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General information

This Journal is a publication of the International Peace Support Training Centre, IPSTC. The Journal will be issued quarterly, in February, May, August and November.

Editorial Team:

Chairman: Col. Modest Kombo
Editor: Prof. Timothy Gatara
Member: Lt. Col. Joyce Sitienei
Editorial Assistant: Evans Adamba

Direct Articles to:

The Editor, Africa Amani Journal, P.O. Box 24232-005,
Karen, Nairobi, Kenya
Email: aajeditor@ipstc.org; timgatara@ipstc.org
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Catherine Gaku Njeru, holds a Masters of Arts in Gender and Development degree from Kenyatta University in Kenya and a Bachelor’s degree in sociology. Catherine has over ten (10) years’ experience in international development approaches, programme development and management focusing on building capacities for institutionalizing gender equality and inclusion principles in development frameworks, policies and programmes with a speciality in peace and security including security sector reforms.

Since 2010, Catherine has been actively engaged in developing national and regional frameworks for integrating gender in peace and security. For instance, between 2010 and 2013 Catherine took lead in the development of the Kenya National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security.

Catherine joined the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in 2014 as a gender specialist to support the integration of gender in the Eastern Africa region’s Peace Support Operations. She has consulted for government and civil society organisations on developing institutional framework works for addressing gender based violence, gender mainstreaming and women peace and security among others.

Prof. Timothy Gatara is a Social Scientist specialized in research and Demography. He graduated from the University of Nairobi with a BA Honors, Sociology and a Masters in Development Sociology. He went on to take a position as a Research Officer with the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations Population Programmes in Kenya. He served the Flying Doctors and the African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF) as a Senior Field Officer. He studied Population Dynamics at the Johns Hopkins University of Baltimore USA, and proceeded to the Centre for the Study of Population at the Florida State University Tallahassee, where he obtained a Ph.D in Sociology majoring in Demography.

He taught Population Dynamics and advanced Demographic Techniques at the Population Studies and Research Institute (PSRI) at the University of Nairobi for 7 years. He joined the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF, Africa Region) and served for 15 years in various senior capacities in the region and internationally, focusing mainly on programme development, institutional dynamics, strategic planning and management of donor funds. He has had extensive consulting experience with international, government and private organizations throughout the world. Prof Gatara is the author of 3 books: Research Methodology; The Poverty of Mind and Statistical Techniques. This is in addition to numerous articles and research and consulting reports.

On leaving IPPF, he joined the Nairobi Evangelical Graduate School of Theology (NEGST) now Africa International University, as the Director of the Institute of African Realities (ISAR). He served as the Deputy Vice Chancellor for Administration and Finance, of the Presbyterian University of East Africa. He now serves as the Senior Researcher at the International Peace Support and Training Centre (IPSTC).
Jacinta King’ori holds a Ph.D. in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, Master of Arts in counselling Psychology and a Bachelor of Education degree. She is currently a lecturer and the chairman in the Department of Co-operatives and community development at the Co-operative University of Kenya.

Oboka Wycliffe Aluoch, holds a Ph.D in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance; MA in Project Planning and Management; and Bachelor of Education. He has wide work experience spanning over 20years. Is currently Dean Faculty of Co-operatives and Community Development at The Co-operative University College of Kenya (CUCK). Has previously served as Director, for Academic Quality Assurance at CUCK; and, a lecturer at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. He is an outstanding researcher and consultant in disaster Risk Reduction for media; Islamic Relief East Africa Region; UNDP-Kenya; International Peace Support Training and Centre; United Nations Mission in South Sudan; and National Drought Management Authority.

Carolyne Gatimu is a Social Scientist. She holds a Master of Arts degree in Development Studies (2011) and a Bachelor’s degree in Social Work (2008) from the University of Nairobi, Kenya. She has been involved in various research projects, taking on different roles and responsibilities. She has previously worked at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi. She has also consulted for Oxfam International and Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex, U.K and is currently working as a Gender researcher at the Peace and Security Department, IPSTC.

Samuel A. Nyanchoga is a professor of history and peace studies. He is the current dean of the faculty of arts and social sciences at the Catholic University of Eastern Africa. He has also served as the director of the institute for regional integration and development at the same university. He is also a recipient of many local and international research awards. He has consulted for organizations such as International Labour Organisation; Institute of Social Studies; Kenya Parliamentary Women Association; National Cohesion and Integration Commission; The Commission for University Education; Kenyan Human Rights Commission and AMISOM. He is also an external examiner for Kenyatta University; Mount Kenya University; University of Nairobi and Masinde Muliro University.
Prof. Clara Momanyi is a professor of Kiswahili in the Department of Kiswahili, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The Catholic University of Eastern Africa. She holds a Bachelor of Education degree in Kiswahili and History from the University of Nairobi, a Master of Arts degree and a PhD both in Kiswahili literary studies from Kenyatta University. Prof. Momanyi has served in national boards as director and has translated both national and international documents and policies into Kiswahili. She is a member of several Kiswahili national and international associations and served as a member of editorial boards in academic journals like RUWAZA AFRIKA, Journal of Contemporary Discourse in Language, Literature, Culture and the Arts, Egerton University, CHEMCHEMI, a Journal of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Kenyatta University and KUMEKUCHA, a Journal of the Faculty of Arts in Catholic University, among others. She has also peer-reviewed articles for other publications in both English and Kiswahili. Prof. Momanyi is a Kiswahili literary writer who has published widely in the area of Kiswahili novels and short stories, and has widely published academic articles in national and international journals. In 2006, she was awarded the Fulbright Senior Scholars Program where she did a postdoctoral research on Teaching Kiswahili as a foreign language in USA. In 2007 she was also recognized by Ford Foundation International Fellowship Program for promoting leadership for social justice. In 2010, she received presidential commendation as the Elder of the Burning Spear (EBS) in recognition for her efforts in the development of national language, culture and human rights. Prof. Momanyi is also a researcher especially in the area of gender, culture and history.

Ayuba Caleb born in 1969, in Kaduna State of Nigeria, Caleb Ayuba attended the Ahmadu Bello University Zaria for his First and Second degrees. He is currently completing his doctoral degree at the Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria. He has also obtained a certificate and a diploma in interfaith Studies-Christian/Muslim dialogue. Caleb Ayuba is also a Research Fellow in Defence and Security Studies in Nigeria’s premier Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja. He has written extensively on questions bordering on terrorisms and insurgencies within states and the international environment in general.
Editorial

The Africa Amani Journal has reached its 3rd edition. In the first two editions, the editorial carried articles on a wide range of topics including “Predicting State Fragility.” The Changing Nature of Peace Keeping in Africa “Terrorism and Counterterrorism”, and “Transitional Justice and Post-Civil War Peacebuilding”.

In the current issue, special focus is given to Gender Mainstreaming in Peace Support Operations. This follows a concerted effort to highlight issues affecting men and women in conflict situations, and in particular women. It also comes after intensive gender mainstreaming work at IPSTC, including the drafting and adoption of a gender policy in the institutions. It is hoped that by showing the salience of gender issues in PSOs, the practice will also take root throughout the security stakeholders.

The issue looks at theoretical work underpinning the case for gender issues in society; it also carries articles on gender and governance, culture and gender violence, gender and politics in Kenya and gender and violence in South Sudan.

As the editorial looks forward to the next issue that will focus on terrorism and counterterrorism, all are welcome to the readership of the issue and the Journal in general.

Prof. Timothy Gatara,
Editor.
Forward

A Gender sensitive environment for peace.

In the previous issue of the Journal, a number of challenges in peace and security in Africa were noted. These included the crisis in Burundi, persistence of gender based violence, terrorism and its escalation in the region, environmentally triggered conflicts and arms trafficking and its threats to peace and security. As the Centre continues to pursue research in these areas and to prepare regional PSO personnel for peacekeeping missions, it is also paying attention to a key and long neglected area of its work: that of gender issues and gender mainstreaming.

The seriousness with which the Centre has taken gender issues and mainstreaming is borne out by a number of achievements: the first is the development of an institutional gender policy to guide mainstreaming within the structures and processes of the institution. The policy has the vision of making the centre an entity that upholds gender equality and specifically pursues conclusively the objects of enhancing gender parity, building the necessary institutional capacity needed to mainstream gender and mobilising the requisite expertise necessary for implementation of the policy. The second area of effort is the training of all staff of the institution and those involved in PSO in understanding both the concept and practice of gender sensitive existence. The final push is in dedicating a volume of the Journal to gender issues with view to alerting players in PSO about the great need to recognise and take into account gender considerations in all their work.

IPSTC is grateful for the full support of UN Women, for not only funding the realisation of the gender policy, but also in supporting its implementation. I welcome you all to this special issue of the Journal and urge continued interest and contribution of articles to future issues. The Centre appreciates the steady support of the Government of Japan through UNDP in making this Journal a permanent and valued feature of IPSTC and Peacebuilding in the region.

Director,
IPSTC.
Gender and Governance: Challenges of Mainstreaming Gender in National Planning and Budgeting in Kenya

Catherine Njeru, International Peace Support and Training Centre, (IPSTC), Nairobi, Kenya.

Abstract

Gender mainstreaming is a global strategy for the attainment of gender equality. The government of Kenya has expressed its intention to attain gender equality and has therefore established policies and institutional mechanisms for gender mainstreaming. However, gender mainstreaming programmes are not effective. This study took place in Nairobi County and focused on three ministries whose role in mainstreaming gender in national development is considered important. The study utilized change theory that argues in any planned change reinforcing and restraining forces must be identified, analyzed and action taken. The study used descriptive research design and employed both primary and secondary data collection techniques. Primary data was collected using questionnaires and interviews. The study found that methods used to mainstream gender in national development include, trainings on gender mainstreaming, integration of gender in the planning and budgeting frameworks, establishment of gender focal points and development of ministerial gender policies. Effectiveness of these methods was hindered by lack of monitoring, low gender mainstreaming skills, ineffective gender mainstreaming structures and lack of budget. The study concludes that for gender mainstreaming to be effective there is urgent need to build gender mainstreaming skills of officers in government ministries, strengthen gender focal points, allocate sufficient budget to gender work and coordinate policy development across sectors to ensure gender mainstreaming coherently runs across all sectors.

Background information

Gender equality is a development objective in its own right (World Bank, 2012). It is also instrumental for poverty reduction and achievement of development goals. A significant volume of research has established that gender inequality is adverse to human development and leads to economically inefficient outcomes (FEMNET, 2008; Economic Commission for Africa 2009).

Inclusion of gender equality goals in planning and budgeting processes is considered a key vehicle for translating into action the gender equality commitments of governments (NCGD, 2009). Yet, ministries of finance and planning have tended to remain singularly untouched by the winds of gender change that blow through other ministries (Sen., 2000).

Globally, gender mainstreaming has been and is still championed by the United Nations (UN). UN agencies including the UN Women, UNFPA and UNDP have invested in assisting UN member states reform their public planning and budgeting processes. For instance, UN Women have made significant contribution towards this by building political support, developing technical resources and capacity, generating good practice and increasing accountability to gender equality (UN Women, 2010).

African states have committed to several instruments that promote gender equality. Consequently, African governments have
established diverse mechanisms; including policies, laws and institutions for gender mainstreaming (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2009; Owulu, 2011). However, while there are so many instruments expressing the formal commitments of African governments to gender equality and mainstreaming, translating these theoretical promises into concrete action remains a formidable challenge (Owulu, 2011). For example, at the fifteen years review of Africa’s implementation of Beijing Platform for Action in 2009, the outcome was a gloomy depiction of African countries’ failure to meet their commitments on gender equality. In particular, many African countries had been unable to address gender issues in poverty reduction papers, public service appointments and in peace building processes among others (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2009). Generally, implementation of gender policies is still rather slow and uneven (Economic Commission for Africa, 2010).

Kenya has adopted and ratified several instruments on gender equality (ADB, 2007). A number of initiatives in line with the international commitments on gender exist. Prominent is the adoption of a National Policy on Gender and Development in the year 2000. The goal of the policy is to facilitate the mainstreaming of the needs and concerns of men and women in development process (GoK, 2000). The five year medium term plan (2008-2012), which implements Vision 2030, commits to the introduction of gender mainstreaming into all government policies, plans and programmes (NCGD, 2009).

Whereas several policy documents on gender equality have been produced, there seem to be inconsistency in their implementation. For instance, the National Gender Policy was adopted in 2000, six years later the Sessional Paper on Gender Equality and Development aimed at aiding the implementation of the gender policy was developed. This notwithstanding, in 2008 a National Action Plan for the implementation of the National Gender Policy was approved. This raises several questions; why did it take so long to come up with implementation frameworks? Are actors committed in implementing the National Gender Policy?

The Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006 proposed the establishment of gender divisions in all ministries. However, this has not yet happened because budgets have not been allocated (ADB, 2007). The Head of the Public Service Commission of Kenya issued a directive asking ministries to appoint gender officers in the year 2007. The directive stipulated that appointed persons need to be trained on gender issues (ADB, 2007). On the contrary, gender staffs have often been assigned to positions rather than be recruited on the basis of expertise (UNIFEM, 2010).

A report by the ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2010) notes that the government of Kenya (GOK) has been very good at generating national gender policies, but not so well in implementing. The report further observes that despite a long history of commitment to gender issues, GOK is challenged in finding ways of supporting poor women to actively participate in development interventions (ibid). Could the challenge be attributed to the non-articulation of gender commitments in the national plans and budgets? The budget is the most important economic policy instrument of government, and as such it can be a powerful tool in transforming the country to meet the gender equality goals.

The study sought to explore challenges of mainstreaming gender in planning and budgeting processes in Kenya. The study achieved this by analyzing gender mainstreaming processes in three key ministries; the ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development (MOGCSID), Finance (MOF) and Planning, National Development
and Vision 2030 (MPNDV2030). The ministries were selected due to their centrality in mainstreaming gender in national planning and budgeting process.

Statement of the Problem

The government of Kenya has stated her commitment to achieve gender equality by signing and ratifying various international instruments on gender. A ministry has been established to facilitate gender mainstreaming in government. Already there are legislations, policies and institutional mechanisms adopted for this purpose. However, programmes on gender mainstreaming have not been effective. An analysis of the planning and budgetary process in Kenya reveals a non-inclusion of gender concerns in national plans and budgets. For instance, a keen look at the Vision 2030 indicates that gender is just mentioned as a section in the social pillar. Explicit measures in the entire Vision to redress structural gender barriers are minimal and scanty. In addition, the indicators that have been developed in Vision 2030 do not reflect how gender mainstreaming will be measured. Further, gender mainstreaming reports by government ministries, show limited knowledge on the subject, dwelling mostly on trainings held and percent of female staff employed; concrete reports on how gender is mainstreamed in programmes and projects undertaken by government ministries is lacking. The study therefore sought to explore challenges facing gender mainstreaming in national planning and budgeting process in Kenya.

Objectives

To evaluate the methods, tools and strategies used in mainstreaming gender in national planning and budgeting process in Kenya;

To find out challenges to gender mainstreaming in national planning and budgeting process in Kenya;

Literature Review

Methods, tools and strategies of Mainstreaming Gender in National Development

The 1995 Beijing Plat Form for Action (BPFA) provides insights into how governments are to mainstream gender. The platform calls for the establishment of national gender machinery as the first step towards mainstreaming gender in national development (UN, 1995). Alluding to the same opinion is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The convention requires states to embody the principle of equality of men and women through law and other appropriate means. The BPFA further gives the necessary conditions for effective functioning of such national machineries which include:

a. Location at the highest possible level in the Government;

b. Institutional mechanisms or processes that facilitate, as appropriate, decentralized planning, implementation and monitoring with a view to involving non-governmental organizations;

c. Sufficient resources in terms of budget and professional capacity and

d. Opportunity to influence development of all government policies.

The study utilized this criterion to measure the establishment and functioning of the Kenya gender machinery.

The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW, 2010) further notes that national gender machineries have major responsibilities for preparing and monitoring the implementation of gender equality plans, strategies and programmes; initiating gender equality legislation; building gender capacity in line ministries and the preparation of tools to support gender mainstreaming across government (CSW, 2010). Yet as Marcus et.al (1996) observes that there is tension between advisory,
advocacy, policy oversight and monitoring roles of the gender machinery, each of which require different skills and institutional cultures. The discussion does not look at the challenges of undertaking these roles and how these challenges are to be overcome.

The mere establishment of national gender machineries does not automatically lead to gender equality. Methodologies that influence the development process for gender responsiveness must be employed. A critical examination of the literature suggests that there is much to learn on the process of gender mainstreaming. However, methods to operationalize these ideas are not as apparent (Wittman, 2010). NCGD (2009) quoting Alami (2008) notes there is no recipe for GRB, countries need to develop tailored approaches that respond to country specific contexts, economic and budget systems. Some methodologies include developing gender budget statements, developing capacities and institutional mechanisms, integrating gender into budgeting and planning documents, promoting and strengthening accountability systems and creating methodologies that rate and score how much expenditure is going towards projects that promote equality (NCGD, 2009). However, Wittman (2010) notes that the daily organizational work hinders the application of these methods.

Common tools for gender mainstreaming discussed by various manuals and reports include gender statistics, benchmarking, gender impact analysis, 3R method, rapid gender analysis, developing gender goals and indicators (ENERGIA, 2010; The Danish National Research and Documentation; Zentai and Krizsan, 2006; Council of Europe, 2004).

The report by Council of Europe (2004) on conceptual framework, methodology and presentation of good practices, categorizes gender mainstreaming tools in to three: Analytical, educational and consultative tools. Analytical tools are those delivering information necessary for the development of policies. Some examples include sex disaggregated statistics, surveys, cost benefit analysis and gender impact assessment, among others. These tools are also crucial for planning, measuring results and assessing progress (Commission on the Status of Women, 2012).

Educational tools are those that deal with awareness-raising and the transfer of knowledge. They include awareness raising, training courses, checklists, guiding manuals and handbooks. Amy North (2008), however, notes that there are concerns about the content, method and effect of training practices.

Consultative tools on the other hand include; think tanks, participation of both sexes in decision making, conferences and seminars. Additional tools that fit in this class are discussed by ENERGIA (2010) which includes documentation and communication.

Zentai and Krizsan (2006) emphasize the need of gender mainstreaming enabling tools. These help create the framework within which gender-responsive policy making, planning and implementation can take place. They are mainly policies, legal frameworks and financing. However, in many African states gender mainstreaming policies and legal frameworks exist yet gender mainstreaming programmes are ineffective (Economic Commission for Africa, 2010).

Of concern is that most of the methods and tools discussed in this section are general. The literature also lacks a clear distinction of what is a method of gender mainstreaming and what is a tool for gender mainstreaming. The study sought to find and evaluate specific methods and tools used in mainstreaming gender in national planning and budgeting process in Kenya. Further, discussions do not explore tools of coordinating gender mainstreaming programmes with different sectors yet mainstreaming gender in national planning and budgeting process is a collaborative effort of different actors.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2010) discusses several strategies used by different African states in mainstreaming gender. Many countries like Ghana and Rwanda have adopted national gender policies that
prioritize areas of focus based on local needs and conditions. Countries such as Libya and Namibia have developed Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers articulating specific gender issues. While countries like Uganda and Tanzania have adopted gender budgeting as a strategy to accelerate promotion of gender equality and equitable development. However, the report does not discuss the effectiveness and failures of these strategies in making gender mainstreaming a daily practice.

The Europeans Women Lobby (2010) report on *Women on boards in Europe from a snail’s pace to a giant leap*, presents another strategy. The report talks about how European Union member states adopted legislations to increase the representation of women on corporate boards. The report concludes that countries that adopted legislations with sanctions made greater progress than those that did not. The report provides a great lesson in analyzing findings.

Countries in Asia and pacific have for instance applied strategies such as gender sensitization, capacity building, gender budgeting, collection of gender information and sex disaggregated data (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2010).

A general observation in the literature shows that while there is clear distinction in the approaches to gender mainstreaming described by Rees (2003) as tinkering, integrationist and transformative, clear procedural application terminologies have not fully been developed. In the gender mainstreaming discourse the terminologies tools, methods and strategies are interchangeably used.

**Theoretical Framework**

**Theory of Change**

This study was guided by Lewin’s (1948) Three-step change theory. Lewin’s theory of change views behaviour as a dynamic balance of forces working in opposing directions, driving forces which facilitate change because they push in the desired direction and restraining forces which hinder change because they push in the opposite direction. In any planned change forces must be analyzed and influenced in order to shift balance in the direction of the desired change. To achieve gender equality for instance, driving forces as well as restraining forces must be identified, analyzed and deliberate actions taken.

Lewin’s change theory describes three steps in change process as follows: The first step is to unfreeze the existing situation or status quo which is considered the equilibrium state, for instance, gender inequality. Lewin suggests two methods of unfreezing. First, increase the driving forces that direct behavior away from the existing situation or status quo. In gender mainstreaming, this calls for removal of barriers that impedes the access of equal opportunities to the disadvantaged gender. Second, decrease the restraining forces that negatively affect the movement from the existing equilibrium, in gender mainstreaming this may possibly mean addressing negative social attitudes, culture and discriminatory laws.

