An Appraisal of the Responsiveness of Countering Violent Extremism Measures

International Peace Support Training Centre
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JOSEPH KIOI MBUGUA & MAJOR GEOFFREY MISIANI

“Enhancing Strategies and Mechanisms of Countering Violent Extremism and Protection of Civilians”.
An Appraisal of the Responsiveness of Countering Violent Extremism Measures
SERIES 8, NO.4

OCCASIONAL PAPER

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JOSEPH KIOI MBUGUA & MAJOR GEOFFREY MISIANI

DECEMBER, 2017
Foreword

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is a Peace Support Operations (PSO) research and training institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). IPSTC has evolved into the regional center of excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. It addresses the complexities of contemporary United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) integrated PSO through analysis of the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum of peace and security concerns ranging from conflict prevention, conflict management to postconflict reconstruction.

The Center has made considerable contributions in training and research on peace support issues in Eastern Africa through design of training curriculum, field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs; the Occasional Papers are field based research products produced annually, while the Issues Briefs are secondary sources based products produced quarterly. These publications are an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC.

The Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD) of the IPSTC presents one of the occasional papers produced this year titled: An Appraisal of the Responsiveness of Countering Violent Extremism Measures in Mombasa and Kwale Counties. The study provides the current state of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) measures put in place by various actors in the county such as the strategic response initiated by the government, challenges and an exploration of proposed actions that can improve performance and effectiveness of CVE measures. This study has generated information necessary for policy and strategy development at the international, regional, national and county levels while at the same time informing training content. The research and publication of this Occasional Paper has been made possible by the support of the Embassy of Japan in Kenya through UNDP-Kenya.

Brigadier Patrick M. Nderitu
Director, IPSTC
Acknowledgment

The support provided by the IPSTC administration starting from the Director, Head of Research to Head of Applied Research is well appreciated. This study could not have been successful without cordial collaboration of the researchers who managed their different academic and professional inclinations in a harmonious manner. The respondents many of whom participated in the research with passion and devotion to contribute to their country’s well-being deserve special credit. The County Commissioner’s office, Kenya Police Service and Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and community representatives deserve special mention for their invaluable contributions.

The research team of Joseph Kioi Mbugua and Major Geoffrey Ongata Misiani however take responsibility for any shortcomings in the study.
## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Administration Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Act Change and Transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>Africa Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
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<td>ATPU</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Police Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGM</td>
<td>County Government of Mombasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGK</td>
<td>County Government of Kwale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDP</td>
<td>County Integrated Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPK</td>
<td>Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Community Policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>County Peace Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Drugs and substance Abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith Based Organizations</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HURIA</td>
<td>Human Rights Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>Income Generating Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization of Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCVE</td>
<td>Kwale County CVE Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>KECOSCE</td>
<td>Kenya Community Support Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHRC</td>
<td>Kenya Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHRN</td>
<td>Kenya Human Rights Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISCO1</td>
<td>Kwale International Sugar Company Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMYA</td>
<td>Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTF</td>
<td>Kenya Tourists Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCAP-PCVE</td>
<td>Mombasa County Action Plan for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCIC</td>
<td>National Cohesion and Integration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counter Terrorism Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>National government</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NK</td>
<td>Nyumba Kumi</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSCVE</td>
<td>National Strategy for Counter Violent Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCCT</td>
<td>United Nations Counter Terrorism Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td>Violent Extremism</td>
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Abstract

The evolving countering violent extremism (CVE) security sub sector is yet to acquire universal conceptual definition and operational standards. Using qualitative exploratory approach this study explores the responsiveness of thematic based CVE measures to the structural context of violent extremism (VE) in Mombasa and Kwale County. The research has identified appropriate strategies in place, established their relevance, feasibility, participation, accountability, effectiveness and challenges. The study has made recommendations based on literature and field research findings. Management of CVE in the country has acquired legal and strategic framework but effective long term implementation will depend on a number of factors discussed in this study.

Key words

Countering violent extremism, social-cultural, economic, political factors and measures
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Definitions and Concepts

Terrorism

Terrorism can refer to ‘the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants’ (UN, 2005). Terrorism refers to an act or threat of action which involves the use of violence against a person, endangers the life of a person other than the person committing the action, creates serious threat to health or safety of the public, results in serious damage to property, involves use of fire arms or explosives among others carried out in the aim of intimidating or causing fear amongst members of the public, intimidating or compelling the government or international organization to do or refrain from any act or destabilizing the religious, political, constitutional, economic or social institutions of a country or an international organization (NCTC, 2016).

Violent Extremism (VE)

Violent Extremism refers to ‘acts of individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals’. The particular beliefs could include those of a political, social or ideological nature. It also refers to individuals using violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies (NCTC, 2016).

Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)

Counter Violent Extremism is the employment of conflict sensitive, voluntary, people centered non-coercive measures to de-legitimize violent extremist ideologies to reduce the number of terrorist supporters and recruits (NCTC, 2016). ‘CVE is a realm of policy, programs and interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical, political, social, cultural and religious ideologies and groups. CVE focuses on countering the pull of terrorist recruitment and influence by building resilience among populations vulnerable to radicalization’ (Holmer, 2013:2). CVE focuses on the strength and potential social capital inherent in communities bearing in mind that well-informed and equipped families, communities and local institutions can offer best defense against violent extremist ideologies (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011).
**CVE Measures Responsiveness**

In this study CVE measures responsiveness refers to the extent to which measures effectively address identified segmented causes of VE, the nature and level in which national and county CVE system, organizations and institutions are designed and operate to deliver desired outcomes.

It will include five key criteria: *Relevance* (clearly linked to the target), *Accessibility* (trickle down to lowest level), *Participation* (participatory process includes all stakeholders such as men, women and youth, National government (NG), County government, (CG), Civil Society Organizations (CSO)), *Feasibility* (chances of the measures succeeding given capacity of the organization and extent of the problem), *Accountability* (level of actors responsibility to beneficiaries, rule of law, oversight authority and collaborating partners).

**Strategies**

Strategies in this study refer to a higher framework below the policy or part of the policy through which CVE is defined and approached. It can encompass measures which precede activities or programmes. The strategy provides a bird’s eye view of the stated mission, goal or objectives.

**Mechanism**

Mechanism here refers to the institutional structures and norms that anchor CVE. Institutions are informed by the overall policy. Institutions can also be creations of strategy or they may employ various strategies to realize their goals and objectives.

**Measures**

Measures in this study refer to course of action or actions taken in order to realize specific objectives. Measures are informed by the overall policy and strategy and likewise measures inform specific programmes and activities.

**Appraise/Assess**

Appraisal and assessment will be used synonymously to refer to estimating or determining the quality and effectiveness of CVE strategies and measures employed.
1. Introduction

The global recourse to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) was informed by the failures and challenges of the American led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) that came soon after September 11, 2001. The measures employed not only did not reduce or deter terrorists but also escalated recruitment and they were widely condemned for torture and human rights abuses (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). The Muslim community in many countries of the world felt they were the target of the new war. This made the peacemaking efforts of moderate Muslims untenable in their domestic political constituencies. A lot of resources were also lost where the returns on investment were dismal (Schmid, 2010).

The basic tenet of CVE is inclusion of all stakeholders in a comprehensive and voluntary process that brings communities, Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and governments in collective action. It attempts to address the structural causes of conflict popularly referred to as the ‘push and pull’ factors according to the context. It also aims to build capacity of vulnerable communities to resist recruitment, detect and deter radicalization and prevent violent extremism.

However, since there is no universal definition, practices may differ from one country or region to another. Some countries include hard measures while others argue for a purely soft approach to change hearts and minds.

The UN came up with the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS). Contained in General Assembly Resolution 60/288 of September 8, 2006, it represented a shift in the counter-terrorism approach. This outlined four methods to counter terrorism: creating measures to, ‘address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, prevent and combat terrorism, build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.’ This approach incorporated the use of non-military tools in addition to the traditional military tools, to combat terrorism, and emphasized respect for fundamental human rights. The strategy reflected the new thinking along CVE where participation and whole of government approach were emphasized.

