International Peace Support Training Centre
Nairobi, Kenya

ISSUE BRIEFS
2014 SERIES

ISSUE No 6

Insecurity in Somalia: The Spill-over effect to Kenya

Asymmetric Warfare in Eastern Africa Conflicts: Case of Somalia

Effective Strategies for Responding to Contemporary Conflicts in Eastern Africa
Table of Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................................................iv

Acronyms .....................................................................................................................v

Introduction to the issue briefs ..................................................................................vii

Issue Briefs

   Insecurity in Somalia: The Spill-over Effect to Kenya .................................1

   Asymmetric Warfare in Eastern Africa Conflicts: Case of Somalia ....34

Highlights of Key Messages in the Issue Briefs .........................................................57
Foreword

The International Peace Support training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security architecture and has developed to be the regional Centre of Excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. IPSTC addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations by describing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction. The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa through design of training curriculum, field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are produced annually, while the Issue Briefs are produced quarterly. The issue briefs are an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC.

The Third Quarter Issue Brief No 6 (2014) has two titles on Insecurity in Somalia: The Spill-over Effect to Kenya and Asymmetric Warfare in Eastern Africa Conflicts: Case of Somalia. The Issue Briefs provide insights into pertinent peace and security issues in the region that are useful to policy makers and aims to contribute to the security debate and praxis in the region. The articles in the Issue Brief are also expected to inform the design of the training modules at IPSTC. The research and publication of this Issue Brief has been made possible by the support of the Government of Japan through UNDP.

Brig. Robert Kabage
Director, IPSTC
# Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>Abandoned Explosive Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEW</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>Demobilization, Disarmament, Resettlement, Re-integration and Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>East Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERRI</td>
<td>Emergency Response and Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXO</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCPR</td>
<td>Nyerere Centre for Peace Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs/RMs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMP</td>
<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction to the Issue Briefs

The topics presented in this Issue Brief No. 6 of 2014 focus on the issues of security in the Horn of Africa and the attempts to briefly describe some components of the prevailing peace and security architecture in the region and the challenges therein. The first paper examines the use of asymmetric warfare in Somalia. The second paper examines the effects that the Somali conflict has on Kenya.

In the first paper, Insecurity in Somalia: The spill-over effect to Kenya the author examines the effect the conflict in Somalia has on Kenya. The decades of civil war in Somalia have a direct effect on all countries in the region, including Kenya. The paper summarises the recent terrorist attacks, as well as an analyses of the long term impact the Somali conflict has on Kenya. The conflict itself started in 1991 with the collapse of Siad Barre regime. Since then, Kenya has hosted a large number of refugees. In the recent past, foreign investment and the tourism sector in the country have suffered due to security threats. Northern Kenya, for example, is flooded with Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW) from Somalia exacerbating cattle rustling and banditry in the entire borderlands of the country.

The conflict in Somalia and its spill-over effect to Kenya is an example of what theorists of conflict refer to as the conflict system. Situations are created where conflicts assume trans-boundary relationships with other countries in the region, and where the conflict borders do not necessary confine to international boundaries. Each conflict has its own linkages that correspond with economic ties, or with ethnic relationships that one or more sides of conflict have in the other country, in this case, the Republic of Kenya. It is through addressing this complex scenario of such a conflict system that the insecurity spill-over effect to neighbouring countries can be reduced and eventually mitigated and eventually eliminated.
In the second paper, *Asymmetric Warfare in Eastern Africa Conflicts: Case of Somalia*, the author presents a survey of asymmetric warfare in the Eastern African countries and Somalia in particular. Intra-state conflicts and terrorism have been major threats to stability in Eastern Africa and have favoured the practice and deployment of asymmetric warfare.

The conflict in Somalia has led to the growth of terrorism where the Al-Shabaab militants and its allies are using landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to create general fear and permanent insecurity in Eastern Africa.

This kind of insecurity undermines economic development and social cohesion within and between countries. To counter these threats, the Eastern African security forces have to adapt and develop their intelligence capabilities to provide relevant, timely and accurate intelligence information to their decision makers.
Insecurity in Somalia: *The Spill-over Effect to Kenya*

*Radoslaw Malinowski*

**Introduction**

On Saturday morning 21 September 2013, a group of terrorists attacked the Westgate Shopping Mall. While the international and national news agencies were broadcasting this security incident, the security forces were trying to repel the attackers and free the hostages. Eventually the Al-Shabaab terrorist group claimed the responsibility for the attack, stating that it was in revenge against ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ – the Kenyan Defence Force/AMISOM operation in Somalia aimed at eliminating the Al-Shabaab. The Westgate Shopping Mall attack became, by and large, a testimony of the potential reach of the Al-Shabaab and as well demonstrated the insecurity spill-over effect of the Somali conflict into Kenya (Williams, 2014).

Somalia, a neighbouring country to Kenya, became an often quoted example of a failed state, since the defeat of president Siad Barre’s government in 1991. This means that functions typically assigned to state institutions, like the monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, administrative control, management of public finances, investment on human capital, creation of citizenship rights through social policy, provision of infrastructure services, formation of markets, management of public assets, effective public borrowing, the sovereignty dividend and the sovereignty gap were not functional (Ghani, 2008). The International Community made several attempts to address this situation, with United Nations in 1992 taking an unprecedented step to resolve problems of starvation, famine and lawlessness (Fishel, 1998). Unfortunately, the UN attempts to restore peace have not been successful so far, as the country experienced unrest and violence in the 1990s and in the first decade of the 21st century (Menkhaus, 2013). As the conflict in Somalia continued, the Somalia territory became a fertile ground for terrorist and criminal organizations, the Al-Shabaab being one of them. The emergence of a well organized, financially stable criminal organization in a lawless neighbouring country...
had to eventually affect Kenya, as they not only share a long un-manned border but also the existence of Somali communities in the counties of Garissa, Mandera, Wajir, Isiolo and Marsabit.

The security threat stemming out of Somalia became imminent in 2011, when a series of kidnappings of foreign tourists in Kenya’s luxury resorts threatened the country’s tourism industry – one of the key sectors of the Kenyan economy (Crisis Group A, 2014). Prior to that, the dynamically changing security situation did not have a big effect on Kenya, and the Kenyan security forces patrolling the Kenya-Somalia border had some sort of modus vivendi albeit with local community peace networks and through them with different Somali militia (The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, 2012).

This paper attempts to analyse the spill over effect of insecurity from Somalia into Kenya. It looks at the different security incidents that are linked to Somalia’s conflict, as well as at the theory of conflict system that can explain the spill over effect of such insecurities. Finally, it identifies the effects on sections of the social life in Kenya and suggests possible remedies.
Statement of the Problem

Although Somalia’s central state institutions ceased to be effective after the collapse of Siad Barre’s government in 1991, Kenya managed to enjoy relative peace throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century (Crisis Group B, 2014). However, there were numerous security incidents in areas close to the Somalia border; but, this part of Kenya was typically less secure than the rest of the country (Crisis Group B, 2014). The vigorous involvement of Kenya in attempts to stabilize Somalia that began on 16 October 2011 when the Kenyan troops entered Somalia eventually broke this unspoken truce, as the Al-Shabaab group decided to launch a series of terrorist attacks on Kenyan soil. The insecurity spill over to Kenya is a vivid example of what some theorists of conflict call conflict system - a situation where a war or conflict in one state is also likely to affect the nearby states. Kenya has been experiencing the effects of conflict in Somalia, for example, influxes of refugees. Despite the intensive trade between the two countries, albeit somewhat ‘grey’, the insecurity incidents have reminded the citizens of Kenya of the grim fact that their neighbouring state is torn by conflict. The spill over effect of insecurity from Somalia to Kenya is complex in several ways: first, it builds up on a number of existing conditions like the big population of refugees in Kenya. Also, the fact that indigenous Somali communities inhabit the north-eastern part of Kenya and it is difficult to monitor the migration (both negative and positive) flow of these communities across the border. To further complicate the issue, there are internal unresolved security issues in Kenya, for example, the existence of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in the coast region that has become linked with the operations of terrorist groups and cells based in or operating from Somalia.

The effect of the spill over effect of insecurity has greater repercussions beyond the deterioration in security. It also impacts on issues such as religious intolerance, economic performance, ethnicity and sense of nationhood, and even the concept of the modern state, as espoused in the Westphalia discourse of 1648.
Focus and Scope
The paper examines the effect the insecurity in Somalia has on Kenya. It analyses the recent insecurity incidents and the root causes of the problem, and gives possible steps that could address the effects. The following were the objectives of the study from which research questions were derived and that resulted in this paper.

Objectives
- To investigate insecurity incidents in Kenya that are a result of the conflict in Somalia;
- To analyse the underlying causes of insecurity incidents in Kenya that are a result of conflict in Somalia; and,
- To identify possible solutions that can address the problem of insecurity spill-over.

