mortars and hand held anti-tank weapons, is authorized.

Rule No 3.3 Deployment and carriage of weapons on or in vehicles, aircraft and vessels is authorized.

Rule 4 — Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm

Rule No 4.1 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against oneself, one's unit or UN personnel is authorized.

Rule No 4.2 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against other international personnel is authorized.

Rule No 4.3 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent against any civilian, or against installations and areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander is authorized.

Rule No 4.4 Searching of detained persons for weapons, ammunition and explosives, is authorized.

Rule No 4.5 Disarming of armed individuals or groups, when so directed by the Force Commander, is authorized.
Annex A

Rule No 4.6  In the absence of police authority, warning and questioning of persons is authorized if those persons are known to be obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission, or are believed, on reasonable grounds to be so doing.

Rule No 4.7  In the absence of police authority, detention and search of persons is authorized if those persons are known to be obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission or are believed on reasonable grounds to be so doing.

Rule 5 — Reaction to Civil Action or Unrest

Rule No 5.1  In the absence of police authority, detention of any person who commits or threatens to commit a crime, is authorized.

Rule No 5.2  In the absence of police authority, warning and questioning of suspicious person or persons obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission are authorized.

Rule No 5.3  In the absence of police authority, detention and search of suspicious person or persons obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission are authorized.

Rule No 5.4  In the absence of police authority, security operations such as roadblocks, barriers, cordon and search and prohibition of entry, which may disrupt the normal pattern of civilian life, are permitted to the extent necessary for mission accomplishment.
ANNEX B TO
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC
DEFINITIONS AND AMPLIFICATIONS

1. **Civil unrest**: the commission, perpetration or instigation of acts of violence, which affect public peace and order.

2. **Collateral Damage**: Incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian property not part of an authorized target.

3. **Cordon**: A deployment of UNAC personnel around an object or location with the intent to isolate an area and restrict and/or control both access and exit.

4. **Detainee**: A detainee or detained person means any person deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction of an offence.

5. **Force**: The use of, or threat to use, physical means to impose one's will. Such means are used by formed, armed and disciplined bodies of UNAC and generally imply the potential to use appropriate and authorized levels of violence.

   a. **Armed Force**: The use of weapons, including firearms and bayonets. Note: Such weapons are generally designed to inflict deadly force, but can also be used in a non-deadly manner.

   b. **Deadly Force**: The level of force which is intended, or is likely to cause, death regardless of whether death actually results. This is the ultimate degree of force.

   c. **Non-deadly Force**: The level of force which is neither intended nor likely to cause death, regardless of whether death actually results.

   d. **Minimum Force**: The minimum degree of authorized force which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, to achieve the objective. The minimum degree of force is applicable whenever force is used. Minimum force can be deadly force if appropriate.

   e. **Unarmed Force**: The use of physical force, short of the use of “armed force”.

DPKO Integrated Training Service, United Nations Logistics Base
Aeroporto Militare "O. Pierozzi" - Piazza Del Vento, 1 - 72011 Casale - Brindisi, Italy - tel. 0831 418750 - fax 0831 418758 www.unlb.org
NOTE: Riot control equipment and other ‘non-lethal weapons’ may be used as a means of unarmed force as they are designed and intended to be used so as not to inflict deadly force.

6. **Hostile Act.** An action where the intent is to cause death, serious bodily harm or destruction of designated property.

7. **Hostile Intent.** The threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through an action which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:
   
   a. The capability and preparedness of the threat.
   
   b. The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack.
   
   c. Historical precedent within the Mission’s Area of Operations (AO).

8. **Loaded Weapon.** A weapon that has ammunition attached to it but none of the ammunition has been placed into the chamber.

9. **Positive Identification.** Assured identification by a specific means. This can be achieved by any of the following methods: visual, electronic support measures, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, passive acoustic analysis or Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) procedures.

10. **Proportionality.** The amount of force which is reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time, to decisively counter a hostile act or hostile intent, or to achieve an authorized objective.

11. **Reasonable Belief.** Reasonable belief is when the Commander, or individual, logically and sensibly concludes, based on the conditions and circumstances in which he or she finds him or herself that a hostile threat exists.
12. **Self-Defence.** Self-Defence is the use of such necessary and reasonable force, including deadly force, by an individual or unit in order to protect oneself, one’s unit and all UN personnel against a hostile act or hostile intent.