Many countries have followed this model to draft national strategies, which are in the process of implementation. Development partners have also focused their interests on supporting CVE initiatives such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance to CVE projects in Kenya. A major problem
associated with CVE is that it is foreign driven and it may not reflect the context of VE since adequate mapping has not been done in Eastern Africa (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake, 2016). Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has spearheaded CVE efforts in the region through creation of a hub for coordination and training member countries.

Kenya is a member of the United Nations (UN) and a signatory to a number of security related international multi-lateral treaties, regional, bilateral agreements aimed at combating terrorism and violent extremism. Kenya is actively engaged in the implementation of CVE activities through the government, international organizations and civil society. It has also played a conspicuous role in regional and international CVE efforts.

This Countering Violent Extremism research in Mombasa and Kwale county study has confirmed findings of previous Mombasa County Government (MCG-CVE & Kwale County Government (KCG) CVE Action plan on the main drivers of violent extremism (VE) and challenges of CVE in both countries. There are specific causes of VE within a political, economic and social cultural context. Though they are not mutually exclusive and in most cases reinforce each other, there is a need to design corresponding measures that are specifically targeted to contextual factors.

The study is organized into 5 chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction, Chapter 2 is the analysis of the relevant literature, while chapter 3 presents research methodology, chapter 4 provides field research findings and chapter 5 presents conclusion and recommendations.

1.1 Background

During the agitation for liberal democracy in Kenya in the 1990s many young men from the Coast region were awarded scholarships to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Islam and returned to become Sheikhs. On their return, they were better trained, more educated and preached the Saudi version of Islam, completely changing many traditions. This included the declaration of Maulid celebrations as heresy (bid’aa). Different Sheikhs took the new interpretation to different extents with some declaring other Muslims as “Kafir” if they did not practice the new version of Islam, hence introducing the Takfir, (Patterson, 2015; CGM, 2017).
In the run up to the 1997 elections, politically motivated ethnic clashes erupted in Likoni where the so called Kaya Bombo youth attacked the Likoni Police station and engaged in a month long orgy of violence that seemed to target mainly non-coastal people (HRW, 2002). Though this might have been a political strategy to push out certain communities from the region, it also laid the foundation for the rise of coastal sub-nationalism. Likoni is largely inhabited by the Digo sub-tribe of the Mijikenda.

Several attacks have been recorded in Mombasa and Kwale including an attack on clubs, churches in Likoni and most recently the attack on Central Police Station in 2016 and killing of policemen in Ndiani, Kwale, 2017. Sheikh Mohamed Idris of Sakina Mosque in Mombasa was also killed in Likoni. Many youth from Mombasa and Kwale have travelled to Somalia and a number have returned. A number of youth have been killed either by police or unknown persons making Mombasa and Kwale restless and full of tension. There are also reports of many youth who have disappeared without trace (CGM, 2017).

The government of Kenya has implemented various CVE measures such as providing legal, policy and institutional frameworks and has partnered with development partners to build local capacity (NCTC, 2016). In the recent past, the country has hosted Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) meetings and the UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) workshops on implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNCCT, 2017).

1.2 Mombasa County

Mombasa County is one of the counties located in the coastal region of Kenya along the shoreline of the Indian Ocean. It borders Kilifi County to the North, the Indian Ocean to the East and Kwale County to the South. The County has six sub-counties namely: Mvita, Kisauni, Nyali, Likoni, Changamwe and Jomvu which also represents electoral constituencies (CGM, 2013). Currently violent extremism is mainly concentrated in Majengo, Kisauni, Old Town, Bondeni and Likoni (Mombasa).

1.3 Kwale County

Kwale County is located at the South Eastern tip of Kenya where it borders Tanzania and counties of Taita Taveta, Mombasa, Kilifi and the Indian Ocean. It has a population of 649,931 according to 2009 national census. Children below 17 years make up 53.83% of the population and the youth (18-35) make up about
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27.45%. It is divided into three sub counties namely; Matuga, Msambweni and Kinango, which correspond to constituencies with an addition of Lunga. The main VE hot spots are Diani, Ukunda, Kona Ya Musa, Bongwe, Mbuwani, Tiwi, Ng’ombeni, Kombani, Mwapala, Matuga and Lunga.

Kwale produced a CVE plan (2016) in a consultative process that brought together the national and county government, civil society and communities. It is founded on NCTC guidelines and global CVE framework (KCG, 2016).

Table 1: Mombasa & Kwale County: Socio-Economic & Political Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Mombasa County Facts &amp; Figures</th>
<th>Kwale County Facts &amp; Figures</th>
<th>National Facts &amp; Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Area in Km²</td>
<td>229.9 km²</td>
<td>8270.2 km²</td>
<td>582 650 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Population Growth rate</td>
<td>939,370 3.5%</td>
<td>713 488 48.46 Million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Education level Primary</td>
<td>KCPE – 35 (2013)</td>
<td>Among last 5 counties in the country – KCPE, KCSE (2012-14)</td>
<td>47 Counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>KCSE – 39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gini Co-efficient</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1.4 Statement of the Problem

Despite government and CSO initiatives for CVE in the country there is still prevalence of CVE in Mombasa and Kwale counties, which cannot be adequately explained. Though implementation of the national strategy is still in formative stages, lack of specific focus on social-cultural, economic and political measures may hinder design and implementation of holistic, targeted and effective CVE measures. Due to this complexity some stakeholders tend to design CVE measures that are generic rather than responsive to the specific context (Cabrera & Pauwels, 2016; ICG, 2016; UNDP, 2016).

There are multiple socio-cultural, economic and political factors that inform VE occurrence. In some instances, contextual grievances such as widespread poverty, perceived political exclusion, and seeming marginalization from the mainstream
society among others have been highlighted as providers of conducive environment for VE (Cabrera & Pauwels, 2016; MCG, 2017; KCG, 2016).

Given that the national CVE strategy and County Action Plans were recently put in place, it is not yet clear how the measures effectively target the above factors, the types of measures being employed and the challenges thereon in making CVE effective especially in Mombasa and Kwale Counties.

1.5 Justification

While considerable efforts have been made to understand VE in Kenya, little research has been done to assess the CVE measures in place and the extent to which they respond to the diverse socio-cultural, economic and political conditions conducive for VE development (ICG, 2016; MCG, 2016 Feddes & Gallucci, 2016).

There is a close relationship between underlying socio-economic, political conditions and terrorist activities (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011). According to this school of thought, there are specific underlying conditions and grievances that explain how, why and where terrorism/violent extremism occur. Therefore CVE measures that do not consider and respond to these factors are bound to fail.

Cabrera and Pauwels (2016) in their study of CVE in the Horn of Africa demonstrates how CVE implementation in Kenya has been bedeviled by accusations of human rights abuse that has created a wedge between communities and the police. They also observe that the measures employed do not respond to the structural factors noting that there is a need for revising programmatic approach to reflect local dynamics.

Finn et al., (2016) in addressing how CVE measures incorporate youth in CVE indicates how the measures are top down rather than bottom up and therefore do not reflect the real conditions and interests of the youth. They also note that CVE measures sometimes retain aspects of counter terrorism that target youth based on Islamic religion and ethnic Somali identity thereby creating disunity among Kenyans that further fuels political conflicts. They assert that CVE should focus purely on soft measures and address youth social and economic vulnerabilities.

Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake (2015) in an Afrobarometer survey of whether Kenya’s CVE strategies exacerbate drivers of violent extremism also observe that Kenya’s CVE measures alienate the target communities further from the state and do not address specific regional or community vulnerabilities.
This study will attempt to fill this gap by assessing the state and responsive nature of CVE interventions undertaken by various actors in Mombasa and Kwale counties. These regions have been identified for the study due to their high susceptibility to VE and presence of organizations implementing CVE measures (Cabrela & Pauwels, 2016).