Research Questions
- What are the insecurity incidents in Kenya that can be linked to the conflict in Somalia?
- What are the underlying causes of insecurity incidents in Kenya that are a result of conflict in Somalia?
- What are possible solutions that can address the problem of insecurity spill-over?
Definition of Key Concepts

Conflict in Somalia

The common conventional reference to the conflict in Somalia dates back to the year 1991, when the anti-government rebel militia drove out president Siad Barre from the capital Mogadishu; however, the fact is that the country had been experiencing mayhem and was fractured along clan lines long before that date. In addition, the government of Siad Barre was not only responsible for a senseless war with neighbouring Ethiopia, but also for a number of violent incidents against its own citizens. For example, the central government used the air force to bomb Hargeisa in its fight against the Isaaq clan and effectively triggered a major refugee crisis, with hundred thousands of people seeking refuge in Ethiopia with others internally displaced within Somalia (Botha, 2014). In the late 1980s, several clans, like the Hawiye, Ogadeni and Majerten clans, were already engaged in violent conflict against the regime of Siad Barre. Unfortunately, even after his fall in 1991 the war did not end as the opposing clans were unable and unprepared to form an effective central government (Clark, 1992). The collapse of the Barre government, the presence of large amounts of arms in civilian and combatants’ hands and animosities between the clans eventually led to a full scale civil war, causing death, refugee and IDPs crisis and a breakdown of infrastructure among others. The international community made several attempts to restore the state institutions and address the devastating humanitarian crisis. These interventions included the United Mission Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) and the United Task Force (UNITAF) also commonly referred to as ‘Operation Restore Hope’. As all the international efforts failed, and the country slid into what Andrew Natsios referred to as ‘the greatest humanitarian crises in the world’ (Clark, 1992). In due course, the country was also divided into three regions, Somaliland, Puntland and South Central, with Somaliland seeking independence and sovereignty from the bigger Somalia. As already noted, several attempts to create an effective government based in Mogadishu were unsuccessful and it was only in the recent past following the decisive intervention by the African Union (AU) and neighbouring countries that a ray of hope to the Somali conflict is visible. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has tried to stabilize the country, and has, thus far, achieved some successes.
The country has adopted an interim Constitution, and a Parliament and Presidency of the Federal Republic of Somalia with established offices in the capital, Mogadishu. However, the Federal government of the Republic of Somalia continues with the struggle to establish its presence, and has had to face a serious challenge posed by the Al-Shabaab militia group that had grown to be its biggest contestant of authority throughout the country.

Interestingly, as Hagman (2005) notes, the collapse of Somalia’s state central institutions led, to a certain extent, to modernisation that is most visible in the spread of money transfer companies and telecommunications sector. However, the combinations of on-going conflict, destroyed infrastructure and the absence of functional central government institutions render Somalia a very unique state for Peace Support Operations (PSO).

The peace situation in Somalia is very delicate, and the country is at a stage where the fragile government is trying to establish itself in the country and thus bring the period of civil war and violent conflict to an end. Unfortunately, there are still imminent threats, stemming mainly from belligerent groups like the Al-Shabaab that can jeopardize the stabilization process and lead to further periods of prolonged chaos and insecurity.

The Global Peace Index classifies Somalia at the bottom of its ranking, and indicates that the peace situation has not improved significantly over the last six years.

Table 1: Global Peace Index

|---------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|

Source: Global Peace Index, (2014)

NB: The Global Peace Index is composed of 22 qualitative and quantitative indicators (ranked on a 1 to 5 scale) and ranks 162 independent states. The index gauges global peace using three broad themes: the level of safety and security in society; the extent of domestic or international conflict; and the degree of militarisation.
Ethnicity

The term ethnicity has many connotations, and is often associated with a specific group of people with its own cultural, religious and often historical and linguistic specifications. Eriksen (1996) observes that, in everyday language, the term ethnicity usually has a ring of ‘minority issues’ and/or race relations’. The word ethnicity is derived from the Greek ethnos (which in turn is derived from the word ethnikos) which, originally meant heathen or pagan. It was used in this sense in England from the mid fourteen century to the mid nineteen century when it gradually began to refer to racial characteristics. Barth (1996) defines an ethnic group as a population that has the following criteria:

1. Is largely biologically self-perpetuating;
2. Shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural norms;
3. Makes up a field of communication and interaction; and,
4. Has a membership, which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from the other categories of the same order (p.75).

The term ethnicity is used in Africa instead of tribe, as the latter has derogative connotation, and was used by sociologists to refer to something imperfect, or even primitive. Given that Kenya, like other states in the Eastern Africa, is a multi-ethnic state, the term ethnicity symbolizes the concept of nation and nationhood.

Conflict System

The concept of Conflict System is relatively new in the field of conflict and peace studies, given that previous conflicts were usually state-centric and confined to state boundaries. As Mawagiru (1997) writes, conflicts must be understood ‘as an organic being whose life cycle [has] amoebic characteristics’ (p. 2). Conflicts tend to create a sort of transboundary relationships with other countries in the region, and conflict borders are not necessary confined to international boundaries. As each conflict has its own linkages that correspond to economic ties, or with ethnic relationships that one or more sides of the conflict has in the other country, there is a high possibility that a spill-over effect will occur. In regard to the conflict in Somalia, understood as
a part of conflict system in the Greater Horn, Mwagiru (1997) further observes that ‘the countries of the Greater Horn relate together through shared conflicts even more than through shared borders’ (p.3). Such scenario means that, to begin with management of a particular individual conflict which does not take into account systemic (or regional) realities is unlikely to be effective, and secondly, conflict management efforts which do not engage other interested actors within the conflict system are also unlikely to succeed. This can be testified by the recent history of conflict resolution efforts in Somalia. Using the conflict system concept it is possible to understand the dynamics and reasons of the spill-over effect of Somalia’s conflict into Kenya. In fact, the conflict system theory expects such a spill-over to occur as a natural part of the conflict cycle. Indeed, the conflict spill-over into Kenya is a continuation of the conflict in Somalia that shares an umbilical cord through economic, geopolitical, and ethnical linkages.

The Al Shabaab

The “Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen” (HSM) or the Youth Movement, popularly known as Al-Shabaab, is classified by the international community as a terrorist organisation. The Al-Shabaab is an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). It has links with the global Al-Qaeda movement, another terror group. As of September 2014, the Al-Shabaab was still in control of a substantial area in the South East part of Somalia despite the loss of control over the major cities and locations as a result of the offensive mounted by AMISOM in conjunction with the Somali Transitional Government Forces. Its strength in terms of troop numbers is unknown but it is estimated by different security analysts at 6,000 combatants (Szoldra, 2013). The Al-Shabaab is also regarded as a jihadist movement that contest the post-Westphalian international state order. It envisions the establishment of a strict version of Sharia law on their controlled territory (AMISOM, 2014). To date, the Al-Shabaab remains as the main opponent of the Transitional Somali Government and the AMISOM.
**AMISOM**

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a peacekeeping mission mandated by the African Union and authorised by the United Nations Security Council (resolution 1744 (2007). The AMISOM mandate was initially for 6 months, subsequently extended (currently for one year). Each mandate has a different focus.

The current mandate (UN SC Resolution 2182 of 24 October 2014) entails:

1. Support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders;
2. Provide protection to Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and key infrastructure to enable them carry out their functions;
3. Assist in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Programme (NSSP);
4. Provide technical assistance and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts;
5. Monitor the security situation in areas of operation;
6. Facilitate humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); and,
7. Protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self defence (AMISOM, 2014).

**Security**

According to the Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies (2005), security is a subjective state in which an individual or collective feels free from threats, anxiety, or danger. Such insecurities have typically been observed in relation to nation-states, for example, in regards to borders or institutions responsible for governance. Traditional security has focused on the ability of a state to ensure its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This state-centric approach echoed a realist paradigm in International Relations, where the state was the primary actor in the International System. This was the dominant approach in the Cold-War era where all the efforts were geared towards ensuring the integrity and sovereignty of the
states (King & Murray, 2001). As long as a state, through alliances and military power, was able to preserve itself, its security goals were achieved. With the end of Cold War hostilities, there was a significant shift in the doctrine of security. One of the factors contributing to this change was the emergence and recognition of non-state actors, such as ethnic groups. While the state remained an instrumental player in the international system, the new actors gained prominence and meaning, and re-defined the nature and prosecution of conflicts (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2014). In today’s world, the potential security threats include those inherited from the Cold War era, for example the proliferation and management of nuclear arms, and a range of new types that include terrorism, cyber crime, and illegal exploitation of natural resources among many others. Today, the question of security is viewed from a wider lens or perspective within a framework popularly referred to as human security.

In 1994, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) published the Human Development Report, which is considered as a decisive document that outlined the concept or paradigm of human security. In the report, human security was seen to constitute two main aspects:

‘It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression; and second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities’ (UNDP Report, 1994, p. 23).

The two types of security do not in fact compete with each other rather they are interdependent. The holistic improvement in the traditional security in parallel with human security is what is desirable. The figure below, proposed by Paris (2001), presents the classification of security in relation to the type of threat, actors and beneficiaries.
Table 2: The Source of Security Threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cell 1</th>
<th>Cell 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Security</strong> (conventional realist approach to security studies)</td>
<td><strong>Redefined Security</strong> (e.g. environmental and economic security)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cell 3</th>
<th>Cell 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intrastate Security</strong> (e.g. civil war, ethnic conflict and genocide)</td>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong> (e.g. environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another model of classification is according to security referent (object), value secured, type of threat, and type of means used to achieve the security (Tadjbakhsh, 2005, p. 28).

