INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTRE (IPSTC), NAIROBI, KENYA

AMANI LECTURE REPORT

August 2014

The Changing Dimensions Of International Peacekeeping in Africa

International Peace Support Training Centre
# Nairobi, Kenya.

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Acknowledgement

The International Peace support Training Centre (IPSTC) thanks you for your attendance and participation in the recent IPSTC Amani Lecture which was held on 16 August, 2014 at IPSTC, Karen. The comments gleaned from your presentation, participation and plenary sessions during the lecture are summarized in this document. Your contribution led to a better understanding of the current challenges of peacekeeping in Africa. The lecture was extremely helpful and informative and we received invaluable feedback on the topic. This lecture has laid the foundation for improvement of our future Amani lecture series. I hope you will be able to join us in future sessions. Thank you once again for being our partners in the Amani Lecture series.

Group Photo: Amani Lecture, IPSTC, August, 16, 2014

Foreword

The IPSTC Amani Lecture 2014 report has been enormously enriched by the event held on the 16 August 2014. The report captures a broad spectrum of alternative models of peacekeeping in Africa. The Amani Lecture series is meant to collate information that will inform security policy makers in regional and national institutions. The workshop was attended by about 60 participants.

Three papers were presented by keynote speakers:

1) Prof. Macharia Munene: Strengthening the International Community's Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict countries in Africa

2) Major General (Rtd) Simon N. Karanja: Alternative Models of Peacekeeping Operations

3) Dr. Khamis Kenyi: Changing Dimensions of International Peacekeeping in Africa with particular focus on upcoming transitions in peacekeeping operations

The overall theme of the lecture was, 'The Changing Dimensions of International Peacekeeping in Africa'. The lecture topic is informed by survey of most conspicuous peace and security issues in the region and discussions among stakeholders. The lecture content was also enriched by subject matter experts from different organizations during the lecture.

I would like to thank the Government of Japan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for supporting this Amani Lecture successful. I would also like to thank distinguished guests, speakers and participants who made their valuable contributions that enriched the lecture and the report.

Brigadier Robert Kabage

Director

IPSTC

Acronyms

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ASF	Africa Standby Force
AU	African Union
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DFC	Deputy Force Commander
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSC	Defence Staff College
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FOC	Full Operational Capability
HDC	Henri Dunant Centre
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre
JMAC	Joint Military Analysis Centre
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
NDC	National Defence College
NSA	Non State Actors
PMC	Private Military Companies
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
UNAMID	United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur
UNAMIS	United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USIU-A	United States International University Africa

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1. Executive Summary

The International Peace Support Training Centre held Amani lecture on "Changing Dimensions of International Peacekeeping in Africa"on the 21st, August, 2014. The lecture focused on the current trends in international peacekeeping in Africa with a focus on two dimensions: the nature of current and upcoming transitions in peacekeeping operations and alternative models of peacekeeping. The Amani lecture gathered an audience composed of IPSTC staff, academics, civil society/practitioners, students from various universities, together with staff from other agencies involved in peace, security and humanitarian work. The lecture was opened by Brig. Robert Kabage, who welcomed participants and speakers. Prof. Timothy Gatara of IPSTC introduced the theme of the lecture noting the need to understand peacekeeping operations due to changing dimensions of peacekeeping and the multiplicity of players among other factors. He also provided guidance on the mode of presentation.

Prof. Macharia Munene of the United States International University (USIU) provided a thorough historical and sociological overview of the current situation of peace support operations. He provided a link between the African history and current state of peace support operations. He called for a change of perception of African actors' involvement in peacekeeping in Africa. The second speaker, Maj. General Simon N Karanja, Former Deputy Force Commander, AMISOM, gave an overview of the changing nature of peace support operations in Africa, and proposed some alternative models of peacekeeping in the African context. He mentioned the problem of countering terrorism as an example of the new tasks that peacekeepers are facing today. Finally, the third speaker, Dr. Bennet Khamis Kenyi, an Information Analyst from the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), UNMISS, gave an overview of peace support operations in Africa and possible ways of consolidating peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

After the three presentations, Prof. Timothy Gatara, Senior Researcher of IPSTC; invited the participants to join a plenary discussion. From the questions and comments raised by the different discussant, it was visible that peacekeeping in Africa is going through major changes and challenges. The speakers observed that African peacekeeping actors must rise to the occasion to define the future course of UN/AU peacekeeping. Indeed, in his closing remarks Brig. Robert Kabage noted the common feeling among the audience that the topic of this Amani lecture requires more time for academic discourse and reflection. The Director promised that IPSTC would organize similar events in the near future.