Given VE’s multifaceted nature, organizations undertaking CVE are ideally expected to conduct context-specific analysis so as to design and implement comprehensive, strategic and responsive measures against VE.

1.6 Focus and Scope

This study will focus on socio-cultural, economic and political factors based CVE measures put in place by various actors. The study will focus on Mombasa and Kwale counties.

1.7 Research Questions & Objectives

1.7.1 Main Research Question

What is the responsiveness of CVE measures undertaken by various actors in Mombasa and Kwale counties with reference to social-cultural, economic and political factors?

1.7.2 Specific Questions

(i) What are the CVE measures undertaken by various actors in the counties of Mombasa and Kwale?

(ii) In what ways do the measures respond to socio-cultural, economic and political factors susceptible to VE?

(iii) How can responsiveness of CVE measures be improved?

1.7.3 Hypothesis

The quality and effectiveness of CVE measures is dependent on responses to specific social-cultural, economic and political factors.

1.7.4 Main Research objective

To assess the responsiveness of CVE measures undertaken by various actors in Mombasa and Kwale Counties.
1.7.5 **Specific Research Objectives**

To:

(i) Assess the CVE measures undertaken by various actors in Mombasa and Kwale Counties

(ii) Examine ways in which the measures respond to socio-cultural, economic and political factors susceptible to Violent Extremism

(iii) Establish how the responsiveness of CVE measures can be enhanced
2. Literature Review

2.1 Countering Violent Extremism

Literature on CVE related issues examines the causes of VE - evolution, impact and related dynamics. The United Nations notes that VE continues to undermine peace and security, human rights and sustainable development throughout the world (UN, 2016). In the past twenty years, the acts of violent extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Boko Haram and Al-Shaabab have threatened lives and livelihoods in various countries (ICG, 2016).

For a long time, countries worldwide depended on security-led counterterrorism interventions to address VE. Such interventions often included traditional military measures, law enforcement means, and sharing of intelligence (ICG, 2016). However, these conventional approaches are repressive and often lead to serious violation of human rights and freedom, and subsequently pushing those affected towards VE. Additionally, these interventions have been reported to be short-term and reactive, whose main objective is to curb some of the outward manifestations of VE (UN, 2016).

A need for comprehensive, long-term and systematic approach that has the potential to address the drivers of VE has been expressed. This has prompted the advent of a development-oriented approach commonly known as Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), (UN, 2016). In accordance with this view, CVE includes approaches to counter terrorists narratives through the development of initiatives designed to mitigate the more structural causes that make an individual vulnerable to recruitment.

Therefore, the current policy paradigms informing CVE focus on ‘whole-of-government approach’ and security and development nexus (Holmer, 2013; Crelinsten, 2009). Prevention includes human rights based approaches such as addressing social, cultural and economic factors. However, there are challenges with anti-terrorist legislations, policies, political and social values and domestic constraints that hinder cooperation (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011; Schmid, 2010). The absence of VE incidents does not necessarily indicate success of CVE measures (Zeuthen, 2016).
2.1.1 Socio-Cultural Factors

Strengthening partnership between government and the civil society is a crucial factor for addressing social-cultural factors (Crelinsten, 2009). In an examination of the effectiveness, suitability and appropriateness of current CVE policies in Kenya, Finn et al. (2016) found that the youth support CVE/PVE soft measures that address structural inequities and that do not profile Kenyan Muslims.

2.1.2 Economic Factors

Countering the financing of terrorism is identified as an effective economic measure (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). According to coast residents CVE should focus on poverty reduction, reducing state authoritarianism, equal treatment of citizens and adequate provision of public services. Other proposed CVE economic solutions are: addressing root causes of violent extremism such as political, socio-cultural and economic grievances as a long-term measure according to specific context (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011).

2.1.3 Political Factors

Some of the proposed solutions to political issues are; inclusion, participation, legitimacy and equality. VE can be countered through enhanced development, and creation of more employment opportunities (GCCS, 2015; Khalil & Zeuthen, 2016). Other measures are: enhancing practitioners training for better community engagement, improving public service delivery, reforming security and criminal justice sector, improving correctional services, supporting community policing and developing risk assessment, disengagement and reintegration programs (GCCS, 2015). These findings, from secondary sources, generally correspond with the authors’ field research findings, thereby indicating the salience of the factors identified.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Though there are no theoretical foundations of CVE other than policy and programme-based frameworks (Challgren et al., 2016); there are theories of social cohesion and integration that can be applied in CVE.

2.2.1 Social Cohesion Theory

According to Emile Durkheim (1893/1994), social cohesion is the interdependence between members of the society, loyalties and solidarity. Talcott Parson (1961)
understood social cohesion as shared values and norms to enable members to identify and support common goals and objectives, share common moral principles and codes of behavior that guide relations with one another. According to Lockwood (1999) social cohesion refers to primary social relationships (family, relatives, and neighbourhood) and secondary association. Social cohesion is a continuous process of elaborating an assembly of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunities.

There are three domains of social cohesion: economic (equality/inequality), political and socio-cultural that informs individuals’ attitudes and behavior (Klein, 2011). Social cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and horizontal interactions among members of a society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that include trust, a sense of belonging, willingness to participate in societal activities and their behavioural patterns. According to this view cohesion can be gauged vertically between state-society relations or horizontally among communities. VE erodes social cohesion while CVE is meant to reduce or eliminate violent extremism and thereby increase social cohesion and national stability. The above analysis when applied to CVE offers a holistic and multi-dimensional prism thereby enabling a more comprehensive analysis and corresponding design of socio-cultural, economic and political factors based CVE measures in the target counties.

2.3 Conceptual Framework

The circles represent specific qualities of measures; overlapping areas indicate presence of several qualities with the center representing few measures that encompass all the qualities of measures. Measures that include a high percentage of these qualities are more likely to be successful.

Author’s conceptualization, 2017
2.4 CVE Responses of Different Actors

2.4.1 United Nations (UN)

The UN provides leadership in CVE through a number of international legal documents and thematic guidelines. UN Security Council has produced a number of CVE related resolutions. Resolution 1373 (2001) obliges member countries to enact anti-terrorism legislations, institutional and regulatory frameworks. UNSCR 1456 (2003) require anti-terrorism laws enacted by member countries to comply with international law and specifically international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law. UNSCR 1624 (2005) focus on controlling incitement to violence while UNSCR 2178 (2014) focus on stemming the flow of foreign fighters. The UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (2006) emphasizes focus on ‘conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism’. It provides guidelines on good practices, countering financing of terrorism, ensuring human rights protection, supporting victims, border security management and regional and national counter terrorism strategy development (UNCCT, 2017). The UN has undertaken various initiatives to create awareness of the strategy and CVE in Kenya however, in spite of this; communities and CSO implementing CVE programmes do not regard it as a leading partner.