Lewin’s second step in the change process is the movement of the target system to a new level of equilibrium. By persuading the society to agree that the status quo is not beneficial. This stage involves a process of change in thoughts, feeling and behavior. In other words, letting the community/society see the costs of gender inequality and persuading it to change.

The third step is re-freezing. Re-freezing is the process of establishing the change as a new habit so that it now becomes the “standard operating procedure”. Without this stage, it is easy to relapse. In gender mainstreaming, this implies sustaining the gender equality practices by institutionalizing them through formal and informal mechanisms such as policies, laws, procedures and regular monitoring accompanied with incentives and sanctions.

The theory has been applied in implementing planned changes. By identifying driving and restraining forces, planners are able to formulate interventions that cause the intended change. Thus, the theory helps planners map out the logical sequence of means-ends linkages underlying a
project, program, or approach. It is pertinent to note that the driving and restraining forces must be analyzed before carrying out a planned change.

The change theory has, however, been criticized for the assumptions that change is linear and will happen as planned. Consequently, project interventions themselves, will introduce the change stimulus and processes that matter and are the vehicles that can actually deliver development (Reeler, 2007). Nevertheless, the theory has been accepted and is widely used in project planning and evaluation (Carole 1995).

The theory was used to locate gender equality attained through gender mainstreaming as a planned change. The study argues that forces driving gender mainstreaming as well as those restraining it must be identified. After this, appropriate action is taken in order to accelerate the implementation of gender mainstreaming programmes.

**Conceptual Framework**

The study conceptualized that a situation of gender inequality exists in Kenya. Changing the situation needs implementation of certain activities (gender mainstreaming programmes). Key driving forces for gender mainstreaming must be present, identified as (a) effective leadership, (b) adequate financial and human resources, (c) availability of appropriate procedures and processes, (d) and appropriate organizational incentives and accountability structures. Restraining forces need to be recognized, scrutinized and minimized. The study seeks to identify presence of driving forces and factors constraining their effective application, thus constraining gender mainstreaming.

![Figure 1: Theory of Change for Gender Mainstreaming](image-url)
Research Methodology

Study Area
The study was undertaken in Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya and home of all ministerial headquarters. The city is located at geographical coordinates 1° 17’ 0” South and 36° 49’ 0” East. Specifically the study took place at the headquarters of the sampled ministries.

Research design
The study was qualitative in nature and was carried through collection of secondary and primary data. Secondary data was obtained by reviewing gender mainstreaming national and ministerial policies, action plans and national planning and budgeting reference documents and guidelines.

Primary data was collected from identified respondents in the ministries of: Finance; Gender, Children and Social Development; and Planning, National Development and Vision 2030.

Variables and categories of analysis
The main areas looked at, in order to respond to the research objectives are outlined against each study objective in table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study objective</th>
<th>Analysis Variable</th>
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<tr>
<td>To evaluate the methods, tools and strategies used in mainstreaming gender in national planning and budgeting process.</td>
<td>What are the existing policies and structures within the ministries for mainstreaming gender in planning and budgeting processes.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>The gender mainstreaming programmes/activities carried by ministries to mainstream gender in planning and budgeting process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To find out challenges to gender mainstreaming in national development</td>
<td>What are the mechanisms and ways for rolling out gender mainstreaming commitments within the ministries?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the difficulties encountered in mainstreaming gender in planning and budgeting process.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difficulties faced due to inadequate capacity and Structural difficulties.</td>
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Target Population
The study targeted officers in all government ministries according to the 2008 ministerial listing, specifically departmental heads and technical staff at ministerial headquarters.

Sampling procedure
Purposive sampling was used to first identify ministries of focus as MOGCSD, MOPNDV230 and MOF. Relevant departments within these ministries were then purposively sampled as shown in Table 2. A list of all staff in each of the selected department was obtained and stratified by sex. Respondents were then randomly obtained from each stratum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Number of departments</th>
<th>Sampled departments</th>
<th>Sample as % of total departments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOGCSD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOPNDV230</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
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Data Collection Tools and Procedure

Primary data for this study was collected through interviews and questionnaires while secondary data was obtained from national planning reference documents such as the vision 2030, the first MTP, Treasury Circular, MTEF manual, ministerial gender mainstreaming work plans and policies, the national policy on gender and development (2000), its implementation action plan (2008) and the monitoring and evaluation frame work for gender mainstreaming (2008).

Face to face in-depth individual interviews using open-ended questions were conducted with departmental heads in MOF, MPNDV2030 and MOGCSD. This method was justified because it enabled in-depth understanding of the problem. Irrelevant questions were skipped and new ones developed. It also allowed observation of body language which is important in interpreting results.

Face to face in-depth interviews were also conducted with gender focal persons in the three ministries. The aim was to seek clarifications, gain deeper understanding of the situation and gather their experiences and challenges in mainstreaming gender in national planning and budgeting process. They also provided information on how gender mainstreaming can be strengthened.

A questionnaire with open and closed questions was employed to capture information on methods used by staff to mainstream gender in planning and budgeting, challenges faced, and seek their views on recommendations for strengthening gender mainstreaming in national planning and budgeting process. The questionnaire was administered to seven gender and development officers in the MOGCSD, 13 economists in the MPNDV2030 and 11 officers in the MOF.

Secondary data on how gender issues were mainstreamed in planning and budgeting reference documents was obtained from various documents. The documents reviewed include; the National Gender and Development Policy (2000), the first MTP (2008 – 2012), 2011/2012 Performance Contracting Guidelines, the 2011/2012 to 2013/2014 Treasury Circular, ministerial gender policies and work-plans.

Findings

Methods, Tools and Strategies of Mainstreaming Gender in National Planning and Budgeting Processes

The first objective of the study sought to evaluate methods and tools used in mainstreaming gender in national planning and budgeting process. To get this information a closed ended question was posed requiring respondents to circle as many of the listed methods as applied in the ministry. This formed the basis for evaluating the methods. The results are shown in the Table 4 below.

Table 3: Methods of mainstreaming gender in national planning and budgeting process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of mainstreaming gender in national development</th>
<th>Number of Respondent</th>
<th>Non responsive</th>
<th>Total respondents</th>
<th>% of respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existence of a ministerial gender policy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of sex disaggregated data</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of officers on gender mainstreaming</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of a gender expert in the sector working groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender officers are members of MTEF committee</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 above shows that training on gender mainstreaming was the most commonly used method of mainstreaming gender at 69%. Followed by development of ministerial gender policies at 56%, use of gender officers at 47% and finally use of sex disaggregated data at 11%. 22% of the officers did not know the methods used.

The study sought to evaluate the methods by interrogating their strengths and weaknesses.

Training on gender mainstreaming

The study found that all ministries were conducting gender trainings. However, the method and content of training differed from ministry to ministry. For instance, gender specific trainings were conducted for gender committees in the ministry of finance (O.I Gatere, 16.8.2012). In the MOPND V2030 there were no exclusive training on gender issues; topics on gender were incorporated as a session in other ministerial trainings organised by the ministry such as training on the MTEF process. Further, ministries nominated planning and budgeting officers to attend gender mainstreaming trainings organised by other institutions like the MOGCSD (O.I Grace, 14.8.2012). In the fiscal year 2011/2012, for instance the ministry conducted five trainings each lasting five days. The trainings focused on gender mainstreaming, collection and analysis of sex disaggregated data and gender responsive budgeting targeting gender officers, finance officers in the line ministries and executive officers of state corporations, (O.I Mary, 10.7.2012).

The study found a major gap in the use of training as a method to mainstream gender was in the manner and the kind of training conducted. The trainings were very elementary, providing general knowledge on GRB rather than building skills. Another concern is that training gender officers from different ministries/sectors in one forum created the impression that gender issues were similar (O.I Kinge, 12.8.2012). Sector specific trainings need to be designed. Another limitation is that follow-ups were not made to monitor the application of the skills gained. However, the training helped in changing the perception that gender is all about women and increased the appreciation of the need to address gender issues in planning and budgeting process (O.I Mwathi, 14.8.2012). This finding corresponds with North’s (2008) and ADB (2010) who raise concerns about content, method and effect of training practices. According to ADB (2010) gender training has been largely ineffective in improving the knowledge necessary for gender-sensitive approaches. In Kenya, for gender training to be effective there is a need to develop practical sector specific training programmes.

Establishment of gender focal points

The study noted all ministries had established a gender focal point meant to catalyze gender mainstreaming in the ministries. The gender focal points are manned by an officer referred to as the gender officer. All ministries had assigned an officer to carry on the duties of a gender officer. The position of a gender officer was not established within the ministerial organization structure. Consequently, the position did not have clear reporting lines and job description. About a third (33%) of the ministries had established gender mainstreaming committee to support the gender officer. Each department nominated an officer to constitute the gender committee. Members of the gender committee assumed the role of the gender officer in the departments they come from and were therefore responsible for addressing gender issues in those departments.

The study noted that the establishment of gender mainstreaming committees was a response to the performance contracting requirement of the year 2010/2011. Although
the gender mainstreaming committee members were to attend to gender issues in their respective departments, often the committee was concerned with fulfilling the gender mainstreaming targets in the performance contracting. For instance, a respondent and a member of gender committee in the department of monitoring unit whose key duties were monitoring, when asked whether the indicators used in monitoring were gender responsive with a particular reference to training her response was:

*I only check if the ministry delivered on the number of training it committed; it is the work of the gender officer to find out how many women and men were trained. Going down to who was trained means I check also on how many persons had disability; this would complicate my work.* (O.I Alice*1 16.8.2012).

The gender focal point is also the liaison office with the gender machinery. It is responsible for reporting to the gender machinery gender mainstreaming activities in the ministry.

The study found the use of gender focal points as a method of mainstreaming gender to have several challenges. First, the gender focal points were not supported with a budget to carry out their work more effectively (O.I Gatere 16.8.2012, Grace, 14.8.2012). Second, the gender focal points were not involved in ministerial planning and budgeting. They therefore do not have an opportunity to influence the ministerial budget for gender responsiveness (O.I Grace, 14.8.2012). The gender focal points also lack staff; they are mainly manned by one officer who has other duties to perform. Most gender officers lack gender training and are therefore unable to guide and catalyse gender mainstreaming in the ministry. The finding demonstrates a weak mechanism for gender mainstreaming within the ministries. Yet the mechanism is meant to guide on gender mainstreaming. The conceptual framework argues that for gender mainstreaming to take place there should be effective leadership. The lack of effective technical leadership for gender mainstreaming in Kenya is lacking and needs to be built.

**Production of ministerial gender policies**

The study also found that ministries were mainstreaming gender by developing gender mainstreaming policies. About two-thirds (66%) of the ministries had developed a gender mainstreaming policy while 34% were finalizing their policies. While production of a ministerial policy on gender mainstreaming is the highest level of formal commitment to gender mainstreaming, ministries were taking a very slow pace to implement them. For instance, the MOPNDV 2030 had developed their ministerial gender mainstreaming guidelines in the year 2011. The guidelines required the formulation of a gender mainstreaming committee (GMC) to implement the guidelines. By the time of the study this had not been done. The study observed that production of a ministerial gender policy was a performance contracting requirement of the year 2010/2011. The method was ineffective because policy pronouncements were not actualized. It may be concluded that ministries were developing ministerial gender policies to meet the performance contracting requirements, consequently gender issues were therefore minimally attended to. Witt man (2010) refers to this minimal attention as a short agenda of mainstreaming. This short-term agenda allows institutions to only comply with the minimum gender equality standards as set by law or regulatory frameworks. The short-term agenda does not lead to institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming, and neither does it lead to substantial change envisaged by the gender mainstreaming strategy.

* Not her real name
Integration of gender in the planning and budgeting frameworks and processes

A review of the national planning and budgeting documents showed that gender was mainstreamed by integrating gender issues in the planning frameworks and in various budget making processes and stages. The study noted that the Kenya budgeting process has three stages; first is a top-down macro target setting stage that includes identification of aggregate resources for allocation of resources across the sectors, in line with national priorities (GOK, 2011; NCGD, 2009). Second, is a bottom up expenditure planning process which involves the preparation of sectoral priorities. The final stage is the financial programming that entails the preparation and consolidation of all ministries plans and budgets into one national itemised budget and its approval (GOK 2011).

The study established that to mainstream gender in budget making process the MOF issued a treasury circular to all ministries instructing them to address gender issues in their plans and budgets (O.I John. 10/8/2012, Treasury Circular, 2011). On evaluating this method, the study found several gaps.

First, the requirement to address gender issues in planning and budgeting was not consistently applied throughout the three planning and budgeting stages. Consequently, attention to gender issues was inconsistently done. For instance, the treasury circular is released in the second stage. This means the requirement does not affect the first stage. Consequently, the macroeconomic framework that sets an indicative budget is largely gender insensitive because sex disaggregated data on the impact of taxation, wealth distribution and roles of men and women in the economy is usually not collected (O.I. Grace 14. 8.2012).

Secondly, the requirement to address gender issues in the planning and budgeting process was not backed with the necessary mechanism to allow for the participation of gender expertise in the process. For example, in the preparation of the ministerial public expenditure review (MPER) gender officers in the ministries are not always consulted (O.I John, 13.8.2012). This is a major gap because as the study found, the MPER forms the foundation for the preparation of programme spending estimates and performance targets. The MPER process is coordinated by a ministerial MTEF committee headed by the accounting officer and composed of head of finance, head of planning office and co-opted heads of departments. Departments are required to prepare their priority programmes and budget estimates and submit to the ministerial MTEF committee (GOK, 2011). The ministerial MTEF committee reviews the proposals and makes the necessary adjustment to ensure that the proposals are within the budget ceiling as stipulated in the treasury circular. It is at this stage that gender gains are made or lost. If departments submit requests that are gender unresponsive, then gender issues are lost; this is a common scenario attributable to low gender expertise within ministries (O.I Onyango, 9.8.2012).

Thirdly, the placement of the requirement to address gender issues in the treasury circular is not strategic. The study found that the requirement was made under human resources development and capacity building section of the treasury circular (Treasury Circular 2011). As a result, gender activities by ministries mostly targeted staff through sensitising staff on gender mainstreaming and collecting data on the number of women and men staff in the ministry rather than how ministerial programmes and activities were responding to gender issues.

Noting that the country’s development agenda was guided by the V2030, the study went ahead to find how gender was integrated in the Vision. The study noted that Vision 2030 is categorised into three pillars: economic, social and political pillar (GOK, 2008). The vision is implemented through five year medium term
plans. The first medium term- plan having commenced in 2008 and is ending in 2012.

The study found that Vision 2030 did address gender issues, although it’s not comprehensively mainstreamed in all pillars. A section in the social pillar was devoted to address gender concerns. Under the said pillar, the vision commits to achieve gender equity in all aspects of society through changes in four key areas of: opportunity, empowerment, capabilities and vulnerabilities (GOK, 2008). However, the vision does not show how gender concerns are to be dealt with in the economic and political pillars.

Considering that the vision is to be implemented in five successive medium-term plans (MTPs) the study went ahead to find how gender was mainstreamed in the first MTP covering the period 2008-2012. It was found that the MTP acknowledges the gendered dimensions of poverty, as well as gender disparities in land ownership, higher rates of unemployment for women; women lower formal sector employment and gendered reasons for girl’s lower school attendance. Often, however the plan does not propose actions that explicitly address the identified gender issues.

The study noted that the medium term plan is implemented through flagship projects in every pillar. Gender specific flagship projects are identified in the social pillar which includes:

Introduction of gender mainstreaming into all government policies plans and programmes to ensure that the needs and interests of each gender are addressed. Proposed actions under the flagship project include; deliberate effort to recognise and acknowledge the various ways in which women make a contribution to the economy, operationalization and strengthening of gender divisions in all ministries and state corporations to aid the gender mainstreaming process. b) Collection of gender disaggregated data that accurately portrays the gender balance in all sections of the country to form the basis for developing gender-sensitive policies, plans and programmes; c) Institutionalisation of Affirmative Action Policy to ensure that women have at least 30 per cent representation in recruitment, promotion and appointment at all decision making levels in order to increase the number of female participation and representation and d) is to continue funding the Women Enterprise Fund to provide Kenyan women with access to alternative financial services (GOK, 2008).

By the time of study the 2008 to 2012 medium term plan was expiring, yet as this study established gender mainstreaming seem not to have taken full effect in all government policies and programmes, gender divisions are still not established leave alone operationalized and strengthened while gender disaggregated data is mainly limited to women and men representation in politics and formal employment and affirmative action policy is not yet developed.

Following this finding it could be concluded that there is gender policy evaporation in Kenya. This finding concurs with others who find evaporation of gender policy as a challenge to gender mainstreaming. Further, the finding tends to agree with Wittman (2010) argument that there are many methods of mainstreaming gender suggested in the literature, including integrating gender into planning documents and development of policy but methods to operationalize these ideas are not as apparent.

**Tools for Mainstreaming Gender in National Development**

The study sought to evaluate the extent in which gender mainstreaming tools were being used in planning and budgeting. This was done by providing a list of various tools used in budgeting and asking respondents to tick the frequency of how they used the tools. The results are shown in Table 4.6 below.
Table 5 above demonstrates the level at which gender budgeting tools were being used by officers. Twenty-eight per cent used gender-aware policy appraisal, 5% used the same tool but not always, 44% have never used the tool and 41% did not know the tool. On sex-disaggregated public expenditure incidence analysis, 0% used the tool always, 29% used the tool sometimes and 60% did not use the tool at all while 11% did not know the tool. On sex-disaggregated beneficiary assessments, 0% used the tool always, 31% sometimes used the tool, 58% had never used the tool and 11% did not know the tool. On gender-disaggregated tax incidence analysis and Sex-disaggregated analysis of the impact of the budget on time use, the trend was the same. 0% always used the two tools, 15% used the tool sometimes consecutively, 44% and 88% never used the tool consecutively and 41% and 12% did not know the tools.

The results demonstrate that the tools were rarely used and were not known by a bigger number of staff. Those aware of them may have learnt about them in gender trainings but in-depth training on their use might not have been done. This tends to confirm that gender mainstreaming trainings are not specialised.

Strategies for Mainstreaming Gender in National Development

The second objective was to find out strategies for mainstreaming gender in national development. This objective was assessed by asking respondents to state strategies they used to mainstream gender in planning and budgeting process. The results are displayed in Table 6 below.

Table 6: Strategies for mainstreaming gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training on gender mainstreaming</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of sex disaggregated data</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender officer</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender policy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non responsive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7 above shows that 31% used training on gender as a strategy to mainstream gender in national planning and budgeting, 17% used sex disaggregated data, 39% used gender officers, 8% used the ministerial gender policy and 6% did not respond to the question.

The question was further followed with questions seeking to find out how the stated strategies applied to the MPER and at the sector working groups. One two-thirds (68%)
opined that the gender officer participated in the MPER process and this way they felt the gender officer would raise gender issues in the MPER. About one-third (32%) did not know how the strategies were applied and mentioned lack of capacity in gender mainstreaming as an obstacle in addressing gender issues at MPER and sector working group level.

Grace had this to say on gender mainstreaming strategies:

*We have been taught gender generally; sector specific tools, methods and strategies need to be developed and tested (O.I Grace 14.8.2012).*

John comments on mainstreaming gender at sector working groups:

*It is too late to mainstream gender at sector working groups; if ministries do not mainstream gender at ministerial level then that’s too bad. Gender officers in ministries need to be proactive and ensure their ministerial plans and budgets take a gender perspective (O.I John 14.8.2012).*

These findings show that the terminology methods and strategies were interchangeably used. Apparent ways of applying these in planning and budgeting process were not clear.

The study also sought to find out mechanisms put in place to monitor and evaluate gender mainstreaming in national planning and budgeting process. Results show that there were no specific indicators in the planning and budgeting process that tracked how gender was mainstreamed. General mechanisms such as the treasury circular and performance contracting were used as monitoring tools. Though these methods were general, the study noted that the performance contracting had increased ministries attention to gender issues. Gender issues were included in the performance contract as an evaluation criterion in the year 2009 and were to be evaluated in the fiscal year 2010/2011. Consequently, most ministerial gender mainstreaming policies, strategies and practices took effect the same fiscal year, i.e. 2010/2011. For instance, in the ministry of Finance, the gender mainstreaming committee that had been set years back (date could not be established) was revived in the year 2010. In 2011, the ministry carried out a gender mainstreaming baseline survey and was finalizing the ministerial gender policy at the time of the study (O.I Gatere, 16.8.2012). The MOGCSD & MOPNDV2030 developed their ministerial gender mainstreaming policy/strategy in the year 2011.

The finding confirms the argument in the conceptual framework that any guided change such as fight for gender equality requires effective accountability mechanisms. The lack of a specific gender monitoring mechanism in the budget making process is a big gap.

### Challenges to Gender Mainstreaming in National Development

The third objective of the study aimed at finding challenges to gender mainstreaming. The objective was addressed by assessing four main variables: management commitment to gender mainstreaming, management accountability measures to gender mainstreaming knowledge and expertise on gender mainstreaming, financial capacity and political will. Political will was measured in terms of availability of enabling legal, institutional and policy framework.

