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Security and Organized Crime: Dynamics and Challenges in South Sudan

Joseph Kioi Mbugua

***Security and Organized Crime:
Dynamic & Challenges in South
Sudan***

Joseph Kioi Mbugua

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Foreword

This publication is one of IPSTC's contributions to understanding the conflict situation in South Sudan. The role of the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) as a regional center of excellence is to contribute to the preparedness of the Eastern Africa region in addressing peace and security challenges. This demanding and extensive task comprises two essential aspects; namely the ability to raise awareness about problems that may affect the region, and the identification of possible ways to address them.

The complex conflict situation in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa calls for knowledge based policy making on pertinent issues of peace and security. Specifically the post conflict situation in South Sudan calls for profound research and analysis of the current conflict dynamics. Given the fragility of the new nation and the immense challenges of providing security and basic services to the entire country and initiating development amidst scarce resources; South Sudan requires reliable knowledge of conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Security and Organized Crime: Dynamics and Challenges in South Sudan; discusses the challenges of organized armed criminality in South Sudan. The presence of other armed groups apart from the SPLA and SPSS inhibits provision of security to all parts of the country. The Government of South Sudan requires capacity to manage the armed groups in order to check proliferation of small arms and to channel resources to development.

The International Peace Support Training Center has made considerable contribution in research and training on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. The research products inform the design of our training modules.

I would like to thank the Government of Japan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for supporting the research and publication of this booklet.

IPSTC will continue to collaborate with development partners to publish high quality research products on topical issues of peace and security in the region.

Brigadier R. G. Kabage

Director

IPSTC

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1 Introduction

Despite the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and subsequent independence in 2011, South Sudan remains plagued by violence and lack of state authority. Violence and criminality are carried out by a variety of actors. This paper explores the dynamics of organized criminality in South Sudan, how it affects the security situation and what the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and other actors are doing to address this vexing problem. The paper is organized in four sections. Section 1 is the introduction which defines the problem, scope of the research and theoretical framework. Section 2 analyzes organized violence. Section 3 presents options for management of law and order while section 4 concludes the paper based on the research findings.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Insecurity in South Sudan has many interrelated causes: Ethnicity; lack of human resources; nascent security structures; lack of infrastructures; and poor inter-state coordination, among others. These causes also constitute impediments to peace and security. The end of the North-South conflict has given way to a more complex pattern of violence which is influenced by a combination of local political interests, ethnicity and pure criminal endeavours. Insecurity in South Sudan takes various forms: violent struggle of armed groups and armed militias; intolerance; need for survival, and capitalism. As seen in other countries that experienced major societal change, freedom, liberalism, and free economy soon translate into abuse and exploitation. If not addressed appropriately and on time, such socio-economic and political evolution may hamper the ability of South Sudan to address its development and nation-building challenges. This paper attempts to analyze the dynamics of and challenges to security in South Sudan by organized crime and criminality. As an emerging post-conflict state, South Sudan may not have developed adequate capacity and structures to deal with organized crime and criminality and this could threaten her state and nation-building endeavours. In this respect, the study sought to ascertain the ability

of the state to handle the excess baggage and hang-over carried from the war period in the form of organized crime.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of the study is to explore the dynamics of and challenges to security in South Sudan posed by organized crime. The specific objectives were to:

- (i) Establish the nature and extent of organized criminality in South Sudan; and
- (ii) Find out the extent to which the nascent security services have the capacity to detect and manage organized crime and other security challenges.

1.3 Scope of the Study

This study examines the nature and magnitude of criminality and its implications for peace and security in post-CPA (2005 to the present) South Sudan. It is based on field research carried out in South Sudan in August 2012. Due to limitations of time and logistics, the study was carried out in Central and Eastern Equatoria States. The research was limited by the geographic coverage and time. However, information from other states was gathered in Juba which is the seat of the national government and from secondary sources.

1.3.1 Research Methodology

The research was primarily qualitative.

1.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis

Primary qualitative data were accessed through interviews with senior government officials, local government leaders, international and civil society organizations, and youth and women groups in both Central and Eastern Equatoria. Secondary data were accessed from official government documents and on-line publications. After their processing, the data were

subjected to qualitative content analysis where the frequencies of grouped responses were established. The field data were used to augment published information gathered from desk-top research or literature review. Inferences were made based on similarities and differences observed.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

This paper reviews the relevant theories that attempt to explain the emergence and growth of organized armed groups. Some of the theories explained below do provide insights into the South Sudan conflict but not a single one of them provides a holistic view. Resource abundance, resource scarcity and grievances and greed are some of the theories reviewed below.

1.4.1 Resource Abundance

According to Collier and Hoeffler (2000), the presence of abundant natural resources may cause the emergence of organized armed groups aiming to take advantage of existing economic opportunities. This happens especially when there are lootable natural resources. The two scholars argue that many economic opportunities reduce the risk of rebellion while the existence of natural resources in low-income countries combined with polarization of society increase the risks of rebellion.¹ This theory fails to identify the underlying conditions that make this happen. It is less informative in fully explaining the causes of conflict in places such as South Sudan. This model has been the foundation of theoretical explanations of the emergence of civil wars. It has however been criticised for ignoring the causes of wars of liberation and downplaying the role of inequality within states.² This model also blames rebels for the emergence of civil wars and ignores government oppression and its role in provoking civil disorder. The GOSS has been accused of marginalizing periphery peoples while attempting to control the resource-rich areas. Such perceptions inform many conflicts in South Sudan

¹Paul Collier, 'Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective', in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (2000), p. 91-111

²Joao Gomes Porto, 'Contemporary Conflict Analysis in Perspective', in Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Serman, eds., *Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts* (Pretoria: Africa Center for Technology Studies and Institute for Security Studies, 2002) p. 13

although this model does not seem to adequately acknowledge them. Resource abundance is not necessarily a cause for conflict since it can boost public coffers to enable the government respond to perceived grievances from the periphery.³

1.4.2 Resource Scarcity

The theory of resource scarcity holds that groups will engage in conflict when the resources they need most for survival are threatened (Giordano and Wolf, 2005). Conflict vulnerability has often been linked to population growth in the less developed countries which have limited coping ability.⁴ Fearon (2004) argues that though resource scarcity has an influence on conflicts, it does not cause conflict in isolation. Due to ecological degradation among other factors, there has been a decline in access to water and pasture during dry seasons in places such as South Sudan.⁵ Pastoralists also engage in conflict among themselves or with sedentary farmers as is the case in Mvoro County of Western Equatoria between the Dinka and the Juru ethnic groups who have subsequently formed militias to protect their interests.

1.4.3 Scarcity, Grievances and Greed

Marginalization and exclusion are aspects resource scarcity. Some scholars argue that groups engage in conflict to seek redress to gaps in the national distribution of resources. The ‘greed vs. grievance’ paradigm of conflict tends to blame the victim more than the government whose responsibility it is to exploit, manage and distribute resources equitably (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). Greed refers to opportunistic and selfish appropriation of resources.⁶ Marginalization and exclusion refer to degrees of being left out in the process of power and resource distribution. They also refer to the policies

³ Paul Collier, Op. cit., p. 105

⁴ Tir and Diel, *Demographic Pressure and Interstate Conflicts: Linking Population Growth and Density to Militarized Disputes and Wars, 1930-89*, Vol. 35, No. 3 1998, pp. 319-339

⁵ Giordano and Wolf (2005), *International Resource Conflict and Mitigation*, Journal of Peace Research, Sage Publications, London

⁶ Le Billon, *Resources for Peace? Managing Revenue from Extractive Industries in Post Conflict Environments*, 2008

that accentuate this pattern.⁷ Though the GOSS has no significant resources to distribute across the country, there are perceptions of marginalization of certain groups and regions especially in the Upper Nile region. Marginalization increases regional disparities and rural poverty. Unaddressed socio-economic grievances lead to emergence of armed groups as witnessed in the emergence of *Anyanya* and SPLM/A against the government of Sudan. Other scholars have proposed that armed groups can maintain and prolong civil wars out of greed. They hold that lack of access to particular resources can be a significant factor in explaining persistence of civil conflicts.⁸ According to Collier, inequality, repression, ethnic and religious fractionalization, are inadequate to explain emergence of rebellion.⁹ In their research on civil wars in Africa, Eltigani and Ateem (2007) found out that conflicts in Africa cannot wholly be explained by ethno-linguistic differences but rather by high levels of poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources. Where the government is unable to listen to grievances from the periphery, armed groups are bound to emerge.

Günther-Baechler et al (2002), Homer-Dixon (1994), and Klare (2001), see a strong link between resource scarcity and violent conflict. They argue that population pressure, combined with natural resource scarcity contribute to violence especially in local or civil conflicts.¹⁰ However, Deudney (2007) argues that fighting to obtain scarce resources is rarely rational, since there are cheaper solutions like conservation, trade, and substitution.¹¹ Collier and

⁷Eltigani Seisi et al, *The Root Causes of Conflicts in Sudan and the Making of Darfur Tragedy*, 2007, p. 18

⁸Indra De Soysa and Eric Neumayer, *Resource Wealth and the Risk of Civil War Onset*, p. 204

⁹Paul Collier, 'Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective', in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (2000), p. 91-111

¹⁰Gunther Baechler et al, *Transformation of Resource Conflicts: Approach and Instruments*, 2002, Michael T. Klare (2001), *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*, Homer-Dixon (1994): *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict; Evidence from Cases*

¹¹Daniel Deudney, *Examining Resource Scarcity; Omniviolence and State capacity*, 2007, Vol 13, Issue 2, P. 165

Hoeffler (2000) and de Soysa (2010), counter this argument with the opining that given certain social conditions, violent conflict is more likely if lootable resources are abundant.¹² In *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: beyond Greed and Grievance* (2003), Ballentine and Sherman argue that there are more reasons why people opt for conflict than suggested in previous research. Poverty induced by exploitation may give rise to insurgency. Resources may finance and sustain the government or rebels during conflict, such as was witnessed in Angola.¹³ On other cases, natural resources are associated with shorter wars and more often end with victory for one party. External actors often intervene to restore the supply of the vital but scarce resource.¹⁴ Plentiful resources may provide sufficient revenues that the government can use to fund its army and co-opt the rebels.

According to the UN High Level Panel on *Threats, Challenges and Change* (2004), commodity shortages can help trigger social unrest and civil war. In 2009, the UNEP's Experts Advisory Group on Environment, Conflict and Peace Building found out that there was a significant potential for violent conflicts over natural resources to intensify in the coming decades.¹⁵ According to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK), resources are the predominant cause of conflict in Sub Saharan Africa, at 38%.¹⁶ Some conflicts in Sudan have centred on the control of water and pasture.¹⁷ A high rate of population growth as opposed to finite resources as a cause of conflict has been challenged by advocates of

¹² Indra De Soysa and Eric Neumayer, *Resource Wealth and the Risk of Civil War Onset*, p. 206

¹³ Michael Renner, *Rethinking Global Security, An African Perspective*, 2002

¹⁴ Humphreys Macartan et al., *Escaping the Resource Curse: What is the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?*, 2007

¹⁵ Report of UNEP's Experts Advisory Group on Environment, Conflict and Peace building, 2009

¹⁶ Conflict Barometer, Sub Saharan Africa, 2010, p. 23

¹⁷ UNEP, Sudan Post Conflict Environment Assessment, 2007

innovation, resilience and technological adaptation.¹⁸ Population growth does not in itself contribute significantly to conflict but it is an important factor where there is more militarization in society. Conflicts occur where there are no institutions and frameworks for conflict management and mitigation. Fearon and Laitin (2004), and De Soysa (2010) found out that oil exporting countries are more likely to suffer from civil wars. Fearon (2004) also argues that the presence of precious commodities such as gemstones and narcotics tends to make wars last longer. Buhaug and Gates and Paivi (2009) demonstrate that the presence of certain minerals in conflict zones expands the geography of conflict.¹⁹

Resource control or sharing is central to the hitherto perceived ethnic conflicts in Africa. Most conflicts in Africa are resource-induced, and there is a strong indication that behind the ethnic and nationalistic political mobilization there is a resource cause. Conflicts induced by resource contestation call for equitable and inclusive resource sharing formulae from responsive governance. In former undivided Sudan, the state operated an unjust system of distribution, the politics of exclusion, social injustice, deprivation, human rights violations, oppression, intimidation and domination. These became the hallmarks of the South Sudan-Sudan conflict. The ethnic factor in access to resources in South Sudan resembles pre-genocide Rwanda and Burundi, where access to public services was structured along ethnic lines. The contestation for power to determine the allocation and distribution of resources is an ideal nursery for social movements that may culminate in regional insurgency. This has definite implications for socio-economic and political development of a given country.