Table 3: Types of Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>State-centred security</th>
<th>Human-centred security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Referent (object)</strong></td>
<td>In a Hobbesian world, the state is the primary provider of security: if the state is secure, then those who live within it are secure.</td>
<td>Individuals are co-equal with the state. State security is the means, not the end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Value</strong></td>
<td>Sovereignty, power, territorial integrity, national independence</td>
<td>Personal safety, well-being and individual freedom. 1) Physical safety and provision for basic needs 2) Personal freedom (liberty of association) 3) Human rights; economic and social rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Threats</td>
<td>Direct organized violence from other states, violence and coercion by other states</td>
<td>Direct and indirect violence, from identifiable sources (such as states or non-state actors) or from structural sources (relations of power ranging from family to the global economy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct violence: death, drugs, dehumanization, discrimination, international disputes.</td>
<td>Indirect violence: deprivation, disease, natural disasters, underdevelopment, population displacement, environmental degradation, poverty, inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By what means</td>
<td>Retaliatory force or threat of its use, balance of power, military means, strengthening of economic might, little attention paid to respect for law or institutions.</td>
<td>Promoting human development: basic needs plus equality, sustainability, and greater democratization and participation at all levels. Promoting political development: global norms and institutions plus collective use of force as well as sanctions if and when necessary, cooperation between states, reliance on international institutions, networks and coalitions, and international organizations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Tadjbakhsh, 2005, p. 28*

**Failed State**

The term failed state was first coined by William Zartman (1995) as “a situation where the structure, authority, law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new” (p.1). The label ‘failed state’ basically suggests that the basic functions or rather core responsibilities of the state are not fulfilled due to numerous reasons like conflict or foreign intervention. According to the Failed State Index, Somalia got a score of 113.9 (out of 120) and tops the list of failed states in the world (Failed State Index 2013, 2014). The failing of a particular state is usually a process during which the functionality of state institutions deteriorates; usually due to internal violence (Rotberg, 2003). Rothberd has posited indicators of a failing state to include: closed economy, political monopoly and loss of monopoly on the use of violence (Rotberg, 2003).

**The Spill-over Effect**

As discussed in the preceding sections, particularly the conflict system concept, the incidents of insecurity in Kenya that are linked to the Somalia conflict can be regarded as part of a natural process on evolvement of conflict. A brief analysis of the factors that are fuelling linkages between the conflict in Somalia and the insecurity incidents in Kenya is presented below.
**Latest Dynamics of Insecurity Incidents**

Starting 2011, Kenya began to be seriously concerned with conflict in Somalia and its effect on the country following a series of attacks on popular tourist resorts that threatened the then thriving industry. In response to the incidents of banditry and kidnappings, Kenya decided to launch an intervention nicknamed “Operation Linda Nchi” (colloquial for ‘Operation Protect the Country’). This was a military intervention by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) deep into the Al-Shabaab controlled parts of Somalia in order to create a buffer zone to prevent a spill-over of insecurity (Crisis Group B, 2014).

This does not mean that the Al-Shabaab militants (some analysts question direct responsibility of this group for the kidnapping incidents) were not present on the Kenyan soil before then. Using its Somali and Islamic background, Al Shabaab militants penetrated certain social cycles in Kenya long before 2011 (Crisis Group, 2010). Soon, after the KDF intervention, a number of terrorist attacks occurred in Nairobi (notably Eastleigh), Mandera, Garrisa, Mombasa, Wajir and Dadaab (Crisis Group B, 2014). These low level attacks climaxed with the Westgate shopping mall on 21 September 2013. As the security agencies made a joint effort to contain the deteriorating situation, an unprecedented attack happened in Mpeketoni in Lamu County, where a group of militants invaded this small town killing 48 people and 10 more on the following day in the neighbouring Poromoko (Ombati, 2014). The last two incidents caused a political stir and a heated debate about who was actually responsible for the attacks. It was suggested that it was a local group linked to Al-Shabaab, rather than the Al-Shabaab itself that carried out the attacks (Standard Media, 2014). Nonetheless, the attackers were using Al-Shabaab emblems and flags thus, whether they were local militia or not, the link to the Somalia conflict was evident. The Mpeketoni raid was a form of jihad – holy war against the non-Muslims – as it was claimed a few days after the violent incident occurred:

“The Mpeketoni attack is a retribution for the Kenyan government brutal oppression of Muslims through coercion, intimidation, and extrajudicial killings of Muslim scholars, particularly in Mombasa and the violation of Muslim honour and sanctity” (Crisis Group B, 2014, p. 5).”
The Mpeketoni attacks made a link to a different conflict, hitherto not connected to the one in Somalia; the demands by the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). The MRC has demanded independence or at least autonomy from the central government in Nairobi. The demand by the MRC has a long historical background that can be traced to the time when a large portion of the Coastal Strip under the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar (1856-1964). To some Kenyan officials like the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Mr David Kimayo, this historical connection was the link to the conflict in Somalia (Crisis Group B, 2014).

Another example of the spill-over effect of the Somalia conflict can be drawn from the attempt by the Kenyan government to tackle insecurity by addressing the issue of illegal migration in the country especially in the urban areas of Nairobi and Mombasa. The operation “Usalama Watch”, was touted as an attempt to rid the country of illegal migrants. However, the operation was perceived to be an attack on the Somali community given the fact that the security raids were focused on those areas habited by the Somali communities (Kerrow, 2014). Operation “Usalama Watch” netted at least 4,000 people, notably of Somali origin, who were held at the Kasarani stadium, which had been gazetted as a temporary holding area. This profiling attracted widespread condemnation from Members of Parliament particularly those representing Somali dominated constituencies. Others who condemned the operation included human rights activists and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA), a civilian body established by parliament to oversee the work of the Kenyan Police Service (Otieno, 2014). During the operation, at least 2,757 refugees were relocated to gazetted refugee camps and 360 were deported to Somalia. This forced migration sparked protests at the perceived profiling of the Somali-ethnic Kenyans against the rest of the citizens. Indeed, a number of protesters made referrals to the infamous 1984 Waggalla massacre – one of the worst violations of human rights in Kenya in which Somalis, mostly men, died in a holding enclosure at the Wajir Stadium. These men had been rounded from their homes and held at the stadium, in sweltering heat and without water, for screening following a fatal violent confrontation with security personnel.
The Long Term Impact of the Somali Conflict Spill-over

The examples of recent increase of insecurity incidents linked to the conflict in Somalia are the outcomes of a gradual development whereby the conflict in Somalia had permeated into the Kenyan society. The presence of Al-Shabaab militias in Kenya, the recruitment of insurgents among the Kenyan youth, and the use of Kenya as a transit hub for international fighters is further evidence of the Somali-Kenya conflict axis (Crisis Group A, 2014). The following are some selected examples of the spill-over effect of conflict in Somalia into Kenya.

Organized Transnational Crime

There have been numerous studies linking terrorist groups with criminal activities, such as smuggling and trafficking just to name but a few (Jonsson, 2009). Terrorist groups are also known to illegally exploit countries natural resources to fund their operations. For example, the Al-Shabaab is reportedly engaged in illegal charcoal smuggling business in Somalia where it imposes a “checkpoint tax” on all exports. This illegal trade is extremely lucrative and complex and, it has been reported that it is coordinated by businessmen based in Kismayo, Somalia as well as in Garissa and Nairobi, Kenya. “Money Jihad”, quoting a July 2014 report by the United Nations Environmental Programme and Interpol indicated that the illegal trade was carried out in contravention to a UN ban against Somali charcoal exports. The report went further and stated that the ‘Al Shabaab [retained] about one third of the [charcoal] income [amounting to approximately] USD38–56 million’ per annum (Money Jihad, 2014; Nellemann, C. et al (Eds), 2014). The UNEP report collaborates similar observations contained in the UN Annual Report on Somalia indicating that the Al Shabaab controlled illegal charcoal trade, despite a UN ban and AMISOM efforts to stop charcoal trafficking. The map below indicates the source, destination countries and the trade routes for illegal charcoal associated with the Al Shabaab.
Map 1: The Illegal Charcoal Trade Routes and Destinations

Charcoal smuggling is not the only illegal activity carried out by Somalia based terrorist groups; for example, there are numerous reports of money laundering between the Al Shabaab and its supporters especially in the United Arab Emirates (Money Jihad, 2014). In addition, there are reports that suggest that Somalia-based criminal groups use Kenya as a transit point to smuggle and trafficking people. Indeed, various studies have alluded to the fact that proceeds from human trafficking are a significant stream of income for terrorist groups worldwide (Jonsson, 2009).

While there is evidence of Somalis having been trafficked and smuggled through Kenya, notably through Nairobi, it has also been suggested that Kenyan citizens have also been trafficked through Somalia to numerous destinations in the Middle East (Malinowski, 2013).

Transnational crime related to human trafficking and smuggling exacerbates other related crimes in particular, it cements endemic corruption. For example, corruption in the public sector has been identified as one of the conduits used by Somali nationals to obtain Kenyan identification documents. Conversely, the same corruption has also seen Kenyans of Somali origin obtain refugee papers and pass as genuine refugees to benefit from various entitlements (Simmons and Lloyd, 2010, p. 16)

In reference to illegal migration, a 2009 report by Chris Harwood, observed that there were estimates of up to 5,000 people fleeing Somalia by foot and truck into eastern Kenya. The swollen numbers of people in Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps was testimony to the insecurity inside Somalia. Reports of the humanitarian situation on the Somali side of the Kenya/Somali border (at Dobley) indicated that many thousands waited in limbo while the border remained officially closed. Additionally, a significant number of Somali migrants returned ‘home’ to Kenya after some years in South Africa. Many Somalis from Somalia consider Kenya their home and those living and running businesses return and set-up shop in Kenya whenever their businesses in South Africa start declining (Horwood, 2009 p. 34).
Map 2: Human Smuggling and Trafficking Patterns from Somalia Through Kenya to South Africa

(Source: Horwood, 2009)
Economic Effects

The conflict in Somalia has had a negative impact on the performance of the Kenyan economy. This has been particularly evident in the tourism sector. The figure below depicts the important role the tourism sector has on the national economy.