The Amani Lecture Series is an initiative of the Peace and Research Department at IPSTC. The overall goal of the series is to stimulate intellectual discussion on topics of relevance to regional peace and security initiatives. Lectures are conducted approximately once every six months and invitations are extended to all Nairobi based national and regional peace and security community.

1.1   Background to the Lecture

International peacekeeping deployments in Africa have reached a pivotal moment. After a period of multiple large-scale deployments to respond to crises in the 1990s, multilateral peacekeeping in Africa is entering a period of change and contraction driven by a number of factors, including (i) changes in conflict trends, (ii) the need for fiscal austerity in countries that typically finance the bulk of peacekeeping deployments, (iii) the recognition that this heavy footprint model of peacekeeping has not worked in supporting the development of a strong political process in some states, and finally, driven by the first three changes, (iv) the development of a broader range of tools to respond to crises.

This Lecture will explore the trends in international peacekeeping deployments to Africa along three dimensions. First, it will examine a number of upcoming expected transitions in peacekeeping operations, each driven by a combination of the above factors. Second it will demonstrate how alternative models of peacekeeping including civilian-led political missions, regional deployments and over the horizon security guarantees are increasingly important tools for crisis response. These first two developments are relying on increasingly dynamic partnerships between actors, both in headquarters and at the field level with subsequent ramifications on institutional relationships.

The risks in these changing strategies are manifold, and are often driven by rapidly unfolding situations rather than a strategic or coherent vision. Yet, developments over the past year have demonstrated the important role that peace operations continue to play in supporting post-conflict and post-crisis states as well as the continued national demand for this type of support. In examining the changing dimensions in international peace operations, the speakers sought to contribute to greater understanding of the challenges and impacts, in order to strengthen the international community's engagement in conflict and post-conflict countries in Africa.

1.2 Objectives

The overall aim of this Amani lecture is to foster synergies and strengthen co-operation among selected stakeholders active in the field of peace and security within Eastern Africa and based in Nairobi. More specifically, the forum will give the audience the opportunity to:

(1) Share experiences of peacekeeping in the current African context;

(2) Discuss emerging alternative models of peacekeeping;

(3) Explore possible ways of consolidating peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

1.2.1 Date and Venue

Thursday 21August 2014 at the Amani Lecture Hall at 14:00- 16:00 Hours, IPSTC, Karen

2. Directors Opening Address

The Director expressed profound appreciation and gratitude for participants' acceptance and honour of IPSTC's invitation to attend the Amani lecture on the; 'Changing Dimensions of International Peacekeeping in Africa'. He paid glowing tribute to three speakers noting that; Maj Gen (Rtd) Simon Karanja is a widely experienced practitioner of peacekeeping in Africa having been both a Deputy Force Commander (DFC) in UNMIS and AMISOM. He also noted Prof. Macharia Munene is well known for his scholarly enthusiasm in supporting peace and peacekeeping on the continent. The Director also expressed confidence in Dr Bennet Khamis Kenyi, a South Sudanese national working for UNMISS in the Joint Military Analysis Centre (JMAC) in the UN mission HQs.

The Director observed that the purpose of Amani Lecture is to update the audience on the status of Peace and Peacekeeping in Africa, and to share ideas on our journey together in the search for peace on the continent. The lecture also gives us an opportunity to explore the future of peace and peacekeeping, and to help us stay relevant and on the cutting edge of knowledge and technology in a rapidly changing peacekeeping scenario.