Competition over environmental resources contributes to intrastate conflict. Loss of livelihoods is linked to environmental degradation and resultant

¹⁸Bjorn Lomborg, *The Sceptical Environmentalist*, (Lomborg challenges widely held beliefs about the environmental causes of conflict and offers a different model of understanding the conflict situation).

¹⁹Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates and Paivi Lujala, *Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict*, 2009, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No.4, p. 544-569, Fearon James D (2004): *Primary Commodities Exports and Civil War*

competition over access to and ownership of natural resources. Natural resources comprise about 40% of all intrastate conflicts in the past six decades.²⁰ Conflicts may arise in the struggle for livelihoods or may be a consequence of migration. Barnett and Adger (2007) argue that climate change-induced reduction in the quantity or quality of resources may cause conflict depending on other variables such as reliance on a primary commodity.²¹ Much of previous research on the causal links between competition over natural resources and violent conflict has focused largely on high-value extractive resources such as oil, gems, other minerals, and timber.²² There was little focus on conflict over the natural resources that underpin rural livelihoods – subsistence-based use of land, water, fisheries, and forests. There has also been growing state interest in securing ownership or long-term use rights for agricultural land and primary resource extraction which has increased attention towards poor people's resource rights and livelihoods.²³

Matthew, Brklacich, and McDonald (2005) argue that in understanding environment, conflict, and cooperation, analysts need to better engage research traditions on the roots of conflict and the dynamics and processes of cooperation.²⁴ Research carried out by Collier and Hoeffler (2000) demonstrates that many rebellions appear to be linked to the capture of resources such as diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone, and drugs in Colombia.²⁵ Experts in resource management maintain that while a range of conflict management approaches and guidelines related to resource management exists, most are applicable to specific conflict situations and cannot be applied broadly as a general tool of analysis in different contexts.

²⁰This information appears in Blade D. Ratner et al, '*Resource conflict, Collective action, and Resilience: An analytical Framework*', CAPRI 2010, p. 1

²¹ Barnett and Adger, *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict*, 2007

²² Le Billon, *Resources for Peace? Managing Revenue from Extractive Industries in Post Conflict Environments* 2008

²³ Ibid p. 20

²⁴ Mather Richard, Brklacich Michael and Macdonald Byan, *Analyzing Environment, Conflict and Cooperation*, 2005

²⁵ Collier Paul and Hoeffler Anke, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Policy Research*, 2000

A number of strategies have proved effective in addressing resource conflicts. These include democratic governance, transparent revenue-sharing, corruption control, a stable investment environment, and the implementation of international control regimes.²⁶ It is interesting to note that most of these findings apply to Africa and the developing world because natural resources do not cause conflict in the United States and Canada, Western Europe and Russia in the same way. It is also important to examine the role of Western governments and their close allies, private mining companies and private military activities in resource exploitation and conflicts in Africa.

1.4.4 Ethno-Nationalist Configurations

Some scholars have associated ethnic diversity and distribution with conflict. They argue that it is easier for rebellion to emerge where one ethnic group accounts for 40-60% of the population.²⁷ According to Elbadawi and Sambani (2000), ethnic diversity is not a cause of conflict but can enhance peace through inter-group bargaining for political inclusion. The prevalence of uneducated young people who have no alternative means of livelihood can also contribute to the emergence of armed groups. There is a correlation between organized armed groups and ethnic identity. However, ethnic identity alone may not be a cause of conflict but a mobilization tool for negotiating access to resources and political power at the national and regional levels. Ethnicity need not be demonized but could be harnessed through peaceful political party-based mobilization. When such groups are denied legitimacy or are targeted for political persecution, organized armed groups will be easy to mobilize. This factor informs the current domestic conflict in South Sudan especially in the greater Upper Nile region. Some authors have argued that poverty can be a motivating factor for youth to join armed groups.²⁸ Other authors argue that perceptions of future insecurity also make the youth amenable to joining armed groups.²⁹

²⁶Franke, Hampel, Milagrosa and Schure, *In Control of Natural Wealth?: Governing the Resource-Conflict Dynamic*, 2007

²⁷Ibid., p.4

²⁸Goodhand 2003, poverty is defined as low income and lack of sustainable livelihoods opportunities

²⁹ Stewart and Fitzgerald, *War and Underdevelopment*, OUP, 2001

1.4.5 Ethnicity, Marginalization and Organized Crime

Research on organized crime in Africa is varied and ranges from historical narratives and case studies to comparative analyses. Recent research has demonstrated a correlation between resource scarcity (rainfall and pasture) and propensity for organized armed groups' conflict in Darfur.³⁰ Other studies have indicated that ethnic marginalization is positively correlated with the probability of violence in civil conflict³¹. Research has shown that there is evidence to support the assertion that 'specific ethno-nationalist configurations are more prone to generate violence in civil wars'. The ethnic composition of a given population coupled with other factors such as marginalization in the political process, plays a significant role in the development of insurgency. Research indicates that internal wars are fostered by an underlying set of conditions that interact within a framework of actors and relationships.³² Conflict in Sudan and the Horn of Africa is caused by a number of factors including resources, political marginalization, ethnic polarization and environmental degradation. The greed-grievance theory advanced by Collier and Hoeffler emphasises the centrality of economic factors in civil wars. The economic approach surfaced due to the inability of the "ancient hatred" and "failed state" arguments to fully explain the prevalence of contemporary civil wars³³. In their comprehensive study of 1999, Collier and Hoeffler conclude that higher per capita income reduces the risk of civil war due to the high opportunity cost of rebellion, while the existence of natural resources in low-income states together with a large polarized population increase its probability.³⁴ In his later research and further analysis, Collier found no significant contribution of grievances to resource conflicts. It has also been noted that inequality, repression, ethnic and religious fractionalization do not adequately explain the outbreak of civil

³⁰ See Muhamed Suliman, *Civil War in the Sudan: The Impact of Ecological Degradation*, Contributions in Black studies, A Journal of African and Afro-American studies, Vol 15, No. 1, 1997

³¹ Lars-Eric Cederman and L. Girardin, in 'Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies', *American Political Science Review* 101. No 1 (February 2007): p.187

³² Colloton et al, *An Adaptive Security Framework – Insurgency in South Sudan*, 2007, p.47

³³ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* 1999, pp. 101-107

³⁴ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War", *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50 (1998), pp. 563-573

wars.³⁵ Conflict can be motivated by other factors, including marginalization and poor governance. It has been established that members and clients of organized armed groups at all levels particularly at leadership levels stand to benefit economically from the control of resources.

³⁵ Paul Collier, “*Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective*”, in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 91-111

2 Organized Violence in South Sudan

This section examines the nature of organized criminality, various patterns and multipliers of insecurity in South Sudan. The socio-economic and political impact of the conflict is also presented. The term organized violence is used in this paper to refer to carefully planned and executed acts of aggression or revenge mostly in inter-communal conflict. Organized violence, which is visible in crimes and conflict, describes the phenomenon rather than ascribing responsibility to individuals (crime) or groups (conflict). Organized violence in South Sudan revolves around rebellion and ethnic conflict. Rebel groups in South Sudan can be traced as far back as 1955 when members of the Sudan Armed Forces from the South mutinied and founded a rebellion dubbed Anyanya I led by Joseph Lagu. Today, there are a number of causes of organized violence in South Sudan.

“The main causes of organized violence are disgruntled politicians and members of the security services who leave the government to pursue their own interests; support from Sudan, illiterate and unemployed youth, and poor infrastructure that limits efficient rescue and patrol operations.”³⁶

However genuine feelings of exclusion whether by political elites or ethnic groups must be addressed for durable peace and security in the country.

“In urban areas there have emerged criminal groups who do not have a political agenda other than exploiting loopholes in the security system to engage in crime such as theft, armed robbery in homes and offices, highway banditry, stealing bank money in transit and intoxicating victims with chemicals such as chloroform. There is also influx of foreign criminals from neighbouring countries who often liaise with local criminals to pursue purely criminal objectives. In the rural areas there are also gangs that attack or abduct women while fetching firewood or murder their victims.”³⁷

Various forms of violence in South Sudan tend to overlap, making it difficult to identify the precise causes. The climate of lawlessness and widespread violence that existed before 2005 still influences today's minds. Further,

³⁶ General Acuil Tito Madut, Inspector General of Police, GOSS, Ministry of Interior, Interview; Juba, 21 August, 2012

³⁷ Mathias Tombe, South Sudan Human Rights Commission, Interview; Juba, 13 August, 2012

although low income does not necessarily mean poverty, the sudden contrast between the traditional way of life and the emergence of a new elite funded by the international community generates a sense of injustice that may legitimate criminal endeavours.

2.1 Armed Groups and Criminality

In South Sudan, violence takes various forms. After the war, some “Other Armed Groups” (OAGs) refused to join the SPLA and continued their struggle with a variety of motivations. Although political struggle may not be considered criminal *per se*, activities performed by organized groups in order to survive, gain support from local populations (i.e. intimidation, extortion, abduction, looting, forceful recruitment, etc.), or to reach their objectives (i.e. assassination, abductions, hostage taking, etc.) may be criminal in essence. The term “organized criminality” refers to the process by or the manner in which crimes are committed. The process usually involves criminal activity, conducted through conspiracy, often utilizing corruption and/or violence. Organized criminality in South Sudan occurs when armed groups pursue political and economic interests using violence rather than political means such as negotiation. In general, organized crime tends to have a larger impact than other crimes.³⁸ However, defining the scope of organized criminality in South Sudan is a challenge. Firstly, the extent of organized criminality that developed during the war and continued after the CPA is not exactly known, more so in the border areas. Secondly, criminal activities tend to happen within the framework of inter-communal conflicts, thus remaining “hidden” under political or traditional explanations. This is the case of some tribal feuds, “blood feuds” and other violent acts, where tradition and crime are difficult to distinguish. Fighting for communal political objectives is not perceived as crime by the perpetrators. As a result, there is impunity in murder, arson, looting, abduction and rape committed by ethnic militias. These atrocities invite revenge from the aggrieved groups thereby making the conflict cyclic. To break this cycle requires comprehensive measures to establish the rule of law, maintain law and order, enhance access to justice,

³⁸Konrad and Skaperdas, *The Political Economy of Organized Crime – Providing Protection When the State Does Not*, UCLA, 2001

and provide health and education services among other development initiatives in South Sudan.

2.1.1 The Nature of Criminality in South Sudan

The rate of crime both in urban areas and the country side is high while the capacity of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the police is very low. The demobilized SPLA soldiers are a source of insecurity to the community. There are also cases of counterfeit money in Central Equatoria (Juba) and Eastern Equatoria (Nadapal and Nimule). There are cases of armed robbery in Juba and Eastern Equatoria especially along the Torit – Kapoeta road up to the Kenya border.