2.4.2 African Union

The OAU adopted a *Prevention and combating of terrorism convention* in 1999 and further guidance was given to Regional Economic Communities (RECs) for implementation of counter-terrorism measures in line with UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and UNSCR 1373 (AU, 2017; Finn, 2016). In 2004, the African Union (AU) Commission added a *Protocol to the OAU Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*. This instrument confers authority to AU Peace and Security Council to coordinate continental anti-terrorism affairs. AU has a Plan of Action on *Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*. Subsequently IGAD drafted and proposed security strategy (IGAD Peace & Security Strategy (IPSS) in 2010 (Demeke & Debru, 2014). IGAD also adopted a peace and security strategy 2016 – 2020 in 2014 which makes an improvement on the 2010-2014 strategy. The aim of the security strategy was to address institutional problems and aligning IGAD strategy to the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework. IGAD also developed a Plan of Action to *Counter Violent Extremism*. Though AU informs governments’ strategy on CVE, practitioners do not regard it as an institution of priority recourse in CVE. Given it’s over reliance on donor-supported programmes, its provisions do not bear home grown and locally owned products.
2.4.3 Bilateral Contributions

Kenya has received support from the United States of America (USA) as it was recognized as a special focus zone in the US National Security Strategy in 2002 (Mogire & Agade, 2011). USAID and US army supported soft power programs for development in North Eastern Kenya/Somali border as a winning hearts and minds strategy (Bachmann & Honke, 2010). Subsequent British and Danish aid has buttressed Kenya’s CVE approaches in a Western paradigm with consequent repercussions (Finn, 2016). Kenya has received hard security assistance to state security forces, provision of legal assistance to anti-terrorism legislation and engaging with perceived vulnerable specific areas and population of the country on soft security issues (Bachmann & Honke, 2010). Kenya has partnered with East African Community (EAC) and IGAD to enforce travel and financial bans (and freezing of assets) for terrorist suspects, transfer of arms, ammunition, supplies and personnel from foreign forces that support Al Shabaab (Demeke & Debru, 2014). These contributions however still bear the much maligned counter terrorism approaches. Capacity building provided to IGAD and CSO in training and programmes design is desirable but the measures should be tailored to local conditions.

2.4.4 Role of Civil Society Organizations

From a global perspective Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play a big role in CVE in order to improve relationships between security agents, civil society and communities. Many countries have their own specific approaches to security sector and community cooperation/community based policing such as Nyumba Kumi in Kenya. CSOs in Kenya have close relationships with affected communities and are perceived to represent their voices.

Kenya has more than 7 500 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and more than 300 000 Community Based Organizations (CBOs), (FARSIGHT, 2016). NGOs, social movements, media, private sector, academic community, CBOs, Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) offer space for dialogue and negotiation on CVE issues, promotes diversity, culture of tolerance and pluralism (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). CSOs can deliver training on CVE awareness, measuring increase in skills, capacity, social cohesion/resilience in CVE interventions and they can also help the security sector incorporate human rights and good governance principles in their CVE approaches (Holmer, 2013). However, relations between government and CSOs are often adversarial due to concerns on human rights abuses by the security sectors and perceived CSOs involvement in political affairs.
2.5  **Management of CVE in Kenya**

The country has put in place a comprehensive legal, policy and institutional framework for responding to CVE.

2.5.1 **National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)**

The NCTC was established through Security Amendment Act, 2014, with a mandate to coordinate national resources through integrated threats analysis and provide effective inter agency guidance and coordination in the management of terrorism and violent extremism threats. The institution however existed through a cabinet decision since 2004. NCTC provides guidelines on CVE approaches to county CVE action plans that roll out implementation of CVE activities in the country (NCTC, 2017). Though NCTC has provided policy direction, its impact has not yet been effectively felt on the ground. It’s yet to bridge the gap between the security sector and communities. The organization is still security heavy with more police, intelligence and military focus than communities and CSO. However, its role in granting legal and formal legitimacy for security sector, CSO and community cooperation is a good beginning.

Given the salience of economic grievances in Kwale and Mombasa, NCTC fails to address this issue since it is not part of its mandate. Certainly it is not addressing root causes of VE and it was not designed for that purpose. Therefore, creative solutions are required for the government to address VE effectively. NCTC is yet to be a premier point of reference and authority on CVE knowledge and practice in Kenya since it has not yet developed administrative and research capacity to claim leadership in the sector.

2.5.2 **National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE)**

The NCTC developed the national CVE Strategy (2016) in order to coordinate activities and guide county action plans. The strategy has nine pillars: Psychosocial, Education, Political, Security, Faith Based and Ideological, Training and Capacity Building, Arts and Culture, Legal and Political Pillar, and Media and Online. Whereas the NSCVE is being implemented at the national level through the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, the NCTC has further issued a Guide to Developing County Action Plans (GDCAP), which takes cognizance of context specific needs. Noting the need for inter-agency collaboration, the guide places control of developing and implementing county strategies on county commissioners and county governors in partnership with
local civil society organisations (NCTC, 2016). The NSCVE has a number of shortcomings identified in this study. Regular reviews can enable the policy to capture evolving dynamics of VE. Counties are using the strategy as their point of departure in drafting local action plans making coordination and standardization in national CVE approaches an achievable goal.

The Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Counter Violent Extremism (MCAP-PCVE) and Kwale County CVE Action Plan are geared to ensure that not only is violent extremism targeted and eliminated but that it also does not arise within communities. Prevention of VE targets strategies that will ensure radicalization does not occur, through working with communities to build their resilience and keep violence out and, it also includes human rights based approaches that address social, cultural and economic factors (MCG & KCG, 2017). Both plans utilized the NCTC-GDCAP guide. MCAP-PCVE also used Mombasa County Government’s Strong Citizenship Curriculum for Public Participation.

The MCAP-PCVE adopted two additional pillars: the economic pillar and the women’s pillar in response to local needs. Mombasa’s demographic economic conditions and associated diversity emerged strongly as key factors that influence the decisions made by youths and young persons to embrace violent extremist ideologies in the County. Women were also identified as both victims and perpetrators of violent extremism in Mombasa (CGM, 2017).

Implementation of the action plan is guided by a number of principles: protection of human dignity and freedoms, adherence to the rule of law and constitutionalism, participation and inclusivity, solidarity building and self-governance. A number of implementation strategies were also recommended: engagement and lobbying, capacity building, dialogue and advocacy. The County Engagement Forum co-chaired by the County Commissioner and the Mombasa Governor is the organ given the responsibility to spearhead the implementation process. Membership is drawn from various stakeholders including state and non-state actors (MCG, 2017). Effective implementation of the plan is however hindered by current poor relationship between the national and county governments.

2.5.3 Counter Violent Extremism Legislations

Laws Amendment Act, 2014 are the foundations of legal strategy for prosecuting terrorism. Other legislatures focus on prevention of torture, extradition, cyber and computer crimes. Subsequent amendments of Terrorism Act criminalized terrorism financing under the Finance Act, 2013. A Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) was established at the Central Bank to track and curb illicit transfer of funds and to enable seizure of assets associated with terrorist activities.

Security Laws Amendment Act of 2014 provides updated security sector responsibilities and powers. Kenya is also a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a regional body that deals with regional flow of illicit transfer of funds and assets meant to support terrorist activities. However, these initiatives do not cover the labyrinth of informal money transfer systems such as Forex Bureaus/foreign currency exchange and value transfer services. The Central Bank later closed informal money transfer systems such as Islamic Hawala and some NGOs suspected of having connections with terrorists’ individuals or organizations (ICG, 2016). Though there are adequate legislations, operations are hindered by poor coordination, poor enforcement and unconventional operations of violent extremists.

2.5.4 Kenya CVE Policies from a Human Rights Perspective

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a part of the International Bill of Human Rights, provides a list of human rights that all human beings are entitled to. The following tenets have a bearing on CVE/PVE measures: right to life, freedom from torture, right to liberty and security, freedom of movement, right to a free trial, right to private and family life, freedom of thought/conscience/religion/belief/freedom of opinion and expression, the right to effective remedy when rights are violated (UNCCT, 2017).

Some members of the police involved in counter terrorism have been accused of torture, disappearance of victims, arbitrary arrest, detaining without charge, detaining suspects’ relatives and rendition of suspects, execution of suspects with impunity, human rights abuse, discriminatory practices and ethnic and religious profiling (Mogire & Agade, 2011; HRW, 2015).
3. Research Methodology

3.1 Overview

This section outlines the methodology used in the study. It explains the research design and its justification and further highlights on the target population. It elaborates on the sample size and sampling procedure, data collection tools employed and rationalization for the selected data analysis instruments.

3.2 Research Design

The study used exploratory research method. This is considered the most appropriate method when the subject is not well understood. According to Bryman (2008) & Yin (1994), the choice of a research design is determined by the nature of the research questions posed (Bryman, 2008 & Yin, 1994). The study used snowball sampling, key informants interviews and focused group discussion coupled with direct observations.