He noted that IPSTC has not held the Amani lectures for sometime due to a number of challenges including planning and the need to make the event a much richer occasion. This is not due to a loss of interest or enthusiasm, but it is mainly for reasons related to planning and the need to turn the Lecture series into an even better forum in the future. He revealed that IPSTC plans to compile information on the status of peace and peacekeeping on the continent and to present this in the form of an annual conference focused on the challenges that peacekeeping in Africa faces, and ways of overcoming them, in the near future. Following the above initiative, the Director noted that IPSTC will soon launch its first issue of its new Journal, 'The Africa Peace Review'.

"The Editorial Board is based here at IPSTC and is in the process of receiving and reviewing articles for the Journal. This is indeed a proud moment for the Centre, and we welcome you to contribute to the effort in the future. We hope to issue the Journal quarterly, and to maintain its production as a quality scholarly document that meets international standards."

The Journal will be heavily backed up by the research in peace that the centre continues to undertake through its Research Department.

Brig. R.G Kabage, Director, Dr. Gatara and Key Note Speakers

3. Key Note Speakers

3.1 Dr. Bennett Khamis Kenyi

Designation: Information Analyst, Joint Mission Analysis Centre United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

Area of discussion: *Upcoming Expected Transitions in Peacekeeping Operations*

Dr. Kenyi is a Southern Sudanese with a PhD in Peace and development studies and a Master degree in Humanitarian and Conflict Studies. He joined the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan(UNAMIS) in January 2005 as a Civil Affairs Officer and was deployed in Darfur for a duration of two and half years in order to provide support in setting up the Civil Affairs Offices in El- Fashir-north Darfur and El- Geneina- western Darfur. While in Darfur he was involved in conflict analysis in order to understand the dynamics of the Conflict in Darfur and used the information to support the then African Union mediation efforts for the resolution of the conflict in Darfur. This involved building networks with different key players in the conflict in Darfur including rebel groups and militia leaders by visiting their locations. While in Darfur he and his colleague negotiated the release of two Civilian Police Officers from the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), who were taken by the IDPs community leaders as hostages in Riyad camp in western Darfur. He also participated in a Joined United Nations/African Union Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to support the AMIS and the transition to the United Nations in June 2006.

In July 2007, he was redeployed back to Khartoum as focal person for Southern Sudan and his tasks included exploring issues related to the CPA at the national capital Khartoum and providing support to Southern Sudan Civil Affairs team in areas of need, through the conduction of field visits to find out

issues of concern. In June and July 2009, he was involved in providing support in Jonglei State stabilization efforts, by temporarily being deployed to Pibor and Akobo; where he was the only civilian officer amongst the military. While in Pibor he was able to manage a conflict between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Murle Youth Militias. When UNMIS mandate was not renewed, he was reassigned to his post in Southern Sudan as a Civil affairs officer with the new mission (UNMISS) but from 1st April 2012 to date he has been working with the Joint Mission Analysis centre as Information Analysts. He is also a part time lecturer with the title of assistant Professor at the Centre of Peace and Development studies in the University of Juba. He lectures Geopolitics of Peace and War, Conflict Resolution (Theory and Practice), International Peace and Security amongst others. He also supervises research thesis for post graduate students at the Centre of Peace and Development studies. He also facilitates in training workshops on issues related to Governance, Conflict Analysis, Conflict Resolution, Dialogue, Mediation and Negotiation skills and Peace Building and Reconciliation.

Prior to joining UNMIS, he worked with Save the Children(United Kingdom) for a duration of seven (7) years as a camp coordinator in charge of Save the Children(UK) projects at the IDPs camps and Urban Poor communities in Khartoum state, in addition to coordinating with the different levels of government and stakeholders.