### Management support to gender mainstreaming

The study sought to find out how management supported gender mainstreaming in the ministries. Table 4.8 below presents the findings on management support to gender mainstreaming.
### Table 7: Management support to gender mainstreaming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for evaluating management commitment</th>
<th>Totally Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Totally Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has allocated adequate fund</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A clear policy on G.M has been developed</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A gender unit/committee has been established</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A gender expert has been employed</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% of ministry staff have been trained on gender mainstreaming</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of gender mainstreaming as a criterion for performance appraisal with a high score</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 shows that management demonstrated varied support to gender mainstreaming. Financial support was least. None of the respondents totally agreed that the management had provided adequate funds for gender work and 43% agreed that some finances were provided for gender work while 57% disagreed. 90% agreed that management demonstrated support for gender work by developing a ministerial gender policy while 10% disagreed. All agreed that by establishing a gender unit/committee management was being committed to gender work, 30% agreed that management demonstrated commitment to gender work by employing a gender expert while 70% disagreed.

The finding shows that in general there is formal commitment to gender work. The formal commitment was translated into action by establishing a gender focal point or a gender mainstreaming committee and developing ministerial gender policies. However, these were minimally provided. For instance, ministries appointed only one officer to carry on the gender work and the officer was not allocated specific budget to implement gender mainstreaming activities. Ministerial gender policies were developed but implementation had not kicked off.

The study noted that the performance contracting for the year 2010/2011 required ministries to establish a gender committee, carry out a baseline and develop a ministerial gender policy. There was no gender mainstreaming activities outside the gender mainstreaming performance contracting targets. Gender mainstreaming activities by the ministries were therefore largely a response to the performance contracting.

### ii) Inadequate management accountability measures to gender mainstreaming

The study sought to find out how ministerial management teams were held accountable to gender mainstreaming. The results were as shown in the figure 4.1 below.
Figure 2 above shows that 68% reported management was held accountable by providing periodical reports on gender mainstreaming, 12% by committing a certain % of budget to gender mainstreaming and 20% by reporting on the existence of a trained gender officer.

The study observed that ministries were required to report on the progress of gender mainstreaming on a quarterly base to the national gender and equality commission. At the end of the financial year, the ministries would receive a compliance certificate from the commission that would be presented to the performance contracting department as evidence of having complied with the gender mainstreaming requirements. The performance contracting as an accountability mechanism has therefore moved gender issues a notch higher (O.I Mary, 16.8.2012). As mentioned elsewhere most ministries developed ministerial gender policies immediately gender was introduced in the performance contracting; although implementation of these policies is yet to take full effect.

The lack of implementation could be associated with the lack of monitoring of gender mainstreaming programmes within the ministerial monitoring frameworks. The study noted that ministries did not have a system to track implementation of gender programmes; although ministries reported to the MOGCS on a quarterly basis the number of women employed by the ministry (O.I, Grace, 16. 8. 2012).

The study further noted that the national monitoring framework for Vision 2030 first medium term plan 2008-2012, had gender indicators even though the indicators were limited to social sector; and were concerned with how women were participating in employment and women access to services such as electricity, water, healthcare and housing (GOK, 2009). The findings concur with ADB (2010) report on gender mainstreaming who concludes that gender mainstreaming initiatives are actively pursued for only a short period before gradually declining in use because of the lack of incentives or rules mandating their use. Even when results are reported they are focused on women and not gender and mostly in health and education sectors. Basically gender mainstreaming approach is reduced into a WID approach (ADB, 2010).

iii) Low knowledge and expertise on gender mainstreaming

The study observed that there is minimal expertise on gender skills despite numerous trainings. This could be explained by the fact that most training takes the form of a sensitization rather than specialised training. Further ministries had not designed their sector specific gender trainings nor were they training their staff regularly. Sector specific gender mainstreaming tools and methodologies have not been designed. Consequently, officers are still unable to integrate gender issues in their daily routines and so are unable to track gender issues on an on-going basis or to take them into account during planning and budgeting. The second factor to this challenge is that even when specialised trainings are conducted follow-ups are not conducted to ensure skills gained are utilised and lessons are documented to design future interventions (O.I, John 31.7.2012).

iv) Financial Constraints

Ninety per cent of respondents raised concerns that gender work received very little or no budget. The national gender machinery is also poorly funded and is not able to effectively carry the gender mainstreaming mandate.

v) Political will for gender mainstreaming

The study also sought to determine the presence of an enabling political will for gender mainstreaming. This was by asking respondents opinion on whether there was
adequate legal, policy and institutional framework for gender mainstreaming. The results are shown in the figure 4.2 below.

Figure 4.2: Existence of political good will for gender mainstreaming

Figure 4.2 shows that 50% opined that the policy environment for gender mainstreaming was good citing the existence of the national policy on gender and development, Vision 2030 and the performance contracting. Thirty eight per cent were of the opinion that the constitution had laid enough ground for institutions to mainstream gender. While 12% felt that the institutional arrangement was present but needed to be strengthened, they mentioned the existence of the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development and the gender focal points in the ministries.

The findings show that the country has created the necessary political environment for gender mainstreaming. According to Zentai and Kriksan (2006) this is a crucial and a necessary step towards mainstreaming gender. However, the commitments in legal and policy has not always translated into full mainstreaming.

vi) Weak National Gender Machinery

The current national gender machinery lacks adequate financial and technical expertise in macroeconomics and other non-social fields. The country’s gender machinery consists of a National Gender and Equality Commission established in August 2011, the Department of Gender and Social Development in the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development and the gender focal points in the line ministries. The Commission at the time of study had two fulltime commissioners and two part-time commissioners, one Commission secretary with a secretariat of three programme officers. The Commission was allocated KES 74 million for programmes in the fiscal year 2011/2012 which cannot assist in acquiring specialised services to supplement the lean staff. The thin staff and budget makes it difficult for the commission to effectively carry out its monitoring and advisory role.

The Department of Gender and Social Development is split into two divisions’ gender and community development. The gender division is headed by a gender secretary who has a director, deputy director and six programme staff. Government funding is equally low. This makes it difficult for the ministry to conduct research to inform policy and also fully build gender capacity within ministries (O.I Mary 16.8.2012). The focal points in the line ministries have only one officer dealing with gender issues who is also not facilitated with a budget and structures within the ministry to effectively mainstream gender.

Recommendations for Strengthening Gender Mainstreaming in National Development

The last objective of the study was to seek recommendations for strengthening gender mainstreaming in national planning and budgeting process.

The following recommendations were made.

Restructure the gender focal points: Respondents recommended the establishment of gender committees with a representation from all departments as opposed to having one focal point dealing with gender issues in the ministry. The committee members would then
be tasked with an official responsibility to tackle gender issues in the departments. This official responsibility should be operationalized by issuance of new job description coupled with specialised training on gender as well as development of sector specific tools and methods. The gender committee members should work closely with ministerial officers to build their capacity so that in the long run officers are able to mainstream gender in their daily work.

**Conduct of gender based research to inform planning and budgeting.** This should include research on taxation, economy driving forces and should ensure care work is factored. In addition, all government programmes and budgets should be regularly assessed and monitored. This calls for the development and operationalization of clear gender monitoring indicators and frameworks as part of national plans and budgets. For this to comprehensively and coherently take place, the MOGCSD should establish strong effective relationships with learning institutions. The learning institutions may be tasked with a responsibility of conducting gender responsive research in diverse areas. MOGCSD should also work closely with the national monitoring unit to advise and ensure gender indicators are inculcated in all monitoring frameworks. Further, the MOGCSD should cooperate with the Kenya bureau of statistics to ensure sex-disaggregated data and gender statistics, including through household surveys, sex disaggregated beneficiary incidence surveys etc. are collected. The MOGCSD should conduct regular meetings with gender officers/ gender committee members in the line ministries; these meetings would provide forums to share on best gender mainstreaming practices, challenges and enable formulation of sector specific solutions to gender mainstreaming.

**Develop a critical mass of economic gender experts** to provide technical capacity on planning and budgeting especially in formulating tools and models of developing gender responsive macro-economic frameworks. As well as provide technical support in engendering the existing planning and budgeting frameworks such as the treasury circular and the MTEF. Further, the economic gender experts would provide gender analytical capacity throughout the budget process by working with technical committees in the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, and respective line ministries. Their role would be to advise on the process and analysis required for gender mainstreaming.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

**Introduction**

This chapter presents conclusion and recommendations. It sums up the findings on the evaluation of the methods, strategies and challenges of mainstreaming gender in national development. The chapter also gives recommendations that can be used to effectively strengthen gender mainstreaming in national development.

**Conclusion**

The first objective of the study was to evaluate methods of mainstreaming gender in national development. The study established that gender mainstreaming methods used were; training and workshops, this method was not very effective as it did not inculcate the requisite skills to allow staff mainstream gender into their daily work. Further follow ups were not made to ensure acquired skills were used. Establishment of institutional mechanisms for gender mainstreaming was another method. Gender focal points and gender committees were established to coordinate gender mainstreaming within the ministries, these institutional mechanisms were faced with many challenges including lack of a budget, skills and inability to influence decisions in the ministries. Development of ministerial gender policies was another method. This method was weak because implementation of policies had
not taken effect. Finally gender was integrated in the national planning and budgeting framework although the integration was not comprehensive throughout the planning and budgeting cycle.

The second objective aimed at finding the strategies used to mainstream gender in national development. The study found out there was no clear distinction between the methods and strategies of mainstreaming gender. Training on gender, development of ministerial gender policies and use of sex disaggregated data and appointment of a gender officer were the strategies used.

The third objective was to find out challenges to mainstreaming gender in national development. Various challenges were identified. These were; inadequate resources both financial and human, management formal commitment to gender mainstreaming was not translated to action coupled with a lack of comprehensive accountability mechanisms, weak national gender machinery, lack of sector specific tools and methodologies for gender mainstreaming, existence of gender non responsive macroeconomic frameworks and lack of a coherent way of addressing gender issues in planning and budgeting processes.

Respondents provided the following recommendations to strengthen gender mainstreaming in national development: need to restructure gender focal points, need to conduct gender research in order to inform planning, create a critical mass of gender economists and provide enough budget for gender work, build gender mainstreaming capacities and invest in developing sector specific gender mainstreaming tools and methodologies.

The following recommendations are given to strengthen gender mainstreaming in Kenya

**Strengthen the national gender machinery**
There is need to strengthen the national gender machinery. At the moment, the machinery has very thin staff and very low funding levels. The government should finance the machinery with enough resources for it to effectively carry out its work.

**Conduct of gender based research to inform planning and budgeting.**
This should include research on taxation, economy driving forces and should ensure care work is factored. In addition, all government programmes and budgets should be regularly assessed and monitored. This calls for the development and operationalization of clear gender monitoring indicators and frameworks as part of national plans and budgets.

**Develop a critical mass of economic gender experts** to provide technical capacity on planning and budgeting especially in formulating tools and models of developing gender responsive macro-economic frameworks.

**Gender experts and scholars need to develop gender mainstreaming concepts** to have a clear distinction of what entails a method and a strategy.

**Areas for Future Research**
Conduct an ethnographic study on the processes of mainstreaming gender in the department of gender in order to capture the daily experiences of mainstreaming gender.

Replicate this study at the county level to find out how gender is mainstreamed in the planning and budgeting process.
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Gender: A Systems View: A Concept Revisit and Commentary

Timothy H. Gatara (Ph.D)

This article was written by the Author and appeared in ‘Africa Link” two decades ago. The author revisits this article with the benefit of hind sight. Has much changed since then for the women of Africa and the world?

“The Thesis

There is a great struggle among policy-makers, professionals and academics to understand the concept of ‘gender’. This struggle is characterised by generic confusion between the biological make up of humans and the roles that they play in their societies. Roles in society seem to be sex based, thus cooking in the kitchen may be seen as being strictly a woman’s role, while leadership may be seen to be a man’s role, though neither were biologically made to suit the roles. Both can handle any of these tasks given the chance.

This sex based definition of gender roles affects power relations between the sexes. This is so because the definition allows greater access to resources and situations that allow one specie to, dominate and subdue another, sometimes in perpetuity, hence, opportunities for discrimination and oppression. The oppressed sex will soon seek freedom and demand equality in power sharing.

The above has become an important and difficult issue of our time because it will have critical bearing on the way society will look like and function in the future, and deserves all due attention.

Here, I argue that oppressive power relations between the sexes is perpetuated and reinforced by universal systems of power and social control. I also explore what needs to be achieved in order to change the power relations and introduce aspects of equal advantages.

The Gender Concept

The old adage that what is good for the goose is good for the gander emphasises the fact that gender is neither female nor male. Biologically, the female entity is clear and its functions based on this biology are also distinct. The same goes for the male. These sex or biological functions however, do not define social roles for either the man or the woman.

The concept of gender thus has little to do with the sex or the biological make up of a human being. The concept has to do with the way society perceives the biological human being and the perception of one’s role in society in relation to this perception. This is where the problem of gender discrimination and oppression stems from. This is because, society perceives one as a biological being and assigns and perpetuates both power and social roles on this basis.

The Systems Concept and Hierarchy

A system is a set of interdependent elements, so dependent that it is almost impossible to happen to one without it happening to the other. The terminology system is familiar enough.
For example, there are all sorts of systems in life. These can be large or small systems. A human being is a System made up of several small systems such as the alimentation and cardinal systems. Society is itself a giant and domineering system towering over and determining the future of all humans. It has subsystems such as the economic system.

Looking at life, it is easy to appreciate the fact that it is a conglomeration of millions of systems living side by side in perpetual relativity and shaping and influencing one another. It is this relativity of systems that defines who we are and how we are defined by society and with what consequences. The systems ensure that definitions stay unless disturbed by forces either inherent in the systems themselves or emanating from outside the systems.

The analysis of systems in terms of both information and energy is an important one in helping us understand power, sex and gender relations in society. There is an argument somewhere in the works of the famous structural functionalist, Talcott Parsons (1952) that stipulates that, if two systems coexist side by side, then the system that is high on information and low on energy will tend to control the system that is high on energy and low on information.

The Systems and Gender Roles

The Social system is the most closely linked to the issue of gender. In the first place, it is the one that defines and interprets traditional wisdom and defines that once born a woman, certain attributes are hers and on the basis of these one will perform tasks in the society that are based on one’s sex. This is in addition to the biological role for which one has no choice to perform.

The same system determines that a biological entity called man is a superior being here to rule by the mere fact that one is a man and not a woman. This system ascertains that this state of affairs is carefully recorded in the archival minds of the members of society and is carried forward from generation to generation without change forever. It codifies this way of life so that at all times it stands. The exercise of power in the Vatican is a good example of this.

The social system further goes on to ensure that other systems that enforce this state of affairs are in place and that they do their work to make this state work. The political system is evolved and empowered to bring its will and force on the creations of the social systems. The political system ensures that power relations between systems remain at variance with one another, and that the subjugation of one system by another is total and everlasting.

Thus, if change is ever to happen in the relations between systems, both big and small, generic and fundamental changes must occur in the definitions that are appendaged to the human by the social system, and in the reinforcing agent of this system, i.e. the political system.

Woman-The System

The woman is a system. Not a single celled creature wandering aimlessly on the face of the earth, for the pleasure of man, without beginning, direction or destiny. This realisation forms the basis for gender freedom.

As a system, there is evidence that a woman is born with as great intelligence as the man. In fact, from the deitical beginnings, the woman was endowed with such intelligence as to overshadow and indeed overcome the physical endowment of the man. In this story, it took only a bite of this fruit to overcome the great knot of life and set us all on the road to endless suffering as humans, without end. It did not take enormous strength for Delilah to overcome the super strength of the Nazarene, Samson. These are the acts and achievements of a system that to our detriment we characterise and treat as weak in modern times.
In our attempt to create a gender that functions for both man and woman, it is important to accommodate, even at the risk of losing some pride, the idea that a woman is a system that is endowed with as great an intelligence as the male system if not greater. The ability to see a woman in society first as a woman and then as a system will go a long way in aiding society come into grips with full meaning of gender that recognizes the existence of both woman and man systems in their own rights.

The cultural system defines woman as a valuable piece of property that is bought and owned through exchange. In some places, woman is or was exchanged for cows or goats. Marriage was institutionalised as a way of affirming this ownership of one human being by another. It was not a consensus-based act that took into consideration the wishes and the rights of both the man and the woman. Although the main raison d’être for the institution of marriage is the procreation and the continuation of the human specie, with all due respect to it the it has been used by society to subordinate one of the partners and to immortalise her suffering in the pursuit of the noble goal and duty of procreation.

The Female Creature and the Societal Systems

The systems of society have only dealt with the human being known as woman, as a female creature and not as a System. This has allowed the systems to define the creature and to forcefully determine an identity for it. This identity suppresses the total phenomenon that the woman is. This is the only way it can be taken advantage of - Outside this, the man creature is quite incapable of dealing with woman as a system. This is due to both its pervasive intelligence and capabilities unrecognised by the social systems.

I am tempted to contend that one of the most effective ways of keeping women in their places if there are such a places is by making sure that they are forever tied and committed to the creed and practice of reproduction, multiplying for and on behalf of humankind or mankind.

Producing children is a full time job. The woman doing it has no chance whatsoever of doing much else with her life. The cultural system ensures that this is so and remains unchanged. The marriages of yesteryears seemed to survive at all times and in all circumstances because they were not based on the equality of man and woman. The marriages were based on the subjugation of one human being by another and the total slavery of that one human being - the woman. Because of this slavery, the man had no reason and still has no reason for seriously wishing to change the status of woman. Seen from this perspective, the woman, in her quest to fulfil her biological role is transformed through the institution of marriage into a social slave. The performance of the biological role even in the animal kingdom does not entail the enslavement of the performer.

The definition of woman is however wider than the biological role. It is extended by the cultural system to other roles that ensure her total serfdom. The woman in marriage is also an economic beast of burden. She produces children and thereafter she is entitled to fend and look after them. Looking after children means that one has to feed them. To feed children means one has to till the land. The woman tills the land. The food that the woman tills is not eaten raw. It is cooked. To cook it the woman needs energy.

The woman must know where this energy comes from and get it herself. Woman has to get this energy from the natural system. The same thing with the food that humankind eats. This natural System sometimes called land, is owned by another creature known as man. And man makes sure that it is well looked after by the creature known as woman. Although this may be argued not to be typical for all women,
the sub-ordination of women even in modern economic times entails the same predicament and sometimes worse.

The political system ensures that woman does not lead. Not being in a position to lead means that power and the means to power are in the hands of the master forever. In short, the entire constellation of systems are galvanised to empower the man, so that the power of the man over the woman is forever Supreme. Man often argues that woman is happy under these conditions and needs no respite. Woman, it is argued has power because she can cook whatever she wants, till what piece of land she wants, decide what the family can eat, lead other women in a monogamous marriage, and even advise the man on how to rule. But she cannot have the power to make these things happen. It belongs to the man. The man as in the traditional caricature is like a person who sits on One's back, choking life out of the person and at the same time assuring the person that he would like to do everything in his power to lighten one's burden, except get off their back!

The product of this state of affairs is a psychological subsystem that is unsure of itself and its place in society. It is an abused subsystem without confidence or hope in either life or the society of which it is a product. The misery of this subsystem however is a reflection of our entire society and the beasts we are. For a society that allows its women to live in decadence and self pity, deserves greater sympathy than those it degrades. A society that produces a dignified woman dignifies itself and approaches a pinnacle of moral purity that it is only too capable of but lacks moral strength and political will to try.

Whence Thou Woman

There is great urgency in our times to recognise two facts that have a critical bearing on our lives. The first is that we are all biological entities. As such, we have biological roles that are natural and are meant to ensure the survival of species. But this is as far as it goes. It does not imply that there are things in society that we must do just because we are biological entities.

Secondly it is to be realised that it is the social systems that define the roles that man and woman must perform in society. The systems must hence be prevented from harming themselves and their members by appending these roles to the biological being. The question that needs to be raised and answered is not where to woman, but rather where to man and woman? In this regard, it must be recognised by society, that both men and women, besides being the biological entities that they are, and having roles in that respect, that they have performed marvellously well, are both important social systems, no lesser or greater than the other.

In this recognition one sees a gender system in which power relations are determined by the equity of social roles. In this gender system, the man/woman system moves forward to recast the major social systems so that they recognise the supremacy of this new human system known as society with all their wisdom. Tradition must be rocked and reshaped. And if it cannot be reshaped, discarded. In its place a new gender reality must be instituted. Such a system will recognise and end gender oppression in all its ramifications. A society that has lost itself through the oppression of one of its kind, woman, will thus find itself again.”