13. **Preemptive Self-Defence.** Action taken to pre-empt an imminent hostile act, where there is clear indication that an attack is about to be made against oneself, one’s unit and UN personnel.

14. **UN Personnel.** All members of UNAC (including locally recruited personnel whilst on duty), UN officials and experts on mission on official visits.

15. **Other International Personnel.** Personnel belonging to international agencies associated with UNAC in the fulfilment of its mandate, and other individuals or groups formally and specifically designated by the SRSG in consultation with UN HQ, including:
   
   a. Members of organisations operating with the authority of the UN Security Council (SC) or General Assembly (GA);
   
   b. Members of authorized charitable, humanitarian or monitoring organisations;
   
   c. Other individuals or groups specifically designated by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG); but excluding foreign nationals such as businessmen and journalists.

16. **Warning Shots.** A warning shot is a signal demonstrating resolve, or a capability to convince persons to stop threatening actions, or as a warning and potential precursor to the actual use of deadly force. A warning shot is a shot fired at a safe point of aim with no intent to cause death, injury or severe damage.

**AMPLIFICATIONS**

17. **General Amplification to Rule No 1:** Rule No 1 generally allows the use of force up to and including deadly force in given circumstances. Any use of force must be graduated where possible and only the minimum force necessary to meet the threat must be used. This does not prevent the immediate use of deadly force if the threat to life is imminent and there is no alternative but to use
deadly force immediately to remove that threat.

18. **Amplification to Rule No 1.5 and Rule No 1.6:** The minimum force necessary, NOT including deadly force, may be used to protect your property and property (including buildings and installations) it is your duty to protect. Deadly force, including opening fire, may ONLY be used against an individual or group who:

   a. attempts to damage or destroy property whose damage or destruction is likely to endanger the life of, or cause serious injury to, yourself or any other person; or

   b. attempts to destroy property that has been declared ‘designated property’ by the Force Commander; and

   c. there is no other reasonable way to prevent the individual or group from so acting.

19. For the purposes of both Rule No 1.5 and Rule No 1.6, the following property has been designated by the SRSG and declared ‘designated property’ by the Force Commander:

   a. UNAC aircraft and vessels, including any aircraft and vessels of Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) that are deployed to the UNAC AO for the purpose of assisting UNAC to fulfill the mandate (whether occupied or not);

   b. Occupied UNAC vehicles, premises and compounds (including police stations, courts, and other central and district administration buildings);

   c. Occupied vehicles, premises and compounds of organizations and agencies who are assisting UNAC in the fulfillment of its humanitarian mandate, including United Nations specialized agencies, other international organizations, foreign government agencies and non-governmental organizations;
d. Carana community power stations and water reticulation and purification plants (whether occupied or not);

e. UNAC arming and refueling points (whether occupied or not); and

f. UNAC and civil communication facilities essential for UNAC command and control between battalions, units and higher headquarters (whether occupied or not).

20. **Amplification to Rule No 1.9:** Deadly force may only be used (as part of a graduated response where possible) where the attempt to restrict movement if successful would likely result in the loss of life or serious injury to any person.

21. **Amplification to Rule No 1.10:** Deadly force may only be used (as part of a graduated response where possible) where the attempt to prevent UNAC personnel from discharging their duty if successful would likely result in the loss of life or serious injury to any person. This does not prevent you from using non-deadly force to resist the individual or groups attempt to prevent you from discharging your duties. If in so doing the response from that individual or group threatens yours or any other person’s life, or is likely to cause serious injury, then deadly force may be used.

22. **General Amplification to Rule No. 5:** Action taken by PKF in relation to persons who are involved in civil actions or unrest shall only occur in the following circumstances: while performing routine activities PKF observe serious criminal activity; Force/Mission protection; providing assistance to Carana Security Agencies in accordance with agreed procedures; and while operating in the vicinity of the tactical coordination line/ border until border normalization is achieved. Persons who are detained are to be treated in compliance with Annex C and the Force Commander’s Detention and Disarmament policy issued separately.