3.3 Study Site

The research was carried out in Mombasa and Kwale counties. These counties were selected because of the high prevalence of violent extremism and presence of national government, county government and civil society CVE measures to address the problem.

3.4 Target Population

The key target populations for this study were relevant national government and county government representatives, Civil Society Organizations (CSO) (including Non-Governmental Organizations, Community Based Organizations (CBO), Faith Based Organizations (FBO) and business sector that carry out CVE measures in the identified study sites) and beneficiaries in the two counties.

3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Procedures

Snowball sampling was used to select eligible organisations, that is, those actively undertaking CVE measures in the selected areas. In addition, individual beneficiaries of the CVE measures were targeted focusing on youth, women and elders. Since mapping of organizations implementing CVE and their beneficiaries is ongoing, there is no sampling frame, size and boundaries of the population are unknown and therefore snowball or chain referral non-probability method was deemed more
appropriate (Heckathorn, 1997). Out of the 70-targeted respondents, 30 and 40 of them took part in the KIIs and FGDs respectively.

3.6 Data Collection Methods

The study utilised both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected through the use of open-ended questionnaires. A desktop review of existing literature was carried out to collect secondary data. Primary data was collected through interview guides. Secondary data was collected to provide a foundation for the existing literature gap. This data was sourced from books, government publications, academic journals and reports.

3.6.1 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted to collect information from the key target population (organizations). The respondents comprised key leaders in both national and county government, civil society and business sector with experience and knowledge on CVE by virtue of their profession and positions of authority. Prior notification and permission was sought from the key respondents at least a week before actual field research visits were conducted.

3.6.2 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were carried out to collect supplementary data from individual beneficiaries of the CVE interventions. FGDs provided an opportunity for clarifying on individual’s views about factors affecting CVE. FGDs comprised of 3-6 persons composed of men and women working on or were beneficiaries of CVE.

3.6.3 Data Analysis Procedures

The data was analysed using a content analysis approach whereby the data collected from FGDs and KIIs was sorted into emerging themes and subsequently coded using Microsoft (MS) Word Tables (La Pelle, 2004). The data was then interpreted based on the study objectives.

The researchers analysed the findings by looking at responses to every objective under inquiry. This process yielded patterns, relationships and trends that provided insight into CVE responsiveness. The meaning and implications of the findings to the policy makers at the County and National government levels was also highlighted.
3.7 Limitations and Mitigation Measures

CVE is a sensitive security matter in the target counties. Getting accurate and reliable data from some respondents was difficult in some hot spots. This problem was addressed through working with partners/research assistants from coastal communities who drew more trust from respondents. Respondents were interviewed in safe spaces where they felt free and secure to share information. Respondents were also assured of confidentiality of the information they shared with the researchers. The research was carried out during the campaign period for the 2017 Kenya general elections. Thus, key government officials were quite engaged in security matters and were not always available. The research schedule was adjusted to fit schedules of senior officers and/or lower rank officers working in the hot spots were interviewed.

3.8 Moral and Ethical Standards of Social Science Research

Moral and ethical standards were observed as per international standards and the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) stipulations. Potential respondents were contacted through phones and emails to seek their consent to participate in the study. Explanations on the purpose of the research, the sponsors, the work of IPSTC and how the study will be used and expected benefits to the community was also made. Due to sensitivity of information sought, respondents were assured of their confidentiality.
4. Field Research Findings: Mombasa and Kwale County

In this chapter field research findings are presented and analysed using various techniques. The measures are stated and supported through verbatim reporting of respondents’ views.

4.1 Context Analysis

4.1.1 Addressing Historical Injustices

Conflicts along the Coast revolve around the same recurrent historical and political grievances that keep on mutating informed by perceptions of historical grievances, marginalization and discrimination especially with regard to access to land. The instability in Somalia has affected security situation in Kenya particularly because the border security management is weak.

*Violent extremism, radicalization, looting and crime has relatively gone down compared to the past. VE has affected the community for about 5-6 years. The Mombasa Republican Council is no longer a major threat. Mombasa County's proximity to the conflict neighbourhood of Somalia has aggravated VE.* (KII, July, 2013, Mombasa)

Violent extremism at the coast was informed by the global war on terrorism.

*The emergence of anti-West, anti-Secular and anti-Kenya religious radical ideology associated with Salafi jihadism that began in the 1990s has influenced youth some of whom went to Somalia and returned to continue spreading the divisive ideology and associated violent extremism.* (KII Interviewee, July 17, 2017, Mnalani, Kwale). *There are criminal gangs/political militias and youth who have gone to Somalia to join Al Shabaab. Others have returned and some of them continue to engage in VE.* (KII Interview (CSO), July 13, 2017, Mombasa)

According to interviewees, community disaffection with the central government in Kwale and the entire Coast region can be traced to the colonial era whereby the British colonial authorities in Kenya and the Sultan of Oman isolated the 10 Miles Coastal Strip from the rest of Kenya’s territory.

*Violent Extremism is rampant and recruitment is still going on but it has relatively gone down due to many government interventions. The coastal political grievances and their violent expressions have mutated over time since the politically instigated Likoni ethnic clashes/Sheikh Balala’s Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) multi-party political mobilization,*
An Appraisal of the Responsiveness of Countering Violent Extremism Measures

1991/2, Kaya Bombo violence associated with politicized attempts to evict non-coastal people, 1997 to present day MRC and Al Shabaab violent extremism. (KII Interviewee, July 20, 2017, Diani, Kwale)

4.1.2 Standardization of CVE Activities

There is no standard interpretation of what VE/CVE is all about among the Security Sectors, Religious leaders, Community and Youth. VE is no longer only a thing brought by foreigners, it is local and it has assumed domestic dynamics. The main target for CVE is the youth at risk, vulnerable youth, sympathizers, returnees, radicalized groups, and recruits for Al Shabaab and ISIS. Religion is used as a justification for VE.

There is lack of high prioritization of CVE in Parliament and Judiciary. CVE is not accorded high priority as a national agenda. There has not been any substantive discussion on CVE in the National Assembly. (KII Interview (CSO), July 12, 2017, Mombasa)

4.2 CVE Measures

4.2.1 Socio-cultural Factors

Community-centered approach to VE

There is a reformed approach to VE. MCAP-PCVE is currently being implemented. Local leaders such as Chiefs and MCA use Barazas/public forums, CSO and community engagement to advocate on VE issues alongside media engagement and counter religious VE narratives.

Building good relations between police/security agents and youth

It is done through open forums/space to air grievances, youth/police/administrators dialogue, extravaganza-road shows/caravans/drama. Building local sportsmen and women as role models and enhancing capacity of Nyumba Kumi are other strategies employed.

There is a monthly stakeholders’ review of CVE. Government is training police officers to start disengagement of VE. The county has strengthened tripartite approach – NG, CG and CSO collaboration. CVE Action Plan Projects are taken to sub-county level. (KII, July 12, 2017, Mombasa)
Promoting community resilience

Promoting resilience of single women/girls, women involvement/network, gender mainstreaming in CSOs, engaging youth in extra-curricular activities, school feeding programs, adult education tailored to the context and dissemination of CVE through media especially Radio – Radio Baraka FM, Pilipili FM and Rahma.

Youth disengagement/rehabilitation from DSA

This is done through counseling, rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees and drug addicts, peacebuilding, health/DSA advocacy. About 600 youth are undergoing DSA rehabilitation in Kisauni. Wives of terror suspects are being trained on healing through engagement with experts, Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) and Office of the President. Rehabilitation is done through provision of ‘food and medicine for work’ to affected community and addicts.