Jacinta Nduta King’ori1 (Ph.D) and Wycliffe Oboka (Ph.D)
Cooperative University College Kenya

Abstract

Recent advances in psychological research indicate that traumatic events can have effects on the victims, perpetrators and those who witness such events. This is on the premise that no one who experiences a disaster is untouched by it. In the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya, children were exposed to and witnessed various traumatic events. Some may have developed behavioral and anxiety disorders. The study sought to assess levels Posttraumatic Stress Disorder severity among the children. The study was guided by Cognitive Behavioral Theory. The study target population was 77,768 children. A sample size of 460 respondents was derived from 10 divisions in Nakuru county which were hard hit by post-election violence. The sample comprised of 400 children who included primary and secondary survivors of the violence and 20 deputy head teachers in the schools sampled and 40 parents who took part in focused group discussions. Expost facto comparative research design was utilized and multi-stage sampling approach was used to derive the sample. Data for the study was obtained using questionnaires, interview schedules and focused group discussions. A pilot study was conducted in Subukia division involving 80 children, four deputy head teachers and two focused group discussions. The hypotheses were tested at significance level of 0.05. The study found high PTSD levels children survivors of post-election violence. This study recommended psychological debriefing and trauma counseling as interventions needed for the survivors.

Key words: Post-Traumatic Stress disorder traumatic experiences, post-election violence, secondary survivors, primary survivors

Introduction

Traumatic events such as being involved or witnessing a serious road accident, military combat, violent personal assault, terrorist attack, community violence, being diagnosed with a life-threatening illness and even hearing about an unexpected injury or violent death of a family member or close friend can cause both short term and long term stress reactions. Many people who experience long term stress reactions continue to function at optimal levels but those who are unable to function at normal range and have difficulties in one or more areas may have Post Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD] (Leach, 1994). The characteristic symptoms resulting from the exposure to the extreme trauma include persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event, intrusive recollections of the event and increased arousal.

The official recognition of PTSD came about only in 1980s when it was recognized as an adult disorder in Diagnostic Statistical Manual – III-R (1987), previously it was described as bereavement syndrome, camp psychosis and traumatic war neurosis.
However, in 1987, DSM-III-R added notes on variation of symptom presentation in children after studies indicated that traumatic events affect children in a much more profound way than adults since they have not yet developed personality or psychological structures to deal with horrors and trauma. Moreover, childhood traumatization is greater than that of adult because it disturbs the child’s developmental process, affects behaviour and long term potential (Green, 1992). Children who have been traumatized see the world as a frightening and dangerous place and if the trauma is not resolved, this fundamental sense of fear and helplessness may carry over into adulthood setting stage for further trauma (Levine, 1997).

Nevertheless, children and adolescents vary in the nature of their responses to traumatic experiences. The reactions may be influenced by their developmental level, ethnicity or cultural factors, previous trauma exposure, available resources, and pre-existing child and family problems (Garrison, 1995). However, nearly all children and adolescents express some kind of distress or behaviour change in the acute phase of recovery from a traumatic event (Sue, 1990). Some of the reactions include development of new fears, separation anxiety, sleep disturbance, sadness, and loss of interest in normal activities, anger, and decline in school work, irritability and somatic complaints.

Research indicates that in community samples more than two thirds of children report experiencing a traumatic event by the age of 16 (Gist, 1989). A comparative study in urban African schools in Cape Town and Nairobi revealed that more than 80% of secondary schools children reported exposure to severe trauma either as victims or witnesses (Seedat, Nyamai, Njenga, 2004). Clark,( 2001) gave estimated rates of witnessing community violence range from 39% - 85%.

A study by Thabet (2000) in Gaza strip among children aged between 6 – 16 years revealed that 59% of the children were diagnosed with PTSD while there was no significant difference between boys and girls in reported anxiety, PTSD and depression. As far as age was concerned, there was no significant difference in reported anxiety, PTSD and depression. Children also reported to have witnessed traumatic events which included, watching mutilated bodies on TV, hearing shootings and bombardments. It also included hearing sonic sounds of Jet fighters, witnessing shooting of relative and being threatened by shooting (Thabet, 2008). Nevertheless in Rwanda, a study carried out by Palmer (1997) after the most brutal genocide the world has ever witnessed indicates that symptoms of PTSD are widely spread around children and adolescents. About 54–62% of the children interviewed exhibit probable PTSD.

Nonetheless, in 2007, Kenya’s general election was accompanied by violent conflict dubbed ‘land’ and ‘ethnic’ clashes. These conflicts mostly affected parts of Coast, Western, Nyanza and Rift Valley regions and Nairobi slums. In Nakuru county in the Rift Valley region, tensions started building up before elections and the announcement of the results for presidential election was preceded by a lot of anxiety and eventually the breakup of the violence. During the post-election violence, many atrocities were committed and human rights violated (Centre for Rights Education and Awareness, 2008). The violence took the form of ethnically targeted killings, forced eviction, maiming, burning of houses and business premises. Traumatic and forced circumcision, penile amputations were some of the worst forms of violence inflicted on male victims from certain communities (Waki report, 2008).

According to ministry of education report (2008), education sector was not spared, schools were not spared, some schools were
burnt, classrooms and offices destroyed; school property such as furniture and teaching materials were stolen. Many children came back to school after staying home for long time while others left due to unfriendly environment (Daraja Civic Initiative Forum Report, 2008). During the violence some schools were completely burnt down. In addition, 64,697 primary school pupils in the country were displaced; 32,847 boys and 30,652 girls from the secondary schools, a total of 9294 children have been displaced; 4682 boys and 2979 girls.

Nakuru county had experienced ethnic and political conflicts in 1992 and 1997 prior to general elections held in those years. However, in 2007 violence erupted after the announcement of results though tension had started to build up before the elections. The post-election violence of 2007/2008 adversely affected Nakuru county, there was losses in human life, property and livelihoods. Injuries were also sustained. Further, thousands of people were displaced. According to Waki Report (2008), 1564 houses were burnt and 263 lives were lost during the initial and retaliatory attacks that took place in Nakuru county. Recent advances in psychological research indicate that traumatic events can have effects on the victims, perpetrators and those who witness them.

In addition, studies have indicated that traumatic events affect children in a much more profound way than adults since they have not yet developed personality or psychological structures to deal with horrors and trauma. This raises a concern; how much did the children witness? How did it impact on their mental health? Did it have a potential of causing PTSD?

PTSD impacts negatively on children who may have experienced trauma. They may have learning difficulties; interfere with their ability to communicate verbally, regulations of emotions, concentration and problem solving skills (Baker, 1990). Survivors of violence may adopt behavior coping mechanisms that affect their ability to develop constructive relationships with peers and adults. Some behaviors may be either directed inward against self, which may include alcohol and drug abuse, suicide, eating disorders and feelings of sadness and hopelessness. Other behaviours may also be directed towards others, for example, repetitive conflicts, getting into trouble with the law and involvement in school violence (Zivcik, 1993).

The negative psychological impacts of violence among children in childhood may persist overtime and sometimes into adulthood if not managed well when they occur. These effects may include depression, anxiety, sexual dysfunctions, substance abuse and PTSD. It is estimated that approximately one third of children and adolescents victims of violence experience PTSD as adult survivors (Saylor, 1993). It is in the view of this that the researcher set out to investigate the possibility of development of PTSD among children survivors of post –election violence of 2007/2008 in Nakuru county.

**Objectives**

i) To assess the level of PTSD severity of the primary and secondary survivors in areas affected by post- election violence of 2007/2008 in Nakuru county.

**Hypothesis**

$H_0$: There is no significant difference between primary and secondary survivors in levels of PTSD severity in areas affected by post- election violence in Nakuru county.

**Research methodology**

The study employed ex-post factor and correlational research designs. The study
was carried out in Nakuru County in the Rift Valley region of Kenya. The county has an area size of 74,905km² and administratively divided into four sub counties namely: Nakuru North, Nakuru central, Molo and Naivasha. The target population for study was 77,768 children. The study used a sample of 400 children survivors of the post-election violence, 20 deputy head teachers and 40 parents from 20 schools. To get the sample, multi stage sampling strategies were adopted. At the first stage, purposive sampling was used to get the 10 divisions that were hardest hit by the pot-election violence of 2007/2008 which included; Naivasha, Keringet, Njoro, Molo, Olenguruone, Mausummit, Kuresoi, Mau Narok, Rongai and Mauche. In the second stage, day schools were purposively selected. In the third stage, simple random sampling was used to get the specific schools. In the fourth stage, purposive sampling was used to get the specific children who are residents of the sampled divisions during the Post-election violence. In the final stage, simple random sampling was used to get the final sample.

The deputy headteachers were selected from the 20 schools selected in the second stage. The parents were picked from two schools randomly selected in areas which were hardest hit by the violence. A questionnaire was used to collect data from the children survivors while the interview schedule was used for the deputy head teachers and focused group discussion guidelines for the parents. To establish the reliability of the research instruments, a pilot study was carried out in Subukia division which possessed same characteristics as the divisions sampled. It involved 80 children, four deputy headteachers and two focused group discussions. Split-half method was used to analyse data from the pilot study and yielded a reliability coefficient of 0.8. The results from the pilot study revealed the research instruments were reliable and possessed both content and face validity. Descriptive analysis was used to establish the mean and standard deviation of survivors’ scores on the Impact of Event Scale while independent t-test was used to test the hypotheses. Qualitative results were based on information obtained from 20 deputy head teachers in 20 schools and 40 parents who participated in focused group discussions.

**Results and Discussion**

To assess the level of PTSD severity, the Impact of Event Scale was utilized. It had 22 items adopted from Weiss (2007) Impact of Event Scale. The scale considered the three categories of PTSD symptoms namely; re-experiencing, avoidance and hyper arousal. The Impact of Events Scale tool was used to determine the level of PTSD severity among the children. The tool is constructed on a 5-point likert scale with scores ranging from Zero (0) to four (4). The scoring range is from 0 – 88. A score of 0–23 indicates absence of PTSD while a score of 24 – 32 is of clinical concern with partial PTSD. A score between 33 and above means confirmed existence of PTSD.

Descriptive analysis found mean score of all sampled children to be (38.4) and a standard deviation of (18.3) on the Impact of Event Scale as indicated on table 1. This was interpreted to mean that on the overall, the scores of all children who participated in the study were high and on the average and majority of the children had confirmed PTSD. Presence of PTSD symptoms among the children studied was supported by results from focused group discussions and interviews from deputy head teachers. Results from focused group discussions further pointed out that parents had noted change in their children’s behaviour. They identified excessive irritability, sleep disturbances, immature behaviour and fear of being alone among children who had been exposed to post-election violence.
This study through focused group discussions also reported that children had developed fear of going beyond the immediate environment. Some members reported that there are certain paths children fear using especially those that used by gangs and prefer using alternative longer routes instead. Avoidance of any conversation about post-election violence is common among the children. In addition deputy head teachers reported learning difficulties among children, higher levels of aggression, truancy, poor concentration and revenge seeking behaviours among children involved in the post-election violence.

In conclusion, reports from the children, observations by the parents in the focused group discussions and report by deputy head teachers support the presence of PTSD symptoms in the children sampled. This finding supports findings of other studies on PTSD among children survivors of community violence. A study by Yule (1999) among children after military operation in Iraq found that PTSD was reported in 87% of the children sampled. A similar study by Allwood (2002) to examine relationship between violent and non-violent war experiences found 41% of the children sampled had clinically significant PTSD symptoms. In a study in Southern Darfur among displaced children reported 75% of the children studied met the criteria of PTSD. Thabet and Vostanis (2004) further agree with the findings of the current study as reported in their study among Palestinian children during war conflict reported high levels of PTSD in the sampled children. However, although the highest score on Impact of Event Scale was 83 out of 88 which is the highest score, the lowest score was zero (0) as indicated on table 1, meaning absence of PTSD symptoms in the survivor. This implies that after witnessing the traumatic events there are some children who did not exhibit PTSD symptoms. This finding corroborates the study by Foy (1994), Clark (2001), and Norris (2001) who found that 15-30 percent of Vietnam War prisoners endured long term deprivation and torture without developing PTSD. This therefore means that not everyone who experiences traumatic event develops PTSD.

Further analysis was performed to determine the scores of primary survivors and secondary survivors separately. The secondary survivors had lower mean score on the Impact of Event Scale. The mean score of the primary survivors was (43.3), with a standard deviation of (17.7), while that of the secondary survivors was (33.5) and a standard deviation of (17.6) as shown on table 1. An independent t-test revealed statistically significant difference between the mean of primary and secondary survivor on the Impact of Event Scale with primary survivors with higher scores. The primary survivors had (m=43.3, s= 17.7), t (392) = 5.54, P = 0.000, a = .05 and that of the secondary survivors was (m =33.5, s = 17.6), t (392) = 5.54, P = 0.000, a = .05, as shown on the table 2. Therefore, the null hypothesis that states that there is no significant difference in level of PTSD severity between the primary and secondary survivors is rejected and the alternative is adopted that states that there is significant difference between primary and secondary survivors in level of PTSD severity.

This finding collaborate those of other studies. Phebe and Tucker (2007) in a comparative study among children survivors of Oklahoma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary survivor</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary survivors</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overall</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field data
City bombing found that those children who reported death of a friend or neighbor had more PTSD symptoms than those who watched the events on television coverage. Pfefferbaum (2001) in a study to establish the prevalence of PTSD reactions in New York City following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack found that post-traumatic stress was significantly prevalent in the primary survivor group than in the comparison group.

Table 2: Relationship between Primary and Secondary Level of PTSD Severity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact of event scores</th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>5.540</td>
<td>391.996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field data

Further analysis was carried out to determine the level of PTSD among the children based on the following scale; A score between 0-23 means no PTSD; 24-32 means partial PTSD and a score of 33 and above means confirmed PTSD. The study found that majority of the survivors had confirmed PTSD (251) which constitutes (64%) of all the respondents as indicated on table 3. This therefore means that there was presence of PTSD in both the primary and secondary survivors. This finding is consistent with findings of a study by Seedat and Njenga (2004) among adolescents in urban African schools which found that experiencing a traumatic event either as a victim or witness produces traumatic effects. The study found that 69 percent of children in Nairobi and 59 percent of children in Cape Town who had witnessed or experienced sexual related trauma exhibited high rates of PTSD.

However, some differences were found between the primary and the secondary survivors. The primary survivors had a higher number of those confirmed than secondary survivors. However there were also some children who had minimal PTSD symptoms among the primary survivors as well as the secondary survivors as illustrated on table 3.

This finding collaborate those of other studies. Phebe and Tucker (2007) in a comparative study among children survivors of Oklahoma City bombing found that those children who reported death of a friend or neighbor had more PTSD symptoms than those who watched the events on television coverage. Pfefferbaum (2001) in a study to establish the prevalence of PTSD reactions in New York City following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack found that post-traumatic stress was significantly prevalent in the primary survivor group than in the comparison group.
Table 3: PTSD level of Severity of Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Confirmed PTSD</th>
<th>Partial PTSD</th>
<th>NO PTSD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary survivors</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary survivors</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field data

On the overall, the study found that majority of the children had confirmed PTSD. This was further confirmed by reports from parents who participated in focused group discussions supported the fact that there was change in their children’s behavior after post-election violence. The identified changes in sleeping habits, relationships and some had regressed to immature behavior. Reports from deputy head teachers interviewed reported learning difficulties poor concentration and truancy among children affected by post-election violence. All these reports suggest the presence of PTSD among the children sampled. The study found a significant difference between primary and secondary survivors on the Impact of Event Scale (level of PTSD) with primary survivors recording higher scores as indicated on table 2.

Conclusion

PTSD was confirmed in 76% of the primary survivors and 51% of the secondary survivors as shown on table 3. On the overall, 64% of the respondents had confirmed PTSD symptoms as indicated on table 3. Further, presence of PTSD among the children was supported by results from focused group discussions and interviews from deputy head teachers. Parents reported change in some aspects of their children’s behavior that include; academic performance, eating habits and sleeping habits.

In addition, reports from deputy head teachers reported learning difficulties, truancy and high levels of aggression among the survivors which indicate presence of PTSD symptoms. Implication of this is that studies have established a correlation between childhood PTSD and psychological disorders in adulthood. If childhood PTSD is not addressed, the disorder may manifest in substance abuse, separation anxiety, attention deficit disorder and sexual dysfunctions in adulthood. It is therefore important to address trauma issues among the children survivors of post-election violence because of the significant far-reaching physical, social, cognitive and behavioural problems associated with childhood PTSD.

In addition, the study found a significant difference between the primary and secondary survivors in levels of PTSD severity with higher levels among primary survivors. The study found 51% of the secondary survivors had confirmed PTSD. Secondary survivors did not have direct exposure to the violence but watched the events unfolding. This therefore means people who witness traumatic events involving others suffer psychological consequences. Therefore, psychological interventions should be extended to victims of the traumatic events (primary survivors) as well as those who observe the events occur (Secondary survivors).

This study recommends that an eclectic approach to counseling be initiated among children affected by post-election violence. They include psychological debriefing and trauma counseling. Trauma counseling should be conducted with the aim of restoring safety, enhancing control and reducing fear and anxiety. This may be accomplished through identifying the causes of anxiety, accommodating the effects and providing information.
References


Culture and Gender Based Violence in South Sudan

Carolyne Gatimu, International Peace Support and Training Centre, (IPSTC)

Abstract

Gender based violence (GBV) in South Sudan exists at a level that requires special acknowledgement. Although most studies so far carried out on the subject have been limited in terms of sample size and statistical analysis, they have nevertheless produced evidence of extensive domestic violence, early/forced marriages, wife inheritance, rape, abductions and sexual slavery among others. There are some cultural practices and social factors prevalent amongst the South Sudanese which perpetrates GBV such as the role of dowry/bride price, girl child compensation and abductions of women and children among others. Again, culturally, some forms of GBV such as wife beating are not viewed as a problem but widely accepted and tolerated. Also, the societal stigma that surrounds victims of sexual violence has a negative impact on reporting and access to treatment and justice. This article explores the link between culture and GBV in South Sudan. It makes the argument that different cultures among different ethnic groups in South Sudan encourages GBV and to a large extent informs its widespread prevalence.

Introduction

Gender Based Violence (GBV) is a cause for concern to the world over as it has emerged as a serious global/public health, human rights and development issue. The term “gender-based violence” refers to violence that targets individuals or groups on the basis of their gender. The United Nations’ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) defines it as “violence that is directed to a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.” This includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, the threat of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Together with “sexual violence” and “violence against women”, “gender-based violence” is used interchangeably. This does not however mean that all acts against a woman are gender-based violence, or that all victims of gender-based violence are female. The surrounding circumstances where men are victims of sexual violence could be a man being harassed, beaten, or killed because they do not conform to views of masculinity, which are accepted by society.

Some studies show that most of the victims of GBV are women and further point out that GBV subjected to men by women maybe as a result of women responding to men’s use of violence against them (UNDP, 2008). On the contrary, cases of GBV against men are on the rise in some countries such as Kenya (Kang’ethe, 2014). In addition, sexual violence against men and boys has been reported as “regular and widespread” in conflict-affected environments such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Bosnia, Liberia among others. Issues of GBV therefore need to take cognizance that any gender can produce perpetrators and victims (Shteir, 2014).

Culture on the other hand denotes the way that people live their lives. It includes knowledge, beliefs, morals, law, customs, norms of behaviour and other habits particular to a group of people or a community. Culture is central in understanding the phenomenon of gender based violence within a community. It is argued that GBV is rooted in discriminatory social norms and power inequalities between men and women in social, economic and political spheres of life. For example, in a number of contexts involving armed conflict globally, rape and sexual assault has been used as a tactic to humiliate, intimidate,
displace and traumatize communities. The use of rape and sexual assault as a tactic of war has a deep, tacit link with the acceptability of all forms of GBV during times of peace.

In South Sudan, the vast majority of women and girls will survive at least one form of GBV – be it rape; sexual assault; physical assault; forced/early marriage; denial of resources, opportunities or services; or psychological/emotional abuse. Many categories of GBV are pervasive and engrained in the fabric of society. All tribes and geographical regions have some differences in terms of prevalence, but the thread of GBV sadly runs throughout the country, with bride price as a cornerstone of the nation’s economy (CARE, 2014).

This article focuses on the relationship between culture and GBV in South Sudan. It looks at the nature of the problem and the ways and forms in which it is perpetrated. It explores some of the theories explaining the existence and prevalence of GBV as well as the cultural and social factors perpetuating it in South Sudan. The culture of silence on GBV issues is also examined and the current ways in which GBV cases are handled by the customary courts. The article ends with a conclusion and recommendations.

**Theoretical Framework**

Gender Based Violence is one of the most controversial topics in the general social sciences discourse as well as different school of thoughts which seek to offer perspectives on the subject. To date, theories of GBV have been strongly influenced by either the biases of psychology, sociology, and criminology or the ideological and political agendas of feminist activism. Two discourses are however central in explaining GBV in South Sudan.

GBV is supported by norms and values surrounding masculinity, femininity, family, and heterosexual relationships within the culture at large. These norms and values perpetuate the vice and explain its widespread prevalence. Violence is therefore a logical extension of the broader cultural norms and practices. The occurrence of GBV- whether in its more crude forms or in its structural expressions- becomes the accepted “norm” of life, and part and parcel of how societies perceive and recognise themselves (O’Neill, 1998). Feminist position in this discourse strongly argues that male to female violence cannot be separated from the patriarchal ideology, normative foundations, institutional arrangements in society, sexist norms, and historical legacy of male dominance, which socialize men, support and legitimate their violent behaviour towards women (Dobash & Dobash, 1992).