23. **Amplification to Hostile Intent.** Hostile intent will always be determined on a case-by-case basis and will be heavily dependent upon local conditions. Hostile intent can be demonstrated by:

a. persons that carry out armed attacks against UN personnel and other international personnel or against those falling under the protection of UNAC;
Annex B

b. members of any military or paramilitary group or organization carrying personal weapons or manning weapon systems, whether or not they are engaged in attacks against UN personnel, other international personnel and/or those falling under the protection of UNAC;

c. civilians that spontaneously take up arms against UN personnel, other international personnel or those falling under the protection of UNAC.

24. In the case of Militia or suspected Militia, at all times the determination of hostile intent shall require weapons being carried in a manner deemed ready for immediate use. When UNAC Security Force units are confronted by Militia or suspected Militia who are:

a. Positively recognized, and

b. Carrying firearms and/or grenades, and

c. Operating in a tactical manner,

then such Militia or suspected Militia may be engaged on the basis that they are demonstrating hostile intent. In such circumstances the requirement to provide a warning in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex C is not mandatory.

25. NOTE: ‘Positively recognized’ means that a person is observed and is understood to be Militia or suspected Militia.

26. ‘Operating in a tactical manner’ shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. The following examples would normally constitute operating in a tactical manner:

a. Militia or suspected Militia patrolling in a tactical manner or military formation;

b. Militia or suspected Militia in an ambush position;

c. Militia or suspected Militia deployed or deploying at a road block(s);
d. Militia or suspected Militia deployed or assessed as deploying as an armed sentry, or sentries to their position.
General

1. **Identification.** Assured identification (positive identification) of hostile forces (groups and persons) prior to engagement is required. Unobserved indirect fire is prohibited.

2. **Civil Action.** UNAC military personnel should avoid any action which would result in the disruption of legitimate civil activities in the mission area.

3. **Prohibitions.** The following prohibitions are to be observed, even when authorized ROE are being used:
   
   a. Use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law, including, in particular, the prohibition on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and biological methods of warfare; bullets which explode, expand or flatten easily in the human body; and certain explosive projectiles. The use of certain conventional weapons, such as non-detectable fragments, anti-personnel mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons is prohibited.

   b. Use of weapons or methods of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which are intended, or may be expected to cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.

   c. Use of weapons or methods of combat of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.

   d. Attacks on monuments of art, architecture or history, archaeological sites, works of art, places of worship and museums and libraries which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. In its area of operation, the UNPKO shall not use such cultural property or their immediate surroundings for purposes which might expose them to destruction or damage. Theft, pillage, misappropriation and
any act of vandalism directed against cultural property are strictly prohibited.

e. Use of methods of warfare to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuff, crops, livestock and drinking water installations and supplies.

f. Making installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations, the object of military operations if such operations may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

g. Engaging in reprisals against objects and installations protected under this paragraph above.

h. Engaging in punitive use of force and retaliation.

4. **Cordon Principles.** Cordon may only be conducted if the Force Commander judges that the situation warrants isolation of the area and that such action is consistent with the mandate of UNAC.

**WARNING PROCEDURES**

5. **General.** The use of armed force is normally a measure of last resort, in response to a hostile act or hostile intent. If a confrontation threatens the UNAC military personnel on the scene, the UN aim must be to dissuade the parties concerned from carrying on.

6. **Graduation.** The following graduated procedures are to be observed:

   a. **Verbal Negotiation and/or Visual Demonstration.** Every effort must be made to warn any potential or actual aggressor before UNAC military personnel respond with force. The aim is to stop hostile activity.
Annex C

b. **Unarmed Force.** If the preceding step is unsuccessful, where possible, minimum unarmed force may be employed. If riot control equipment or other non-lethal weapons are possessed by UNAC personnel trained to use those weapons, and where they would be an effective means to bring the threat to an end before having to resort to deadly force, then they may be used if authorized by the on-scene commander.

c. **Charge Weapons.** An attempt should be made to make use of the visual and audible effect of charging weapons to convince any aggressor that failure to stop the aggressive activity may result in the use of deadly force.

d. **Warning Shots.** If the threat continues, and subject to the orders of the commander on the scene, warning shots should be fired at a safe point of aim, to avoid causing personal injury or collateral damage.

e. **Armed Force.** If all the preceding steps, including the use of unarmed force, are unsuccessful and there are no other choices available, the necessary armed force may be used. The decision to open fire will be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time. Before opening fire, a final warning is to be given as follows:

i. The warning may be given verbally (in English and in the local language and / or visually by a sign or by illumination (e.g. hand-held red flares, searchlights, etc).

ii. You are to challenge in English:

iii. “UNITED NATIONS, HALT OR I SHOOT”.

iv. This challenge will be repeated in French as follows:

v. “NATIONS UNIES HALTE OU JE TIRE”.

vi. The verbal or visual warning should be repeated as many (and at least three) times as necessary to ensure understanding or compliance.