Strengthening inter-faith collaboration and dialogue

Strategies focus on the empowerment of Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), sensitizing Muslim faithful in Mosques, marriage ceremonies and funerals, training Imams and Clerics, interfaith peace dialogue and collaboration with Council of Clerics – Christians, Hindu and Muslims and adapting common counter narrative messaging and advocacy on peaceful co-existence and social cohesion. Radical Sheikhs have been removed from Mosques and Committees for running Mosques have been established. Advocacy on respect for diversity, faiths and beliefs, joint celebrations in religious festivals has also been undertaken.

Enhancing partners’ collaboration and synergy

It is done through actors’ collaboration in the Mombasa CVE action plan development. CSO/FBO cooperate with NG and CGM. NCTC facilitates training on dis-engagement. CSOs work with County Peace Committees in capacity building on CVE.

Partners are cooperating in conducting CVE research with local and international researchers. Counter radicalization/VE messaging is done through proper interpretation of religious books, Ayahs/Verses that are used in radicalization, advocacy on youthful Imams’ role in VE and radicalization, promoting responsible media reporting on CVE, partners collaboration with police to share security information and training workers on IED awareness. (KII, July 12, 2017)
CSOs mapped hot spots in Kwale - Msambweni, Matuga, and Lunga while Kinango Sub County is considered a ‘safe haven’ for VE. Kwale CVE Action Plan (KCVE) was developed through consultations. FBOs collaborated with partners in CVE. Kwale County Peace Committee (CPC) partners with County CVE Steering Committee. CSOs use social media intervention. After action review of KCVE activities target youth and women.

Strengthening partners’ collaboration is done where Police, CSO, County Commissioner and County government enhance understanding of different partners such as; Community representatives, media, CBOs and NGOs. Chiefs are also pro-active in community security and cooperate with police. Holding public/ police dialogue forums to build confidence and trust.

**Building capacity of County Peace Committees and enhancing neighbourhood watch**

Reporting to security agencies has increased.

*VE suspects were arrested in Masjid Musa Mosque and Mbuwani (radicalization mosque). A number of VE and returnees cases are going on and suspects are out on bond for oathing with suspected Al Shabaab remanded for further investigations. Peace committees are working for peace and CVE. Training on CVE and Peacebuilding is taking place at Government Training Institute (GTI) in Kwale. CGK has implemented some CVE projects. Community sensitization is being done through schools – teachers/ parents and community partnership for peace.* (KII, July 19, Mnalani, Kwale)

**Promoting CVE awareness**

Sensitization on VE is done through Chief’s/County, community leaders and CSO Commissioners/Barazas. Village Committees work on community security, elders monitor youth movement and professionals from Kwale have done research and sensitization. CSOs are promoting peace in schools and colleges.

**Building capacity for Early Warning and Early Response (EWER)**

CSOs have created platforms for engagement and awareness on VE early warning for enabling women to recognize signs of radicalization of their children.
CSO use professional and innovative approaches/programming to CVE

We use baseline survey, continuous learning approach, Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting and Learning, quarterly evaluation, Early Warning and Response (EWER) system and reporting incidents. Introduction of peace poems/plays in Madrassa and establishment of youth camps targeting school going children (14-18 years old) is also being done. (KII, July 13, Mombasa)

CSOs mapped CVE actors in Kwale to enable them to concentrate on specific pillars where they have comparative advantage. Establishment of CVE clinics in schools, Peace clubs and Amani clubs has been done. National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) has supported establishment of peace clubs and monitors CVE progress.

Counter narrative messages through social media platforms

CSOs use Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram and Kiswahili Counter VE narratives. Identify recruiters and engage them positively to renounce VE.

Training youth in CVE and peacebuilding

CSOs have created ICT platforms – mobile phone-based to share information on youth, CVE and security issues and are developing a core group of youth as change agents and peace ambassadors. Reporting of incidents and fact-finding is also done by CSOs alongside engaging in community policing, liaising with County Commissioners on incidents and follow up of the trained youth.

Building capacity of Police, Community Police and Nyumba Kumi elders in CVE

National Police Service has trained officers on CVE at Kanyayo College in CT/Tactical course and Administration Police (AP)/Regular police common understanding on CVE in handling perpetrators and victims. CSOs are building capacity of CP and NK elders. Some police officers have attended CVE training seminars conducted by CSOs. Emphasize cultural/traditional values and structures that support peacebuilding and CVE. (KII, Administration Police, Mombasa, July, 14, 2017).

Promoting Inter-faith dialogue and collaboration

CSOs/FBOs foster youth peaceful co-existence and inter-faith dialogue – Sheikhs, Imams, Priests, Bishops and Pastors in Kwale. They also promote positive interpretation of Islamic teachings through dialogue.
Promoting civic education through participatory budgeting and education
CSOs create awareness on the constitution and devolved government to enable citizens to understand their rights and obligations thereby reducing ignorance.

Promoting gender sensitive programming
This is done through gender sensitive CVE to address women inclusion and mapping of women and youth participation in CVE.

Detection of Early Warning signs of radicalization in youth behavior
Parents/community/CSOs collective action for prevention – counseling. CSOs train women on children behavioural changes associated with deviant behavior as a result of radicalization and drug abuse.

Supporting extra-curricular activities for youth
Using sports, music and drama to keep youth occupied. Government and CSOs with support of development partners are building capacity of youth through sports. Given the widespread and large number of idle youth in this region, this is a relevant activity.

Building capacity of youth in education
This is done through establishment of Early Childhood Education (ECDE) and vocational training centers in every ward. County government of Kwale is improving education access and retention through provision of free education to bright students (those with more than 350 marks). It has sent 68 youth abroad to study relevant mining causes. 20 million shillings has been set aside to provide bursaries in every ward. Parents take their responsibility seriously and monitor children behavior (Tiwi ward). There has been enhanced community faith in CGK. CSOs sensitize chiefs and the community to support youth education. Peace committees provide information; Nyumba Kumi acts as middlemen between police and community.

4.2.2 Economic Factors
Enhancing youth capacity in entrepreneurship and employment
Through Devolved funds (UWEZO, Youth Fund, and Women Fund) and partners support. IOM established projects targeting returnees/vulnerable people, IGAs
such as ‘car wash’. FBO projects train youth/returnees in IT/entrepreneurship and skills such as carpentry. Resource centers for youth empowerment have also been established.

KCVE Action plan has an economic pillar. The County government is providing assistance in establishing flourmills and other Income Generating Activities (IGAs) for youth and women.

*CSOs have supported returnees through IGAs and connected youth to 30% youth procurement allocations. Youth capacity building to develop business plans and supporting women IGA projects to support children. Training in agricultural based business skills is also done with projects funded by IOM that provide materials/equipment, seeds, goats, cattle, sheds, poultry, drip irrigation units, freezers for fish traders, subsidies for fertilizers but not hard cash. County government has built schools, roads, installing electricity, youth empowerment through IGAs, women enterprises. (KII, July 18, 2017, Kwale Town, Kwale)*

National and County governments have been providing bursaries and free education. The County Government has increased employment of local youth and has been recruiting youth for National Youth Service. Government and CSO do continuous sensitization on devolved funds to improve community uptake.

**Enhancing CVE economic sector actors’ collaboration with security agents**

Kenya Tourists Federation (KTF) facilitates actors’ collaboration in the Tourism industry. It was reported that British Council/KTF were providing training on security for the tourism industry. The training focused on basic risk communication and security. Monthly meetings on security review are ongoing and Early Warning System has been put in place with cooperation of the police.

*CSOs seeking solution to land disputes through land based litigations against private companies. CSOs successfully went to court to stop eviction of squatters. There are about six pending court cases involving Kwale International Sugar Company (KISCOL). (KII, July 19, 2017, Mnalani, Kwale)*

There are inter-agency measures for jobs creation done by NG/CGK/International Organization of Migration (IOM). CSO provide oversight on devolved funds.
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) assisted by providing pesticides against recent army worms’ invasion. NG, CG, and Private sector collaboration has been enhanced to improve security for private investments through police and private security guards collaboration that complement NG efforts. Attacks on tourists were stopped. County government has enhanced vocational training and promotion of awareness and understanding of CVE. (KII, July 18, 2017, Kwale)

Hotel industry is making contributions towards security management.