3.2   Major General (Rtd) Simon N. Karanja

Designation: Former Deputy Force Commander, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
June 2012- Sep 2013
Area of Discussion: *Alternative Models of Peacekeeping*

Maj Gen (Rtd) Simon Nduashey Karanja is an acomplished retired military officer. He retired from the Kenya Defence Forces in Januany 2014 after a career spanning over 38 years. He has held various appointment in command, staff officer operations and logistics as well as in training institutions. Prior to his retirement he was the Deputy Force Commander Operations andPlanning in AMISOM Somalia. He participated in other UN missions as a DFC in UNMIS- Sudan and as the Contingent Commander of the Kenyan Forces in East Timor (Timorleste). He recently was contracted by the UN as a logistic consultant for United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) specifically to organise, establish

and implement the Logistic Support for SNA authorised by the UN Security Council Resolution 2124 (Nov 2013). He completed High School and joined the military. He is a graduate of the National Defence College(NDC) and the Defence Staff College (DSC) Kenya. Gen Karanja is Married and blessed with four (4) boys. In his free time he loves playing snooker, golf, table tennis and lawn tennis.

3.3   Prof. Macharia Munene

Designation: History Professor, United States International University

Area of Discussion: *Strengthening the International Community's Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict countries in Africa*

Prof. Macharia is a distinguished academic in Kenya and he makes commentaries on key peace and security issues in Kenya and Eastern Africa in local and international media. He has appeared in numerous radio, television and film programmes focusing on governance, diplomacy, peace and security themes. Macharia Munene is a long serving Professor of International Relations at the United States International University Africa (USIU-A). He is widely published on key issues of global and regional peace, security, diplomacy and international relations in local dailies and international journals.

He has served as an external examiner of several local public universities and he has been a visiting professor in Universities in Spain and the United States. Professor Macharia studied in the United States of America receiving a

PhD in Diplomatic History from Ohio University in 1985. He has supervised graduate students studying for Masters and PhD in Kenya and abroad. Prof. Macharia has also served as a Dean, School of Arts and Sciences, USIU- and Chairman, Division of Arts and Sciences, USIU-Africa and Chairman, Department of History, University of Nairobi. Prof. Macharia has received many academic awards both locally and abroad including Fulbright Senior Research Fellowship at Boston University.

4. Strengthening the International Community's Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict Countries in Africa

Macharia Munene

4.1 Introductory Remarks

I would like to approach my presentation by raising a question as to whether there is need to strengthen international engagement in African conflicts. If so, what has been the situation, and what can be done about it? The implication is that the engagement has been of poor quality and hence the need to strengthen. I would like to approach these by examining four overlapping concepts that are at play. These are *strength, international community, conflicts and post-conflicts, and Africa. These will be in sections namely concepts, the interplay with concepts, post-colonial conflicts in Africa, and international interventions in African conflicts.*

4.2 The Concepts
4.2.1 Strength

Strength connotes power, capacity, will and willingness, and ability to compel others to do what one wants. Will is determination and willingness is psycho-readiness to act irrespective of the risk. Ability to compel can be material, military, psychological, moral, intellectual, and mostly political. Politics is the ability to exercise and project power over other people, institutions, and countries at all levels. That ability can also mean capacity to deny resources or access to resources to rivals and potential rivals and thereby monopolize critical or strategic resources.

When that political ability is exercised over other people's space, it is called geopolitics, meaning the ability to manipulate space to achieve political ends. At the international level, this implies one country politically manipulating others to achieve its purported desires and to deny resources. African countries often find themselves at the receiving ends of such manipulations because they lack all types of strength.

Strength, and ability to use it to advantage, however, is dependent on the amount and type of knowledge at the disposal of the entity trying to exercise it. This makes knowledge and its control the most critical aspect of strength and distinguishes strong countries from weak ones. Strong countries tend to have policy makers

and officials who have proper command of three types of knowledge that are vital to the safeguarding of the interests of state. These are knowledge of self in terms of national philosophy and ideals, capabilities, weaknesses and vulnerable points, and general readiness. Second is knowledge of the national ideals, philosophies, resources, and capabilities in other countries that states interact with. Third is knowledge of the points of convergence and divergence with other states so as to know when to deal or cut. Ignorance of the three types of knowledge on the part of officials and policy makers is a liability to the state.