Table 4: Tourism Contribution to the National Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>(Million)</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of GDP at constant prices</td>
<td>(Per cent)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP at market prices</td>
<td>(KSh Mn)</td>
<td>2,570,334.4</td>
<td>3,047,392.5</td>
<td>3,403,534.4</td>
<td>3,797,987.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost of petroleum products</td>
<td>(KSh Mn)</td>
<td>200,780.0</td>
<td>337,749.2</td>
<td>326,921.6</td>
<td>315,374.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>(KSh Mn)</td>
<td>-537,411.9</td>
<td>-788,145.3</td>
<td>-856,740.0</td>
<td>-911,029.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Supply (M3)</td>
<td>(KSh Mn)</td>
<td>1,271,638.0</td>
<td>1,514,152.0</td>
<td>1,727,686.0</td>
<td>1,957,492.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total domestic credit</td>
<td>(KSh Mn)</td>
<td>1,267,940.0</td>
<td>1,532,051.0</td>
<td>1,767,756.8</td>
<td>2,007,162.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of payments (current account balance)</td>
<td>(KSh Mn)</td>
<td>-187,677.3</td>
<td>-340,178.7</td>
<td>-359,676.7</td>
<td>-412,379.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Horticultural Produce exports</td>
<td>(’000 tonnes)</td>
<td>228.3</td>
<td>216.2</td>
<td>205.7</td>
<td>213.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing output</td>
<td>(KSh Mn)</td>
<td>842,506.3</td>
<td>1,015,541.8</td>
<td>1,049,344.5</td>
<td>1,097,082.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction output</td>
<td>(KSh Mn)</td>
<td>289,023.8</td>
<td>319,730.5</td>
<td>353,314.7</td>
<td>394,881.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Consumption</td>
<td>(’000 tonnes)</td>
<td>3,765.7</td>
<td>3,857.9</td>
<td>3,638.0</td>
<td>3,707.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity consumption</td>
<td>(GWh)</td>
<td>5,754.7</td>
<td>6,273.6</td>
<td>6,414.4</td>
<td>6,928.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism earnings</td>
<td>(KSh Mn)</td>
<td>73,700.0</td>
<td>97,890.0</td>
<td>96,020.0</td>
<td>93,970.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage employment</td>
<td>(’000)</td>
<td>2,016.2</td>
<td>2,084.1</td>
<td>2,155.8</td>
<td>2,265.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education - Primary enrolment</td>
<td>(’000)</td>
<td>9,381.2</td>
<td>9,857.9</td>
<td>9,995.2</td>
<td>10,182.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education - Secondary enrolment</td>
<td>(’000)</td>
<td>1,653.4</td>
<td>1,767.7</td>
<td>1,914.8</td>
<td>2,104.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education - University enrolment</td>
<td>(’000)</td>
<td>177.6</td>
<td>198.3</td>
<td>240.6</td>
<td>324.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered doctors and dentists</td>
<td>(Number)</td>
<td>8,027.0</td>
<td>8,479.0</td>
<td>9,077.0</td>
<td>9,727.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kenya Facts and Figures (2014)
Figure 1: Tourist Arrivals in Kenya 2010-2013

The above figures show a sharp decline in foreign tourist arrivals to Kenya. This has been attributed to travel bans and travel warnings issued by foreign countries as a result of increased insecurity (Liloba, 2014). A decline in the tourism industry has other negative effects on the Kenyan economy. For example, 7,500 workers in the tourist industry at the coastal hotels and resorts lost their jobs in the first half of 2014 (Ringa, 2014). Foreign missions in Kenya have closed down their consulates and are increasingly demanding for the reinforcement of security for their interests in the country (UK closes Mombasa Consulate, 2014). There is no doubt that the insecurity in Kenya requires to be addressed before the country can witness resurgence in tourist numbers.
Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Northern Kenya

One of the biggest challenges to security in Northern Kenya (a term commonly used to depict the counties of Turkana, West Pokot, Samburu, Marsabit, Wajir, Garrisa, Mandera and Isiolo) is the pervasive conflict among and between different pastoralist communities. By themselves, pastoralist conflicts are complex in nature and are a result of many factors; however, the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the region exacerbates the conflicts (Nairobi Protocol, 2004). Illegal armament in Northern Kenya has a long history beginning with the militarization in 1960’s and early 1970’s by the Siad Barre, regime in its quest to create a “Greater Somalia” covering parts of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. By the time president Siad Barre was deposed in 1992, many ordinary citizens were in possession of SALW (Subow, 2002). Since then, Somalia has become one of the sources and transit points of SALW that eventually find a ready market in Kenya and beyond. Kenya and Somalia share along porous border and, as long as there is no central government in Somalia or an effective border policing by Kenya, the trafficking of SALW will continue and their negative impacts will equally continue to manifest in the region.
Table 5: Dynamics of Arms Flow from Somalia to the region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Main source</th>
<th>Means*</th>
<th>Routes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>vehicles,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>individuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kenya</td>
<td>Somalia, Uganda,</td>
<td>Road,</td>
<td>Isiolo–Nyeri, Nairobi–Thika, Nairobi–Kiambu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>individuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>Somalia, Tanzania</td>
<td>Road, ship,</td>
<td>Lunga Lunga–Mombasa, Kiung–Lamu–Malindi–Mombasa, Ocean–various ports &amp; homes–Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>boats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Road, people,</td>
<td>Somalia–Mandera, Somalia–Garissa, Manda–Wajir, Ethiopia–Manda–Wajir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>animals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Eastern</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Road, animals,</td>
<td>Moyale–Marsabit–Isiolo, Garissa–Isiolo–Marsabit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>traders,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Rift/</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Road, traders,</td>
<td>Sudan–Lokichoggio–Lodwar–Kapenguria–Eldoret, Ethiopia–Maralal–Nyahururu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Sudan, Uganda</td>
<td>community to</td>
<td>Kapenguria–Tot–Kapedo, Uganda–Lodwar, Uganda–Kapenguria–Kitale–Bungoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Rift</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Road, traders,</td>
<td>Kitale–Eldoret–Nakuru, Nairobi–Naivas–Nakuru, Nyahururu–Nakuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan, Uganda</td>
<td>community to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Nyanza</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Road, traders,</td>
<td>Tanzania–Isebana–Kisii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above table is a summary of the regions and the main sources of small arms and some of the routes and means used to proliferate these small arms into the region (Wepundi, 2012).
Refugee Crisis

As of January 2014, UNHCR put the total number of refugees in Kenya as 534,938 of whom 482,390 were from Somalia. Thus, the refugee crisis in Kenya can be said to be predominantly an outcome of the conflict in Somalia. The number makes Kenya the sixth biggest hosting country for refugees in the world (see the table below) with the Dadaab Refugee Camp as the biggest refugee camp in the world. The large refugee influx is testimony of the negative impact of the conflict in Somali spilling-over across international borders. Not only is this influx a humanitarian catastrophe but, the squalid living conditions in the camps render the refugees, especially the young men, susceptible to recruitment into criminal gang activities or into terrorism by organizations such as the Al-Shabaab.

Table 6: Top Ten Refugees Hosting Nations in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country of asylum</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Per 1000 popn</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Per $b GDP</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Asylum seekers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1,616,507</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,811.32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>857,354</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>906.77</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>856,546</td>
<td>177.63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12,919.25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>641,915</td>
<td>88.25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,047.88</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>609,938</td>
<td>8.14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>519.44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>534,938</td>
<td>12.06</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6,653.46</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>434,479</td>
<td>33.88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15,517.11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>433,936</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3,574.43</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>301,047</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>22.47</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>263,662</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15.69</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>84,343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR, (2013)
Underlying Internal Factors that Contribute to the Insecurity Spill-over

Youth Unemployment

One of the key challenges facing the youth in Kenya is undoubtedly unemployment. Besides engagement in the informal sector, many youths cannot find employment elsewhere. Different reports, for example, Szoldra (2013) and Okar (2014) have indicated that the Al-Shabaab exploits the unemployment factor to lure youth into joining their ranks. To illustrate this, Christopher Anzalone (2012) narrates that in November 2010, the Al-Shabaab’s Al-Kataib Media Foundation released a 35-minute recruitment video - “Message to the Umma: And Inspire the Believers,” featuring nine named foreign fighters from different countries. Six of the foreign fighters were from East Africa, three from Kenya and the other three from Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Sudan. The video was subtitled in both English and Kiswahili, suggesting that its target audiences were potential recruits from abroad. Ali Rage, the Al-Shabaab’s spokesman, closed the video by specifically inviting East African foreign fighters to join the Somali insurgency, concluding his comments by saying, “to our people/family in East Africa we say, ‘welcome to Somalia, “hakuna matata” (there are no worries)” (p.1)

Other reports collaborate and confirm that indeed, the Al-Shabaab is exploiting the unemployment factor. A senior Anti-Terrorism Police Unit officer in Kenya is quoted as saying: ‘Six youths among them two secondary school students from Mombasa, were arrested in Kizingitini, Lamu, while trying to enter Somalia, allegedly to join [the] al-Shabaab” (Nasongo, 2010, p.1). In addition, security reports allege that disadvantaged urban areas in Nairobi and other major towns, including some rural areas, are recruiting grounds for the Al-Shabaab. New recruits, not necessary Muslims, join the terrorist movement not because of ideological reasons, but as a result of the economic hardships they endure. As a BBC journalist established, those recruiting for Al-Shabaab understand the economic factor very well, and use it in their rhetoric; for example, ‘He (Al Shabaab recruiter) used to tell us, “Instead of sitting in the slum doing nothing, it’s better to go to Somalia and fight for your religion, you’ll go straight to heaven’” (Taylor, 2013, p.1).
While it is difficult to change or influence those who join terrorists for ideological reasons, it is not difficult to influence those who choose to join terrorists to improve their livelihoods. The problem of young, unemployed Kenyans joining terrorist groups like the Al-Shabaab is significant especially given that they might later be re-deployed back to the country to mount attacks on Kenyan soil or to recruit more volunteers.