“Sometimes there are collaborations between cattle raiders in Kenya and the ones in Eastern Equatoria. There was a recent case of the Dinka going for cattle deep inside Uganda but they were apprehended. There have been conflicts on access to river streams mainly about fishing rights among the clans of Latuka (Eastern Equatoria) and Nuer /Dinka in the Lakes state. In Bahr el Ghazal, there are conflicts over the migration of the Misseriya Arabs who traditionally come south during the dry season.”³⁹

New gangs have emerged, such as the “Boda-Boda Gang” that uses the “Boda-Boda” (motorbike taxis) to abduct, extract ransom, rob, and/or kill wealthy individuals. In Juba, gangs target successful business persons (usually Ethiopians, Eritreans and Kenyans). According to a statement presented in Parliament by Kenya’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Sam Onger, 24 Kenyans have been killed in South Sudan since 2008.⁴⁰ Cross-border criminality is a serious concern. During and after the war, illegal activities developed ranging from arms trafficking to alcohol smuggling that escape the national tax system and contribute to the emergence of organized criminality. The problem has been identified as follows:

“It's never been a part of our life here, and according to intelligence, these people are coming from outside, from

³⁹David Charles Ali Bilal, Ministry of Justice, Eastern Equatoria, Interview: 24 August, 2012

⁴⁰ Standard Digital, Uproar over Kenyans killed in South Sudan, 17 August 2012.

neighbouring countries. They are committing sophisticated crimes such as armed robberies on shops and people."⁴¹

In addition, militias from bordering countries, such as the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and elements of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Congo (FARDC), who do not have command and control structures, resort to criminal activities for survival by terrorizing local populations.

2.1.2 Poaching and Environmental Over-exploitation

South Sudan has a wide range of unique flora and fauna. Some species of animals and birds are only available in this region. However, widespread poverty and conflict have exposed the population to poaching. Animal products (ivory, rhinoceros horns, hides and skins) command high prices due to high global demand, especially from Asia.⁴² Armed civilians move easily across the DRC/South Sudan border and these movements go undetected. Poachers and a group of nomadic pastoralists, the Mbororo⁴³, have crossed the border for years, rarely hampered by the local authorities and ignored or tolerated by locals.⁴⁴ In Western Equatoria state, there is the Lantoto Game Reserve that borders Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and contains savannah grassland and rich forests.⁴⁵ Its 4,920 square kilometre expanse is home to a wide range of highly prized animals that lure poachers from the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, and Libya.⁴⁶ South Sudanese soldiers have been suspected of engaging in poaching and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is known to use wildlife resources to sustain itself.⁴⁷ There are no reliable records of the number of animals killed per year but the trend portends to negative prospects for the future given the current levels of insecurity and poverty. South Sudan has about 40 million hectares of forest. Mahogany is

⁴¹ Interior Minister Alison MonaniMagaya, Press Conference, Juba, 25 September 2012

⁴² Environmental resources, UNODC Report 2011, p. 3

⁴³ Mbororo are pastoralists of Fulani origin found in 18 African countries, including CAR, Cameroon, and several West African countries (Survival, 2006). They are often heavily armed to protect their livestock but often engage in poaching and cattle raiding

⁴⁴ See Joshua Marks, *Border in Name Only: Arms Trafficking and Armed Groups at the DRC-Sudan Border*, Small Arms Survey, HSBA, Working Paper No. 4, 2007

⁴⁵ UNESCO, 1984

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 14

⁴⁷ Alexander Abad Santos, The Atlantic Wire, September 4, 2012, www.theatlanticwire.com

transported through Uganda for export. There are large teak plantations in the south. It is estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 cubic meters of teak logs are transported through Uganda every month. Poor infrastructure and lack of mobile forces prevent South Sudanese authorities from respond effectively.

2.1.3 Cattle Raiding

Although cattle-raiding is a common practice in some tribes of South Sudan, the most worrying evolution in is its new “industrial dimension”. Inter-ethnic cattle raiding now occurs for commercial and political reasons. As it was exemplified by the violent clashes between “cattle raiders” and the Kenyan Police in Baragoi, on 12th November 2012, cattle raiders tend to become better organized and armed to conduct larger operations. As regards South Sudan, most of the large scale cattle raiding operations occur across the border with Kenya and Ethiopia.

2.1.4 Financial Crimes: Counterfeiting and Money Laundering

There have been reports of counterfeit medicine, currency, electrical goods and toys in a number of African countries including South Sudan.⁴⁸ South Sudan has a low financial governance capacity and there have been reports of corruption especially in the oil sector. In March 2012, the GOSS introduced the Anti-money laundering Bill requiring financial and non-financial institutions to report transactions of suspicious nature. The Bill also proposes to establish a financial intelligence unit to help banks identify suspicious accounts and transactions. The South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC) is also working out modalities of collaboration with international banking institutions to rein in money laundering.⁴⁹

2.1.5 Low Governance Capacity and Economic Vulnerability

The absence of effective official governance in the South and widespread use of violence during the war have generated new behaviour, a sense of lawlessness, and new balance of power at local level. The GOSS is still unable to provide basic services to all such as health, water, electricity and

⁴⁸Sudan, 2011, *OSAC Crime and Safety Report*, Juba, www.osac.gov/pages/contentreport

⁴⁹ Sudan Tribune, *South Sudan Criminalizes Money Laundering*, March 17, 2012

education and many people are left to compete and fight over meagre resources. The government is not visible in all the areas of the country. It has not the capacity to handle ethnic conflicts through deterrence and dialogue. Health facilities, often elementary, are only available in urban centres. There is poor infrastructure that hinders provision of security and other services. There are credible complaints of corruption, bias and nepotism against the GOSS. The economy is still dependent on oil and donor funding thus increasing vulnerability to external shocks. The non-oil sector economy is still dominated by cattle husbandry, which is characterized by high vulnerability associated with raids and violence. There are no proper mechanisms for revenue allocation and resource distribution and therefore some sectors and regions feel short-changed.

This GOSS is unable to develop a tax base for long-term financing of the public service. Taxes are haphazardly collected by armed groups who rarely remit their collections to the State or the central government. Local authority administration is still weak to offer an alternative to public administration in the rural areas. There is resistance to effective federalism in some quarters (Juba) perhaps due to the need to create a cohesive South Sudan nation or fear of autonomy of some states such as Unity that contributes the most to the exchequer, being the main producer of oil.⁵⁰

2.1.6 Inability to Maintain Law and Order

There has been an upsurge in trans-border criminal activities with criminal networks from neighbouring countries engaging in theft, cattle trade, fraud, money laundering and selling counterfeit goods. South Sudan is a large country with permeable, long and difficult to monitor borders. The GOSS is unable to maintain law and order with a police service of about 28,000 officers who are ill equipped and inadequately trained.⁵¹ South Sudan continues to suffer chronic insecurity at the community level. Armed rebellion, militia activities and army defections manifest an unstable security sector. Lack of mobility is currently a major problem for the South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF), particularly as motor transport assets are mostly

⁵⁰ Geoffrey Lou Duke, SSANSA, Interview: Juba, August 16 August, 2012

⁵¹ Wolfram Lacher, *South Sudan, International Peace-building and its Limits*, SWP, February 2012, p. 9

deployed to border areas in support of the much needed defensive tasks. In addition, the lack of mobility is compounded by a reactive (rather than proactive) approach to security challenges.⁵² The SSAF is faced with a number of obstacles that hinder its transformation into a conventional, professional, inclusive and independent army with the right structures and discipline. South Sudan is still engrossed in conflict with the North and a number of internal armed groups are still in operation. There have been accusations of defections from SPLA by members of different ethnic groups in support of their kith and kin during local conflicts. SSAF is unable to engage in impartial intervention during ethnic conflicts because of ethnic loyalties. The SSAF soldiers in the rural areas do not receive regular salaries and therefore sustain themselves through illegal taxation among other means.⁵³

“Relations between the public and the security services providing organizations are poor. The GOSS is still trying to reach out to the people, in most places its presence is hardly felt. There are not enough police for the population and therefore most places especially in the rural areas do not access policing services.”⁵⁴

2.1.7 Democracy and Management of Elections

South Sudan still suffers from a large democratic deficit. There are still no checks and balances to the GOSS. Power is not well divided between the executive, legislature and Judiciary and there are no effective oversight systems and effective human rights and law enforcement mechanisms. Armed conflicts have also weakened the power and legitimacy of state institutions, democracy and development. Criminal groups have exploited this discrepancy to provide alternative sources of leadership and employment to the people especially the youth.

“There is inadequate infrastructure such as roads. This limits communities’ interaction and therefore space for removing mistrust, suspicion and prejudice is curtailed. There are no clear benchmarks for good governance. There is no collective vision of the country and its future and there are no structures to ensure transparency and

⁵² Saferworld, *Security response in the state of Jonglei*, January 2012, p. 23

⁵³ Oysten Rolandsen, *Land, Security and Peace building in the Southern Sudan*, PRIO Paper (Oslo, 2009)

⁵⁴ Geoffrey Lou Duke, South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), Interview: 20 August, 2012

*accountability and therefore corruption is still practiced in the public sector”.*⁵⁵

2.1.8 Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons

Though Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) do not cause conflict on their own, they raise the impact of conflict through the number of dead and injured and also alter inter-group balance of power. SALW are available because of the insecurity situation in the country and the neighbouring countries. SALW are traded as a means of livelihood by the unemployed youth and militia groups. The GOSS has not yet developed a legitimate and comprehensive disarmament policy. Security in most of South Sudan is still inadequate to convince the people to lay down their arms voluntarily. A number of factors make South Sudan vulnerable to illicit arms flow. These include a network of unmonitored trails, little or no state presence, dense forest cover in some areas, and a recent history of armed conflict along the border with North Sudan, Darfur, DRC, Ethiopia and Uganda. Rebel groups in South Sudan acquire illicit arms from Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea. These countries went through long periods of civil war and still face low key internal rebellions today. There have been reports of former and serving SPLA soldiers selling weapons in the market using motorcycles and bicycles even after the 2005 CPA.⁵⁶

*“Once guns have been taken from the warriors, the warriors should be compensated, incentives must be created to make the people voluntarily surrender guns rather than using force – Use of force should be a last resort”.*⁵⁷

The control of the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) faces a number of challenges:

“Weak governance capacity facilitates the influx of SALW and is responsible for low capacity in enforcement of the rule of law. The long unmarked border stretching over 2,000 Km is a hindrance to close monitoring of influx of SALW. Influx of SALW is facilitated by organized armed groups. The Sudan continues to support militias along the border to

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷Reverend Sarafino Oseyek, (Assistant Bishop, Africa Inland Church, Torit), Interview: 24 August 2012

*undermine stability of South Sudan. There is collaboration in the buying and selling of SALW among cattle keeping ethnic groups such as Toposa in South Sudan, Nyangatom in Ethiopia, Turkana and Pokot in Kenya and Karamojong in Uganda. There are no infrastructures for controlling SALW such as armouries and reliable roads. Sections of the security service have old weapons and there is poor tracing and tracking of arms. There is no clear policy on disposal of SALW collected from the field”.*⁵⁸

There are cases where communities hide or migrate with their weapons when disarmament is initiated in their countries. Disarmament could also be carried out in specific clusters such as Uganda/South Sudan, and Kenya/South Sudan, Ethiopia/South Sudan. SALW are used in human, drugs and arms trafficking. Due to prevalence of active conflicts in North and South Sudan, there has been a high demand for and supply of small arms in the region. Armed groups also acquire arms from other countries in the region and from transnational suppliers. Some of the armed groups are composed of former SPLA soldiers who defected with their weapons. Unsafe SPLA stockpiles serve as a source of weapons at the community level. Outside Juba, arms and ammunition are mostly stored in unsafe conditions, in insecure mud huts, abandoned school buildings, hospitals, and corrugated steel huts. These armouries are easy targets for attack by armed groups.⁵⁹ Cross-border cattle trade with Ethiopia, Chad and Sudan for cash, weapons and ammunition has also encouraged proliferation.