4.2.2 International Community

In common usage, the term *International Community* is mainly an amorphous *Euro* thing, meaning Western Europe and North America and the institutions that they control. The usage is at times extended to the *conceptual West* which includes countries that are geographically in the East such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand. In application, therefore, *international community* tends to be exclusive to, and actually synonymous with the conceptual West because it hardly refers to anything *Third World* whether African, Asian, or Latin America. To call for strengthening the *international community,* therefore, is to call for more involvement of the *conceptual West,* particularly the Euros in Africa. Is this the intent in Africa?

Yet even within the Euros there are pivotal countries that give direction and others tend to follow. The United States of America (USA/US), with its capacity to order the others around in the name of *international community,* is the key country. Next in the pecking order of Euro power politics are the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany. In most instances, due to World War II experience, Japan and Germany tend to tag along with what the US wants when dealing with Third World countries. This then is the *International Community* that is implied in the call for engagement in conflict and post conflict situations in Africa. Should this call be expanded to imply other extra-continental forces that are not part of the *conceptual West?*

4.2.3 Conflicts and Post-Conflicts

Conflicts and *post-conflicts* connote chaos, warlike activities, and inability to get along due to perceived incompatible differences. As concepts, conflicts are natural and cannot be avoided but their harmful effects can be managed or minimized. It is the successful management of harmful conflicts that leads to post-conflict situations that require constant monitoring in order to avoid relapsing back into harmful conflicts. When negative conflicts arise, therefore, the implication is that the people concerned have failed to manage conflict situations and have therefore inadvertently allowed a breach of the *peace*. This is partly because *peace* does not exist in itself, has to be worked at constantly. The call for the *International Community* to increase engagement in conflict and post-conflict situations in Africa implies that those involved in Africa have failed to manage negative conflicts or to maintain the peace once the conflicts are minimized. This appears to be the case in some parts, but not all. It is also accurate in that the African Union (AU) has limited capacity to handle challenges of security nature.

4.2.4   Africa

The term Africa is both geographical and conceptual. In application, Africa is mostly conceptual in that it has racial connotations riding on it. For instance, peoples in North Africa tend to identify and be identifies with the Arabs in the Middle East but not with peoples of tropical Africa. Similarly, for a long time, South Africa tended to be removed from Africa because of the white dominance and closeness to the conceptual West. That closeness is still intact despite the 1994 changes that brought in black political rule.

Africa, therefore, refers to the territories in tropical Africa that stretch from Senegal in the West to the Horn of Africa, from River Limpopo in the south to the Sahara Desert in the north and was actually the zone, in late 19th Century, of serious Euro territorial competition. After prolonged imperial ventures in which they had rewritten the past and created myths of their greatness that are still perpetuated in post-colonial times and, having produced an imperial offspring, the USA, the Euros met at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, to agree on how to divide Africa without killing each other. They all claimed they were imposing colonialism on Africans for the sake of humanity and civilization and even argued that Africans would know how good it is to be ruled by white people even if it is cruel. Does that kind of logic still resonate in international discourses?

Legitimacy for territorial claims was in Europe and each Euro-power was expected to create colonial states often using soldiers, administrators, and missionaries. The whole process was an exercise in mental impoverishment of the Africans who, through a new discipline of anthropology, became objects of study. As objects, Africans were not expected to participate in studying. They were to be guided and groomed to serve external interests. This remained true of independent African countries which, having been externally defined remained dependent on Euro-ways as they struggled to redefine their identities. There are several officials in policy making positions in African states who look up to the conceptual West for guidance in critical areas of state, including governance and security. At the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), African delegates debated how to balance pre-colonial and colonial identities in post-colonial environments. In many places, that debate was never concluded and the repercussions have been devastating.

4.3   The Interplay

The application of the four concepts is at play in post-colonial African countries. The image is that African states do not have strength to protect their sovereignty or capacity to know what their interests are. They remain objects of Euro ridicule and in perpetual need of outside intervention. Europeans, noted

Cambridge Historian John Lonsdale, construct Africa "*as the hopeless, history-less, 'other'*, the dark antipodes to the purposeful, liberal-above all, storied west." In the process, Africa appears like the place of chaos and civil wars, aid and aids, or what ex-British Prime Minister Tony Blair called "*the scar on the conscious of the world*".