Related to the normative support for violence is the social theory of gender and power (Connell, 1987). In this discourse, GBV originates from unequal power relations (imbalances) between men and women and serves to maintain them among both groups and as individuals on the personal, household, community and state levels. In particular, violence against women has always been a tactic by which men maintain control over and exploit women’s bodies and labour and has been used when a woman does not comply with the perpetrator’s wishes or as a means of displacing a man’s anger or bolstering his sagging masculinity (Bisika, n.d). These two discourses could be used to explain the widespread prevalence of GBV in South Sudan, emanating from negative cultural norms, values, and practices as well as unequal power relations between men and women.
Gender Based Violence in South Sudan

Gender Based Violence (GBV) is a serious problem in South Sudan. It occurs in the public as well as domestic spaces. There are those forms that have been perpetrated since time immemorial by the South Sudanese. Issues such as early and/or forced marriages, elopement, abductions of women and children (both boys and girls), girl child compensation, wife beating, wife inheritance etc. are not necessarily new amongst the South Sudanese. These forms of GBV are culturally accepted and for the majority, they are not seen as a problem. Accusations of adultery, husbands not being able to sustain their wives, rape cases, defilement, denial of education for girls, denial of property ownership for women, young women stabbing their husbands who they were forced to marry, sexual harassment in places of work, and rape-related pregnancies, among others are GBV issues that are happening now and people have started talking about them (Gatimu, 2015).

Conflict-related sexual violence cases have also been reported overwhelmingly in South Sudan, especially after the new conflict that broke out in December 2013. Rape and sexual violence has been perpetrated against civilians by both government and opposition forces. The forms of sexual violence used during the conflict include rape, sometimes with an object (guns or bullets), gang-rape, abduction and sexual slavery, and forced abortion in all the affected states. In some instances, women’s bodies were mutilated and, and in at least one instance, women were forced to go outside their homes naked (UNMISS, 2014; Amnesty International, 2014). In addition, IDP camps within and outside UN compounds have become breeding ground for rape.

The Culture of silence on matters of GBV

The fact that all these forms of GBV exists and are being perpetrated in South Sudan is not in contention. However, the culture of silence amongst the South Sudanese on GBV issues is surprising. Gatimu (2015) found out that GBV is seen as a domestic issue and hence should be solved at the family level regardless of the type and form, and whether the victim is injured or he/she has died out of the GBV-related circumstances. Victims rarely report cases of sexual violence due to cultural inhibitions related to fear, shame and stigma. In the study, one key informant observed the following:

“In incidences where rape occurs, most South Sudanese do not talk about it to external people or people outside their family because it reduces the honour of the family, it’s a shame and if it’s a case of an unmarried girl, then it is argued that she will never find an honourable man to marry. Even in the Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites, when it happens, they do not report it to the UN police or even to an elder in the community. They instead report the matter to the senior-most person in the family, discuss the gravity of the issue internally then decide whether to go to the police or not. Meanwhile, the family of the victim is still talking to the family of the perpetrator to see whether they can get compensation. What is unfortunate is the fact that they do not consider the rights of the survivor or the health consequences of the rape. If compensation occurs, the men are happy but if the victim (girl/woman) gets really sick, then it’s the responsibility of the women in the household to get her medical assistance. The women first look for traditional herbs, they only go to the hospital when it’s very serious. This is the only time they will talk about rape, or the fact that their daughter was raped.”

— XY key informant (Juba, 24 March 2015).

There are implications of this culture of silence on accessing treatment and justice. As pointed by the key informant quoted above, victims of sexual violence such as rape do not seek medical
attention immediately and they only do so if and when they get seriously sick. They instead seek traditional medicine in the form of herbs and only visit the hospital when the traditional medicine has failed. The South Sudanese generally have a lot of faith in their traditional medicine and by extension traditional ways of solving problems. In cases of rape, most of the victims will go to the hospital when it’s already too late to do an examination or tests which can give medical evidence to aid the prosecution of the perpetrator in a statutory court. Although rape is a criminal offence, most of the rape cases are handled by the customary courts and do not need medical proof of rape. Additionally, seeking medical services when it is already too late means that some treatment such as post-exposure prophylaxis for STIs/HIV will not be effective which should be taken within 72 hours. This therefore makes it difficult for the health service providers to offer much help to the victims.

Role of Dowry/Bride price

Different cultures among the many ethnic groups in South Sudan emphasize the cohesion and strength of the family as a basis of society (Gross et al., 2010; CARE 2014). This is a good thing but it places undue pressure on the women to keep their marriages and also makes them vulnerable to GBV. Since the male is the undisputed head of each household, the role of women in this social pattern is that of cementing family ties through “bride-wealth” and of producing children. As a result, women are often marginalised in their families.

Again, South Sudanese families exchange women for various benefits during the formation of marriages. Families arrange marriages across the tribes and send women to live with their husbands to solidify relationships between clans through the production of children. As a result, families often view young unmarried girls as economic burdens. The practice of considering bride-price offers otherwise known as “booking” can happen when a girl is as young as five years old with marriages potentially initiated as early as the girl’s first menstrual cycle (CARE, 2014). When a man marries, his family pays the bride’s family “bride wealth” in the form of cows or other livestock such as donkeys, sheep, and goats. In a place where extreme poverty is common, this bride wealth can be critical to a family’s wellbeing; families marry their girls out early and feel as if they have no choice in the matter (Gross et al., 2010).

The bride-wealth system also acts to prevent divorce even where marriage is violent or otherwise unbearable. Most young men need their family members to contribute to their bride wealth. Upon marriage, the bride wealth is distributed among members of the bride’s family. Thus, many family members benefit from and rely upon the couple’s marital success. Although this helps fortify family ties, it also discourages divorce, since divorce requires the collection, return and redistribution of bride wealth. This is a complicated and cumbersome process bound to anger many family members. In addition, many of the assets the bride’s family members received in bride wealth may no longer exist at the time of divorce; the cattle from bride wealth may have died, been slaughtered for food or been stolen. Therefore, the pressure women face to preserve family cohesion makes them more likely to stay in abusive marriages than to end them. This all leaves women in a vulnerable position that makes them targets for GBV and unlikely to seek justice when they suffer it. South Sudanese society expects women to be responsible for the care of their children but men retain control over major decisions about child rearing. Additionally, societal norms demand that women meet the sexual and child-producing needs of their husbands without fail.

Girl child compensation

This is an age old practice in some communities in South Sudan, especially in Eastern Equatorial that perpetuates violence against girls. Girl child compensation usually occurs in such a situation whereby if a person from one clan decides to kill another from a different clan,
mostly out of a dispute, then the members of the aggrieved clan have the right to go to the clan of the murderer and demand compensation. This compensation is not in terms of cows or fine goods but is demanded in form of a human being, who has to be a girl. The killer is left unpunished and the girl is left to suffer. When the girl joins the new family, she becomes a slave often being left to do tedious domestic chores and does not find parental care and love from that family (Gatimu, 2015). In such a situation, if a girl is chosen for compensation, she has no choice but to obey. This practice has prevailed in some communities but others have since stopped the practice. It is a form of gender based violence perpetuated against young girls.

Abductions of women and children

Abductions of women and children occur during cattle raids in South Sudan and they have been happening since time immemorial. If the raiders do not find cattle, they abduct women and children. Upon arrival, if the abductor does not want to marry the woman abducted, he can sell her off or marry her to another man and demand dowry from the man. Young girls on the other hand are abducted to go and perform domestic chores in the abductors home while abducted boys are expected to go and look after cattle. In some instances, young boys are abducted and recruited as child soldiers by armed forces and groups (Gatimu, 2015).

Levirate and wife inheritance

In South Sudan, many believe that if a man dies, his wife does not have any right on her status since bride price was already paid for her. It is argued that it’s the family of the late husband that is supposed to nominate a man to take responsibility of the widow so as to continue in the footsteps of the late. This is not a unique thing in African societies because in many cultures, it is expected that the brother of the late man will take responsibility of his brother’s wife and also the elder son in a family is expected to take care of his father’s wives if his father dies. This is not an entirely bad arrangement as it ensures that widows and orphaned children are taken care of by their extended families. However, a woman should have a right to decide whether she wants to be inherited or not.

Akechak et al (2004) observes that in many African societies, including Southern Sudanese society, there exists a custom known as levirate under which women remain married to their dead husbands and cannot marry again unless they obtain a divorce from their dead spouse. Children continue to be born to them by the deceased husband’s surviving kinsmen but bear the name of and are considered in all respects progeny of, the dead man. This custom results in a practice known as wife inheritance. A man may also marry a woman in what is known as ghost marriage to produce children in the name of a dead male relative. Additionally, men fear “complete” or “true death” – that is, a man dying without having fathered children or without children having been assigned to him. For these reasons, South Sudanese society has developed ways to ensure that men have heirs. For example, social paternity (assigning children to a man) takes precedence over physical paternity (biological paternity). A man can assign his children to a relative to ensure that the relative has heirs. In the Nuer and Dinka communities for example, a woman may continue to give birth to children in the name of her dead husband by having sex with one of his surviving male relatives (Gross et al, 2010).

As noted earlier, South Sudanese society expects women to be responsible for the care of their children, but men retain control over major decisions about child rearing. As described above, assignment of a woman’s children may be out of her hands after her husband’s death and even while still living, he can decide to assign some of his children to another relative without the consent of the mother or child. The ability of the men to control these practices gives them great bargaining power in any dispute with the woman and puts any woman who seeks justice in a vulnerable position.
The justice system in customary courts

In South Sudan, customary and traditional justice systems composed of chiefs and elders handle the vast majority of GBV cases. These are courts recognised by the South Sudan Constitution. However, many of these customary and local institutions including the courts, are seemingly ill equipped to deal with complex cases such as GBV. The types of cases handled by the courts mostly involve marriage disputes including divorce and wife battery, issues of inheritance, rape and other capital offences. GBV in South Sudan falls at the nexus of criminal and family law. Family law is inextricably intertwined with customs and traditions and is the purview of the customary courts. Criminal law currently exists in a jurisdictional limbo with some cases going exclusively to customary courts. Even serious cases such as rape are brought with greater frequency for adjudication according to customary law. Different ethnic groups apply somewhat different customary laws (Haki, 2011).

In the Dinka customary law for example, rape cases are punished primarily by compensation to the victim’s family. In the case of a married woman, cows are paid to the husband and in the case of an unmarried woman to her parents. Therefore, women survivors are side-lined while perpetrators and survivors’ families handle the dispute. Usually a cow will be sold to pay for the woman’s treatment. Rape cases are not punished severely in terms of imprisonment. Men are only sentenced to three months prison for rape, unless the woman is married, in which case there is additional punishment for adultery with another man’s wife.

In Juba, amongst the Bari and Mundari speakers, rape cases that are brought to the customary courts normally have already reached a consensus that the man must be punished. Where a woman is not yet married, the rapist will often be forced to marry the girl before the case is ever brought to the court. This is often a preferred alternative for both parties, as the man does not receive jail time or have to pay a large fine and the woman and her family do not face the public stigma of having an abused and now, unwanted or “tainted” daughter who would be difficult to marry. Where the woman or family does not agree to marriage or where the woman is already married and abused by a stranger, the courts will punish the man on multiple counts.

Wives are almost universally considered the property of their husbands largely due to the dowry paid for them universally throughout South Sudan as mentioned in the preceding discussion. Men consider the dowry as giving them a right to discipline the woman as they please and families always reinforce this perception. However, wife beating still occurs even when no dowry has been exchanged, suggesting a deeper cultural practice not linked entirely to material considerations. As a result, and largely a reflection of these cultural norms, wife abuse is tolerated by most customary courts. For example, in Juba, in the Bari and Mundari speaker’s customary courts, tolerance of spousal abuse is high. The chiefs do reprimand husbands for beating their wives, even when there was no apparent reason, but punishment of the man does not go beyond a small fine, even where severe beatings occurred and the wife was pregnant. In most cases, there is always a legitimate reason for wife beating that places the blame on the woman rather than the man. There are varying degrees and contextual considerations within each tribe, but in all the regions, some amount of discipline or wife abuse is accepted.

Lastly, corporal punishment is a regular practice across the courts and tribes in South Sudan. Lashings are given as punishment to both men and women. Women, however, are often given lashings in an addition to beatings they already received at home. Lashings given as discipline to women in the courts reinforce the acceptance of violence against women for misbehaviour (Haki, 2011).
Conclusion

Every society has its own cultural norms and practices. While some cultural practices are good, some continue to infringe on women and children’s rights. In the case of South Sudan, promoting family cohesion and stability is good for the wellbeing of children and the society at large and so does ensuring that orphaned children and widows are taken care of. However, such practices have been found to put undue pressure on women and girls and infringed on their human rights as discussed in the paper. Other age-old practices such as girl child compensation and abductions are also a human rights issue. As pointed out in the discussion, these practices constitute gender based violence which is a public health and development issue.

In view of the foregoing, we recommended that in South Sudan, a lot of awareness raising needs to be carried out on especially these negative cultural norms, values and practices that perpetuate GBV. This can be spearheaded by civil society in conjunction with community leaders. In addition, the current traditional justice system does not help at all in protecting women and children rights. The majority of the customary law systems show plainly a conflict between international human rights laws and rights granted to women and children. There is need to initiate dialogue with the leadership of the customary courts by the lawmakers, community leaders and the judiciary to find ways of harmonizing the customary law with international law.

References


In December 2013, growing political tensions among the key leaders in South Sudan erupted into violence. While the political dispute that triggered this violence was not clearly based on ethnic identity, it overlapped with pre-existing ethnic and political grievances that sparked armed clashes and ethnic-based killings in the capital Juba and beyond. The fighting, which occurred between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and forces loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar, and among armed civilians, has caused a huge security and humanitarian emergency. See Blanchard (2014).
Gender as analytical tool in Africa’s Peace building process: A Commentary

Samuel Alfayo Nyanchoga, Nantes Institute of Advanced Studies, France

Introduction

Gender as an analytical and inter-relational tool in peace process brings into focus the competencies, perceptions, challenges and experiences of both men and women in conflict management and conflict resolution. Men tend to dominate the process itself and institutions that deal with peace process and tilt the perceptions and policies that are applied in post conflict situations. Consequently women are marginalized as decision makers and in the activities that promote peace. To engender the peace process is to ensure that women interests and needs are taken into consideration in the peace process and secondly ensure their active participation.

The application of gender as analytical and inter-relational tool in peace process has be to weaved through the prism of African culture, neo liberal context, emerging genders and interrogate the discordance that arises there of the inter- sectionality between the approaches. A gender-relational approach to peacebuilding implies a broadly based description of how gender roles and relations work in each particular context, including how gender differences intersects with other identities, the challenges and opportunities they present for transformative change.

One critical aspect of gender that has been ignored in Africa are gender minorities namely the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons (LGBTI). These categories of gender minorities are largely absent from peace and security building process. The fundamental assumption is that positive peace and security must be enjoyed by all citizens. However, a number of African countries reveal substantial degree of negative legal and violent activism against these category of gender minorities. To work with gender as analytical and inter relational tool to peaceful and secure societies means to challenge the simpler dichotomy of male and female and incorporate other emerging genders. It will be important to analyze this process from the prism of theory and praxis and its general applicability in the African context.

Gender and peace; theoretical and historiographical perspectives

Scholarship on gender, peace and security dates back to the beginning of the 20th century.

The interrogation of the historiography on gender and peace highlight diverse perspectives (Reardon 1985; Brock-Utne 1985, 1989; Ruddick 1989; Harris & King 1989, Sylvester 1987; Forcey 1991; Sharoni 1993.). The liberal feminist perspective point to the marginalization of women in the peace negotiation process (Forcey 1991; Sharoni 1993); yet the radical feminism on gender and peace argue that women may articulate a different “voice” on peace process (Gilligan 1982; Reardon 1985; Hartsock 1985; Harding 1986, 1991; Brock-Utne 1985, 1989; Black 1989; Ruddick 1989; Northrup 1990). These scholars point to women daily experiences and struggles that may be an asset in peace building process. The exclusion, oppression and discrimination have given women insightful perspectives on peace process than the male dominant groups (Hartsock 1985; Harding 1991).
Peace and security from strategic perspective

From the strategic discourse; peace and security is equated or perceived as national security. This means the absence of war, security of governments, political elites with little regard to the general population (Cohn 1989, 1993; Enloe 1990, 1993). From these perspectives governments invest in military technology and reliance on military to protect the citizens (Reardon, 1985; Harris & King 1989; Ruddick, 1989; Enloe 1990, 1993).

Peace and security from holistic perspective

The concept of security and peace implies safety for the people from violent and non-violent threats, freedom from fear and want; freedom from threat to human life, survival, dignity, functioning and sustainability. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 article 1 called upon nations to participate and contribute to the realization of all-inclusive human peace and security. According to UDHR the concept of peace and security imply freedom from want and freedom from fear and covered all aspects of human life such as economic, food, safety, health, personal, community, environment and elimination of sources of conflicts. The UN initiative in 2000 under the millennium development goals widened the scope of human peace and security to include reversal of poverty, hunger, child mortality and disease (Hossain and Isiaka, 2015:31-50; Hassan, 2015).

Intersectionality between gender, peace and security

The postmodernist or “post structural approaches to a gendered process to peace and security recognizes the multiplicity of voices, perspectives and experiences in human society that may contribute to peaceful and secure societies (Butler 1989; Nicholson 1990; Hirsch & Fox-Keller 1990; Barrett & Phillips 1992; Ferguson 1993). Post structuralism focuses on the structures of hegemony and power and how they impede peace process as well as on the fact that peace rests on social justice, equality and equity in society. Post structuralism also contends that multiple actors such as women children play a critical role in peace process (Hirsch, 2012: 2-250).

Gender, peace and security in multi-lateral context


The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1889 of 2009, called for the setup of global indicators for the implementation of Resolution 1325 and greater participation of women in peace building. In 2010, in response to Resolution 1889, through the efforts of the United Nations several member states some emerging from conflict situation established national action plans on the women, peace and security resolutions. Several multilateral actors and institutions also begun to take action on women, peace and security issues. For example the Strategic Commands of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization set up parameters for implementation of Resolution 1325 through training, staffing, standards reporting on issues related to women, peace and security. The African Union also through, its solemn declaration on gender equality in Africa in 2004 affirmed its commitment to human rights as

Inter-relational aspects of gender, peace and security

According to Myrttinen, Naujoks and El-Bushra (2014) gender is a relational process because of the ways in which identities are created in relationship with each other, in the context of the whole society. Gender identities are varied and transient and they range from, male female, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons. The importance of one’s gender identity in relation to other identities is dependent on the given societal circumstances. One cannot assume that his or her gender identity is more important than the other. The vulnerability and exclusion of LGBTI in Africa as the ‘unwanted others’ make it rather precarious for their participation in peace and security process. In South Africa the sexual harassment of the lesbians, in Burundi and Uganda, homosexuality is illegal and LGBTI issues are largely a social taboo while in Kenya there is a declared ‘official silence’ on the gender minorities. All this points to the grim possibility of incorporating these categories in building peaceful and secure societies in Africa.

Gender identity and access to justice in post-conflict environment

The ability to access formal, informal and transitional justice is determined by one’s gender identity. The response to women and girls victim of violence and conflict including rape face challenges in Africa. In Northern Uganda for example after many years of rebel activities women and girls victims of war and violence find it difficult to seek justice. The justice system appears not responsive to constraints of women as men dominate many of the institutions and sometimes women victims are required to facilitate the arrests of the perpetrators. There are other barriers to seeking justice such as financial constraints, religious and cultural factors that compel women to settle disputes outside courts (FIDA-Uganda, 2011:1-46). Another case of Sierra Leone after many years of violence and conflict; women also face similar challenges in seeking redress. These obstacles include; knowledge of the law and mechanisms for redress, physical accessibility, affordability, timeliness, linguistic accessibility, legal, cultural accessibility and social stigma. Others factors are political including political environment, policy decisions, funding and institutional challenges. There are capacity constraints and resource shortages, staffing, equipment, resources and structural environment that constraint women from seeking justice (Denney and Ibrahim, 2012).

Similarly gender minorities face even greater challenges among justice and referral service providers, policymakers and in programme interventions. These forms of gender identity are undermined by ‘heteronormativity’ of the heterosexuality as the only normal sexual orientation or marital relations between women and men. Men and women who transcend these norms or challenge these roles face discrimination and violence and greater challenges in seeking justice. To ignore these gender categories in our legal framework and social network is to court insecure and
non-peaceful societies. The case of increased collective violence or collective rape against lesbians in South Africa is not in any sense an alternative to creating peaceful and secure societies but the moralization of violence against a section of human society and violation of fundamental human rights. South Africa through its constitution has denied the right to associate to this group as a specific gender category (Martin, Kelly, Turquet, & Ross. 2009).