2.1.9 Erosion of Cultural Institutions and Practices

Like in many African societies, there were systems of regulating the behaviour of community members. Besides imposing restrictions on the killing of women, children and the old in society, there were systems of compensating for the dead, property destroyed and livestock stolen. Such traditional systems helped society to resolve conflicts, provide justice, healing, and reconciliation. Though these systems are still in place, the authority of elders was undermined by the long period of warfare where young people took up arms. The GOSS is trying to salvage what remains to be incorporated into the formal nascent public administration infrastructure

⁵⁸ John Chiek Bum Klzier, Deputy Director, Research and Analysis, Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC), Interview, Juba, 22 August 2012

⁵⁹ Ibid., This information was also corroborated by the Inspector General of Prisons during the field research in Juba

being established. The protracted violent conflict period affected the culture and traditions of the people of South Sudan. Elders significantly lost their authority to direct the affairs of the youth and warlords became the symbol of leadership. The SPLA appointed County Commissioners in their areas of administration, most of who were soldiers, thereby creating new centres of authority and undermining the old order. Militias have also exploited the erosion of traditional authority to create their own power base.⁶⁰

The issue is both legal and cultural. The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan provides that in case of conflict between customary law and the Constitution, the latter shall prevail. At the state and national levels, the government has declared that abduction will be dealt with as a crime and traditional excuses will not be allowed.⁶¹ However, not all was lost and there are current attempts to reinvigorate traditional structures for peace building in South Sudan. In 1994, the SPLM/A national convention decided to integrate traditional authorities into its civil administration operating in counties.⁶² After the CPA, government structures were put at the national capital Juba and at State level. The Local Government Act of 2009 confirmed the role of traditional authorities as semi-autonomous authorities. There is still lack of trained public service administration personnel who can create systems of cooperation with the traditional sector. This is one of the challenges of addressing communal conflicts. In Eastern Equatoria, the Toposa and the Boya still maintain the office of King as the supreme ethnic leader who heads conflict resolution initiatives over resources and other matters. There are other smaller offices established under him. These structures have successfully been used to resolve conflicts among the communities. These traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have come under heavy stress in the recent past as socio-economic conditions changed. The government of the day and political parties have also had mixed relations with the traditional set-up. The forging of a national identity for South Sudan will take long to overcome the strong ethnic identities.

⁶⁰Jok Madut Jok, Diversity, Unity and Nation building in South Sudan, USIP, p. 10

⁶¹David Charles Ali Bilal, Senior Legal Council and Head of Legal Administration, Ministry of Justice, Eastern Equatorial State, Torit, Republic of South Sudan, Interview: 24, August 2012

⁶²Wolfram Lacher, *South Sudan, International Peace building and its Limits*, SWP, February 2012, p. 9

However, state machinery must be designed to achieve this purpose for durable inter-ethnic cohesion and integration.

2.1.10 Lack of Access to Justice

There is hardly any access to justice among the victims of organized crime. Impunity reigns supreme because of poor security and justice administration. There is rampant corruption in the public service. This undermines development of infrastructure and provision of basic services such as health and education. This sustains poverty and inequality thereby attracting formation of armed groups. There is still low transparency and accountability of the security sector. As the nation is still emerging from conflict there is low awareness of civic responsibilities in a democracy.

2.1.11 Demography

South Sudan has a population of 8.3 million according to the 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census (2008), of which 1.4 million live in the few urban areas, compared with 6.9 million in rural areas. The population is predominantly rural (83%) and dependent on subsistence agriculture. South Sudan has a young population with (51%) under the age of eighteen and 72% under the age of thirty.

As a result, and despite the small numbers, urban areas tend to develop proportionally faster than the other parts of the country. This partly explains the development of criminal gangs in Juba. In urban centres where international presence and funding tend to concentrate, incentives for illegal practices abound. Racketeering by small businesses seems to have become common practice in Juba. On the countryside, given the very poor communication and infrastructures network, the extremely low density of population makes it very difficult for the authorities to have a firm grip on illegal activities.

2.1.12 Impact of Organized Violence

South Sudan has incurred many scars from the long war. These are physical, psychological, social, and economic. Unfortunately, instead of the meagre resources of the country being efficiently deployed in post-conflict reconstruction, they are used to respond to domestic conflicts. By September 2012, more than 167,000 people had been displaced; about 2.9 million were

in need of food aid and more than 650,000 south Sudanese had returned from Sudan since 2010.⁶³ A UN report confirms that 800 people have died in violence and 94, 000 have been displaced since the beginning of 2011.⁶⁴ Continued armed conflicts only serve to delay the consolidation of the post-CPA peace dividends. According to a survey carried out by South Sudan Action Network for Small Arms Control (SANSA) between 2009 and 2011, there was an increase in the rate of deaths and injuries associated with proliferation of illicit guns. By May 2011, 5,000 persons had lost their lives and thousands more had been injured due to conflicts within South Sudan. More than 200,000 persons were displaced by these conflicts in 2011 alone, and 43,000 of them were from Jonglei.⁶⁵ Violent conflicts and poverty have affected women disproportionately. Women's rights are severely curtailed by cultural practices and lack of education. Approximately 50% of girls are married off before the age of 18 contrary to the provision of the constitution and the law. Though South Sudan has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and has enacted the Child Act (2008), many children have been severely affected by violent conflict during which many do not attend school while orphaned children are abducted and sold to other families. Young girls from poor families in urban areas engage in prostitution and fall prey to HIV/AIDs infections.⁶⁶

*"The cost of living is high and the initial reception of the soldiers by the community was negative. There have been cases of women being targeted for killing in Eastern Equatoria. This may be due to the frustration of the demobilized soldiers who cannot take care of their families."*⁶⁷

SALW exacerbate inter-community conflicts, cattle raiding, abduction of women and children, and conflict over access to water points and pasture.

"There are many cases of orphaned or abandoned children belonging to the soldiers. Women are unable to take care of them. There are cases of

⁶³The Humanitarian Situation in Sudan and South Sudan, Current Issues for Congress and U.S Policy, 2012, p.36

⁶⁴ Quoted in Alison Giffen, Considerations for a new peace keeping force in South Sudan, Stimson Working Paper, April/May 2011, p.1, see also South Sudan facing most violence since the end of civil war, OXFAM May, 2011

⁶⁵Annual Report, South Sudan Human Rights Commission, January-December, 2011

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 30

⁶⁷ Mrs Jane Surur, Secretary General, Women Association of Eastern Equatoria, Interview: Torit, 24 August 2012

children engaging in crime. Many of the cases involving children have not been concluded. Pastoralists graze their animals while armed. There is a high level of illiteracy especially among the pastoralists. Women cannot engage in farming, collect firewood or freely fetch water. Young girls are taken out of school for marriage before or after completing primary school.”⁶⁸

South Sudan remains one of the world’s poorest countries, lagging behind on all socio-economic indicators as explained earlier.

“Many lives have been lost owing to the use of SALW. Armed militias have destabilized the livelihoods of communities.”⁶⁹

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), some 2,000 people had been killed and more than 130,000 displaced in ethnic conflict between January and October 2011 in the Upper Nile Region.⁷⁰ Insurgency merged with traditional cattle rustling produce devastating effects in the region such as when George Athor armed the Lou Nuer youth against their rivals. Organized crime has undermined the rule of law through violence and corruption as witnessed in Jonglei and Upper Nile States. Generally, organized criminal groups do not seek to overthrow governments but their actions can increase susceptibility of the state to insecurity. The activities of organized groups has made the country resort to the use of the military for policing activities, an act that has increased human rights abuse and threatened personal liberty. Citizens also form local vigilante groups that often mutate into complex security threats. In 2009, the United Nations estimated that 2,500 people died in cattle raid-related violence in the country. Cattle raiding is often heightened by proliferation of SALW and it in turn heightens ethnic animosity.⁷¹ The Lou Nuer and Murle communities were in conflict over cattle in 2012 where about 6,000 Lou Nuer fighters attacked the Murle in Likuangole, Pibor County, and other towns, burning homes, hospitals, government buildings, and seizing livestock.⁷² About 1,000 were killed and more than 20,000 displaced.⁷³ The

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ UN OCHA Report, South Sudan, 9th November 2011

⁷¹ Ibid., p.22

⁷² BBC Report, January 1, 2012

⁷³ Lisa Grande, UN Humanitarian Coordinator, South Sudan

UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) deployed a battalion of about 800 troops in Pibor to reinforce government forces but they were heavily outnumbered by the attackers. Incidents of raiding often take place in areas where there is very little government presence.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ISS, *South Sudan, Cattle Rustling Becomes Increasingly Violent*, February 2012

3 Managing Law and Order

This section explores the various strategies and options adopted to address organized criminality in South Sudan. The author focuses on preventive and pre-emptive solutions to the insecurity situation in South Sudan.

3.1 The Preventive Dimension

The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS 2011), which forms the foundation of security sector legislation and policy, is yet to be translated into action. The SPLM government is still faced with the challenge of developing inclusive and transparent security institutions to forestall internal rebellions. The international community must in the interim continue to bridge the security gap through UNMISS and other regional and bilateral programmes. For sustainable peace and security in South Sudan, the GOSS must develop inclusive institutions of governance such political parties. The different states need to devolve political power and resources for rapid equitable development. The lessons of one-party dictatorships in other African countries should provide adequate justification for reforms. Attempts at ethnic pacification and control will only increase inter-ethnic violence and militarization, thereby creating opportunities for foreign intervention by conflict entrepreneurs.

3.1.1 Security Sector Development

The creation of a new State that conforms to international standards – including good governance and the rule of law – goes along with the establishment of an effective, reliable and legitimate security sector. Other than reforming the security sector, South Sudan is trying to create one. The challenge is not only to convert SPLA into national armed forces, through integration of other armed groups (OAGs), but also to create a skilled army. In war, the SPLA was essentially a combat instrument. Training and education were rudimentary and limited to what was required namely, suppressing the enemy. In a post-war situation, and under the scrutiny of the international community, the requirement for SSAF personnel is essentially

different. Security is no longer a matter of killing, but a matter of generating trust and confidence among the population. Overcoming the ethnic divide, implementing the rule of law, contributing to the construction of the society rather than to the destruction of the enemy should be the main direction in developing the Security Sector. The recent arrests of ten South Sudanese police officers and military under the suspicion of being part of a criminal gang that robbed individuals by using their service weapons⁷⁵ is an indication of the internal threats the new security sector is facing. The main focus of security sector development is to shift from ethnically-based and decentralized security architecture to a national security system. Next is the reintegration of former combatants, and sometimes enemies, into a unified system without prejudice and providing equal opportunities for all. In these processes, vetting of former combatants and application of the rule of law are additional challenges that may conflict with the idea of reaching national unity and therefore must be handled with care. Located between Somalia and the southern part of the Sahara, South Sudan is also concerned that some criminal activities may be linked to terrorism. These activities could make South Sudan a hub for terrorist logistics in the region. In order to better track criminals and save the country from being an attractive haven for possible terrorists, the South Sudan Police is currently developing a database of criminals.⁷⁶

3.1.2 The Justice System

Justice has not only a punitive function, but must contribute to prevention of crime. A strong and effective justice establishment is a tool to deter criminals by giving crime a price, and in removing the sense of impunity that tends to prevail in many parts of the country. An effective judicial system should convey the message that no space (both in the social structure and the geography of the country) is allowed for crime and impunity. Currently, the Judiciary suffers from low capacity of well trained staff, non-funding of critical areas, construction of judicial infrastructure, provision of libraries and legal texts. Many judges have big case loads and cannot conclude judgments within a reasonable time limit thereby jeopardizing delivery of

⁷⁵UNMISS, Fondation Hironnelle, *Juba Police Arrest another 10 Gang members*, 7 August 2012.