Lack of strength explains suggestions for various types of interventions in Africa, mostly from the *International Community,* and conflicts and post-conflict troubles are common reasons. Some interventions are to provide humanitarian aid in times of crises, whether natural or manufactured, and others are simply to facilitate the activities of conflict entrepreneurs. There are times when African states and regional organizations call for extra-continental intervention as an admission that the enormity of the crisis is beyond individual countries or the region. There are other times when intervention is forced on African countries. Thus *African* countries become the centre of intervention by the *international community* because they lack *strength* so much that they cannot handle *conflicts* or sustain post-conflict situations of peace on their own and they then need external guidance. Is this an accurate portrayal?

4.3.1 Post-Colonial Conflicts in Africa

The colonial period was inherently divisive of the African peoples creating two types of new identities whose effects lingered on in post-colonial times. To serve colonial interests, all Africans in a colonial state had the same identity of being "natives" of British, French, Italian, and Belgian this or that. Their new identity was thus in connection with the European ruler in particular colonial administrative zones but not with their relatives across the new boundaries. Within the colonial state, they were also given new identities when they tried to challenge colonial authorities and it was then stressed that they were "tribes" that had been saved from killing each other by the benevolence of the Euros. As tribes, they could not live together without Euro guidance.

Right from the start of the post-colonial era in the 1960s, Africans tried to confront the identity challenge, using selected historical memory. At the centre was the balancing of pre-colonial and colonial identities in post-colonial environments. Some states, believing in irredentism, expansionism, and contractibility of states, wanted to dismantle colonial boundaries and presumably unite divided peoples by creating new states. Others accepted the sanctity of colonial boundaries and rejected expansionism and contractibility of state. This was a way of avoiding violent conflicts as each state tried to re-invent itself by creating a nation identity out of the multiplicity of peoples within the inherited colonial state. It was Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika who persuaded the OAU to accept colonial boundaries and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sister African state.

Still, many African states struggled to survive while facing the problems of friction between the idea of state and the idea of nation. Some people within refused to be part of the new state run by fellow Africans.

This made states to remain fragile and tended to create environment for disturbances because of perceived inability of security forces to command trust. This then helped to justify insurgency and the transfer of the sense of legitimacy to alternative centres.

This continental development seemingly led to the emergence of what appeared like clusters of conflict in Africa. In Western Africa, there was the Mano River cluster around Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. In Southern Africa is the Limpopo cluster embracing South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique. In Central Africa is the Great Lakes Region (GLR) cluster around Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. In Eastern Africa is the Horn of Africa (HoA) cluster around Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. In each cluster, the question of which pre-colonial identity to stress at times led to mass killings. They still argue on state or regime legitimacy and thereby perpetuate conflicts. And in each cluster, extra-continental interests were heavily involved in perpetuating chaos, often by exploiting internal identity differences.

In addition, the attempted identity balancing was complicated by the existing ideological and geopolitical Cold War rivalry for global dominance between the US led-West and the Soviet led-East. It meant that African states were not given chance to sort themselves out and the immediate consequences were violence in the Great Lakes, especially in Congo which was actually the genesis of the scramble for Africa in the 1880s. There were also numerous coups across the continent, some externally engineered while others were the results of internal rivalries and incompetence.

During the Cold War, therefore, the *international community* made little serious effort to contain conflicts. This changed slightly as violent conflicts became common in fragmented states such as Somalia turned into a haven of international terrorism. The possible disintegration of other states, apart from Somalia, is a constant concern that attracts attention and became good reason for involvement of the international community.

4.4   The Necessity of Engagement by the International Community

Is it necessary to strengthen the engagement of the *international community?* The answer is yes. This is partly because of the myriads of seemingly unending violent conflicts in Africa that are global in origin and impact. They therefore need global response and this is where strengthening the engagement of the *international community* applies in several ways.

First, there is the issue of attitude towards Africans. Previous interventions tended to treat Africans as objects, the peace kept, with little say on the actual peace keeping or who the *peace keepers* should be. The inappropriateness of particular ill prepared *peace keepers* simply exacerbated the existing conflict instead of successfully managing it. This weakness can be turned into strength if policy makers undertake serious

analysis of the potential *peace kept* and peace keepers to determine the compatibility of the two. It does not help when *peace keepers* are rumoured to be looters, rapists, and collaborators in assorted conflict entrepreneurship.