Cultural barriers and power dynamics

Many of the African societies have hierarchized power structures and this limits access to power and decision making to all groups in society. In Burundi for instance, the hierarchy of power or the dominant role of elders in northern Ugandan society does not promote gender based issues or social equality. The importance of one gender in peace process depended on the societal circumstances. For instance the presence and importance of heterosexuals in a peace brokered process in either northern part of Uganda or in south Africa will face restrictions and limited freedom because their social spaces are constrained by what society approve as socially normal and acceptable behavior. It is also important to note gender identities and roles in peace process are highly ritualized. It is not uncommon to find out that certain ritualistic roles exclude women, children and the youth and other socially marginalized gender minorities. In dealing with trans-border conflicts between the Oromo of Ethiopia and Turkana of Kenya; or between the Samburu and Turkana; there is overwhelming dominant role of male elders yet the active segment of society that perpetrate the conflicts are male warriors and most affected are children and women. The locus of societal power in the peace process falls in the hand of the male gerontocracy, state machinery and political elites. The presence of women is peripheral and restricted to activities like singing, dancing, arts and drama. The consequent impact of this is lack of sustained peace and secure societies (Patta, Hussein, Diba, Molu, Tumal, Eugenie, and Adan, 2011).

Gender and reintegration

Gender is an important factor in determining the reintegration of former combatants and returning populations with specific support programmes taking into consideration their needs and identities. The reintegration in Uganda of NRM combatants was often hampered by the lack of education, gendered stereotypes that women and girls would easily fit into the informal sector. In northern Uganda, some former Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) abductees and in Burundi women and girls preferred to migrate to cities’ informal sector some engaging in prostitution and hawking. Consequently many female-headed households arose in post-conflict Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi swelling the socio-economically vulnerable sections of post-conflict societies in the region. The reintegration of other gender minorities such as the same-sex couples remain obscure. This is not withstanding the empowerment projects aimed at improving especially the economic conditions of women in these countries (Mazurana, and McKay 2004).

Gender mainstreaming of the security sector

This is a strategy for making women, men and gender minorities’ concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that all gender identities fit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.

In the context of security sector reform, gender mainstreaming involves considering the impact the security programmes have on the different security needs of women, men, boys, girls and gender minorities. Gender and security sector reform is a process of transforming security
sector for several reasons. This includes the promotion of gender initiatives such as gender training for security sector personnel and mentoring schemes to facilitate the professional development of female and other gender minority police officers. The gendered budget ensures that resources are being distributed equally. The promotion of equal participation of men, women and gender minorities in security sector reform processes and security sector institutions is a method of strengthening local ownership as well as increasing representation and effectiveness. In relation to security sector reform processes, this may involve ensuring that women, gender minority, and men are equally involved in security sector reform needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation, and that representatives of women participate in security sector reform policy and decision making. Because men are over-represented, promoting equal participation generally involves increasing the recruitment, retention and advancement of women and gender minority.

Dealing with male-dominated, militarized command structures is still a military challenge. Recruiting more women into newly reconstructed security sector institutions and ensuring that the newly reformed justice institutions take into account the needs of gender minority, men and women will be instrumental in reforming the security sector.

According to the UN 2008 report gender security sector reform is key to developing security sector institutions that are non-discriminatory, representative of the population and capable of effectively responding to the specific security needs of diverse groups. Gender dimensions are often included in security sector reform processes as part of a country’s commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) (UNSCR 1325), which calls for wider female participation in all aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and for more consideration of the specific needs of women and girls.

**Constitutional amendment**

Reforming the security sector in Kenya for instance by restructuring National Intelligence Service has its challenges. The national intelligence security act first and foremost violates bill of rights because of the arbitrary powers bestowed upon National Intelligence Service officers to detain suspects, search and seize private property and monitor communications in pretext of protecting national security. It also violates the rights of refugees and freedom of association and assembly. Countries such as South Africa may need to repeal from its national constitution the discrimination against people on the basis of sexual orientation, including by tackling the rising tide of violence against lesbian women and also demonstrate its commitment by ratifying the UN’s declaration on sexual orientation and gender identity condemning violence, harassment, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatization, and prejudice based on sexual orientation and gender identity (Martin, Kelly, Turquet, and Ross 2009).

**Benefits of security sector reform**

**Effective Service Delivery**

One of the key tenets of security sector reforms that the security sector should be designed to serve the security and justice needs of the population. A person’s gender including sexual orientation plays an important part in his or her own security needs. Women, men, girls, boys, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons have different experiences in areas such as sexual violence, trafficking in human beings, gang violence, and robbery and their security must factored in securitization of programmes and policies.

**Achieving Security Sector Objectives**

The gender perspectives are a useful tool to achieving the security sector’s objectives. For example, in order to encourage women who have been victims of sexual violence to report the crime; it may be important to give them the option of speaking to a woman police officer,
perhaps in a police station. In cases where men are affected similar provisions may also be needed.

**Forming Partnership**

It will be important to form partnerships between security providers (e.g. police, justice institutions and prisons), health care providers and civil society organisations, as part of a holistic approach to security sector reform. The health sector may need to work with civil society organization and security sector to promote emergency contraception services and other health services and make them available and accessible to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities.

**Collaboration**

Collaboration between security sector institutions and civil society groups involved in gender issues can increase the effectiveness of the security sector. Such groups can deliver training, support policy development, and on an ongoing basis, provide complementary security and justice services and keep security forces informed about issues within communities.

**Appropriate Staffing**

If security sector institutions lack either male or female staff at any level, their staff will possess a smaller skill set, limiting their operational options. This is in line with the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 that mandates member state to recruit and staff the security sector in line with specific needs.

**Cultural Aspects**

Certain security roles might for cultural reasons only be able to be performed by personnel of a particular gender, requiring both male and female personnel for effective operations. For example, in many cultures it is inappropriate for a male police officer or soldier to search a woman. Likewise, in intelligence-gathering, civilians may only be willing to speak with security sector personnel of a certain gender.

**Local Ownership**

Local ownership has been recognized as a key pillar in ensuring that security sector reform is both implemented correctly and sustainably. The reform of security policies, institutions and activities must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors. Given that security and justice needs vary by gender, it is important to ensure that people of different genders are consulted and involved. In practice, this can be achieved by involving women’s groups, youth groups and other organisations that work on gender-related security issues such as human trafficking, gang violence and human rights.

**Oversight and Accountability**

Improving oversight and accountability of the security sector can ensure the sustainability of security and peace by building trust among the population and by deterring security sector personnel from abusing their power. To be effective, it is essential that security sector oversight bodies and accountability mechanisms (parliaments, national human rights institutions, complaints bodies, local security fora etc.) adopt a gendered perspective. This involves both giving particular attention to the different types of violations committed by security sector personnel against people of different genders, and monitoring the quality of services delivered to people of different genders.

**Police ratio to civilian population**

The United Nations recommended ratio is one police officer for every 450 citizens. This is far from being a reality because in some counties such as Kenya Police force of about 40,000 translates to one police officer for every 1,150 civilians. Even in these circumstances the police forces are also underfunded and poorly equipped. This is compounded further by poor pay, poor housing and corruption affecting the provision of security to the public. Countries may need to recruit more police force along gender lines to bridge the gap.
Conclusion and Recommendations

A gendered approach to security and peace will contribute to civilian ownership of the processes. The involvement of the community may take the form of neighbourhood policing; using local-level communications/newsletters, face-to-face meetings with organized by the security personnel in order to improve perceptions of the community of the police.

The media has an important channel to create public awareness in understanding and participating in peace and security matters. The media should enhance the public responsiveness to security concerns and inform the public in a responsible manner. It should also be noted that the public has right to be informed on security matters. Engendering security sector is a crucial component of security reform. Increasing gender representation in the security sector can be a positive influence by meeting the needs and interests of various genders.

Research and academic institutions should assist in improving curriculum and conceptual understanding of gender, security and peace process. The security sector curriculum should promote democracy, different and emerging gender perspectives, human rights, good governance and the creation of a culture of accountability and transparency in the management of security sector processes.

It is also emerging from this article that we may not essentialize the meaning of gender as the natural distinction between men and women that eventually is reconstructed into social roles. It is also notable that one may not universalize the meaning of gender without the risk of ignoring emerging gender constructs and identities. The application of gender as an analytical category in peace and security building in Africa must take cognizance of all the emerging, divergent and discordant gender constructs and identities.

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Gender and Politics in Kenya: A Retrospective Account  
Clara Momanyi (Ph.D), Catholic University of Eastern Africa

Introduction

Development is a term that can refer to many things depending on how it is used in different contexts. Since it is people who initiate development, then society is thought to be developed when it takes care of its members, both men and women. Besides, when it creates opportunities for its members to earn a fair reward for their labours, and enables them to participate in the decisions that affect their lives, then that society is thought to be developed. In addition, a society can be termed as having developed when it provides for those that are vulnerable and disadvantaged, while respecting the civil and political liberties of its members. After the 1995 World Summit for Social Development (WSSD) in Copenhagen, world leaders realized that in order to foster development, there was the need to put people at the centre of that development. This includes both men and women, since they contribute immensely in their nation’s wealth. It also means that radical changes needed to be made especially in those countries that do not fully involve women in the development process. Such countries needed to change predominant ideologies and social structures that prohibit equal participation of both men and women in developing the nation.

The 21st century agenda for African Women’s empowerment, for example, is an initiative aimed at consolidating all the International Declarations and Action Plans accomplished in the World and Regional Conferences for purposes of putting up strategies to empower women. The main objective is to have women participate fully in development just as men. Yet despite the fact that majority of African countries, including Kenya, have ratified various United Nations Conventions supporting women’s empowerment, their representation in politics and governance is minimal. Participation in politics is a basic human right, and a responsibility of all Kenyans irrespective of whether they are men or women.

In Kenya, women form the majority of voters but few present themselves as aspirants for political office. Besides, among those who contest, very few become members of parliament. It is also a fact that Kenyan women fully participate as voters, yet their numbers in parliament are not significant as compared to men. There are basic reasons why this situation presents itself not only in Kenya but Africa in general.

This chapter discusses in brief the concept of gender as it is sometimes misunderstood when it comes to issues dealing with men and women. It also strives to relate patriarchy and politics of gender as this symbolic order controls gender relations and assigns roles to societal members leading to their unequal representation especially in civic and elective positions. It also underlines gender dimensions and the political landscape of Kenyan men and women since the advent of multi-party politics in 1992. This was after the repeal of Section 2(a) of the Constitution which heralded multi-party democracy and with it, the jostling of party positions and representation in elective posts for both men and women. Hence, the chapter is basically premised on participation of men and women in national elections. The chapter concludes by giving recommendations and suggestions with regards to gender equity in politics and the need for fair play when it comes to decision making policies that affect the development of both men and women. It also suggests institutional frameworks including social measures that need to be put in place to enable women participate on an equal footing with men in politics.

Theoretical Perspectives

Several theories have been advanced in relation to the advancement of women across the ages. Some theories have delved into patriarchy, capitalism, industrialization and social
transformations to try and explain the gender imbalances in world societies. The social theory assumes that gender is the axiom, the one that holds one’s identity. Under the umbrella of the social theory, there is also what is known as the sex-role theory where people learn from the established social institutions and where they are supposed to behave in ways that are socially acceptable and appropriate to their sex. Hence, it recognizes the dichotomy between men and women where men are known to be aggressive and women are passive. However, these theorists forget to see that gender itself is a social construct and one that is informed by our subject positions.

The Marxist theory, on the other hand, advocated that women would achieve equality with men when the means of production were collectively owned by men and women. This theory has been proved wrong over time. Equally, radical feminists who advocated radical means to achieve gender equity by trying to use feminine sexuality and working towards an androgynous culture have failed to achieve gender parity in many aspects. In addition, theories advanced by feminists like Firestone (1972), Millet (1977), Steady (1981), Kristeva (1986) and Ogundipe-Leslie (1984) to mention but a few, have challenged the patriarchal symbolic order controlled by men. They object the approach where the phallus is the signifier of sexual difference and where men control the social institutions (Weedon 1991, 49). As much as feminists have tried to deconstruct this social order, it still continues to order our lives. This is because for centuries we have internalized this dichotomy and it might take a while before complete gender parity is attained in our social institutions. Confronting these patriarchal tendencies that have been established through centuries of social conditioning will need the concerted efforts of both men and women.

The author quite agrees with Nzomo (2003) when she states that these approaches have failed to see that it is the oppressive traditions and policies that have continued to push women to the domestic sphere. It is the symbolic patriarchal order that has continued to legitimize privileges that men enjoy, give them power to control political discourse and perpetuate the socio-political systems that bring about gender inequality.

**The Concept of Gender**

Gender is a dynamic concept which has been given a variety of meanings depending on the prevailing situations. For example, in many Kenyan political discourses, the word gender often becomes synonymous with those of the female sex. Generally, in everyday conversation when people talk about gender, they ordinarily refer to women. This then removes its credibility to confront discriminatory practices that perpetuate gender inequality between men and women. For purposes of this discussion, we need to understand the concept before we look at the political landscape of Kenyan politics since the latter revolves around it.

Historically, the term was mostly used in 1970s when feminists from the western world used it to explain differences in the social relations between men and women. For example, Kessler and McKenna (1978) emphasize that all the differences between men and women are the products of social meanings. Their arguments, therefore, lay bare the distinct differences between sex and gender. In the 1980s, the term was entrenched especially at the Nairobi Women Conference of 1985 and later at the Cairo Conference of 1994. It was also significantly used during the Beijing Women Conference of 1995 and it was through these women conferences that the term was used to refer to discussions relating to men and women. In essence, therefore, gender can be defined as the socially determined differences between men and women. It is different from sexism because while the latter is a biological concept, gender is a social construct. We can also define it as socially constructed sex irrespective of whether it is male or female. Kiruki (2010, 71), for example, describes it as a metaphor that is rich in roles that are intertwined. He states that gender exerts pressure to all of us in our everyday lives, reminding us of our gendered subject positions that create power differences between men and women. These differences are manifested through roles and behaviours,
attitudes and values. Gender roles are usually learned and internalized within the culture of the individual. It is also important to understand that while discussing gender, we should not treat it as a fixed concept. Indeed, as Lombardo (2009, 7) states, concepts have no fixed or essential meaning but are usually shaped by political goals and intentions.

Gender is a social power where relationships between men and women are governed and controlled through a social system that also assigns their roles in society. Hence, gender relations are a social phenomenon that is present in many world societies including the Kenyan society. However, what is significant in the different roles between men and women is that they can be changed depending on the needs and aspirations of the society. They are not inborn neither are they fixed. Male and female attributes are, therefore, socially constructed and can be changed for purposes of posterity and development.

**Patriarchy and the Politics of Gender**

The patriarchal system which has often been defined as a system of power relations in society is where men have authority over women. The system has established structures that exclude women from participating in decision-making processes. In Africa, for example, gender disparities, patriarchal ideologies and socio-cultural structures that subordinate women and glorify men have for centuries excluded the former from governance and fair treatment when it comes to human rights. As Steady (1981, 35-36) observes, women have continued to be shackled by their own negative self-image and by centuries of internalization of patriarchal ideologies. Indeed, as Kabira and Muthoni (1994, 5) states, ‘for centuries women have been buying peace to maintain this patriarchal order while surrendering their power and basic human rights willingly’. Kenya is basically a patriarchal society where for centuries, gender subject positions have evolved that identify roles along gender lines.

In this chapter, the author discusses how gender and social relations play into our day to day politics and position us to make decisions that have everything to do with our subject positions. As mentioned earlier, the issue of political significance of gender gained prominence in the 1970s. This is when the patriarchal system of imbalance of power between men and women was being challenged. It was also when prejudices about women and politics were being challenged by feminist thoughts. This debate continued right up to the 1980s and gave rise to a new field of political studies where gender and politics gained prominence. Prevailing feminist political scientists and theorists, for example, came to realize that political science as a discipline had ignored this important issue (Bryson, 1992).

It was important because over half the world population which comprise of women was being ignored when it came to political participation. In fact, the Women Liberation Movement (WLM) which began in 1960s also contributed to this prolonged debate which then led to political mobilization of women the world over.

WLM was not only a large scale social movement, but a powerful political force affecting political parties which were predominantly male, state corporations where decision-making processes were male dominated, economic organizations and even attitudes which were gender biased. WLM had capacities to mobilize large numbers of women of the world who were previously politically inactive due to what has been discussed as the patriarchal symbolic order. Women then became a political constituency who were agitating for political rights and recognition of their positions in the various gender-blind social institutions that worked against their participation. This agitation led to political integration of women especially in political parties and in elective processes. However, what should be noted here is that women as a constituency are not a uniform political group because there are various groups of women in different countries who have both similar and different interests. For example, the agitation experienced in Europe cannot entirely be the same as that which is experienced in
Africa due to differences of class, race, religion and nation states. Even within Africa, the various countries experience different political scenarios and different gender perceptions. The current study of gender and politics which is a field within political science is informed by feminist political consciousness and also by women’s behaviour. We can, therefore, state here that gender became politicized in the 1970s and has continued to be an important debate especially in modern day politics.

In Kenya, the patriarchal nature of the society has not yet accepted women leadership as evidenced in various social and political institutions. There are not enough supporting mechanisms put in place to create a level playing ground for both men and women to rise above social stereotypes (Nzomo 2003, 7). Forces of patriarchy which permeates in the various social institutions seem to have colluded to keep women out of public sphere especially their involvement in politics.

Gender inequalities have continued to negate the principles of basic rights, freedom and justice as expounded in Chapter 2 of the Kenyan Constitution. Critical decision making power continues to indicate gender power imbalances even after the new Constitution (2010) was promulgated. We only need to have a critical look at the structures in place, for example, in political parties and local council wards to know the existing gender imbalances. The age old patriarchal ideologies and socio-cultural structures have continued to give credence to undemocratic systems of governance where men are favoured by existing cultural traditions. Indeed, as Kabira and Nzioki (1994, 70) observe, there is need to ‘focus on the dynamic relationship between men and women...there is need to address the cultural constraints, sexism, discrimination and gender inequalities’ for purposes of development. This chapter, therefore, gives a retrospective account of the political participation of both men and women in Kenya and an overview of gender relations at play in the political games which have been witnessed since the advent of multiparty politics.

Gender Dimensions and the Political Landscape: An Overview

With the repeal of Section 2 (a) of the Kenyan Constitution in 1992 and the onset of multi-party democracy, more women expressed desire to participate in active politics. In fact, the multi-party political trend in Kenya has continued to push a number of Kenyan women into the political waters to fight for elective posts against men. From 1992, political parties continued to advocate for constitutional review, a process that led to the formation of the National Executive Committee (NEC) and the Inter Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG). It is these developments that heralded the process of constitutional review which later culminated into the new constitutional dispensation in 2010. Most of the political parties have been and continue to be dominated by men. In fact, their formation and the propagation of their agenda are male driven. However, due to the campaigns for constitutional review, women have also been busy agitating for equal representation in party positions. Men know the voting power of women since they are the majority. Ignoring them would be tantamount to losing their political grip in the areas where they operate. Therefore in the party politics of 1990s, the leadership of these parties began to address women’s concerns as a strategy for future credibility and sustainability.

In the 1990s also, women were agitating for political inclusion not only in the political parties but also in elective positions. They went as far as developing a women’s election manifesto to guide the electorate and political leaders whose majority were men, on what Kenyan women wanted. However, as the results of the consecutive elections would show, politics is about power coupled with aggression and ruthless honesty. The majority of women have not learnt the power games men employ to edge them out. Besides, the patriarchal symbolic order of the Kenyan society has not really accepted women leadership and this is evident in the national and civic election results Kenya has witnessed so far. Let us now interrogate the politics of gender at play in the several national elections that Kenya has had since the onset of multi-partyism.
Earlier in the 1988 elections, queue voting was introduced and it had its effects also on the voting patterns of women. The most glaring fact about this kind of voting is that one cannot hide who he/she is voting for. The system laid bare voters’ preferences and this led to mistrust. For example, there were men who controlled the voting preferences of their wives and could even order them not to queue behind a female candidate or even a male candidate they did not prefer. The performance of women during the 1992 multi-party elections improved but not to the expectations of many. This is because out of the 188 parliamentary seats contested for, only 6 of them were taken by women. There were a total of 70 women contestants in those elections where the majority lost.

Most people expected the number of women elected to parliament to rise due to the introduction of multi-party system, and the subsequent lobbying which was done by various women groups. However, this was not to be. Patriarchy demands that both men and women will support a system that ensures peaceful coexistence. Hence in this case, men who are the wielders of power will work hard to ensure that subordinate groups accept the status quo.

However, it should be noted that Kenya has been undergoing democratic transition since the 1990s. This includes the rising gender awareness and civic education being offered to citizens in different forums prior to the 2005 and 2010 Kenyan constitutional referenda and the events preceding the 4th World Conference of Women held in Beijing, China in 1995. These greatly sensitized Kenyan women. The Post-Beijing activities carried out by civic organizations, NGOs and some government ministries also encouraged more women to join active politics. The government realized the need to nominate one woman to parliament in 1995. So it can correctly be argued that the Beijing activities solicited such a response, although minimal.