Coast Tourists Network Liaise with county commissioners, police and county peace committees. Hotels vet staff and assess them for six months; new employees have to acquire police clearance. Hotels provide in-house training on terrorism related security issues. Hotels maintain routine security check procedures. There has been support for training on VE awareness from the British High Commission. (KII, July 19, 2017, Ndiani, Kwale)

4.2.3 Political Factors

National Government’s proactive initiatives through creation of NCTC and CVE strategy are changing the landscape.

Government Amnesty provision for returnees

CSO participated in discussions on Amnesty provision with the government and NCTC. Government is improving capacity of trained CVE experts and it is addressing historical injustices. Enhanced security with more police posts established. (KII, July, 17, 2017, Mombasa)

Enhancing partners’ collaboration

Police/community relations and inter-agency cooperation are enhanced and community goodwill gained and has enabled CSOs to influence government CVE decisions.

Enhanced civic education

CSO have partnered with Registrar of persons to establish National Identity Card Clinics to enhance youth access to the documents. CSOs are engaging with politicians in CVE forums to enhance their positive contribution. (KII, July 13, Mombasa)
Kwale and Mombasa CVE plan follows NCTC guidelines on establishing CVE forums

They are made up of three representatives each drawn from: parastatals, CSIC, CSOs and CG. Projects implemented by various actors are based on the KCVE plan. The Counter Commissioner is the convener of CVE forums, which meet quarterly. County commissioner/police and Ndiani Community/private sector hold regular meetings to review security issues.

Police monitors VE suspects and returnees’ movements

The government does not publicize their status to prevent stigmatization. Returnees were given start up kits and a program of integration is being implemented and monitored.

CSOs promote community partnership in security. Police ensure security/gain intelligence on armed groups operations and detection of crime. Police are improving community relations. Returnees were apprehended by police. (FGD, Kwale, July 20, 2017)

4.3 Challenges

4.3.1 Socio-Cultural Factors

Impunity of perpetrators and vulnerability of security personnel

Youth gangs have emerged. Community policing (CP) and Nyumba Kumi (NK) initiatives are not yet effective. Advocates of CVE such as Imams, chiefs and elders face death threats and abuse. There is no legal and policy foundation for Nyumba Kumi (NK). There is disregard of rule of law coupled with police harassment and human rights abuses. Violent extremists kill people perceived to cooperate with national government.

CVE actors continue to work under hostile environment

A former Assistant Chief was killed by VE in Kombani and the chief in Ukunda was shot on the leg. The area is still mourning the loss of youth and relatives and women have been rendered widows. The main areas affected are: Ukunda, Posogol (killing point in Ukunda), Ndiani, Kona Ya Musa, Matuga, Bongwe-Gombato, Kombani, Mwapala, Mnalanli, Mavuni, Horo in Lunga, Juakali, Nzombo location, Mwalugaba, Kikonene and Mubani. (Interview, Member of County Peace Committee (CPC), July 17, 2017, Msambweni, Kwale).
Youth radicalization is taking place. The youth expressed disaffection towards government and moderate religious leaders.

*Some youth have formed gangs; some Sheikhs and Imams misinterpret the true message of Islam and some youth believe in martyrdom. There is no standardized curriculum for Madrassa therefore some teachers can teach the wrong interpretation.* (KII, July 14, 2017, Mombasa)

**Information/knowledge Gap**

There is no information on the nature and dynamics of VE or how CVE is impacting on drivers of the conflict due to inadequate research based knowledge and inadequate trickle-down effect of CVE awareness.

**Inadequate community participation in CVE**

There is a clash of ideologies between Sheikhs and youth translating into low community trust for some FBO CVE advocates.

*Police are regarded as untrustworthy by the community. Some actors use ineffective CVE strategies such as staging road shows/caravans, which may have little impact on specific VE target groups. Also there are no effective change-agents to work as role models for the youth. There is inadequate follow up and poor government reintegration of returnees and ineffective DSA supply and rehabilitation management.* (KII, July 12, 2017, Mombasa)

Due to structural conditions the family has been severely affected as it is manifested in early marriages, high divorce rates, and deterioration of social morals, weak parental guidance and counseling. Combined with weakness at the family level, youth capacity is low and there is little community and government collaboration to address the problem.

*Children as young as 15 years old locally known as ‘Kichuuzi’, supply and take drugs with impunity and once they gain income from drug peddling, they leave school. The level of illiteracy and school drop outs rate is high. Due to a combination of these problems, society is characterized by fear, desperation, and mistrust.* (KII, July 14, 2017, Mombasa)
Poor administration of justice

This makes witnesses unwilling to volunteer information. Parents protect suspects and communities acquiesce to VE for fear of victimization/retribution and there is corruption among police who release VE suspects.

Lack of effective CVE co-ordination among CSO actors

Of the nine CVE strategic pillars, many actors overlap on few pillars such as training and capacity building. There is over concentration on a few areas in Kwale such as Ukunda – Gombato. CSOs are not well coordinated.

Inadequate rehabilitation services for DSA addicts

Given the magnitude of the problem in the area, the little assistance provided has not had a major impact. DSA is a serious concern in Kwale and Mombasa Counties. DSA contribute to VE.

Inadequate CVE awareness and capacity

Kwale County is large and therefore the CVE message has not percolated to the grassroots level and training in CVE is inadequate. Elders/Balozi, CP, NK Committees activities are not harmonized.

Radicalization and recruitment of VE through social media and infiltration of Al Shabaab

This happens through the porous border and community reluctance to provide information to police.

CVE actors face security risks; NK elders are killed, Chiefs/village elders live in fear. 51 people have been killed since 2016. DPC members are perceived as traitors. Some returnees abandoned IGA projects for fear of reprisal. Some youth are opposed to CVE and there is irresponsible/insensitive journalism that exposes CVE actors and increases hotel and tourism industry vulnerability due to negative media reports. (FGD, July 20, 2017, Kwale)

VE recruitment takes place through Madrassa and relief food supplies. Some schools are also engaged in recruitment.

There is low scale radicalization through Madrassa from fundamentalist ideologies of terrorists/Al Shabaab and influence of some Islamic sects such as ANSARI who do not
value education; youth gangs, Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and Al Shabaab returnees who perpetuate Illegal arms flow. Other groups present are Mtalia, AL Qaeda and Wakali Kwanza. (KII, July 17, 2017, Kwale)

There is social media incitement and intimidation and appropriation of VE grievances by politicians.

CVE concept not yet well understood by community and religious leaders

There is a challenge of countering narratives that are opposed to CVE through religious leaders who are knowledgeable on the subject and can use religious scripts to counter them. Radicalization in Madrassa is done through social media, DSA and petty criminality. Family and youth are rendered vulnerable by poor parental guidance, low education levels, high school dropout rates, intergenerational discord and negative cultural beliefs.

There are perceptions of historical injustices

This had led to perceptions of marginalization, lack of strong identification with national government and poor land administration, politicization coupled with corruption and land grabbing. Youth expressed disaffection with police brutality, disappearances, marginalization and inaccessibility of documents such as birth certificates and identity cards.

Politicians and extremists offer false promises. Politicians influence release of suspects and politicize religion and CVE. There is also limited access to justice among the youth. Some respondents felt that there was wholesale community condemnation, human rights abuses and poor reintegration of returnees. Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) followers advocate for the whole former Coast Province’s rights despite establishment of counties.

Attempts by elders to advise them to register as a formal political party and agitate for their rights through legal mechanisms have not been successful. Currently there is no major secession-type tension after MRC was subdued in 2013. (Interview, Member of CPC, July 17, 2017 Msambweni, Kwale)

Armed Gangs Operate with Impunity.