The Al-Shabaab Influence on Local Conflicts

Organizations like the Al-Shabaab are smart enough to use local conflicts and their resultant insecurity to their advantage. The activities of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), an outlawed group in the coastal region of Kenya is a good example of how conflict on one country can leverage on insecurity in another country. Undeniably, the demands by the MRC might be constitutionally legitimate and on the face of it, might have little to do with the conflict in Somalia. However, the response by government to the MRC activities notably, uncompromising use of repressive force, unconsciously links the group to Al-Shabaab. The disgruntled MRC retaliates by sympathizing or even supporting the Al-Shabaab in its activities against Kenyan (Botha, 2014). On its part, the Al-Shabaab is successfully exploiting one of the MRC’s grievances; that is, an allegation that “a Christian government is oppressing Muslims in the coast region” to radicalize youth along religious lines. This is a dangerous turn of events where previously constitutionally legitimate demands for example, asking for equitable distribution of resources is made to acquire a religious angle. This makes its resolution even more difficult.

Promotion of Religious Extremism

Religion is a social phenomenon that R. Appleby (2000) states: ‘Can heal, but also kill’. It is a sociological fact that holy books of mainstream religions, such as the Quran or the Bible, either inspire acts of violence or acts of mercy and compassion. Indeed, it is the interpretation of the message, or rather “the sacred” of each religion that determines the attitude of a particular believer. That is why each religion will have extremist believers, usually opting for the violent option, and also moderate or tolerant believers, who will always seek consensus and peace (Appleby, 2000). Kenya is a multi-religious state that has so far escaped the scourge of violent religious extremism. However, this relative religious tolerance is bound to change

ISSUE BRIEFS: Issue No. 6

— 25 —
as radicalism takes foot in the world. Groups like the Al-Shabaab are waiting in the wings to exploit any situation of a polarized Christian-Muslim society. Already, incidents of burning of Christian churches in Garrisa and Mombasa have been witnessed and it behoves on the government in power to ensure that such acts do not take root in the country.

**Political Jockeying as an Obstacle to Unity**

Ordinarily, security should be a national concept but, more often than not is used by different political actors, especially where insecurity prevails, to portray the government in power as inept. For example, the opposition party - Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD), has used the insecurity card to call for the withdrawal of Kenyan troops from Somalia ostensibly, to curtail retaliatory attacks on Kenya by the Al-Shabaab. The government is vehemently opposed to this proposal (Crisis Group B, 2014). Political disputes and disagreements are at the heart of any democratic system however, lack of consensus and an agreed upon security strategy is a recipe for external vulnerability of any sovereign state. The Crisis Group asserts that un-informed political rhetoric on (in) security is a danger to any security-fragile situations. (Crisis Group B, 2014).

**Security – Identity Nexus**

The various insecurities oscillating around the conflict in Somalia are interlinked with the concept of identity. Given that Somalia and Kenya share close attributes in regards to the Somali community demography, it is pertinent that government policies are seen to be inclusive for purposes of nation building (Barth, 1996). Security is likely to deteriorate in divided societies, especially where certain communities perceive to be marginalised or neglected (Buzan, 1997). In such situations, deliberate efforts must be taken by government to eliminate structural injustices in order to forge a national identity. Historically, the communities living in the counties of Garrisa, Wajir, Isiolo, Mandera and Marsabit have regarded themselves as second-class citizens. This is because there are relatively little socio-economic developments in these counties. In addition, overall presence of government is missing; this creates an environment where those who contest the Kenyan sovereignty (in judicial sense) will not only gain support but the perceived marginalization is likely to drive communities to take up arms to assert their rights (Walker, 1996).
Conclusion

The problem of insecurity spill-over from the Somalia conflict into Kenya is a natural phenomenon of conflict development in the region. The impact of this is spill-over is testified by the terrorist attacks in major Kenyan towns and cities.

The Al-Shabaab remains a key security threat not only to Kenya but also to the region as a whole. All concerted efforts must be undertaken to curb the incursion by the Al-Shabaab into the fabric of the Kenyan society.

The spill-over have other negative connotations and impacts including the unmitigated proliferation of illicit SALW, refugee crisis, human trafficking, illegal trade among others.

Kenya needs to enact a comprehensive security architecture free from political machinations and one that addresses the root causes that give rise to insecurity in the country. In parallel, the country should support all efforts towards solving the conflict in its sister neighbour Somalia.
Recommendations

It might be trivial; but it is necessary to reiterate that the ultimate end of Somalia’s conflict spill-over will be through the establishment of permanent, sustainable peace in the country. Kenya and Somalia share a border and thus any mayhem in Somalia will ultimately have an effect on Kenyan security. Kenya, in concert with others, should continue its efforts in assisting the establishment and strengthening of various Somali Federal government institutions.

Address the growing religious extremism through engaging in interreligious dialogue and anti-discriminatory policies. This can be achieved for example, through implementation of the 2008 Presidential Special Action Committee Recommendations (included in 2013 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Report) on addressing institutional discrimination against Muslims.

The issues of insecurity are often rooted in local communities and cannot be left in the hands of security agencies alone. There should be an agreed and sustainable plan of involving local communities in monitoring security threats (however with respect to human rights standards as codified in the Kenyan Constitution, particularly the right to freedom of association).

In regards to the terrorist challenge to Kenya, the issue of security should be free from political wrangles, regardless of which party or president is in power. Political parties should develop and agree on a comprehensive national and regional security for the country irrespective of their party manifestos.

The government should prioritize the task of nation building through various practical steps like addressing the problem of marginalized communities. This is important especially in the context of Northern Kenya, where communities consider themselves socio-economically marginalized. Deliberate and specific steps like creating jobs for the youth should be prioritised. Youth in productive engagements will be less vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment into violent gangs or terrorist organizations like the Al-Shabaab.
References


**Online Sources**


Asymmetric Warfare in Eastern Africa Conflicts: Case of Somalia

Lt- Col Donatien Nduwimana

Introduction

The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s opened a window for the disintegration of states, rise in religious wars, escalation of ethnic conflicts and the use of violence as a manifestation of power. This has produced an extraordinary growth of non-state actors using different methods of warfare. They include para-military groups organized around warlords who control particular areas, terrorist cells, fanatical volunteers like the Mujahedeen, organized criminal groups, renegade units of regular forces or other security services, as well as mercenaries and private military companies. By their nature, these groups prefer and have largely adopted unconventional tactics to prosecute conflict.

Eastern African countries have and are still facing violent internal conflicts and terrorism that can be characterized as asymmetrical warfare. The civil wars in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the current conflicts in Somalia and South Sudan have been and are largely unconventional. The conflicts have involved civilians, combatants and regular forces. Often, the conflicts are characterized by deadly attacks on weak targets like economic infrastructures, civilian populations and camps hosting refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This form of warfare is commonly referred to as ‘new wars’ or ‘asymmetric wars’.

Depending on the prevailing circumstances, asymmetric warfare entails different characteristics including: prevalent political and ideological (often religious) leanings, deliberate exploitation of the mass media, organized crime (illegal or private violence), massive violations of human rights (violence against civilians) and complete disregard of standard ethics of war.

The strategy in asymmetrical warfare is to gain political power through sowing fear and hatred, to create a climate of terror, to eliminate moderate voices and to defeat tolerance.²

Terrorism, as an asymmetric warfare, is now a reality in Eastern Africa. The Al-Shabaab, an affiliate of the Al-Qaeda, has been attributed with several terrorist attacks targeting innocent victims and aimed at creating fear and political dissatisfaction among the populace. Tellingly, asymmetric warfare is not limited to Eastern Africa alone but the entire world is vulnerable and at risk of terrorist attacks.

Focus and Scope

This paper aims to examine the nature of asymmetric warfare in Eastern Africa with special reference to the conflict in Somali. In particular, the paper examines the impact of land mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) used by the Al-Shabaab on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Somalia.

Objectives

• To examine the determinants of asymmetric warfare in Eastern Africa with specific reference to Somalia;

• To assess the impact of land mines and IED on PSOs in Somalia; and,

• To identify appropriate strategies to counter the threat of land mines and IED in Somalia.

Guiding Questions

• What is the nature of asymmetric warfare in Eastern Africa?

• To What extent have land mines and IED hindered progress of PSOs in Somalia?

• What kinds of Strategies are employed to counter the effects of land mines and IEDs in Somalia?

Statement of the Problem

Struggle for power, ethnic representation/domination, lack of adequate democratic governance, poverty and natural resources are some of the factors contributing to violent intra-state conflicts in Eastern Africa. Intra-state conflicts and terrorism are the major threats in the region. These conflicts employ asymmetric tactics of warfare including: land mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). These weapons have devastating negative impacts and continue to kill many people; unfortunately the victims are mainly civilians. These types of deadly arms and weapons are preferred because they are easy to hide, carry and do not require large crews to operate yet they have deadly impacts on their targets.