⁷⁶*News 24*, “South Sudan cracks down on soaring crime”, 27 September 2011

justice.⁷⁷ The Judiciary is being reformed though at a slow pace and there are attempts to provide space for the traditional courts. In this context, the debate over the death penalty in South Sudan may have strategic implications. Currently, 200 individuals are on the death row in South Sudan and two individuals were hanged on 28 August 2012.⁷⁸ The resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly's Third Committee in New York on 19 November 2012 on a Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty that will be voted by the General assembly in December 2012⁷⁹, will also be felt in South Sudan.

3.1.3 Security Oversight: The South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC)

Security oversight institutions provide the top layer of democratic accountability of the security services. The GOSS has established a number of governance institutions to implement various programmes pertaining to security oversight. Control of corruption that takes huge amounts of public funds is vital in releasing resources for development. Corruption also widens inequality and breeds discontent among the populace. Establishing effective institutions for controlling corruption is essential for sustainable peace. The South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC) was established in 2011 with a mandate to protect public property, investigate cases of corruption and combat administrative malpractices in public institutions. By June 2012, the Commission had reportedly recovered US\$ 60 million stolen from the government. There has been a lot of government rhetoric to fight corruption but it has not been accompanied with actions such as prosecution. In 2010, the president declared zero-tolerance to corruption and the government informed the public that there were 75 corrupt officials, but neither names were given nor prosecutions instituted.⁸⁰ Not a single south Sudanese has been prosecuted for corruption since independence in 2011.⁸¹

“The government said there are about 75 corrupt officials in the public service but no names were given or prosecution instituted.

⁷⁷ Annual Report, South Sudan Human Rights Commission, January – December 2011, p.43

⁷⁸ Amnesty International, *South Sudan Place Moratorium on Death Penalty*, 5 November 2012

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Lokuto Bismark, CEPO, Interview, Juba, August 16th, 2012

⁸¹ Sudan Tribune, Saturday June 2, 2012

*Corruption in the public sector thrives amidst poor record keeping, lax accounting procedures and lack of a legal foundation.*⁸²

3.1.4 The Public Financial Management Bill and Accountability Act 2011

Better management of public funds is essential for rapid development to forestall poverty-related grievances. The act spells out GOSS's financial management and accountability rules and procedures. Since the act was introduced, tax collection systems have improved with electronic management. There is still big room for improvement in the management of public funds. The GOSS together with development partners are poised to implement stringent financial management systems envisaged in the public financial management bill. Devolution of public financial management responsibilities to the states and county levels with commensurate capacity building has been proposed by previous surveys.⁸³ This legislation is yet to be fully implemented and the capacity of institutions in charge of financial management is still very low.

3.1.5 Social Development

Social support for vulnerable groups such as children is vital for long term social security. The GOSS has a lot of financial needs on the table and the social sector is often not high on the agenda. The states also do not have adequate resources for allocation to this sector. However, there is the Ministry of Culture and Social Development that is charged with the responsibility of developing the social sector. The ministry has set lofty goals whose achievements are pegged on development partner's cooperation. Though the GOSS is making efforts to address the security situation, a lot remains to be done.

"The ministry of Culture and Social Development has developed gender based working groups for child protection in collaboration with UNHCR, UNDP and Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. The activities are coordinated by GOSS and

⁸²Geoffrey Lou Duke, South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), Interview; August 20th, 2012

⁸³John MukumMbakau and Jessica Elaine Smith, *The Anti-Corruption Agenda; Using Public Financial Management to Build Credible Institutions*, 2012, p. 4

UNMISS. *There is an on-going project to build houses for veterans together with other rehabilitation programmes.*⁸⁴

3.2 The Pre-emptive Dimension

Options based on conflict management and resolution are short term measures that are more effective if they are linked with long term and structural strategies within the conflict prevention, management and resolution continuum (CPMR). Disarmament is an on-going process that seeks to remove arms from the hands of civilians and former combatants and reintegrate them into the society while providing alternative means of livelihood. Disarmament is one tool of confidence building in the process of seeking national healing and reconciliation. It cannot be successful if carried out in isolation without linkages to other long term state and nation building measures.⁸⁵ There have been improvements in disarmament operations and community conflicts are gradually going down after a series of measures were carried out. The GOSS carried out sensitization campaigns in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Warrap and Lakes states, before disarmament in 2011/12 having learned from past mistakes. Given the prevalence of cattle raiding practices among the communities, there is genuine concern of insecurity in some communities when their neighbours are not simultaneously disarmed.

*“After the disarmament exercise carried out in 2005-6 faced resistance among the targeted communities, the next one carried out in 2008 was more cautious but it was still selective and targeted at communities or regions that were not supporters of SPLM/A.”*⁸⁶

The concept of disarmament has been redefined to accommodate the socio-economic and political situation in the country. Disarmament cannot be effective without a dynamic economy and job opportunities. The insistence of the international community to focus more on disarmament rather than job

⁸⁴ Mrs Jane Surur, Secretary General, Women Association of Eastern Equatoria, Interview, Torit, 24 August 2012

⁸⁵ William Deng Deng, Chairperson, National DDR Commission; *DDR in the Republic of South Sudan and its Impact on the East African Region*, Presentation during the IPSTC Symposium, 1st November, 2012

⁸⁶ *Conflicting Priorities, GOSS Security Challenges and Recent Responses*, HSBA, Sudan Issue Brief No. 14, May 2009 p. 6

creation has ushered the ineffectiveness of disarmament programmes. A comprehensive plan must drive economic development efforts, capacity building by developing skills, reducing the number of weapons and generating new jobs for ex-combatants. Through its contribution to establish or restore state authority and the rule of law, disarmament is a key part of the state-building process.

“Much as disarmament is important there is a dilemma of disarming communities thereby making them vulnerable to attack from other communities in South Sudan or across the border, while the GOSS cannot effectively fill the void.”⁸⁷

Denying the option to resorting to violence to solve inter-communal issues is the ultimate goal of the disarmament process. Further, effective disarmament of the population will be fully realized once the population recognizes and trusts the role and effectiveness of the security establishment. Security must be understood within the framework of the rule of law. The law must be the same and enforced the same way for all. The GOSS has also made efforts to contain the cattle raids. Livestock Patrol Units have been established within the South Sudan Police Service but are yet to be operational and effective.⁸⁸

3.2.1 Bureau of Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC)

The Bureau of Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC) combats the proliferation of small arms and community insecurity to ensure that communities are secure and the threat posed by small arms is reduced. BCSAC was established in 2008 as a highly specialized organization with technical skills to make policy and inform government decision making on issues related to SALW.

“The BCSSAC is present in all the ten states. There are a number of regulatory instruments to manage SALW such as the Mandate for BCSSAC, Policy, and Strategic Plan and Concept paper. The department

⁸⁷Geoffrey Lou Duke, South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), Interview, Juba, 20 August 2012

⁸⁸Sudan Tribune, 19February 2012

*operates with some degree of independence. It focuses on 3 areas; Conflict sensitive development, Rule of Law, and Peace building.*⁸⁹

Conflict prevention is done through consultations with communities on issues of peace and security using the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) technique. The program covers 55 Counties out of 79. The PRA brings together the Bureau, Local Government, Community leaders and Administrative officers. The security personnel are also trained on implementation of the rule of law. Chiefs of security organizations such as national security and intelligence departments, the Governor, women, youth, traditional leaders, elders and opinion leaders such as Paramount Chief, Executive Chief, Sub Chief and Headmen are all invited in regional small arms control and management workshops. Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) including Islamic and Christian faiths also participate. Regional and international organizations such as UNDP, SUDEMOP (Sudan Domestic Elections Monitoring and Observation Program), UNMISS, SSANSA, Local NGOs, Youth for Peace and Youth for Referendum (CBOs) are also incorporated.⁹⁰

The Bureau coordinates its activities with the Peace Commission, Human Rights Commission, SPLA, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Justice, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Welfare, DDR Commission, and Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC).

*“The Bureau for community security has carried out community outreach through Radio and TV. All the security sector organs are involved in the control of SALW.”*⁹¹

The GOSS is cognisant of the fact that sustainable peace and security requires multifaceted interventions that involve simultaneous development of education, agriculture, health and other sectors. However, there are still a number of obstacles to the control of illicit arms. The GOSS weapons are only marked at the police department.

⁸⁹ John Chiek Bum Klzier, Deputy Director, Research and Analysis, Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC), Interview, Juba, 22 August 2012

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

“The whole regime of the supply and demand for small arms has not yet been comprehensively addressed in South Sudan. Parliamentary oversight of the security sector is still ineffective.”⁹²

The GOSS has increased security in the rural areas but some youth are still resisting disarmament and walk around in small groups. A lot of weapons have been collected but there is no proper marking and registration and a proper policy for disposal of the collected weapons.

“The security services are believed to use some of the weapons and there are risks of soldiers who are not paid well or when their salaries are delayed – selling the collected weapons.”⁹³

There are some NGOs that have engaged in de-mining and destruction of arms but there is no clear policy or mechanism for arms destruction. Arms destruction requires policy framework, administrative structures, resources and risk management systems. The Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control is in the process of developing systems of stockpile management and establishment of a data base system. There is a need for technical skills to manage arms.

“Marking of arms is going on with the assistance of the Regional Center for the Control of Small Arms (RECSA). The United Nations Program of Action (UNPoA) on SALW is set to provide assistance in the development of data base software. Needs assessment has been done in all the states.”⁹⁴

3.2.2 Institutional Response Capacity: The South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF)

South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) was established after independence in July 2011 when the former Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was renamed SSAF (although the acronym “SPLA” continues to be in use).⁹⁵ The role of the armed forces in domestic issues is still not clear. The persistence of armed groups that challenge the rule of the Juba authorities creates a need

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Wolfram Lacher, *South Sudan, International State Building and its Limits*, SWP, February 2012, p. 12

to have the ability to oppose robust insurgent forces within the country. The extent to which armed forces can be used to solve issues other than war has not been defined yet in the overall defence and security architecture. It appears, however, that the South Sudanese government will need to have capacities beyond the ones of the police to deal with robust domestic threats, while maintaining such tasks with the Armed Forces. Lessons from the neighbouring states of Uganda and Ethiopia where ruling regimes trace their political power to armed rebellion, indicate that the military plays a larger role in domestic security and there is subsequent shrinking of democratic space and respect for human rights. Bilateral donor support and lack of coordination tend to hamper the development of a comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) framework that would harmonize police, judicial, and governance reforms.

3.2.3 South Sudan Police Service (SSPS)

The South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) was established in 2006 and later regularized by an Act of Parliament in 2009. The SSPS's regulations were published in 2010 to guide the management of policing affairs in the country. SSPS covers the whole country but the Governor is in charge of the State police. The general security sector governance framework is being currently developed. There is an action plan for transforming the police from 2011-15:

“The Police Service is made up of people who came from different forces such as: retired police who were serving the former Government of Sudan, members of SPLA who were policing the liberated areas and members of militias who re-joined Government of South Sudan (GOSS) after peace agreements. The SSPS is made up of the Regular police, Auxiliary, Fire brigade and the Wildlife Service. The Police service is faced with a number of challenges such as: aging workforce, some of the personnel lack basic training in policing and high rates of illiteracy.”⁹⁶

The DDR program is expected to reduce the size of the police service. According to the Director General of the Police, Tito Madut:

“The priority is to recruit more educated young people into the police service. The top cadre of the police service has been trained in leadership,

⁹⁶General Acuil Tito Madut, Inspector General of Police, GOSS, Ministry of Interior, Juba, Interview; 21 August 2012

command and management. The officers are further taken to the Police Academy for 3 months to be trained in policing skills and rule of law."⁹⁷

The SSPS is currently carrying out a screening exercise to identify personnel for promotion and to slowly phase out those who are not qualified. There is also training provided at the State level in Upper Nile, Equatoria, Juba and Malakal. There are also other smaller training facilities in the other States. The John Garang Police Academy in Rajaf (Juba) was established in 2010. Buildings have been put up for training and the first graduates are expected to roll out soon. UNMISS has been assisting the police through training but the training is limited in scope and lasts only two weeks.