Second, the meaning of *international community* in terms of usage would need to be expanded to include other key players in global geopolitics. Restricting the application of the term to the conceptual West or the Euros ignores such forces as the BRIC countries of China, Russia, India, and Brazil. If ways can be found of reducing the rivalry for resources and political leverage between the Euros and the BRICs in Africa while increasing collaborative efforts, this would be one of strengthening international engagements in settling conflicts. At present, the rivalry makes it difficult to settle conflicts or maintain peace after settlement. The chaos in South Sudan is partly due to this rivalry between the Euros and the BRICs.

Third, the level of commitment on the part of the *International Community* to combating, in Africa, such global challenges as terrorism, piracy, and drug dealings needs re-examination. Members do not seem serious. Inadequate financial and military logistical support of African forces like AMISOM, at times tied to the political whims of policy makers, tends to encourage global terrorism. Information that, depending on the issue, the *international community* occasionally gangs up with reputed terrorist organizations gives the impression that members are not committed to ending conflict. Kenya has had many occasions to complain about the seeming lack of commitment on the part of the international community.

Fourth, the *international community* engagement in Africa can be strengthened by adopting positive instead of negative bully attitude towards Africa and Africans. In the 1990s and 2000s, prominent Euro-Africanists started calling for the de-certification of African states at the United Nations. The argument was that African states had problems upholding sovereignty within a state, due to internal challenges. The West advocated for redrawing of the map and portrayed sovereignty in Africa as farce, 'phantom' or 'mirage'. Some of them advised African states to share sovereignty with extra-continental entities and even went to the extent of claiming that Euro engineered coups in Africa were "progressive". Such attitudes still exist in Euro circles and they do not help.

Fifth, the International Community's application of the doctrine of legitimizing insurgency in targeted countries in effort to effect regime change has been detrimental rather than positive. Members then appear to be condescending promoters of conflicts in Africa and this weakens their positions, especially if the state in question is pivotal to regional wellbeing. The general perception that members of the conceptual West or international community actively funded, advised, and campaigned for or against particular presidential candidates in Kenya made them guilty of conflict mongering. They did that to legitimize

political insurgency and it seemingly backfired. To strengthen international community engagement in Africa in reducing conflicts, therefore, needs to avoid international community being perceived as partisan brigades of one party.

4.5   Plenary Discussions

It was generally agreed that African technocrats and policy makers need to understand conflict and that peacekeepers must keep their dignity. The concept of the international community should encompass BRICS so that African interests can be taken into consideration. Africa has been a playing field of international powers rivalry in competition for resources. African peacekeepers can be empowered with resources from the West to take care of international terrorism/piracy and drug dealing. The West should adapt positive attitudes towards Africa. Africa must also rise above blaming the West for all its trouble; the question of poor leadership and poor governance should also be taken into consideration.

5.   Alternative Models of Peacekeeping Operations

Major Gen. (Rtd) S.N. Karanja

5.1   Introduction

Since the inception of the UN, there has been a total of 71 conflicts which the UN has authorised peacekeeping operations. The first UN missions were the UN Truce Supervision Organization to monitor the Arab-Israel Ceasefire in 1948 and the UN Military Observer Group in the Indo-Pak war in 1949 to monitor the ceasefire in the Kashmir. Thereafter conflicts have been increasing by the decade, between 1940 and 50 there were only 4 missions while between 60s and 70s, there were 3 missions, and between 80s and 90s, there were 41 missions and from 2000 to 2010, there were 15 missions. One of the reasons for the increase in number of the UN missions has also been the dictates of the changes in the models of peacekeeping operations.

To be able to discuss the **alternative Models of Peacekeeping** we must first understand what are the imperatives that have caused the changes in the models of peacekeeping operations, reflect back to see whether the models that have been in practice since the inception of the UN in 1945 are still relevant and whether the metamorphosis is still going on. We then can ask ourselves what we need to do to address this metamorphosis and develop alternative models of peacekeeping.