During the 1997 general elections, there were 50 women candidates who accounted for only 5.7% of the total candidature. It was also during these elections when for the first time in Kenyan history, 2 women vied for the presidency: Mrs Charity Ngilu and Prof. Wangari Maathai. However, although they failed to capture the presidency, it was evident that Kenyan women were changing their attitudes about political leadership and likewise Kenyan men were starting to become more tolerant where women leadership was concerned. After the elections, only 9 women joined the National Assembly as against 213 men. The women accounted for only 4.1% (Women’s Bureau 2000, 39). However, out of the 9 women, 4 were elected and 5 nominated. This means that women’s participation in politics still remained low despite the fact that women voters were and still are the majority. In that parliament, there was no female cabinet minister, except one assistant minister who was pushed to the Ministry of Culture and Social Services.

In the local authorities, women have not fared any better. Since independence, few women continued to be elected as councillors as the following table for the 1992 Local Authority Members shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>% Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>County Councils</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Councils</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Councils</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Councils</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Councils</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,786</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Supervisor of Elections – A.G.’s Chambers.*

Electioneering is usually associated with spending cash to woe voters, something which most women cannot afford. Lack of financial and material support, let alone moral support prevent many women from joining politics as compared to men. Tribalism also became rampant especially during the onset of multi-party politics. This is because most of the political parties formed had tribal orientations and people seemed to join parties of their choice based on this tendency. Women were and have continued to be on the receiving end because while they fight gender discrimination, they are
also confronted by the ghost of tribalism. These are some of the restrictions that limit women’s involvement in politics as compared to men.

However, organizations like the Maendeleo ya Wanawake, Women Political Caucus, the National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW) and the contributions by FIDA have been lobbying for increased women representation not only in parliament but also in national decision making bodies. Although most of these women oriented organizations do not sponsor women candidates, they serve as incubators for women aspirants where they can receive training such as leadership skills which they need to negotiate the rough and discriminative political terrain.

In fact, the efforts of such bodies led to an increased number of women parliamentarians in the 2002 elections as compared to the previous elections. Nzomo (2003:11) calls the 2002 elections ‘a political watershed from the 40 years of post-colonial Kenyatta and Moi regimes under KANU’. Awareness campaigns, voter and civic education including human rights activism gave many women the urge to take a plunge in political waters to seek elective positions. While men parliamentarians were still the majority in these elections, women managed to clinch 9 positions in parliament while 8 of them were nominated.

The introduction of the Affirmative Action Bill by a member of parliament (Beth Mugo) also saw 1 more woman being nominated to parliament. This amounted to 7.1% of women in parliament, a small percentage still which could not make a great impact as compared to the number of men parliamentarians.

Why affirmative action? In Kenya this is a proactive and positive step towards achieving gender equity in the political arena as well as in decision making organs in the country. Affirmative Action is well described by Wanyande (2003, 50) when he states that it is a ‘body of policies and procedures designed to eliminate employment discrimination against women, ethnic and other minority groups with the objective of redressing past discrimination’. The affirmative action policy so introduced in the constitution witnessed an increase of women representation in parliament, for example, from 10% in 2007 to 20% in 2013. In 2007 elections, there were 207 members of parliament elected where the female candidates elected were 15. Although women had marginal presence in parliament as compared to men, their continual involvement and participation in political processes assured them hope for better gains in future.

When we examine the results of the 2013 general elections, it is possible to note that although the men still hold the majority of seats in both the parliamentary and civic positions, women registered a higher number of representatives compared to the previous years. There were 68 women in the National Assembly and 18 in the Senate, bringing a total of 86 elected and nominated women in parliament out of 416 parliamentarians. The National Assembly has 349 members while the Senate has 67 members. This means that women constitute 21% in the bicameral parliament, definitely a higher percentage compared to the previous elections, thanks to the provisions of the new Constitution (2010) where more women came in as representatives from the 47 counties as members of parliament. The expansion of nomination slots for women in political parties and the one third gender rule as stipulated in the Constitution boosted their numbers in parliament.

However, the public domain still remains a male sphere where male ideologies reign supreme irrespective of the constitutional provisions concerning gender equality and human rights (Chapter IV of the Constitution). Most male politicians play down women positions in leadership and it is therefore possible that they may overlook even the Constitution especially on the one third gender rule.

The country also seems to be in a dilemma of sorts because if more women are nominated to parliament to satisfy the 30% clause, the move will over burden the tax payer who will have to be taxed more to cater for salaries and remuneration of this new group of politicians. This may also not be sustainable in an economy that is not expanding fast enough. On the other
hand, the author believes that women should not be tied down to the 30% threshold. Who said that they cannot be represented beyond this as long as they fight it out with men and establish the right strategies using their numbers to rally behind their fellow women aspirants? At the moment, there is a bill in Parliament referred to as the Best Loser Bill (2015) which seeks to have more women in the parliament. The Bill is aimed at assisting women who lose in elections by having them nominated into parliament. The onus is on women parliamentarians to lobby for their male counterparts to pass the Bill to make it easier for women to enter parliament.

The author believes that both men and women can equally participate in politics given a level playing ground, but does not also believe that women can be assisted to achieve gender parity with men through tokenism. Although affirmative action has had a positive impact in women political participation especially through nominations into parliament and senate, Kenyan women should not embrace tokenism. The latter can have a negative psychological impact on women political aspirants who may want to believe that in order to attain gender equality, women must be handed posts on a silver platter. This will also kill the spirit of competition and fair play.

The author also believes that women must come together to form a strong political constituency so as to address gender disparities in all spheres including politics. Unlike men, women form a critical mass that can confront the existing stereotypes by changing the mind-set of the populace especially through the few that get elected to parliament or in local assemblies. These can work hard to change the patriarchal attitudes and cultural ideologies that militate against gender equality for the benefit of all.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed briefly the concept of gender in order to understand how it has been misunderstood by various groups especially when discussing the participation of both genders in development and politics. A discussion of the role of patriarchy and how it plays in gender politics has also been advanced so as to understand clearly how this symbolic order influences the politics of the day. The alienation of Kenyan women from politics and an overview of the election results from the advent of multi party politics to date have also been discussed including the gender dimensions at play in Kenyan politics. Following this discussion, a number of recommendations and suggestions have been outlined here below:

- Most Kenyan women live in the rural areas and this is where the vote baskets of political aspirants are situated. Many of the aspirants, especially men, capitalize on these women because they are able to penetrate their self help groups and woe them. This being the case, women political aspirants who also have affinity to their grass root colleagues need to carry out serious campaigns while addressing gender imbalances in the political sphere. They need also to fight it out with men without waiting to be nominated into parliament or in local authorities just because they could not make it through the ballot.

- It is a fact that men do not need to form organizations to fight for their course. However, women need these mobilization tools to inspire and support one another. The popular fallacy that ‘women are their worst enemies’ should not be entertained but should be viewed as a counter-development strategy which has been used over time to further discriminate and subordinate them.

- For purposes of having their presence felt in the country, elite women who are aspiring for political positions need to desist from holding most of their meetings in city or town hotels where the majority of those living in the country side cannot attend. These women will not vote for their fellow women because they have not been given civic education needed to change their mind sets or attitudes about voting for their fellow women. Even those that get elected into such positions should prove to others through their active participation in parliament, senate or county assemblies that they can fight for their rights and solve the myriad of problems they face. Although attitude change takes a long time,
women will continue to vote for men if they see no tangible results that can improve their lot from women politicians.

- Although the Constitution demands the application of the 1/3 gender rule in all civic and political appointments, the implementation of this clause is proving a herculean task especially in parliament due to the fact that there were no sufficient mechanisms put in place to realize it. It seems that there will be gender imbalance in the elective offices for a while due to the bias Kenyans have on electing women. The author believes that proper mechanisms have to be put in place in future elections so that this clause is realized without taxing wananchi more to accommodate more women so as to satisfy this clause.

- Political parties need to come up with structures that can take on board gender balance in party appointments. For example, the involvement of women is minimal because the majority of these parties are male dominated. Once they embrace the principle of inclusivity, women will ultimately gain entry into the electoral and political decision making structures so that they can play their roles on an equal footing with men.

- A lot of civic education is needed in Kenya in order to change the socio-cultural attitudes of people especially when it comes to women participation in the public sphere. This chapter has hinted that culture, rural/urban barriers, lack of resources and gender stereotypes have continued to prevent women from participating in politics on an equal footing with men. It may take time to achieve gender parity in politics but ultimately, positive results will be achieved through the concerted efforts by government and institutions.

- Due to the fact that women political leaders are disadvantaged in the political power games, they need to mobilize their fellow women in counties in order to have a common purpose. They need to educate them to elect women who can articulate their issues in the electoral offices. By so doing, they may succeed to ‘decolonize’ the minds of most women who have been brought up to believe that men are the ones who should be in politics and not women.

- The awareness of gender differences especially in politics among the men folk can also be achieved through education. This is an important step towards addressing gender concerns in politics and gradually accommodating women’s views in the political decisions.

- In parliament, men should also take their women colleagues as partners and not objects of ridicule or subordinates as has been witnessed in previous parliaments.

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References


Responding to Continental Insecurity: The Imperative of the Africa Standby Force


Abstract

The paper made deliberate effort at confirming that African historical narrative is characterized by the incidences of violent conflicts and wars resulting in deaths and destruction of human holdings. This violence also induces human displacements within and across national territories as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees. This situation has become unacceptable to the people and governments of Africa. In response, due to the neglect of African interests in the international environment which results in the perpetuation of African violent conflicts, the people of Africa collectively decided that the OAU – that was legally limited - must give way for the birthing of a new continental organization – the AU; an organization that will be empowered by standard legal instruments to prevent and manage African security challenges. It is this proactive reasoning that led to the construction of an African Standby Force (ASF). Africa is realizing, perhaps for the first time, that while it has been at the forefront of maintaining international peace and security through her contributions to International Peace Support Operations (IPSOs) since 1948, her own conflicts challenges have not enjoyed prompt responses from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This is what makes the ASF initiative as a conflict response mechanism imperative to the prevention of African security challenges. The paper employed the content analysis of the literature in the areas of international relations (IR) and peace and conflict resolution to examine the central issues surrounding the ASF framework. The paper has found out that if properly funded and giving access to operational resources including equipments, the ASF – due to its broad and clearly defined mandate will contribute immensely to the reduction of the violence plaguing Africa. Finally, the paper recommends the importance of taking seriously Early Warning Signals emanating from the theatres of violent conflicts in Africa for the ASF’s prompt response.

Introduction

The end of the First and Second World Wars in 1918 and 1945 respectively became a time for sober reflection for the whole of humanity. For the first time in the history of human evolution, it became evident that man is capable of ‘manufacturing’ savagery and destruction of his kind in a manner that was before the twentieth Century thought to be inconceivable (Paige, 2009). The magnitude of this devastation and the realization of its implications on the relations between groups residing within the territories of states and the relations between these states in a wholly inchoate and anarchic environment by extension have informed the urgent need to ensure that such catastrophic phenomenon-as that of war- is not allowed to re-occur as human morality and historical consciousness advances.

Thus, from the twentieth Century, the world has seen the emergence of different shades of Peace and security advocates determined to understand the complex factors responsible for violent conflicts and how best to check these fiery and devastating infamies. These peace
advocates saw International Relations (IR) Scholars, economic and political historians, seasoned Diplomats, national military institutions and veterans of international Peace Support Operations (PSO), a cross breed of interfaith ethicists drawn from the Christian, Jewish and Muslim orientations all convening to achieve a common goal- to chart a course that will direct the thrust of international peace and human security. The result of this effort has seen the conception of different theories and practical approaches for responding to the challenge of insecurities. However, despite the institutionalization of different international instruments; from the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN) and the legal regimes giving them legitimacy, to the decentralization of security activities resulting in the formation of regional and Sub regional bodies, insecurity at both the domestic and international terrain has persisted (Mckay, 1963).

It is evident that Africa is one of the most affected regions plagued by violent conflicts and other equally devastating challenges militating against its development. It is increasingly becoming clear that Africa’s post-colonial environment is besieged and embattled on many fronts by non-state actors (Alamu, 2015). With the end of the ideologically motivated Cold War and the liberalization of the processes of illicit arms procurement, the dynamics of insecurities have become highly unpredictable. During the recently concluded Amani Africa II Exercise in Pretoria, South Africa, the African Union (AU) has identified some of these contemporary challenges to Africa.

According to the AU, some of the core issues are, increased incidences of the failure of democratic ideals threatening peace and stability in ‘dangerous places’ like Nkurunziza’s Burundi, Central Africa Republic (CAR), Somalia, the newly born Republic of South Sudan and Sudan itself, the Comoros, Lesotho, Darfur and a host of others (Amani Africa (2015).

This is apart from the cancerous phenomenon of terrorism and asymmetrical warfare eating into the very existence of African states (Born, Fluri, and Johnson, 2003: 109). In this regard, the challenge to the sovereignties and territorial integrity of Mali, Chad, Niger, Cameroun, Kenya, Ethiopia, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and the entire Sahelian region readily comes to the fore. Terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to domestic, regional and the international environment. Responses to the incidences of terrorism are complex, especially as it is often linked to the organic networks of organized crime. These range from police action to border control. In addition, there is also the dimension of intelligence and measures covering the interconnected fields of finance, criminal law and informational technology (Born, Fluri, and Johnson, 2003).

The paper purposes to examine the reasons why the African continent has continued to be exposed to the kind of insecurities it is going through. In addition, the paper recommends a proactive approach in tackling insecurity especially at a time when diplomacy is no longer yielding notable results because of the abundance of illicit arms catches in the possession of non state criminal actors. A situation that is informing the relevance of military deployments both domestically and internationally.

**Threat Perceptions to Post Colonial Africa**

The post independence African leadership of the Monrovia and Casablanca inclination was a rare breed that had the interest of the continent ever shaping its thinking and policies. The Pan African nationalism and visionary imagination of Africa’s pioneer leaders was largely responsible for the approach they took in their attempt to craft a single organic and supra continental government under one central administration. Most of these policies were driven by security concerns of both the
time and the future. Africa had just emerged from the throes of colonialism and the colonial power had bequeathed a weak military to confront these challenges. In addition, there were plenty of nationalist agitations within national territories. These statesmen, including Kwame Nkrumah, Tafawa Balewa, Leopold Senghor, Sekou Toure, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Felix Houphouet Boigny, Ahmadu Ahidjo, have successfully categorized these threat perceptions to the continent as will be brought to the fore in the ensuing debate (Mama, 2006).

Despite the vision and sense of nationalism sustaining the effort at constructing a formidable peace and security framework, they failed to prevent or even manage the myriad challenges the OAU faced at inception as a regional body dedicated to the welfare and the unity of African people. However, OAU failed to achieve its objective of uniting African people. For example, the OAU was not vigorous enough in its effort to resolve the Hutu and Tutsi conflict during the genocide. Thus, even though it oversaw the crafting of the Arusha Peace Accord, the OAU failed to include the most important issues to the conflict prevention and resolution processes. Thus, according to Uvin (1998: 45), the Accord concerned itself almost sorely with the component that emphasised modalities for power sharing arrangement between the dominant actors in the violence. Unfortunately, the OAU ignored the most pressing challenges including the question of poverty, the highly stratified social and economic order, the contemptuous treatment reserved to the poor and the ever present presence of the instrument of government in public affairs which is always accompanied by an oppressive system (Uvin 1998:45). It was issues like these that greatly hampered the OAU from achieving its mandate of uniting Africa people at the intra and inter states levels.

But these shortcomings were not unique to the OAU. An examination of other similar continental bodies across the world reveals the same dilemma. From the Organization of American States (OAS) to the Arab League (AL), all have shown a character that tempts analysts to describe their efforts as a failed attempt at conflict resolution and peacebuilding, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Haas (1986: 17) asserts that from the period marking the end of the second world war (in 1945) to the mid 1980s, out of the 319 recorded disputes, 86 (only 27 %) were referred to the Organisation of American States (OAS), The Arab League or the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) “and the council of Europe for management, and the regional organizations failed to abate 44 percent and failed to settle 74 percent of these referrals”. The issues of these threats will be addressed in the following section.

Internal Threats to Africa’s Peace and Security

Internal threats to Africa imply the sum total of developments within the continent that deliberately compromises and undermines the socio-economic and political balance of African states. It is these issues that have threatened the security of most African states since the misadventure of the colonialist that ran Africa’s affairs since Chairman Otto Von Bismark’s Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 (Ukpabi, 1966; Nnoli, 1998). It was this incursion that resulted in the failure to build strong institutions, culminating in the ‘failed states’ phenomenon in a number of states in Africa: Somalia, CAR, DRC. etc. This state failure syndrome has resulted in the spawning of political intolerance, religious extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism against states and their vulnerable citizens. In addition, other issues include students and trade union militancy against the oppressive tendencies of the primordial bigotry, corruption and the mismanagement of national resources of many African leaders. Inversely, there were equally the devastating nationalism of emergent ethnic bigots as exemplified by Nigeria’s secessionist leader - Odumegwu Ojukwu (Bassey and Fwa, 2011: 137) and Jonas Savimbi in Angola.
amongst many others. In addition, there is also the activities of dissidents and separatist elements that fall under the umbrella tag of non state actors as well as military coup d’états that characterized the firmament of the African political narrative especially immediately after the attainment of political independence. From this overview, it is safe to conclude that the burden of distractions resulting in Africa’s stagnation stems more from internal socio economic and political variables than in external factors.

On the contrary, it is common to hear nationalists and underdevelopment scholars and their counterparts in policy establishment arguing that contemporary unfolding experiences of conflicts and underdevelopment have roots in the domination of African and Latin America peoples by the global powers of bygone eras (Mustapha, 2006; Oyewumi, 2006); from Cortez’s invasion and domination of the Inca, Mayan and Aztec Civilizations of Latin America to Africa’s occupation by an Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony (Chomsky, 1999), a phenomenon spanning half a millennia of human evolutionary history that had bequeathed the burden of stagnation and underdevelopment to these dominated peoples subsisting in the margin of civilization (Oyewumi, 2006: 313). Specifically Oyewumi (2006: 313) has maintained that:

The last five hundred years, described as the age of modernity, have been marked by a number of historical processes including the Atlantic Slave trade and the attendant institutions of slavery, and the European colonization of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The idea of modernity evokes the development of capitalism and industrialization, as well as the establishment of nation states and the growth of regional disparities in the world system.

While this is correct, it cannot also be disputed that many of the highlighted timeline historical events and their negative consequences cannot be disconnected from the bad leadership of most African statesmen (Imoibighe, 1996; Meredith, 2005). The culpability of the colonialist in disrupting the African progress is most evident when the policy adapted for administering African territories is brought under examination. The British, Belgian, Portuguese and French colonial overlords thrived most in dividing African peoples so that they could enjoy absolute control of their colonial subjects. This strategy is described as the ‘Policy of Divide and Rule’ (Rodney, 1976; Ake, 1992; Ikimi, 1977, Olusanya, 1966; Ikoku, 1976).

Through the infamous indirect rule, the British deliberately created the conditions of rivalry, hatred and sometimes tribal wars to divide the people under their sphere of influence (Rodney, 1969; Imoibighe, 1996). This fact ensured that virtually all the states that emerged from the bitter experiences of colonialism came out weak, unfocussed and panting under the travails of near-dysfunctional institutions. Hence most of these states became vulnerable to external manipulation as much as they were to internal pressures manifesting in coups and counter coup de tats and separatist movements. It is necessary to note that long before the establishment of the OAU, many African states were already embroiled in different forms of strife. For instance, even before independence the Tiv Riots in central Nigeria had become a recurring phenomenon (Aluaigba, 2008). These serial riots continued until the overthrow of the first republic in 1966. Another violent conflict that threatened the survival of the newly independent polity was the one in the South west of the country (Kums, 1996). From the 1954 election in Nigeria, violence became part of the electoral process afterwards.

It was the 1965 western regional election that signalled the dangers Nigeria could be exposed to as an independent democratic state. The said election resulted in so much violence that it literally threatened the first republic.
The 1964 Federal election that preceded the regional election in the West actually laid the foundation for the mayhem in 1965 (Ayuba, 2011). The West has been described by political pundits as the ‘Wild Wild West’ to capture the bleak aura of the times when intra party violence brought the Action Group and the Western regional government to its knees. This resulted in Operation Wetie and ultimately the capitulation of the first republic. The severity of this violent conflict resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency over the region in 1962. It was actually complex socio-political questions like these that climaxed in the coup and counter coup d’états of January 1966 and July 1966 which eventuated in the Nigerian Civil war (Kolade, 2015).