**FIRING PROCEDURES**

7. **Opening Fire Without Warning.** The only circumstance, under which it is permitted to open fire without attempting to follow the warning sequence, would be if an attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that, even a moment’s delay could lead to death of, or grievous injury to oneself, UN personnel and those who are under the protection of UNAC as specified in this ROE.

8. **Procedures During Firing.** The use of firearms must be controlled, and there should be no indiscriminate firing. Automatic fire should only be used as a last resort. The following points must be kept in mind during fire:

   a. Fire must be aimed.

   b. Minimum rounds are to be fired to achieve the authorized objective.

   c. All necessary precautions are to be taken to avoid collateral damage.

9. **Procedures After firing.** After any weapon firing, the following actions are to be taken:

   a. **Medical Assistance.** All injured persons should be given first aid as soon as possible, when such aid can be given without endangering lives.

   b. **Recording.** Details of the incident are to be recorded, including:

      i. Date, time and place of firing;

      ii. Unit and personnel involved;

      iii. The events leading up to firing;
iv. Why UNAC personnel opened fire;

v. Who or what was fired on;

vi. The weapons fired and the number of rounds discharged;

vii. The apparent results of the firing; and

viii. A diagram of the incident scene.

10. Reporting. Following an immediate report that firing has taken place, the above information and the current situation are to be reported through the UN chain of command, to the Force Commander and UN HQ (DPKO), as rapidly as possible.

SEARCH AND APPREHENSION PROCEDURES

11. See the Force Commander’s Detention and Disarmament Policy issued separately.
ANNEX D
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC
WEAPON STATES

1. **General.** The weapon states provided below may be authorized by the Force Commander as he believes operationally appropriate provided the state selected does not exceed the authority given by Security Council resolution 1544 (2006) of 22 July 2006 and all other relevant subsequent resolutions and as defined in the Numbered ROE for UNAC.

2. In urgent circumstances, a commander or individual soldier may increase weapon readiness. As soon as the immediate danger has passed, weapon readiness status will be returned to that ordered by higher authority.

3. **Graduated Weapon States:**

   **State 1 — Personal Weapons (Rifles, carbines, light machine guns and pistols);**

   1.1 Personal weapons should be carried in a non-offensive manner.

   1.2 Personal weapons may be carried by all military personnel serving in formed UNAC military units, but ammunition is to be carried separately from the weapon.

   1.3 Personal weapons may be carried and have a loaded magazine or belted ammunition inserted in or attached to the weapon. However, the weapon may not be cocked and no ammunition may be inserted into the breech or chamber.

   1.4 Personal weapons may have a loaded magazine or belted ammunition inserted in or attached to the weapon. The weapon may be cocked and ammunition may be inserted into the breech or chamber.

   **State 2 – Anti-tank weapons;**

   2.1 Anti-tank weapons / RPG may be carried covertly by designated UNAC military personnel.

   2.2 Anti-tank weapons / RPG may be carried overtly by designated UNAC military personnel.
State 3 — Riot Control Weapons;

3.1 No riot control weapons may be carried.

3.2 Riot control weapons may be issued to UNAC patrols, but are to be carried in patrol vehicles and must remain out of sight of non-UN personnel.

3.3 Riot control weapons may be carried openly.

State 4 — Laser Equipment;

4.1 Ground / vehicle laser sources may only be used in the "Passive" state.

4.2 Ground / vehicle laser sources may be used in the "Active" mode. All reasonable precautions are to be taken to ensure that no injuries are inflicted as a result of the use of laser.