Groups such as Mulungunipa, Al Shabaab, ISIS, Wakali Wao, Wakali Kwanza and MRC operate in the region, VE suspects kill security personnel, elders and chiefs. (FGD, July 14, 2017, Kisauni, Mombasa)
4.3.2 Economic

Youth economic vulnerability

There is no economic pillar in the national CVE strategy. The devolved funds have not been sustainable due to poor legal structures and lack of business skills among the youth. There is lack of adequate resources to reach grassroots levels and no follow-up of Income Generating Activities (AGAs). County government of Mombasa does not fund CVE and corruption is rampant.

Economic sector is not working well as a CVE tool. There is inadequate SMEs, low up take of devolved funds and unresolved land grievances

There have been cases of MPESA Outlets’ raids in Kwale. There is limited NG and CGK funding of CVE. Hotel industry does not sponsor education or support the fishing industry. There is unemployment/perceived discrimination in access to jobs in the private sector, vulnerability of youth to influence of violent groups and radicalization of hotel workers by Al Shabaab. (KII, July 20, Kwale, 2017)

There are unresolved land issues which fuel conflict.

4.3.3 Political Factors

Lack of or ineffective participation of county governments in security management

At the national level the constitutionally proposed ‘County Policing Authority’ is yet to be effected to facilitate effective cooperation of NG/CG on security matters. CVE strategy not yet gazetted to provide legal teeth and there is no legal framework for its implementation. There is no bill to legalize amnesty and no clear legal process and interpretation of amnesty policy thereby making implementation difficult.

Divisive politics exist and can be seen in the disharmony between NG/CG and politicization of security especially around elections. There is no agreement on resource/burden sharing in the funding of CVE between the NG/CG. There is perceived connection between youth gangs and politicians. (FGD, Mombasa, July 15, 2017)

Mistrust between government and CSOs

Some CSOs facing allegations of supporting VE were finally absolved. Police are accused of human rights abuses. Intra-returnees killing have been observed and there is no provision for returnees’ protection/rehabilitation. There are no proper
channels of community/government communication on security matters. Security agents don’t work in harmony coupled with inadequate civic education.

**Poor interagency coordination**

There is disharmony in CVE coordination between the national and county government and there are mixed perceptions of government’s hard security approach towards VE that reduced their activities but at the same time drove the actors underground and, as well hardened them even further.

This was observed with CVE actors at the local level where the NCTC’s whole of government approach is not visible.

*Poor police/community relations and partnership cooperation is weak. Intra-returnees conflicts and murders. Some returnees volunteered for amnesty and later re-engaged into VE. Some returnees are training new VE with the skills they acquired in Somalia. Grey area in the relationship between VE and MRC.* (KII, July 20, Kwale, 2017)

**Weak legal and policy foundation leading to poor access to justice**

National policy on CP and NK is not yet ratified and there is inadequate follow-up of returnees’ re-integration. CGK has minimal involvement in security affairs. Suspects are often released for lack of evidence. Sometimes police release suspects un-procedurally due to corruption. Security agencies do not protect informers and sometimes leak information to suspects and suspects have disappeared while in police custody. Returnees do not get adequate support to integrate effectively in the face of social stigma and discrimination.

**4.3.4 Gauging CVE Measures Responsiveness Using Rubrics Analysis**

Performance rating is done based on respondents views and researchers’ assessment using descriptive rather than evaluative approach since what is being measured cannot be objectively quantified and dimensions are of different value (Moskal, 2006). Assessment/scoring level include very strong, strong, average, very weak and weak.
### Table II. Analysis of Measures Responsiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic area</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Accessibility</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Feasibility</th>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Overall Rating level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-cultural</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Building good relations between police/ youth through dialogue/ open forums and training police officers</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Very Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Promoting Inter-faith dialogue and collaboration</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Community-centered approach to VE &amp; Promoting community resilience</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Creation of mobile phone based platform and counter messaging</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Very Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Youth disengagement/rehabilitation from DSA</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Detection of Early Warning signs of radicalization</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Promoting gender sensitive programming</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Building capacity of youth in education</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sensitization on CVE through extravaganza – road shows/caravans, drama</td>
<td>Very weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Enhancing youth uptake of devolved and other funds: Sensitization, training and follow up of small businesses</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Enhancing CVE economic sector actors’ collaboration with security agents</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Inter-agency measures for jobs creation</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Creation of NCTC and National CVE Strategy</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Government Amnesty provision for returnees</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Enhanced civic education</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Enhancing partners and inter-agency collaboration</td>
<td>Very Strong</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4 Discussion of Findings

The criteria below will be used to assess the quality and effectiveness of the measures employed.

4.4.1 Relevance

In both counties there is a general correspondence between the causes identified in the field research and literature review. As indicated in the challenges, a number of questions can be raised on whether some measures respond to the target VE.

4.4.2 Accessibility

Efforts have been put in place by multiple actors to make CVE trickle down to the village level. However challenges have been noted associated with scale, area and population target, capacity and other vulnerabilities.

4.4.3 Participation

CVE as a community-focused intervention require local buy-in. However as a foreign and top-down concept it has not yet been well fused with local community’s culture, ideology and general communication. There is need for a more effective communication and participatory strategy. The local culture encourages group discussions and this can offer a good entry point for participatory analysis.

4.4.4 Feasibility

There are a number of strategic and legal foundations identified in this study that augur well for CVE implementation. However, challenges have also been identified associated with scarcity of resources, community vulnerability, low capacity, ineffective coordination, violent extremists’ resistance and political interference.

4.4.5 Accountability

The level of actors’ responsibility to beneficiaries, rule of law, oversight authority and collaborating partners is inadequate. While there is a central NCTC that coordinates and guides CVE at the national level, mechanisms for working with county government have not been streamlined and are currently dependent on county government’s goodwill and cooperation. Impunity of DSA supply and usage, unaccounted murders, disappearances, corruption, political incitement have been noted in this study. While CSOs working on CVE collaborate with one another, there is no formal network/mecchanism for developing standards, evaluation and continuous learning.
The field research findings correspond to earlier findings in secondary sources, CIDP and County CVE Action Plans. Both theories apply to the study where feelings of relative deprivation abound with corresponding negative impact on social cohesion.
5. Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

This study set out to determine responsiveness of CVE measures put in place by various actors in Mombasa and Kwale County. The responsiveness of measures has been well illustrated through content analysis. The road to VE free domain in Kenya and the two counties is well on course. There is a general understanding and commitment to the goal of CVE as set out in the NSCVE. At the county level there is an improvement in police, CSO and community relations compared to the past. However the grievances associated with historical injustices, land disputes, Al Shabaab influence, marginalization, poverty, low education levels, community vulnerability, high rates of unemployment continue to inform CVE obstacles in the two counties.

The study identifies areas of notable responsiveness of measures and their gaps. There were a number of recommendations to address gaps identified through the analysis of the study findings.

5.2 Recommendations

Table III. Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Responsible Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Inclusion of economic pillar in NCVE strategy</td>
<td>Short term</td>
<td>National government/ NCTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Anchoring actors participation in CVE on sound legal basis to enhance accountability</td>
<td>Short term</td>
<td>National government/ Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Creating better mechanisms for improving relationship between the community and police</td>
<td>Long term</td>
<td>National and County government, national police service, NCTC, CSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Continuous capacity building of partners in CVE</td>
<td>Long term</td>
<td>National government, NCTC, CSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Instituting measures for addressing structural drivers of VE such as political, historical and land grievances</td>
<td>Long term</td>
<td>National and County government, NCTC, CSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Measure</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Responsible Agency</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Enhancing security sector reforms for professional policing and fair administration of justice</td>
<td>Long term</td>
<td>National government, NCTC, CSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Strengthen inter-faith/religious collaboration to promote social cohesion and peaceful co-existence</td>
<td>Short term</td>
<td>FBO/CSO, NCTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>More statistical based studies as opposed to qualitative interpretive studies</td>
<td>Short term</td>
<td>Research and academic institutions, IPSTC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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