Many other African states suffered from this experience before 1963. Prominent amongst these are; Zaire (then Leopoldville), Sudan, Ethiopia, Togo, Congo (Brazzaville), Benin (then Dahomey), Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), Libya, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. These confrontations had different forms and were defined by different dynamics making each unique in their individual character. Thus, apart from stifling their developments these conflicts in the same vein blurred the understanding of these countries from appreciating the need for an African Defence Force. The reason for this is simple. Analysis has established that internal threats to African security were widely spread within the continent even before the OAU was put in place. Thus, summing up the matter as pertains the challenge the continent is confronted with, with regards to the imperative of constructing a formidable continental Peace and security architecture, Kums (1996: 25) has observed that:

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\text{Therefore, unless the level of external threat is higher than the internal one, so as to undermine the latter, the people are bound to be inward looking in their defence deployment. This situation has been aggravated by the tendency in most African countries who concentrate political power as well as the wealth of the nation in a few corrupt hands.}
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**Inter-African Threats**

Beyond the grievous challenges of internally induced violent conflicts and civil wars, African states have also made their mark in the area of inter-state wars. This is despite the seeming homogeneity in their racial and cultural identity, apart from their similar historic-geographic experiences that should have ordinarily facilitated Africa’s cohesion and integration, thereby enhancing her competitive capacities in her post independence history. Reasons for these disharmonies are ascribed to the conditions of the asymmetrical distribution of resources between states as well as the differences in the ideological mindset of the countries constituting contiguous neighbours (Ikoku, 1976).

Disputes over territorial boundaries as defined by the different European colonial administrations after the Berlin conference of 1884-85, marked yet another defining characteristic of inter-African conflicts. A cursory examination of Africa’s inter-states conflict reveals that boundary/territorial questions were largely responsible for continental insecurities. For example, there was the Ethiopia-Somalis border war of 1982; the Mauritania-Senegal conflict in 1989–1991; the 1998-2000 Eritrea/Ethiopia war; the Djibouti/Eritrea border conflict of 2008 and the most recent one, the Sudan/South Sudan border conflict of 2012. These conquering European powers did nothing about bringing certain basic considerations into play to delineate the boundaries in contention. For instance, the peoples’ ethno-cultural identities, economies, political orientation and physical features were not issues of consequence to the colonial powers when they carved out these territories. Their only motivation was their avaricious national interests (Imoibgh, 2013). R.L Kapil (1966: 660). has noted that “delimitation agreements were negotiated before detailed knowledge of the terrains and
peoples in the interior of the continent was available”

The deliberate refusal of these powers to take into cognizance the components of national stability like the ethnic/linguistic, sectarian religious leaning, the clan distribution of the people and the overall conceptual framework and world view of African people greatly imperilled the evolution of organic states which is central to the understanding of African conflicts. These basically cultural components often harnessed in the pursuit of and the aggregation of corporate interest could be seen as Geertz presents it. According to Clifford Geertz (in Keohane, 1991: 107), culture is the ‘web of significance’ that people have created for themselves. The negligence of the cultural component of the people led to the partitioning of many national and ethnic communities into two or more ‘dissimilar states’. Amongst ethnic groups partitioned were the Hausa/Fulani between Niger, Nigeria and the Chad republics. There are, among others, the Yorubas between Nigeria and the Republic of Benin, the Ewe between Ghana and Togo, the Somalis between Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, the Maasai between Tanzania and Kenya, the Hutu and Tutsi stocks between Burundi and Rwanda. Therefore some groups within some countries have operated as minorities with limited rights and privileges. Where this is the case, these groups aspire to join their kith and kin in the countries where they have the majority population (Kapil, 1966; Meredith, 2005). In fact this was a major factor responsible for the Rwandan genocide (Meredith, 2005).

It is important to note that a total of thirty boundary/territorial disputes were recorded on the continent before the end of 1996. Out of these, twenty one did not experience any implosion, while the others experienced massive human casualties and bloodshed consequent on war. To reiterate, some of the common issues resulting in the violence in question include the pursuit of individual national economic interests by states (the presence of mineral deposits in some areas, thus making them of strategic benefits); ethno-cultural attraction that makes nationalists pursue irredentists policies against their neighbours. Some key examples include Somalia’s territorial claim against Kenya and Ethiopia based on ethno-cultural concerns. Morocco’s assertive claims over Western Sahara are premised on the same consideration (International Crisis Group, 2007). On the Morocco/Western Sahara conflicts, the International Crisis Group has made the following interesting comments;

The Western Sahara conflict is both one of the world’s oldest and one of its most neglected. More than 30 years after the war began the displacement of large numbers of people and a ceasefire in 1991 that froze military positions, its end remains remote. This is substantially due to the fact that for most of the actors – Morocco, Algeria and the Polisario Front, as well as Western countries – the status quo offers advantages a settlement might put at risk. But the conflict has human, political and economic costs and real victims: for the countries directly concerned the region and the wider international community. This is important to acknowledge if a new conflict-resolution dynamic is to be created.

On the other hand, Cameroon’s claim against Nigeria’s Bakassi Peninsula has its source in the huge oil mineral deposits in the Bakassi Peninsula, a territory lying between the two countries. Hence, economic and strategic considerations sustain the thrusts of the struggle between the nations (Alamu, 2013; Dokubo, 2010).

**External Threats**

This section focuses on the role of external forces in contributing to the overall condition of insecurity plaguing the African continent. It has been noted that Africa, more than any other continent and her peoples have suffered under the yoke of a global conspiracy (Chomsky, 1999). From the slave trade to colonialism
right into the experiences of imperialism and racism, Africa has been at the midst of it all. In recent times, while the objective has not shifted significantly, the pursuits of the nations of the North Atlantic region pertaining to Africa is its re-colonization by proxy and sometimes even directly. The interest of the West and Asia (China and Japan) in Africa is economic as it is strategic (Chomsky, 1999). Therefore they have continued to employ that age-old scheme of divide and rule to control individual African countries – a strategy that has worked for these imperialist grand masters in their dream of building a global empire (Bakut and Ayuba, 2013). To this end, these civilizations constitute a major source of threat to an independent Africa, as long as they have continued to harbour the dream of re-colonization by means that are subtle as much as they are aggressively frontal. However, with regards to Africa and even other parts of the Third World, post colonial states were exposed to a high degree of external political, economic and ideological ‘support’, which tended, in some measure, to distort or even disguise the more general process of economic and political and even military marginalization of the continent from the rest of the global economy (Bakut, 2000: 13). This condition greatly weakens the potential of African actors in contesting alongside other more established global powers (Rodney, 1976).

Apart from the Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Central Command (CENTCOM) that oversees America’s strategic interest on the continent; other European countries have equally entered into different forms of ‘military alliances, partnerships and co-operations with individual African states. For instance, France has five (5) military bases (that may include missile trial spots) in Africa: Port Boet in Abidjan, Cote D’ Ivoire, Senegal, Gabon, Djibouti, and Central Africa Republic (CAR). Britain has three (3) in Kenya, Mauritius and in Botswana. The US has her bases in Somalia, Egypt, Morocco and Kenya. The Former USSR had her installations stationed in Ethiopia after an agreement with Mengistu Haile Mariam’s erstwhile junta. Finally, Germany’s base was cited in the Shaba region in former Zaire (Kums, 1996: 29).With these heavy military presence, Africa was bound to face the kind of challenges that characterized her post independent history. For instance, France overthrew Jean Badel Bokassa of the CAR, and France went on to “halt revolts against favoured regimes like in Gabon in February 1964 to restore Leon Mba, and in Zaire during the Shaba crisis of 1977/79”. Just recently, the French military was at the fore front of entrenching and consolidating the government of Allasane Ouatara in Cote D’ Ivoire. This is apart from the French’s and the US’ culpability in the Rwandan genocide. This assertion is validated by Chossudovsky (2003: 115) who maintains on this note that

The genocide was successful in its intentions, as the French-supported Hutu Habyarimana government was replaced with a US-supported Tutsi Paul Kagame government, with the aid of US Special Forces and CIA. The situation (the genocide) should in fact be viewed as an undeclared war between France and America. The aim was to install an Anglo-American protectorate in Rwanda, which enabled the US to establish a neo-colonial foothold in Central Africa. This was successfully achieved, as the language of the private and government sectors switched from French to English. (Chossudovsky, 2003: 115).

In addition

The RPF deputy leader, Paul Kagame was trained at US Army installations in the United States and when, during the 1990 invasion of Rwanda, the RPF’s leader was killed, “Kagame became the head of the guerrilla army, and his ties with the Pentagon, CIA, and State Department became closer. Classified UN documents revealed that Annan and Albright were aware of this information. It came out in a
French National Assembly inquiry that, the U.S. even supplied the RPF with the Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles that were used to shoot down the Rwandan presidential aircraft, and that a UN investigation team got a hold of information that, a company linked to the CIA leased the warehouse used to assemble the missile launchers. However, the investigation was closed down once the relationship to the US was realized (Marshal, 2008: 2).

These imperialist hegemonists were active as well in the conflict between the Polisario Nationalist movements and Mauritania (Kapil, 1966: 26). Many other incidences of the west’s aggression and interventionist activities through coup de tats and the scuttling of the overall development project of the continent abound.

This may to some extent explain the challenge the OAU farced in its attempt to resolve conflicts involving its member. Thus, while the OAU was thought to be facing an African problem, in the real sense, the challenge confronting her was against an external force.

Towards the Emergence of the African Union (AU) and its Potential in Peacebuilding:

Historically, progressive African state-men like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Toure of Guinea had favored the idea of an African Union at the dawn of African rebirth in the 1960s. On the other hand, their conservative compatriots maintained the view that the continent at the time was not ripe for a political union (Birai, 2001: 234). For the latter group, a gradual functionalists approach should be adapted towards initial economic cooperation and subsequently continental political integration (Birai, 2001).

Some of the perceived weaknesses that hastened the transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) was the provision in the OAU charter that gave undue recognition to the sovereignty of nations (hence no entity, whether statal or organizational) could interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state within the organization. Despite the leverage enjoyed by the AU, consequent on enabling laws strengthening it, it has not lived up to the confidence reposed on it. For instance, with the prevalence of crime against humanity and sometimes outright genocide the “Just cause Threshold” now permits intervention to protect victims of violent conflicts. This proviso is embedded within the Rome Statutes, and it subscribes to the doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’ giving legal backing for intervention as observed above. With this doctrine, the International Community has now resolved that it would no longer stand by and watch while despotic regimes and certain interests within states continue to perpetuate themselves in power and in the process ignite violent conflicts and wars. Anan reiterated this position in his speech at the millennium summit where he called on strategic actors to appreciate the emergent reality that “human rights concerns must transcend the claims of sovereignty by nations” (Anan, 1999). Unfortunately, China, Russia and many of the developing Worlds, led the opposition against Anan’s benign advocacy (Ayoob, 2001). What must not be lost on observers however is that Africa’s multifaceted political, financial and operational limitations afford western nations and their agencies entry points to intervene in the affairs that are purely African in their orientation which gives them opportunity to manipulate the process(es) to their own economic advantage (Bencherab, et al, 2011: 17).

Despite the conceivable efforts of the OAU at addressing the multifaceted conflicts confronting Africa from the Congo crisis in the early 1960s to contemporary incidences, the area the Organization of African Unity has faced the most challenge has been in the spheres of preventive diplomacy, conflict mitigation and resolution. Thus, in its more than
fifty years post independence experience, the African continent has remained the continent with the most grievous security challenges ranging from violent conflicts, terrorism, war and the massive flow of refugee populations and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the case of intrastate conflicts. It was obviously this short comings that informed the action of the African Heads of States and Government (AHSG) to make a detour from its previously passive attitude towards continental conflicts as elaborated by Nhara (1998: 3) He is on record as saying:

Much has been said in recent times about the role of the Organization of African Unity in the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. Without delving too deeply into the history of the OAU, the turning point for the Organization, in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution, came in 1993. Some thirty years after the founding of the organization, the African Heads of State and Government adopted the Cairo Declaration, which established the OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The decision to establish this Mechanism within the OAU was reached against a realization that there was no way Africa could improve its socio-economic performance, in the years following the end of the Cold War, in an ocean of wars, conflicts and domestic tension. The Heads of State and Government saw in the establishment of such a Mechanism the opportunity to bring to the fore the process of dealing with conflicts on the African continent a new institutional dynamism, enabling speedy action to prevent or manage and, ultimately, resolve conflicts when and where they occur.

The failings of the OAU occasioned by what is perceived the state-centrism and the principles of non interference “which constitutes the organization’s charter is deemed an important factor in stirring the renewed vigor for the translation of the O.A.U. to the A.U. Nonetheless, the difference between the two organizations is hardly noticeable (Dunmoye, 2001: 246). To create a cohesive organisation, members in 1997, established the African Economic Community (AEC) The body had in mind the development of an African common Market which was later to become the A.U. The AEC entered into accord with regional African economic groupings that was projected to lead to the harmonization of policies of those common markets. A more aggressive expansion and transformation of the OAU was adopted at Lomé, Togo, in 2000, in the structure of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which replaced the OAU in 2002. The A.U. carries within it more powers to advance African economic, social, and political integration, and a stronger commitment to democratic principle (http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history). Of course, an important component of the newly birth African Union is the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This is the platform upon which the Africa Standby Force is embedded to manage African security challenges. This initiative was conceived because of the experience of Africa in the post cold war international environment and the weakness exhibited by the OAU in confronting the menace posed to continental peace and security.

The end of the Cold War between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the WARSAW Pact alliances successfully orchestrated one of the greatest socio-economic and political disruptions in human history. The Cold war ensured the containment of irredentist and insurrectionist tendencies within the boundary of states. However, from the 1990’s legitimate government authorities and the institutional frameworks upon which these governments rest and receive legitimacy in the international system were suffering increasingly from challenges by non-state actors and criminal gangs operating under different nomenclatures as predicted in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilization thesis (1996).
The triumphalists victory of liberal ideologies over every other form of human system as argued in Fukuyama (1992) reverberated across the world and generated heated debate and intellectual backlashes. The initial concrete reaction to contest Fukuyama’s assumption originated from the established scholar of the realists paradigm, Samuel Huntington (1996). In his ‘Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World order’ thesis, Huntington has remarkably maintained that while conflicts between nations in a geopolitical order might become insignificant, new forms of challenge to states will became the order to define the global future. These will bear ethno-religious and civilisational character and these will unfold within the border of nation-states. From this period, the rising waves of intra-state violent conflicts and trans-border criminalities have been aggravated. These are marked by activities as terrorists onslaughts against states and their vulnerable citizenry, the complex dynamical trends of Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation (SALW), threats to national maritime security through the activities of sea pirates which have all, in a conspiratorial posture imperilled contemporary international peace and security order.

It was this fact that led to violent conflicts and the destruction and collapse of many states of Africa. Thus, in this period, wars and ethno religious and politically motivated violence erupted in Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Nigeria, Libya, Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central Africa Republic (CAR), Burundi and Rwanda amongst many other wars. Rwanda in particular was unique in the sense that between a short span of time; April and July of 1994 to be precise, between 800–850 thousand people were slaughtered in Rwanda (Prunier 1995:265). “The vast majority of the dead were members of the minority Tutsi ethnic grouping. However, members of the majority ethnic grouping – the Hutu – were also killed if they were seen as opponents of the genocide’s (Hutu) organisers” (Storey, 2012: 2). It is these challenges that informed the conception of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Standby Force (ASF) within its framework to confront threats to national insecurities within Africa.

The Imperative for a Stand-by Force in Continental Security Order

The Charter of the African Union (AU) equips the organization to tackle contemporary threats to regional peace and security. African leaders recognized that peace and unity are critical to development and made it a cardinal priority by establishing the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This includes the protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and Security Council (AUPSC), the African Standby Force, the continental Early Warning System (EWS) and the panel of the wise and also an AU peace fund. An important addition is the determination to promote human rights. The primary responsibility of the OAU at inception up to its rounding up was to protect the national sovereignty of member states and as such did not allow interference into their internal affairs. This proviso weakened the capacity of the OAU in ensuring the entrenchment of what should be its human security responsibility. It was some of the shortcomings of the OAU that justified the locus for the restructuring of the continental organization (Dunmoye, 2001).

The AU also respects national sovereignty, but has gone further to authorize rights of intervention in grave circumstances in line with the global resolve for humanitarian protection under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Kamani, 2015: 6). In other words, while the AU respects the sovereignty status of state entities, it has gone beyond to ascribe to itself the powers and rights to intervene in a member state in order prevent and restore peace and socioeconomic and political stability to threatened countries during
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity wherever and whenever they seem to be brewing. (Article 4 (h) (Kamani, 2015: 6). Article 3, sub-sections 1 (e) and (f) of the constitutive act emphasize the promotion of the guarantee and respect of the basic human rights and principles of liberal democratic governance. The inclusion of this provision is because the AU recognizes the fact that the struggle for political power is always the reason for the outbreak of violence and war on the continent. Therefore, the AU under Article 30 forbids the unconstitutional change of government within the African region. Undoubtedly, a critical challenge to achieving pan African unity is the prevalence of conflicts and political instability (Dunmoye, 2001). Notwithstanding these carefully crafted legal arrangements, the African Union like its predecessor, the OAU, is still grappling with numerous challenges including poor funding and the fact that the stand by force – ASF has not become fully operational despite the fact that armed conflicts and insurgencies are still prevalent in South Sudan, Nigeria, CAR, DRC, and so on. Thus this negates the principle of ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Dunmoye, 2001).

Specifically, the functions of the ASF includes: observing and monitoring missions; perform other forms of peace support operations; intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member states to restore peace and security; in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act; organize preventive deployment to prevent a dispute or a conflict from escalating, an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states and the resurgence of violence after parties to conflict have reached an agreement; it is also to perform the specialised duties of peace building; pursue activities including post conflict disarmament and demobilization; provide humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support effort to address major natural disasters; it is also the duty of the ASF to perform any other functions as may be deemed appropriate by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the Assembly of Heads of States Governments (ASF, 2013).

In principles, the ASF has multidimensional capacity which includes military, police and civilian personnel. This should be on permanent standby in their respective countries. These forces are organized to be ready for rapid deployment to the theatre of violent conflicts in their countries of origin. “Thus the initial concept of the ASF was that of a quick reaction capacity that would enable Africans to respond swiftly to a crisis unhampered by any heavy political and instrumental burdens”. It must equally be reiterated at this juncture that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has embedded within its well thought – out framework, the AU Conflict Early Warning System (AUCEWS). Therefore a combination of forces on permanent standby and the CEWS mechanism in place will give positive results any time there is threat to human security.

Thus, in the effort to operationalize its mandate, the ASF, in October 2010, organized the first continental Exercise to evaluate its operational readiness. This was conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’ (Amani Africa, 2015). The initiative, tagged the AMANI AFRICA I, Command Post Exercise marked the climax to “a two years training and capacity building cycle designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the African Union Commission (AUC), through the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD)”. Pursuant to the above, it was expected that the process will go ahead to mobilize the African Standby Force (ASF) for an AU mandated peace support operation’ (Amani Africa, 2015). This revolutionary initiative aimed at charting the course of peace and conflict resolution in Africa is a result of collaboration between African Union and the European Union.
Conclusions and Recommendations

The thrust of this thesis has been sustained by the assumption that Africa’s post-colonial experiences of violence and war could only be arrested by the creation of an indigenous defence mechanism in the form of a standing military - the ASF - in constant state of preparedness to respond to the continent’s challenges of insecurities including intra state violent conflicts, wars, cross-border crime and criminality, terrorist onslaught against states and many more of these menaces threatening the survival of African states and their fragile institutions. Therefore, the Conflict Early Warning resources of member states need to be developed to facilitate the rapid response capabilities of the ASF. This is important because it was the non adherence to this mechanism that resulted in the Rwanda genocide. Note that the Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, the Canadian born, Romeo Dellaire had dispatched series of warnings to the UN headquarters and specifically to its department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) and to the big players in international politics. But these warnings were not heeded to in what analyst describe as the marginalization of African affairs in international politics. Thus, the APSA and the ASF need to be proactive if Africa is to enjoy the much desired peace and stability needed to serve as catalyst for sustainable human development in the 21st Century and beyond. This recommendation is apt in view of the reality that since the Rwandan catastrophes, regions and the countries within are left to tackle their own security challenges by themselves. This informs the recommendations that Africa, in line with the expectations of the times must arise to confront the problems inhibiting her progress.

In addition, to achieve the above identified solutions, it is important to also consider the empowerment of the Pan Africa Parliament in a manner that it will be central in taking major decisions pertaining matters that cover the security of states within the continental union. This is important because security is core in facilitating human wellbeing, thus it becomes essential that the views of the people are integrated and given expression in national, sub regional and continental security policies. This is without any doubt imperative because when carefully considered, most countries always take decisions concerning the continent with their selfish national interest determining the course/direction of these decisions. On the contrary, if the Pan African Parliament (PAP) becomes an important decision making instrument in the process, the ultimate interest that will determine policies and actions will be focused on the continent as a whole and not some specific country or state within the union.

It is crucial to mention at this point of our discourse that most of the conflicts ravaging Africa are structural in nature and are usually caused by poverty and disequilibrium in resource allocation. Therefore, poverty eradication must be the fulcrum upon which any peace-building effort and conflict management initiative should be anchored. Thus, an important approach towards addressing the issues of poverty on the continent is through making practical legislations that cover realistic economic areas like the rural economy, agriculture, mining and small scale manufacturing enterprises. These laws must be fashioned deliberately to protect rural farmers against international agricultural and mining speculators who acquire vast tracts of land leading to the disempowerment of small-scale farmers.
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