*"The security sector does not receive as much funds as preferred. GOSS is faced with lack of resources and competing interests such as provision of infrastructure, health and education. The GOSS recognizes the importance of the security sector in maintenance of law and order and guaranteeing peace and development. There is also no food security and electricity is in short supply."*⁹⁸

Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and South Africa are providing assistance in police training. SSPS provide basic policing training before the officers can specialize in specific areas. The police service requires more infrastructure and most departments are located far from each other instead of being housed together or close by. There are no police stations in the rural areas. There are no adequate places for confining suspects in police stations or cells.

*"The concept of Community Based Policing (CBP) is being introduced so that the police and community can understand that they need each other to increase security. Sensitization is required for people to appreciate what Community Based Policing is all about. Officers are being trained before CBP program is rolled out to the lower levels. The SSPS is set to establish Community Policing Forums at different levels of administration."*⁹⁹

Inter-faith community forums have been formed to work with police in Eastern Equatoria. The Police have been offering support to the SPLA in

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

disarmament initiatives. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is assisting in training border security personnel.

*“There is a plan to establish and train border police. There are plans to establish a permanent auxiliary police. Some small units are already in Bahr el Ghazal, Bor, Upper Nile and Juba”.*¹⁰⁰

The SSPS developed a Strategic Plan whose coverage and implementation have been hampered by the challenges caused by the fallout of 2010 elections and loss of the oil revenue. The Police Act 2009 was also enacted but is yet to be well implemented. According to the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP 2011-13), SSPS plans to ensure internal security and maintain law and order via a democratically-oriented, fully functional professional police service, sensitive to human rights, gender and cognizant of modern concepts of international policing and capable of enforcing law and order throughout South Sudan. By 2013, all states will have functional police capacity and police-community relations committees. National and state boards for community policing and livestock policing units will be established in all ten states with trained personnel. The correction system is a key partner in fighting crime. Not only by punishing criminals but also by contributing to make a better society. As its name suggests “correction” is about “correcting”, to make things right. Departing from a punitive stance and moving towards a correction system that contributes to build a better society must be the overall strategy. The Southern Sudan Prisons Service is currently governed by the Interim Constitution of South Sudan framework, the Prisons Service Act, other relevant legislations and United Nations standards dealing with the treatment of prisoners.¹⁰¹ Members of the Prisons service were drawn from SPLA, militias and others removed from Government of Sudan (GoS) after separation of the two countries.

“The Prisons Service Department faces a number of obstacles: Prisons are overcrowded; facilities were established during colonial times. There is no adequate rehabilitation capacity. The infrastructure in South Sudan – including prisons – was destroyed during the war. The department uses containers and mud huts to confine convicts. Some convicts are confined in open areas. Many have not been classified and separated in terms of

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Southern Sudan Prisons Service 3 years Emergency Strategic Development Plan (2011-2013), Office of the Director General, Ministry of Interior, 4th January 2010

age, gender and nature of crime. Women, men and children prisoners mix during the day.”¹⁰²

The GOSS is however aware of the need for prison reforms and a number of measures have been put in place to ensure humane and human rights-based correctional services.

“UNMISS and UNDP have been helping in renovations of prisons in Wau, Malakal, Yambio and Juba. A new prison where classification is done has been established in Bor. There are plans to improve sanitation through renovation of clinics in prisons, including medical facilities and ablutions in prisons. People suffering from mental illness are in prison instead of being in hospitals. There are plans to work with the Ministry of Health to establish containment areas in hospitals.”¹⁰³

According to the SSDP 2011-13, by 2013, the Prison Service will provide secure and humane incarceration and detention services via functional and secure prisons at county, state and national levels providing coherent, secure and humane treatment to prisoners. UNODC in partnership with other organizations has been building capacity of prisons.

“Training for the prison service is still under way – UNMISS has provided limited short term training. There is a need to have a training centre at State level. The small training centre that exists has a capacity for only 128 trainees. Some members of staff are old, illiterate and others have disabilities. There are plans to train and recruit more youth while the aged will be gradually phased out. There is poor communication between States and Counties. It is difficult to collect data from the rural areas on a daily basis. There are no internet and specialized radio communication.”¹⁰⁴

There are about 1,000 prisoners in Juba alone and about 6,500 in the whole country. There is on-going screening to establish the prevailing capacity. There is a strategic plan in place to guide the operations of the SSPS.

“There are plans to employ professionals in the police service. New regulations and job descriptions are currently being developed. UNDP is

¹⁰² 1st Lieutenant General Abel Makoi Woi, Director General Department of Prison Services, Interview; Juba, August 21st, 2012

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Op. cit

*assisting in a project to access data in 3 states and providing food to prisoners especially suckling mothers.*¹⁰⁵

3.3 Capacity-building

Response to criminal acts depends on several factors: a good police intelligence network, an adequate presence of police forces across the territory, especially in the areas prone to criminal activities, an infrastructure network that allows rapid deployment when needed, an equipment that matches the level of threat, and a solid training in law, police techniques, human rights, and tactics.

3.3.1 The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established to advise and assist the Government of South Sudan, including military and police at national and local levels as appropriate, in fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians in compliance with international humanitarian and refugee law¹⁰⁶. This means the UN supports consolidation of peace and security in the new nation of South Sudan. UNMISS provides early warning information, protection of civilians affected by conflict and providing security advisory briefs to the government. The mission is however criticized for not providing adequate protection to civilians and not deterring further violence. There has not been a good working relationship between UNMISS and SPLA personnel on the ground in areas like Jonglei.¹⁰⁷ UNMISS is assisting in the protection of human rights, providing education on human rights, Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and specific offences affecting women. UNDP is assisting in improving the rule of law and access to justice. UNMISS provided support to the Government for the integration of militias, including screening, registration and provision of transport in 2011. A coordinated sharing of information, joint assessment, planning and implementation of security measures between the GOSS and civil society can enhance the mission's success through pro-active

¹⁰⁵ 1st Lieutenant General Abel Makoi Woi, Director General Department of Prison Services, Interview; Juba, 21 August, 2012

¹⁰⁶ www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/mandate.shtml, accessed 28 May 2012

¹⁰⁷ Saferworld, *Security response in the State of Jonglei*, January 2012, p. 14

intervention. UNMISS provided support to the Government for the integration of militias, including screening, registration and provision of transport in 2011. UNMISS in cooperation with UNODC has also organized training and technical assistance to the prison service. Training assistance was offered to the Ministry of Justice in cooperation with UNDP.¹⁰⁸ UNMISS has also offered assistance in human rights related legislation. Disarmament, Demobilisation, Resettlement and Reconciliation (DDRR) projects have also been implemented in Western Bahr el Ghazal, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria States.

3.3.2 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

UNODC is the guardian of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) also referred as Organized Crime Convention and the three Protocols on: Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, and Trafficking of Firearms that supplement it. This is the only international convention, which deals with organized crime. The adoption of the Convention at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2000 and its entry into force in 2003 also marked a historic commitment by the international community to counter organized crime.¹⁰⁹ The Organized Crime Convention offers States a framework for preventing and combating organized crime, and a platform for cooperating in doing so. According to UNODC, parties to the Convention have committed to establishing criminal offences for participating in an organized crime group, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice in their national legislations. By becoming parties to the UNTOC, States also have access to a new framework for mutual legal assistance and extradition, as well as a platform for strengthening law enforcement cooperation. Since the establishment of the Republic of South Sudan as the world's newest State in July 2011, the restoration of internal security and law enforcement have been high on the agenda. In an effort to build and strengthen forensic awareness and basic crime scene investigation capacities in the country, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), alongside the police component of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and

¹⁰⁸ Report of the Secretary General, UNMISS, March 2012

¹⁰⁹ UNODC, Organized crime; available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html, accessed May 15, 2012

the United Nations Development Programme, is establishing a capacity in crime scene investigation and forensic expert training. Further, the UNODC supports regional knowledge exchange and peer support in intelligence creation, specialised investigative techniques (forensic accounting, use of forensic science) and advances in corruption prevention approaches. The two main forums for these activities are the East African Anti-Corruption Association and the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (STAR).

3.3.3. Bilateral Projects

The United States funds a bilateral capacity-building project with South Sudan involving DynCorp, a private security company (PSC). The project is designed to support both the South Sudan National Security (SSNS) and the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS). In fact, the project is designed in support of UNMISS efforts to support SSPS, and involves 15 DynCorp civilian police advisors.

4 Conclusion

This study sought to investigate the dynamics and challenges to security by organized crime and criminality in South Sudan. It found out among others that criminality is not a benign issue. Beyond the concerns related to human security, the development of organized criminality may affect regional security. Considering the geographic position of South Sudan between Somalia and other troubled Sub-Saharan countries prone to terrorism, the thin line between criminality and terrorism must attract the attention of regional partners. This includes a comprehensive strategy to address the proliferation of small arms and to control them. Further, the killing of foreign nationals tends to strain relations between South Sudan and its neighbours and development partners. This is the case with Kenya whose authorities have reacted to the criminal actions that targeted Kenyan nationals in Juba. Given the considerable size of the country, the number and scope of the security challenges ahead, and the budget constraints of the country, maintaining law and order will be a considerable task.

A possible way to compensate for the lack of presence at local level, the police authorities will have to work with local communities. However, this may be a double-edged sword as exemplified by the example of Darfur. Any security cooperation with local communities must be based on a legitimate authority that is accountable for its activities. The criminal justice system must be strengthened in order to deliver lawful and humane treatment of people through competent and prompt investigations, expert adjudication, humane and rehabilitative correctional services and enforcement of human rights through the established institutions. The inclusion of traditional institutions in the peace and security administration is vital to the development of appropriate policies and strategies of dealing with internal armed violence. The international community must continue to support peace, security and development priorities as spelt out in the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan and the National Development Plan, 2011-13.

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ANNEX 1: Regional Distribution of Armed Groups

Organized armed groups in South Sudan are active in 7 out of the 10 states and are more prevalent in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity and Bahr el Ghazal States. This distribution is informed by ethnic identity and settlements, participation or non-participation in the liberation struggle, proximity to north Sudan, availability of resources and relationship with either the Government of Sudan (GOS) or the Government of South Sudan (GOSS).