In Somalia, the current improvement of security in many parts of the country is yet to impact on the use of landmines and IEDs in terror attacks. Even more worrying, the terrorists have significantly extended their battlefield from Somalia to other countries especially Kenya and Uganda. Beside the fact that asymmetrical warfare tactics cause fear and insecurity everywhere, they also undermine economic development and social cohesion within and between countries. The resulting insecurity especially in Somalia has given opportunities to international terrorist organizations to access Eastern African countries and establish networks for their asymmetric warfare.
Theoretical Framework

Traditional Approach to Asymmetric Warfare

Traditional approaches to asymmetry warfare are mainly based on the old logic of capability with some focusing on the disparity in the means engaged by the belligerents - asymmetry in means. The idea is that the weaker party in a conflict, knowing that it would not weather a frontal clash, avoids direct confrontation with its enemy and concentrates its efforts on actions mainly based on surprise and directed against soft targets. The weaker party is aware that it does not have enough capacity and at the same time wants to continue executing the conflict.

Other approaches put special emphasis on the nature of the belligerents - asymmetry in identities. While regular forces are characterized by a transparent structure (uniform, hierarchy, weaponry), irregular forces are by nature extremely evanescent. It is difficult to know whether an individual is a member of the civilian population or of the combatants. Indeed, most combatants are part-time, that is, they take part in the fights more or less spontaneously (it can happen that the insurrectional force themselves do not know their members) or on a more or less regular basis and, spend the rest of the time as ordinary members of their social community.

Modern Approach to Asymmetric Warfare

Modern asymmetric conflicts show a very different picture. Whereas the institutional party still sets its main objectives in the traditional battle spaces (topographic space, airspace, electromagnetic space etc.), the insurrectional force sets its main objectives in the info- and the human spaces. When Osama bin Laden issued his 1998 ‘Fatwa’ calling for Americans to be killed anywhere in the world, he effectively laid the foundation for asymmetrical international war. Raymond (2003) defines asymmetric warfare as organized violence conducted between political units of vastly unequal military capability where the weaker side relies on relatively low-tech means to attack a more powerful high-tech opponent.

---

3 Baeriswyl Raphaël, (2008), Use and Perception of Violence: A Girardian Approach to Asymmetric Warfare
6 Ibid
Literature Review

Many scholars have contributed to the understanding of the concept of asymmetric warfare. Most of them focus on the fluid changes in asymmetric tactics. These changes need a permanent capacity within the regular forces to ensure that they adapt their capacities to address emerging security challenges. Marine Corp Colonel Gary I. Wilson, an analyst of emerging trends in non-conventional warfare says that changes in terrorist tactics, methods and operational activities are naturally occurring phenomena. He draws similarities between bacteria that naturally mutate in order to become resistant to antibiotics or other adverse conditions. His comparison would suggest that terrorists and their methods mutate in order to find new ways to survive and better project their strengths against the gaps and weaknesses of opposing civilizations.

Gross, Michael in ‘Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict’ claims that asymmetric conflict is changing the way that we practice and think about war. Torture, rendition, assassination, blackmail, extortion, direct attacks on civilians, and chemical weapons are all finding their way to the battlefield despite long-standing prohibitions. This book offers a practical guide for policymakers, military officers, lawyers, students, journalists, and others who ask how to adapt the laws and conventions of war to the changing demands of asymmetric conflict. As war wages between state and non-state parties, difficult questions arise about the status of guerrillas, the methods each side may use to defeat the other, and the means necessary to identify and protect civilians caught in the crossfire. Many practices that conventional war prohibits are slowly evolving into new norms of asymmetric conflict.

Rid, Thomas in ‘Irregular Warfare in the Information Age – Westport’, posits that two intimately connected trends are putting modern armies under huge pressure to adapt: the rise of insurgencies and the rise of the Web. Both in cyberspace and in warfare, a public dimension has assumed increasing importance in only a few years. The book traces the contrasting ways in which insurgents and counterinsurgents have adapted irregular conflict to novel media platforms. It examines the public affairs policies of the US land forces, the British Army, and the Israel Defense

---

Forces. Then, it compares the media-related counterinsurgency methods of these conventional armies with the methods devised by their irregular adversaries, showing how such organizations such as the Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah use technology, not merely to advertise their political agenda and influence public opinion, but to mobilize a following and put violent ideas into action. However, the same technology that tends to level the operational playing field in irregular warfare also incurs heavy costs on insurgents, and even heavier costs on terrorists.8

Shultz, Richard H., Dew, Andrea J., in ‘Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat’ noted that ‘since the end of the Cold War, conventional militaries and their political leaders have confronted a new, brutal type of warfare in which non-state armed groups use asymmetrical tactics to successfully fight larger, technologically superior forces’. In order to prevent further bloodshed and political chaos, it is crucial to understand how these unconventional armed groups think and to adapt to their methods of combat. The authors investigated the history and politics of modern asymmetrical warfare. Focusing on four specific hotbeds of instability: Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, they conducted a careful analysis of tribal culture and the value of clan associations. They examined why these ‘traditional’ or ‘tribal’ warriors fight, how they recruit, where they find sanctuary, and what informs their strategy. Traveling across two centuries and several continents, the authors examine the doctrinal, tactical, and strategic advantages and consider the historical, cultural and anthropological factors behind the motivation and success of warriors in contemporary asymmetric warfare.

Asymmetric Warfare: Nature and Characteristics

The origin of the term “asymmetric warfare” dates back to a 1975 article in World Politics by Andrew J.R. Mack in which it refers to a significant disparity in power between opposing actors in conflict.9 Asymmetric warfare is considered as a conflict deviating from the norm, or an indirect approach to affect a counterbalance of force, since forces seek to negate or avoid the strengths of another, while employing their own strength against the other’s weakness. Asymmetric warfare is also understood as a strategy, a tactic, or a method of warfare and conflict10.

8 NATO, Asymmetric warfare, Public Diplomatic Division, 2010
The definition of the term remains complicated because the academic and military communities have used it in different ways. It has been closely associated with the conventional imbalance inducing potential enemies to wage asymmetric or irregular warfare (Bowie, Haffa & Mullins 2003:130). This has included, inter alia, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Some in military circles has used the term to refer to the indirect nature of strategies adopted by many weak non-state actors, rather than to the correlation of forces.11

Characteristics of Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric warfare can be well characterized by contrasting it with conventional symmetric warfare, which focuses on the government installations and the military. Irregular asymmetric warfare, however, focuses on the people (population-centric) and not the military. In symmetric warfare, two powers have similar military power and resources and rely on tactics that are largely similar, differing only in the details of execution. In asymmetric warfare, the tactics and military power of forces are dissimilar. The more dissimilar the belligerents, the more difficult it is to anticipate their unconventional, asymmetric actions12. According to Mao Zedong, ‘the guerrilla swims like a fish in the sea of the people’ and, as the Vietnam War had proved, asymmetric war against a super power can be won especially with the support of the people. In the latest asymmetric war in Afghanistan, the Taliban were defeated, because they neither had the support of the Afghan populace, nor could they muster any outside support. Similarly, the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan collapsed in the face of the US and Coalition offensive.13

The Nature of Asymmetric Warfare

Generally, there are six aspects of asymmetric warfare: method, technology, will, morale, normative, organizational, and patience. Method generally refers to the employment of different tactical doctrines and operational concepts against an opponent. The methodological nature of asymmetrical warfare will generally be seen on the operational and tactical levels of war.

12 Field Manual, Head Quarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC, September, 2008
The technological aspect of asymmetrical warfare is the most prevalent as it generally employs technologically superior weapons against an opponent. Technological asymmetry is used at all levels of war. Asymmetric will can be used to propel a campaign or cause forward. An opponent unwillingness to surrender or accept defeat can protract a war until a wholly superior opponent gives up. Asymmetric will can be used at all levels of war. Morale of troops can be manipulated in order to create an asymmetric advantage for the enemy. Using radio broadcasts and other mass media to push forward an image or agenda can create this asymmetry, commonly known now as the “CNN effect”. Normative asymmetries exist when there are differences in ethical and legal standards between opponents. Organizational asymmetries are most notable when a conflict involves a state and non-state actor. Typically, non-state actors will be organized in a network fashion, where a state actor will be organization hierarchically. Asymmetries of patience are created when opponents view time differently.\textsuperscript{14}

For example, the United States typically desires a short, decisive battle with a definitive outcome, whereas terrorist opponents may be willing to wait for years between attacks as was the case with the World Trade Centre. The first attack came in 1993. While the final attack that brought down the Twin Towers came in 2001. This was an eight-year battle, or even longer, for the terrorists involved whereas the United States only saw two separate and distinct actions – one in 1993 and the other in 2011.\textsuperscript{15}

Asymmetric warfare in Eastern Africa has been observed in different countries. From intra-state conflicts in Burundi, Republic Democratic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and currently in South Sudan to the global terrorism attributed to the Al-Shabaab.