State 5 — Mortars;

5.1 Mortars may be carried covertly by UNAC patrols and in UNAC vehicles.

5.2 Mortars may be carried overtly by UNAC patrols and in UNAC vehicles.

State 6 — Ground, Vehicle and Aircraft- Mounted Weapons (Crew served weapons);

6.1 Ground, vehicle, vessel and aircraft-mounted weapons may be deployed, but not loaded with missiles or shells. Where the weapon system contains ammunition integral to the system, the weapon is not to be prepared for firing i.e. not “charged”.

6.2 Ground, vehicle, vessel and aircraft mounted weapon systems may be prepared for firing i.e. “charged”.

State 7 — Helicopter- Mounted Weapons;

7.1 Helicopter-mounted missiles may not be deployed.
7.2 Helicopter-mounted guns and missiles may be deployed. Guns may have a loaded magazine or belted ammunition inserted in or attached to the weapon, but they may not be cocked, and no ammunition may be inserted into the breech or chamber. Missiles may not be prepared for immediate firing.

7.3 Helicopter mounted guns and missiles may be deployed. Guns may have a loaded magazine or belted ammunition inserted in or attached to the weapon and may be cocked and ammunition inserted into the breech or chamber. Missiles may be prepared for immediate firing.

**NB:** Instructions for armoured-fighting vehicles (AFV), artillery/howitzer guns, anti-aircraft systems and any additional weapon systems authorized by the United Nations will be issued separately.
Annex E
UNited Nations Assistance Carana (UNAC)
Rules of Engagement – Aide-Mémoire (Soldiers Card)

GENERAL RULES FOR USE OF FORCE

1. The principles of minimum force and proportionality shall apply at all times and in all circumstances.

2. Wherever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort shall be made to control a situation through measures short of force, including personal contact and negotiation, visual signals, maneuvers, charging of weapons and firing warning shots.

3. The use of force, including deadly force, shall only be resorted to if all other means to control the situation have failed or do not hold any promise of achieving the authorized objective.

4. Any force used must be limited in its intensity and duration to what is necessary to achieve the authorized objective and must be commensurate with the level of the threat. In some cases, operational urgency may dictate the immediate use of deadly force.

5. Use force only when absolutely necessary to achieve your immediate aim, to protect yourself, your soldiers, UN or other designated personnel, installations, equipment and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

6. The decision to open fire shall be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time to obtain such an order. Before opening fire, give a final warning at least three times, either in French, which is the national and administrative language in the mission area, or in English which is also an official language of the National Government:

   “NATIONS UNIES HALTE OU JE TIRE”
   “UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL FIRE”

You may open fire without warning only when an attack is so unexpected that a moment’s delay could lead to death or grievous injury to yourself, to other members of the UNAC military component or to other persons who are under
protection of UNAC military component as specified in these ROE.

7. Fire must be aimed and controlled. Automatic fire will be opened only as last resort. If possible, a single shot should be aimed at non-vital parts of the body in order not to kill. Indiscriminate fire is not permitted. Fire for effect must not last longer than necessary to achieve the immediate aim.

8. Avoid or minimize collateral damage.

9. After fire has ceased, render medical assistance and record the details of the incident and report them as soon as possible through the chain of command, whether or not casualties have occurred.

10. When in doubt, always seek clarification from higher command.

You are allowed to use force: UP TO AND INCLUDING DEADLY FORCE:

1. To defend oneself, other UN personnel, individuals designated by the Head of Mission or other international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent;

2. To resist attempts to abduct or detain oneself, other UN personnel, other international personnel or individuals designated by the Head of Mission;

3. To protect installations, facilities, equipment, areas or goods designated by the Head of Mission against a hostile act or hostile intent;

4. To protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance*;

5. To resist attempts by any person or group that limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UN personnel, humanitarian workers or individuals designated by the Head of Mission*;

* when and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

You are allowed to use force, EXCLUDING DEADLY FORCE:

6. To prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities;
7. To prevent forcible passage by individuals or groups through a checkpoint** and to detain those who have forcibly effected passage through a checkpoint**.

** Whose establishment has been authorized by the Force Commander.

8. Detained persons are to be handed over to appropriate local authorities as soon as possible.

** Hostile Act. A hostile act is defined as an action where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm or destruction of designated property.

** Hostile Intent. Hostile intent is defined as the threat of imminent use of force, demonstrated through an action which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:

- The capability and preparedness of the threat;
- The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack;
- Historical precedent within the Mission’s Area of Responsibility.