The State of Bahr el-Ghazal

Peace Defence Forces (PDF)

There are a number of active armed groups in the Greater Upper Nile region and Bahr el Ghazal. Major General Atom Al Nour commands the *Peace Defence Forces (PDF)* in Western and Northern Bahr el Ghazal estimated at around 400 fighters. These forces comprised Fertit ethnic groups though Al Nour is a Misseriya. The Fertit have occasionally been in conflict with the Dinka.¹¹⁰

Bagi Force

Sultan Abdel Bagi Agyii is a notable Dinka political leader from Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Bagi fought alongside Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) during the civil war. He later joined the SPLA after negotiations with Salva Kiir in 2006. He was dropped as a Salva Kiir advisor after the 2010 elections. Bagi teamed up with other rebels in March 2011 to fight the SPLM government but he soon accepted Salva Kiir's amnesty in October 2011.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ John Young, *The South Sudan Defense Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration*, HSBA, SWP No. 1, p. 35

¹¹¹ HSBA, *Facts and Figures, South Sudan Armed Groups*, PDF, April 2011

South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM/A)

The *South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM/A)* was founded in the 1990s. It was a much smaller group than South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). This was a largely Nuer body, although its membership included Annuak and Murle. It was founded by Michael Wal Duany who had served as a Professor in the United States.¹¹² This movement was later led by James Gai Yoach. James Gai is currently based in Khartoum and he is deputized by Monituel. Other notable rebel leaders like Mathew Puljang, Philip Bepean and Kolcharra Nyang have also led this organization. The force was estimated at about 2,000 fighters in 2011. The activities of SSLA in Unity state subsided in 2012 after more active presence of SPLA. SSLA however retains a significant presence in the Mayom County of Jonglei state.¹¹³

The State of Jonglei

Jonglei, the largest state in South Sudan epitomizes the complex conflict situation. Jonglei has a population of about 1.3 million people. There is extreme poverty coupled with poor infrastructure and food insecurity.¹¹⁴ A number of militias have emerged in this state closely reflecting the ethnic diversity and rivalry in the region. The traditional cattle raiding among the Murle, Lou Nuer and Dinka has evolved into a complex security situation involving ethnic groups, militia and South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF). The situation is also aggravated by politics, inability of the GOSS to provide security, proliferation of SALW and a high population competing for scarce resources.¹¹⁵

The YauYau Militia

Militias associated with Murle leader David Yau Yau are still active in Jonglei. Yau Yau, a member of the minority Murle ethnic group hails from Pibor County of Jonglei state bordering Ethiopia. Unlike other leaders of armed groups, Yau Yau is a civilian and studied theology in Kenya. He

¹¹² Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 1, p. 20

¹¹³ Report of UN Secretary General, 2012

¹¹⁴ Oxfam 2011, op. cit., p. 1

¹¹⁵ Jarred Ferrie, *Community perspective on the Lou Nuer/Murle conflict in South Sudan*, Boma Development Initiative Report, 2011, p. 2

formed an insurgent group after he failed to secure a post with the Jonglei state assembly in the 2010 elections. His forces clashed with SPLA just before the referendum of 2011. Some analysts have traced his rebellion to local Murle politics and grievances about atrocities committed by SPLA during a disarmament exercise in their area. He did not respond to the GOSS's pardon of 2010 but began amnesty talks with the GOSS in June 2011.¹¹⁶ Yau Yau later returned to the rebel ranks and is still leading a rebellion in Pibor.¹¹⁷ At least 3,000 people had been killed in inter-ethnic violence in the State by November 2011.¹¹⁸ About 2,500 people were killed throughout South Sudan in 2009 and out of this number, 750 were killed in one week in a battle pitting the Lou Nuer against the Murle in Jonglei.¹¹⁹ It has been alleged that the communities in this region accessed arms from SPLA. The SPLA and UNMISS have not been effective in addressing the internecine conflict. The conflict is characterized by impunity since no perpetrators have ever faced justice (formal or traditional)¹²⁰. KolChara Nyang is a relatively low key player and was believed to be hiding in Heglig. Charra was associated with an armed incident in the Mayom area before the referendum. He and his supporters ambushed an SPLA column north-east of Mayom in December 2010. KolCharra is one among other anti-GOSS militants with unclear allegiances and support bases operating in the Mayom area. The SPLA suspected these groups were receiving support from SAF units based along the common border.¹²¹

Pibor (Popular) Defence Forces (PDF)

The Pibor (Popular) Defence Forces (PDF) was led by Sultan Ismael Konye. Konye is a Murle leader appointed by President Salva Kiir to sit in the Council of State after independence. He served as a presidential advisor in the Salva Kiir administration until the 2010 elections.

¹¹⁶HSBA, *Facts and Figures, South Sudan Armed Groups*, YauYau, April 2011

¹¹⁷Sudan Tribune, *Jonglei MP SPLA perception of Murle as enemies*, October 14, 2012

¹¹⁸ UNMISS media monitoring report, 18, November 2011

¹¹⁹ UN OCHA, *Humanitarian Action in South Sudan Report*, Number 20, November 2009

¹²⁰South Sudan Human Rights Commission; *Annual Report 2011*; p. 21

¹²¹HSBA, SWP, *Facts and Figures, South Sudan Armed Groups*, 2011

South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A)

The South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) was formed by Lt. Gen. George Athor in 2010. Athor was considered the most powerful of the post-election insurrectionists. He defected from SPLM complaining about lack of democracy in Salva Kiir's administration. The former Deputy Chief of Staff of SPLA quit after SPLM's Kuo Manyang won the seat of Governor in Jonglei, whom Athor accused of vote rigging. Athor built his force with SPLA defectors and also recruited disenfranchised youth primarily from the Gawaar Nuer and Padeng Dinka ethnic groups.¹²² Athor was allegedly killed by SPLA forces in December 2011 but there have been reports that he was assassinated in Uganda where he had gone to visit Ugandan president Yoweri K. Museveni.¹²³ He was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Peter Kuol, a graduate of the University of Nairobi, who vowed to continue the war. In February 2012, Kuol defected to SPLM. By April 2012 there were reportedly 1,800 SSLA fighters awaiting the outcome of negotiations with GOSS to be reintegrated into the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). There have been attempts at resolving the conflict led by the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) and other stakeholders. Dialogue forums were created where leaders from the Lou Nuer and Murle met. Other than long term development, there is an urgent need for specific security measures from the GOSS and UNMISS to turn the tides in Jonglei from conflict to peace.

Unity State

Unity State is located in the north-central part of South Sudan along the North-South border. It is a major oil producing state, thus making it a strategic territory in South Sudan. Unity State is also a predominantly Nuer homeland (80%) but there are Dinka in some counties.¹²⁴ Unity is situated along complex geographic, socio-economic and political frontiers. There have been several militia activities in 2011 and 2012. There are governance problems, territorial disputes, cross-border tensions, economic isolation and

¹²² The New Sudan Vision, May 13, 2010

¹²³ Sudan Tribune, *Uganda denies involvement in killing South Sudan's Athor*, December 23, 2011

¹²⁴ The 2008 disputed census estimates the population to be about 585 000

proximity to the effects of the North-South conflict. The state bore a significant brunt of the North-South conflict and internal ethnic conflict over the years. There are fundamental challenges of governance reforms, transcending ethnic based political competition, security sector reforms and rule of law implementation mechanisms.¹²⁵ The interruption of the traditional Misseriya¹²⁶ migration into Unity State has caused conflict. Internal boundaries within the State have also not been defined.

Ethnic violence in neighbouring South Kordofan has disrupted trade and sent in migrants into Unity. There have also been concerns about unregulated land allocations. Peace and security in Unity State is intertwined with the major security concerns that face South Sudan including management of the North-South conflict and the oil sector in South Sudan. Unity State also faces the effects of rampant cattle raiding that pit the Nuer against the Dinka in Warrap and Lake States.¹²⁷

South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A)

Several active militia groups have caused instability in the state, displaced populations, caused food shortages, and increased re-mining and counter insurgency operations. Some of the rebel groups were operating under the umbrella of loose organizations called *South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army* (SSLM/A). There were violent cattle raids where women and children were killed in Mayendit County in September 2011.¹²⁸ Armed militias of the late Gatluak Gai, Peter Gadet, Bapiny Monituel¹²⁹ and James Gai Yoach¹³⁰ were based in Unity State. The current Governor of the State,

¹²⁵ ICG, *South Sudan; Compounding insecurity in Unity State*, 2011, p. 4

¹²⁶ The Misseriya are Baggara Arab nomads who migrate seasonally from South Kordofan to neighbouring States such as Unity

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 5

¹²⁸ Community Consultations Report; *Unity State, BCSSAC and South Sudan Peace Commission*, May 2012

¹²⁹ Monituel is a former Nuer militia leader loyal to Paulino Matiep. He became a SAF Brigadier General after the CPA and refused to join the SPLA after the 2006 Juba Declaration. The Khartoum-backed commander swore allegiance to the late George Athor. Bapiny associated himself with other civil war-era southern militia commanders, including Gordon Kong and Gabriel Tang Ginye.

¹³⁰ Gai Yoach is a Leek Nuer from Rubkhona and SAF General. He was allied to George Athor in 2011 and both later joined Peter Gadet in an SSLA alliance. He remained opposed to the GOSS even after Gadet joined the government

Taban Deng, is viewed as Juba's candidate and therefore does not enjoy local support. Heavy handed government responses to insecurity have often pushed local communities into rebel causes. There has not been a coherent counter insurgency strategy in Unity and the whole of South Sudan. Organized armed group activities continue to be a source of conflict in the State and the local people continue to suffer the effects of the conflicts.¹³¹ During a raid in Mayom County in 2011, civilians were killed, property looted, villages raided and burnt by forces loyal to Peter Gadet.¹³² In Unity and Lakes States, cattle raiding is deemed a criminal offence and perpetrators are liable to imprisonment, though this has hardly deterred these crimes.¹³³ Forces loyal to Peter Gadet in Upper Nile and Unity, as well as some members of the minority Shilluk tribe, have remained active threats to the GOSS's authority. In his '*Mayom Declaration*', Gadet accused the SPLM government of corruption and tribalism. Peter Gadet and his forces have since been reintegrated into the SPLA as at February 2012.¹³⁴

Upper Nile

Upper Nile State is located in the north-eastern part of the country. It is largely inhabited by the Shilluk but there are also other ethnic groups such as Nuer, Dinka and Bari. It is one of the regions that have borne the burden of the previous war with Sudan and continues to face internal conflicts. The state has high levels of poverty and most people have no access to basic services such as health, clean drinking water and education. A new group of marginalized youth engaged in cattle raiding and operating outside ethnic group control, the *Niggas*, has emerged.¹³⁵ This has posed acute problems to

¹³¹ South Sudan Human Rights Commission, *Annual Report*, May 2011, p. 39

¹³² Peter Gadet was a reputable rebel leader in his Mayom County of Unity state and together with Paulino Matiep became leaders in the SAF supported SSDF. Peter and thousands of his fighters integrated into SPLA after the Juba Declaration in 2006 and assumed high ranking leadership in both Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile states. Peter later joined George Athor in a coalition against SPLA.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 25

¹³⁴ Report of UN Secretary General, South Sudan 2012, Para 25

¹³⁵ *Community Consultation Report*; Upper Nile State, BCCSAC and South Sudan Peace Commission, 2012, p. 3

local conflict resolution mechanisms. Two rebel forces led by Johnson Olonyi and Ayok Ogat remain active in Upper Nile State.¹³⁶

The Nuer Nassir Faction

The Nuer Nassir Faction was led by Major General Gordon Koang in eastern Upper Nile state around El Nasser. His forces are estimated at around 1,000. Gordon served as a deputy to the late Paulino Matiep of SSDF. His forces operated along the North-South border.

The Gabriel Tang Ginye Forces

The Forces of Gabriel Tang Ginye, a former Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) major-general, is known as the Southern militia. With assistance from Khartoum, it fought the SPLA in the civil war. Tang Ginye is a Nuer from Upper Nile. He has been leading a group said to be responsible for a number of skirmishes in Malakal (2006-09) that left several hundreds dead and thousands displaced. He resides in Khartoum and only makes occasional visits to Upper Nile. Though he accepted the presidential pardon in 2010, his forces are still active. Tang Ginye is said to maintain his forces on money and resources.