**Asymmetric Warfare in Eastern African Intra-state Conflicts**

It is commonly accepted that an increase in intra-state wars has prevailed in Eastern Africa since the end of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s/early 1990s. Different warring factions, including rebel movements, in the region, are increasingly using

\textsuperscript{14} Steven M. and Douglas Johnson II, (2001), Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts

unconventional or asymmetric warfare to wage and prolong conflicts.\textsuperscript{16} In particular, the Al-Shabaab insurgents and other factions in Somalia have been accused of using IEDs and landmines in their fight against AMISOM. The Al-Shabaab has used asymmetric warfare in other countries in the region. To note, government forces were using antipersonnel mines before the Ottawa treaty - Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. IEDs, often referred to as command-detonated IEDs and bombs, are used extensively; however, the Mine Treaty prohibits victim-activated mines and other explosive devices but, command-detonated mines and devices are not.\textsuperscript{17}

In August 2011, AMISOM forces discovered an IED-manufacturing facility in Mogadishu. In addition, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has also reported the presence of improvised pressure plates, which, is an indication that the Al-Shabaab has a large program to employ IEDs, against vehicles or dismounted troops in Somalia.

Within the Eastern African region, the use of land mines has also been reported in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Fortunately, these countries are signatories to the Ottawa Treaty and have completed their land mine clearance programs under their post-conflict activities.

**Terrorism as an Asymmetric Warfare in Eastern Africa**

The Al Qaeda and affiliated groups have had a presence in Eastern Africa for almost 20 years now. The extent of their operations has varied over time. The region’s porous borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, pervasive corruption, and, in some cases, state complicity in terrorist activities, combined with the almost 20-year absence of central authority in Somalia, have provided an enabling environment for the Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups.\textsuperscript{18} Some countries in the region have served, at various times, as terrorist safe havens, staging areas, or transit points.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Tawane A. (2010) Terrorism in East Africa, Nairobi: University of Nairobi.
\end{itemize}
All Eastern African countries have been victims of terrorist acts. These acts have either been carried out by and against individual countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) for a domestic cause or they have focused on extra-national or extra-regional targets, such as Western targets located in the region.\(^1\) The USA and allied interests have been periodically targeted, prompting the United States to enhance security measures in the region and engage regional partners to strengthen their own counterterrorism capabilities.\(^2\) The terrorist threat from Somalia continue to undermine the overall security situation in Eastern Africa with untold loss of life and property and an overall undermining of the economies in the region. This situation has been worsened by the prolonged and severe intra-state conflict in the region leading to instability, poverty and overall socio-economic decline. These factors render countries vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. It has also been variously argued that the apparent spread of violent Islamic radicalism in the region has been informed and fuelled by the conflict in Somalia.

---

\(^1\) Kimunguyi, P. (2007) Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa, Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University.

The Case of Somalia

Somalia slid into violent factional civil conflict in 1991 after the fall of the repressive regime of president Siad Barre. With lawlessness, banditry and mass starvation and without an organized central government, the security and humanitarian problems in Somalia escalated. Various Muslim extremists and different warlords have fought one another for the spoils of war brought about by the insecurity and lack of policing along the Somalia coastline. Numerous UN-backed efforts to restore peace and stability in Somalia have failed despite the existence of many ceasefire agreements between the warring factions.

Following the entry of AMISOM and its successful operations together with the Somali National forces, the Al-Shabaab adopted different types of warfare within and outside of Somalia that included the following dimensions.

Bombings: The Al-Shabaab has consistently carried out these kind of attacks by using IEDs. IEDs are cheap and with modern technology, they have become smaller and harder to detect.

Kidnappings and Hostage-taking: The Al-Shabaab has used kidnappings and hostage-taking to establish a strong bargaining position and to elicit publicity. Kidnapping is one of the most difficult acts for a terrorist group to accomplish, but, if a kidnapping is successful, it can gain terrorists money, release of jailed comrades, and publicity for an extended period. Hostage-taking involves the seizure of a facility or location and the taking of hostages. Unlike a kidnapping, hostage-taking provokes a confrontation with authorities. It forces authorities to either make dramatic decisions or to comply with the terrorists’ demands. It is overt and designed to attract and hold media attention.

Armed Attacks and Assassinations: Armed attacks include raids and ambushes. Assassinations are the killing of a selected victim, usually by bombings or small arms. Drive-by shooting is a common technique employed by unsophisticated or loosely organized terrorist groups. Historically, terrorists have assassinated specific individuals for psychological effect.

22 Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu), 2008.
This type of warfare is currently used by the Somali terrorists groups to force contributing troops to AMISOM to withdraw their forces from Somalia.

Arsons and Firebombing: The Al-Shabaab and related groups are using arson and firebombing against utilities, hotels, government buildings and industrial centers to portray an image that the government in power is incapable of maintaining order.\(^{23}\)

Hijacking: Hijacking involves forceful waylaying and capture of goods and their means of transport and either diverting their use and/or holding onto them for ransom purposes. Hijacking of food conveys is a common occurrence. In reference to Somalia in general, Somali pirates hijacked 46 ships in 2009, 47 in 2010 and 25 in 2011. This practice has decreased since 2010 due to new defense strategies against piracy on the coast of Somalia. In 2012, there were just 75 attacks reported off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden down from 237 attacks in 2011 and only 14 ships were hijacked, according to the International Maritime Bureau. There have been speculations that the proceeds from the ransoms might have ended up in the hands of the Al-Shabaab.

**Impact of Land Mines and IEDs on AMISOM Operations**

Landmines and IEDs are a contributing factor to the protracted emergency situation in many parts of Somalia. For example, grazing land and water sources have been badly damaged. Incidents involving explosive devices are reported almost daily through June 2012.\(^{24}\) The on-going fighting between Somali forces backed by AMISOM troops against the Al Shabaab and various clan militias has exacerbated the mine problem. The Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) report that there are privately held stockpiles of varying sizes of Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), which pose a significant threat from accidental explosions as well as possible diversion of explosives to construct IEDs.\(^{25}\) AMISOM has suffered from land mines and IEDs that have resulted in death, serious injuries and slowed down their operations.

---

24 Ibrahim, Abdifitah, Somalia Report, 27 April 2011
Counter-IED and Landmine Operations in Somalia

As a result of the sustained period of calm and stability in Somalia, attributed to increased international support to the Federal government in Mogadishu, it is believed that refugees and IDPS will opt to return to their homes. AMISOM and the government is concerned that many of the areas the people will return to are still not safe from abandoned arms and weapons. For this reason, the AMISOM and the government have expressed the urgent need for increased clearance of AXOs and UXOs. There is also need for risk education on these munitions to the returnees. The United Nations Mine Service (UNMAS) has implemented some interventions in response to the threat of landmines and IEDs in Somalia since 2009. The UNMAS program provides three distinct types of support:

1. Lifesaving humanitarian programming;
2. Support to peacekeeping through the Explosive Management Support to AMISOM project;

From 2013, survey and manual demining, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and lifesaving outreach and radio messaging initiatives are being implemented in Somaliland, Puntland and south-central Somalia with the following results.

1. 290,906 men, women, boys, and girls were reached with mine and IEDs awareness messages in south-central Somalia, including in the newly accessible parts of the country such as Beletweyne, Baidoa, Afgoye, Dollow and Luuq and along the Western Border where returnees are crossing back into Somalia from Kenya;
2. 7,843 items of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) were safely removed and destroyed;
3. Continued capacity building efforts with the Somali Police Force (SPF) throughout 2013 are already starting to bear fruit with the SPF intended to take over the role of first responders to situations by the end of 2014. The SPF has identified and secured 1,079 explosive items including over 140 IEDs. In addition, the SPF Explosive Detection Dog Unit has conducted 23,132 searches; and,
4. UNMAS has enabled AMISOM to fulfil its mandate with greater safety and freedom of movement. This has been done through a programme capacity development in mine action and EOD for the police and other relevant personnel in government; conducting mine clearance, EOD, and battle area clearance for the most vulnerable sectors of the population; training for AMISOM in EOD and counter-IED operations and Supporting general mine/IED awareness activities to minimize civilian death and injury.\textsuperscript{26}

These activities have significantly contributed to the reduction of harm caused by IEDs and land mines. However, more still needs to be done. In addition, given the fact that terrorists or insurgents are always perfecting their tactics and practices, AMISOM and its partners need to consistently improve their capacity of reaction to the changing environment of warfare and especially of the asymmetric type.

\textsuperscript{26} UNMAS Annual Report 2008
Challenges of Counter-terrorism/Counter-asymmetric Warfare in Eastern Africa

Poverty and Analphabetism

Eastern Africa is relatively poor and suffers from civil wars, wars between neighbouring countries, natural disasters, economic mismanagement, corruption and inter-ethnic conflict among others. The poverty levels are extremely high with the majority of the population living in hunger and starvation. Famines are common throughout the region. The region is high on the index of least developed countries in the world and it has been suggested that the region is host to some of the least fortunate of the entire human race\textsuperscript{27}. This malaise exacerbated by the burgeoning population of uneducated and unemployed youth has resulted in a ready pool of dissatisfied populace susceptible to recruitment into terrorist activities or joining ranks of other armed groups.

Intelligence and Operational Capabilities

Training and doctrine on terrorism and asymmetric warfare are not sufficient in the security sectors within Eastern Africa. The sector is also not adequately resourced with the appropriate tools and equipment. What is needed is for the security sector to be able to anticipate the occurrence of a threat and not merely to respond when the attacks occur. This calls for timely and comprehensive intelligence gathering and analysis to inform action. The development of national and regional awareness as well improved operational tactics amongst the security apparatus are key components to fighting asymmetric warfare and terrorism. Besides inadequate training, there is also an apparent disconnect between the various arms of the security apparatus who do not share all the available information. Thus, the security apparatus tend to respond to asymmetric or terrorist attacks after their execution rather than detecting and preventing them from occurring.