Sudan People's Liberation Movement – Democratic Change (SPLM-DC)

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement – Democratic Change (SPLM-DC) was a splinter group of SPLM/A. It is now an opposition party in South Sudan. It draws its support mainly from the Shilluk people of Upper Nile. The Shilluk have had differences with the Dinka in Upper Nile over land ownership and control in the post-2011 referendum. The national SPLM government and the state government have been accused of favouring the Dinka over the Shilluk in the dispute. Rebellions led by Robert Gwang, Alyuak Ogot and Johnson Olonyi have championed this locally supported cause. SPLM-DC leader, Dr. Lam Akol, has been viewed by the government as the hand behind this rebellion. There have been reports of association between SPLA-DC and the Shilluk rebel movements.¹³⁷ The South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army formerly led by George Athor is still active in

¹³⁶ Report of the UN Secretary General, South Sudan, 2011 Para 29

¹³⁷ HSBA No. 18, November 2011

the state. Kuol Manyang took over after the death of Athor. Since Manyang's defection to SPLA, a separate and smaller faction, SSDM/A, is still active in Upper Nile state after assuming the SSDM/A title. In northern Upper Nile, Maj. Gen. Johnson Olonyi led a predominantly Shilluk cadre of about 800 fighters. Johnson Olonyi is the current head of SSDM/A as at April 2012.¹³⁸ SSDA forces are estimated at about 2,600 fighters. Some 900 of SSDA fighters are said to have surrendered to SPLA in February 2012.¹³⁹

White Army

The White Army was a Nuer (Lou, Gawaar, Jikany) youth-based ethnic militia mainly established to defend cattle and property in Upper Nile state during the war.¹⁴⁰ It was made up of armed civilians who were active on an ad hoc basis. The roots of the White Army are traced back to the formation of defensive groups by Nuer youth in the cattle camps of Upper Nile. The origins of the White Army are traced back to Riek Machar who split from John Garang's SPLA in 1991 after the army launched an attack on the Dinka in Bor.¹⁴¹ Though they were initially under the control of local elders, the youth subsequently took over leadership. Most members of the White Army were disarmed by the GOSS after the referendum. Due to violent conflict and insecurity in the area, members of the community have since re-armed.¹⁴² They number about 4,000 during active seasons. A reinvigorated White Army numbering about 8,000 fighters attacked the Murle in January 2012 stealing thousands of livestock and displacing thousands of people. A combined SPLA and UNMISS force of about 1,800 was unable to stop the carnage. The White Army is still active today and it is often embroiled in political and ethnic conflicts pitting the Lou Nuer against other groups and the GOSS. The White Army is a typical ethnically- based militia that is established in conflict situations as a vigilante (protection) group. It may be directly under ethnic leadership but in some cases it can mutate and become

¹³⁸ Sudan Tribune: *South Sudan rebels battle with SPLA at Upper Nile State*, April 15, 2012

¹³⁹ Report of the UN Secretary General on South Sudan to UNSC, March 2012 Para 22

¹⁴⁰ Tribal militias that were active before 2005 include the Rufa'a in southern Blue Nile, the Fertit in western Bahr al Ghazal, the Toposa, Lotuko, Mundari and Acholi militias in Equatoria, and the Murle in Jonglei state. The use of tribal militias by the GoS increased in the 1980s (Johnson, 2003).

¹⁴¹ Saferworld, *Security Responses in Jonglei State*, p. 10

¹⁴² HSBA, SWP; *Facts and Figures*, South Sudan Armed Groups, White Army, April 2011

a dangerous group even to its own ethnic group as the armed youth seek autonomy from the elders. Where it is under the authority of the ethnic group's leaders, their armament is legitimate and sanctioned by the community. Addressing the issue of militia alone without considering their community interests is inadequate to restore peace. The perceived community grievances must be addressed in order to contain the militia.

Central Equatoria

This is the state that hosts the national capital, Juba. It is a microcosm of the national socio-political and economic situation in the country. Juba is a fast growing town where entrepreneurs from neighbouring countries are running the local private sector-dominated economy. It is also home to a plethora of international development partners such as United Nations organizations, African Union and International NGOs. The cost of living is high owing to the high cost of imported goods including foodstuffs. Pastoralists have been reduced to about 30% of the population. In Central Equatoria, cattle raiders are punished by the traditional system of retribution whereby when a case is proved against an accused person, the culprit pays 15 cows for every cow stolen.¹⁴³ Traditionally, Central Equatoria belongs to the Bari though other groups have migrated to the state such as Dinka, Mundari and Kuku. These communities have fewer arms than the pastoralists. Conflicts over ownership of land have increased since the 2005 CPA that ushered in the rapid expansion of the city. The River Nile crosses through the state providing green pasture along its banks.

Patriotic Resistance Movement/Army

The Patriotic Resistance Movement/Army was founded by Alfred Ladu in 1993 after breaking away from SPLA. Ladu is a leading member of the Bari ethnic group in Central Equatoria. He re-joined the SPLA in 2006 after the Juba declaration. He stood as an independent candidate in his region but he was defeated by Clement Wani during the 2010 elections. He was named a government advisor after the elections and later appointed minister of environment in the post-independence government.

¹⁴³South Sudan Human Rights Commission, *Annual Report*, January-December 2011, p. 23

Mundari Forces of Clement Wani Konga

Though Clement Wani is the Governor of Central Equatoria, he retains some of his ethnic militia citing security reasons. He is a respected paramount chief of the Mundari. His forces provided security to the GOSS after independence. Many of his Mundari forces have also joined SPLA.

Eastern Equatoria

Eastern Equatoria State was at the centre of internal fighting during the war and continues to suffer cross-border conflicts from Kenya and Uganda. The state capital, Torit, has a historical significance in South Sudan, being the area where the first shots of liberation were fired during the mutiny of 1955. This state is home to the Latuka, Lango, Madi, Imatong, Acholi, Didinga and Toposa. Groups of Bor Dinka have settled in this state after fleeing fighting in the Bor region of Jonglei. Most of the ethnic groups have indigenous militias who get armed when the need arises. Though the state has deposits of limestone, gold, uranium, thorium, copper, lead, chrome, nickel and talc, local militias have not utilised these minerals as war booty.¹⁴⁴ However, the Bor Dinka have settled in the area where these minerals are located perhaps to access them when the right time comes.¹⁴⁵ The state is also suffering from insecurity associated with prevalence of a large number of illicit SALW in the hands of civilians, and high youth unemployment. There is highway banditry along the Torit-Kapoeta road up to the Kenya border with many cases of murder and armed robberies in Kapoeta, Ikotos and Budi Counties. There are land conflicts pitting communities against each other and against the state. There are large numbers of IDPs with some from north Sudan who have come back to be resettled in the state. Sometimes security forces are attacked by civilians especially in pastoralist areas where arms abound. There are also cases of counterfeit currencies in Eastern Equatoria (Nadapal and Nimule). There have also been conflicts over access to river streams and fishing rights among the clans of Latuka of Eastern Equatoria and Nuer /Dinka in the Lakes state.

¹⁴⁴ Small Arms Survey; HSBA, SWP, No. 13, Eastern Equatoria, p. 9

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 15

Equatoria Defence Forces (EDF)

EDF was established to defend Equatorians against outside forces including SPLA, during the war. At one time it was commanded by Martin Kenyi (now a senior GOSS official). EDF was previously allied to SAF and merged with SPLA in 2004, though a significant number of them melted into the communities with their arms.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶Small Arms Survey, Op.cit., p. 31

Annex 2: The Quarterly Crime Statistics Reports for December 2011 – February 2012

10 October 2012 – Juba: The South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) released two Quarterly Crimes Statistics reports detailing crime rates, trends, and analysis for the last two quarters on Tuesday 9 October 2012 at Juba Grand Hotel. UNDP and UNPOL, with funding from the Government of Japan, provided technical support to the SSNPS at both the national and state levels in the collection and analysis of crime statistics. Major General Johanna Madikotsi Nkomo, UNMISS Deputy Police Commissioner stated: “People may be asking why it is important that we are launching statistics. They are just numbers – but for the woman, child or man who is a victim of crime, they don’t seem themselves just a number.” The Quarterly Crime Statistics reports contain data across nine states covering the types of crimes as well as comparisons between regions and the two quarters. These reports provide the evidence on the current context and enable policy makers to craft informed strategies and serve as a baseline to track progress. As explained by the Honourable Dr. Barnaba Marial, Minister of Information, “this evidence base will help a young country formulate policy to prevent, reduce and detect crimes and support greater effectiveness in delivery of justice services.” Major General Nkomo further elaborated that these reports are a management tool which can help Government to prioritize programmes to prevent crime, noting, “it will tell you crime is because there are no jobs, there is no education, it will tell the Government to support job creation initiatives and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports to start youth programs.”

The availability of reliable and relevant statistics is essential for planning the deployment of scarce resources within the criminal justice system. Mr. Balázs Horváth, Country Director of UNDP, explained why they are critical: “Statistics provide a sound basis for dialogue on policies, decision making on the allocation of resources and the targeting of crime prevention and response mechanisms. They enable us to develop informed strategies and ensure that planning is based on evidence... In these times of austerity and limited resources, it is crucial for all of us to target scarce resources in the

most effective way.” Thus, this data can serve as a tool for monitoring the professionalism of the SSNPS, identify new and emerging patterns of criminal behaviour, and allow development partners to better support the Government in the management of risk. Mr. Ishikawa Ryo, Government of Japan, explained how his country supports South Sudan in building capacity and stated, “In this respect, the report can play an important role as a great motivation for the esteemed SSNPS. I am sure that formulating the report can become a great step toward security reform in this country.”

In December 2011, South Sudan began collecting data on crime at the county and state levels and aggregating them into these quarterly crime statistics reports. The main source of data is records compiled by the SSNPS, and although there is a level of crime that goes unreported, there is no other reliable source of national crime statistics. Moreover, it is notable that the Government has begun data collection and analysis early enough. Having this type of information will enable the Government to take the appropriate steps to professionalize the SSNPS, protect citizens and foster security of communities. Honourable General Acuil Tito Madut, Inspector General of Police stated, “it was difficult to assess our successes and failures. Police success is measured by crime in a given locality....now our quality of work will only improve.” The first launch of the Quarterly Crime Statistics reports for December 2011 – February 2012 and for March 2012 – May 2012 also included a detailed presentation of the key findings:

- (i) Crime has a disproportionate impact on women
- (ii) In the six-month reporting period, there has been a general decline in the number of major crimes (murder, grievous harm, theft, housebreaking, and rape)
- (iii) Rates of misappropriating, trespassing and kidnapping have increased over 100% in the six-month reporting period while murder and theft have declined
- (iv) Both murder and offences to property are higher in states with low economic growth (Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes and Western Equatoria)

The collection of these statistics will enable better planning for longer term development, as there cannot be development or peace without security. Honourable General Alison Monani Magaya, Minister of the Interior, also added that these statistics are important for other development partners and Government ministries: "...this does not only affect the security sector – it concerns all stakeholders... For an efficient administration of justice, we all need to collaborate on crime prevention and rule of law. Also in attendance were the Honourable Lt. Gen. Aleu Anyieny Aleu, Chairperson of Defence, Security and Public Order Committee and Chief Justice Chan Reec Madut, who stressed the inter-linkage between crime prevention and the capacity to bring cases to trial in a fair and transparent manner.

The International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC)

The International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) is a distinguished training and research institution focusing on capacity building of peace support missions within the context of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The center addresses the complex contemporary United Nations and African Union integrated peace support operations by exposing actors to the multi-faceted nature of such operations. The training and research undertaken at the center cut across a broad spectrum of conflict prevention; management and post-conflict recovery. IPSTC is a key training institution for the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) of the African Union's Africa Standby Force (ASF). The Center collaborates with other partners such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and the United States of America.

The Paper

This paper explores the challenges of organized armed criminality in South Sudan. The presence of other armed groups apart from the SPLA and SPSS inhibits provision of security to all parts of the country. The connection between armed groups, ethnic conflict, resources, criminality and political fractionalization has created a complex problem. The Government of South Sudan requires capacity to manage the armed groups in order to check proliferation of small arms and to channel resources to development.

The Author

Mr. Mbugua is an experienced peace and security researcher and trainer. He has previously undertaken research for Security Research and Information Center (SRIC), Practical Action, UN Women, PACT Kenya, Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (Kenya) and Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA). The author has trained Kenya Police and Administration Police at the Kenya School of Government under the auspices of the National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management. Mr. Mbugua has also been a guest lecturer at African Nazarene University and Pan African Peace building Institute at Mindolo Ecumenical Center, Kitwe, Zambia. The author holds a B.A from the University of Nairobi, Post Graduate Diploma in Mass communication and an M.A in peace studies from the University of San Diego in California.



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