The Demonstration Effect

The fact remains that when some people in a community do something, others are more likely to repeat the same. Similarly, it is possible that various armed groups in the region will learn from the asymmetric warfare and terrorist attacks practiced by the Al-Shabaab and its supporters. Given that asymmetric warfare is not unduly sophisticated, these armed groups might adopt it to prosecute confrontations in their respective countries and/or beyond the region.
Conclusion and Recommendations

Eastern African countries are actually facing two types of conflicts. Asymmetric warfare practiced in intra-states conflicts and international terrorism by the Al-Shabaab and other Al-Qaeda affiliates. Asymmetric warfare and terrorism in the region are driven by continued ethnic, religious, nationalist, separatist, political and economic motivations. Terrorists have also developed connections and networks in different countries, which allow them to conduct asymmetric attacks with ease.

Terrorism is a global phenomenon and all countries must join hands, commit resources and cooperate to deal with the menace. In his research paper of 27 April 1998 titled “Asymmetric warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism”, Clark L Staten, Executive Director of the Emergency Response and Research Institute (ERRI) concluded that Terrorism will remain a major transnational problem. Future conflicts in the near term may not involve massive number of troops to fixed battle zones but, will involve combating small numbers of fanatical terrorists using a variety of means like Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and other sophisticated technologies and tactics.

In Eastern Africa, Somalia constitutes a general security risk for the broader region. The Al-Shabaab radicals have become the enforcers of extreme ideologies and are not shy to employ asymmetric tactics to carry out heinous acts of terrorism throughout the region. The Al-Shabaab works in small compartmentalized groups, which makes detection increasingly difficult. Indeed, there are terrorist cells that are put together just for the purpose of committing a single act and then melting back into the population in various countries. Such an asymmetric warfare strategy confuses security systems whose training is still largely focused on traditional conventional warfare.

28 Clark, S. (1998), Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism: The Coming Challenge For Emergency and National Security Forces, Emergency Response and Research Institute
Recommendations

The following recommendations are divided in two categories; general recommendations and practical recommendations.

General Recommendations

It has been pointed out that the intra-state conflicts in Eastern African are numerous and interconnected and range from poverty, bad governance, structural inequality, injustice and terrorism. Some of these causes are local while others are the result of transformations in international structures. Many of the sources of local conflicts can be prevented or solved through home-grown interventions including, among others, the establishment and realization of good governance and democracy. It is also incumbent on governments to enhance their capacities to deliver positive socio-economic programs for the people. This will effectively mitigate conflicts and empower communities. Informed communities are less likely to support unconstitutional means of solving their conflicts. More importantly, the vulnerability of the youth to be recruited in armed groups or terrorist cells will be greatly reduced.

Practical Recommendations

The Practical recommendations aim to provide solutions to the respective security structures within the Eastern African countries in order to build their capacity to deal with asymmetric warfare.

Improvement in Intelligence Matters

Security forces have to build their intelligence capabilities of gathering, processing, interpreting and sharing intelligence. The intelligence sector should be able to foresee, understand and act before attacks are executed. The goal of Intelligence, operations is to provide accurate, relevant and timely intelligence information to decision makers. Security forces and other stakeholders must learn to properly use this important tool at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The starting point is to properly and comprehensively capacitate the security sector.

The countries in the region should then utilize every facet of their security architecture to protect the citizenly and the socio-economic and political structures.
Security Training and Doctrine

In the history of conflict, ‘those who adapt survive, those who do not die’. Asymmetric or irregular threats are largely unpredictable and given the uncertainty of the threat; the key skill that individuals, units, and teams of commanders and leaders need to learn is adaptability. Adaptability is defined as the degree to which adjustments are possible in practices, processes, or structures of systems to project actual changes of a situation. Those responsible for security must provide enhanced opportunities to individuals and units to learn to deal with the asymmetric threats faced in the current national and international security environment.

Involving the Populace

The aim of the war against asymmetric warfare should be to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory. The population must be efficiently protected to ensure that they cooperate without fear of retribution by armed groups. Confidence building among the population should be done progressively using the pacified theory/technique of conquering territory, dominating it and then moving on to newer areas/aspects. The first steps are to remove or drive away the armed groups then strengthen the positions through the building of the necessary communication infrastructures to enhance cooperation with the population. It is pertinent that the communities are intimately involved given the fact that terrorists and insurgents can never operate successfully without the support of the population.

Risk Education Training

Risk Education Training is important to educate the population and develop awareness on security situation. It is life saving information provided to those at risk. It helps minimize the risks for people living, working or travelling in vulnerable or soft target areas.

If this education is planned and well executed as a continuous program at all levels, it will enhance the capacity of the populace to observe, analyse and report threats. Once the awareness is built, a culture is developed and this can be used to enhance the participation of communities in realizing a comprehensive security architecture.

**Winning Hearts and Mind**

To win the hearts and minds of one’s adversary is a cornerstone of counterinsurgency theory.\(^{31}\) “Wining Hearts” means persuading people that their best interests are served by your success; “Winning Minds” means convincing the people that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless\(^{32}\). This strategy advises soldiers on the ground to create trusted networks with the local population and community leaders on the basis of common interests. Compliance and respect will come from the belief in the inevitability of the benefit of cooperation with the security organs and not from any sense of sympathy. This is important in peace support operations such as AMISOM as well as in the larger Eastern African region as the war against insurgencies intensifies.

---

References

Books and Articles


Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu), 2008.


UNMAS Annual Report 2008

Online Sources


Highlights of Key Messages in the Issue Briefs

The Insecurity in Somalia: The Spill-over Effect to Kenya

The security threat stemming from the Somalia conflict spill-over into Kenya is real as demonstrated by the series of kidnappings of foreign tourists from Kenyan luxury resorts; low-key gun, IEDs and grenade attacks; to the infamous Westgate Mall terror attack on 21 September 2013.

The spill-over effects are multifaceted and impact on such aspects as religion, economic performance, ethnicity and sense of nationhood, and even the concept of the modern state as espoused in the Westphalia process of 1648.

The Spill over effect can be summed up in following categories:

1. Deteriorating security as a result of terrorism;
2. Increase in transnational crime such as illegal trade, human trafficking, human smuggling;
3. Economic decline especially in the tourism industry;
4. Proliferation of illicit SALW in Northern Kenya and the region as a whole; and,
5. A serious refugee crisis.

The internal factors that contribute to the security spill-over include:

1. Youth unemployment;
2. Inability by government to comprehensively address legitimate demands by communities;
3. Growth of religious extremism;
4. Political jockeying across the political divide; and,
5. Grey security-identity nexus.
Possible remedies to the current status quo include:

1. Intensifying support to AMISOM and the Somali Federal Government;
2. Working towards political consensus on national and regional security;
3. Counteracting religious extremism;
4. Tackling the problem of youth unemployment and general socio-economic marginalisation; and,
5. Encouraging nation-building efforts and in particular involving local communities in the security architecture.

Asymmetric Warfare in Eastern Africa Conflicts: *Case of Somalia*

Struggle for power, ethnic representation/domination, lack of adequate democratic governance, poverty and natural resources have led to violent intra-state conflicts in Eastern Africa.

1. Intra-state conflicts and terrorism are a major threat to Eastern African Countries that are increasingly confronted by the phenomenon of asymmetric warfare.

2. The Al-Shabaab militants and its allies are using landmines and IEDs to create general fear and permanent insecurity in Eastern Africa. This kind of insecurity undermines economic development and social cohesion within and between countries.

3. As asymmetric or irregular threats are largely unpredictable, the key skill that countries need to learn is adaptability defined as the degree to which adjustments are possible in practices and processes to project actual changes in security situations.

4. Those responsible for security should revamp their intelligence capabilities in order to be more proactive than reactive. The goal of the intelligence operations should be to provide accurate, relevant and timely intelligence to the decision makers.
About the Authors

Radoslaw Malinowski

Mr Radoslaw Malinowski is an applied researcher at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), Nairobi, Kenya. He holds a Master of Arts Degree in Law and a Master of Arts Degree in Theology from the Catholic University of Lublin (Poland), as well as a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations and Peace Studies from Hekima College – a constituent College of Catholic University of Eastern Africa (CUEA), Kenya. He is currently pursuing a PhD at the Catholic University of Lublin (Poland). He has worked for different non-governmental and international organisations in Kenya, South Sudan, Malawi and South Africa in the area of peace, conflict and human rights. He is also a part time lecturer at the Tangaza University College (CUEA).

Lt Col Donatien Nduwimana

Lt. Col. Donatien NDUWIMANA is a senior army officer of the Burundian National Defense Forces. He is currently a researcher at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC).

His career as a military Officer began when he was commissioned into the Burundian National Defense Forces in 1988. He completed military and academic training in 1994. Since then he has held key positions in command and staff, some of which include those of Battalion Commander between 2007 and 2010 and Ministry of Defense Advisor in Studies and Strategic Planning in 2012.

He has attended several career military courses during his time of service including senior staff course at the Combined War College in Yaounde, Cameroon, Junior staff Course in Libreville, Gabon, and Multinational Battalion Commander in Peace Operations course in Bamako, Mali.

He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Economics Sciences (Management and Administration) and a Master’s degree in Strategy, Defense, Security, Conflict and Disaster Management from the University of Yaounde in Cameroon.