The first imperative is the dynamic nature of conflict. Conflict has been changing since the beginning of mankind. Conflicts in the Stone Age and during the Medieval Wars were not the same, neither was the WWII the same as the First. It is this dynamic nature of conflict that made the **League of Nations** fail to stop the WWII leading to the formation of the United Nations (UN) with the determination to, and I quoted from the UN Charter;**"save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind…And to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security…"**.This changing nature of conflict is still ongoing. Conflicts before the end of the Cold War are very different from the Post-Cold war conflicts.

Conflict in the post WWII were mainly politically motivated and fanned by the super power rivalry, mostly Inter-State conflict. The end of the "Cold War" ushered in a new generation of civil war known as "New Wars", mostly Intra-State conflicts which are economically motivated. This was as a result of withdrawal of external resources provided by the superpowers to wage proxy wars. These "New Wars" have led to the rephrasing of Carl Von Clausewitz dictum, **"War has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means".**

The end of the Cold War did not only remove a major source of conflict from the international system but also removed the paralyses the UN suffered due to super power rivalry which often crippled the Security Council. The role of the UNSC increased in all spheres of enhancing peace in the world such as Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making, Economic Sanctions, and more importantly an increase by four times, the number of UN Peacekeeping Operations between 1987 and 1999. The change was not only in number but also in size and complexity of the missions. The complexity has been caused by the changing nature of conflict today where there are more parties to the conflict, more often than not the conflict involve non-State actors such as rival War Lords, faction leaders, paramilitary forces or organized criminals who do not respect the principle of reciprocity in International Law.

We have seen in recent times a sharp increase in number of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). These wars now include the targeting of civilians in form of Genocide, ethnic cleansing, fights over the resources and as retaliatory actions. Unlike in the cold war period where refugees were side effects of war; today they are a central part to the objectives and tactics of these conflicts. Examples of where civilians have been used as human shields are rife in many missions.

The second imperative is the changing Strategic Environment that has caused rapid evolution of peacekeeping. The changing pattern of conflicts we have just discussed, the changing major powers relations and the evolving structures of the Regional Security arrangements, shape the evolution of UN Peacekeeping. We have already witnessed three (3) phases of UN Peacekeeping evolutions during the

Post-Cold War period. Firstly, the expansion of UN Missions in the 80s and 90s; where the UN missions increased from 8 in the 70s to 80s to 41. Secondly the failures of the UN missions in the Mid 90s and thirdly the ensuing retrenchment leading to a new generation of missions with mandates involving new responsibilities in the civilians, post-conflict spheres with new actors, often in partnership arrangements, the so called *"Hybrid"* Missions. The fourth phase is the shifting and assertive USA policy after the September 11, 2001 (Referred to as 911) which is changing the geographical focus of some of the donor countries as well as in the UNSC towards terrorism, complex security environment, challenging political terrain for the UN, the middle East and *Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),* which may impact on allocation of resources for UN PKO. Conversely the ongoing changes in the pattern of conflict and the changing perceptions of the security threats may further reshape the Peacekeeping landscape.

5.2   Models of Peacekeeping Missions

AS we discuss the alternative models of peacekeeping, we need to look at what models of peacekeeping have been practiced by the UN over the last seven decades. There are mainly three models of peacekeeping known to have been in existence. These are, the Traditional Model (*also referred to as First Generation Peacekeeping Operations)* under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, Regional Arrangements under Chapter VIII (*referred to as Multinational Peacekeeping operations mostly under Chapter VII but authorised by the UNSC).* The third model is the **coalition of the willing** *(which is often used inter-changeably with Multinational PKO)* is a multi-state operation which is not authorised by the UN. It is therefore essential that we draw a line between these two models, one mandated by the UN while the other is not but eventually transforms into a Regional Arrangement or Multi-national PKO.

5.3   Emerging Trends in PKO in the Post-Cold War

Most conflicts have occurred in Africa than other continents in the recent past. Out of 39 countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa, 21 have been involved in an Intra-State conflict (represents 53%). There were more people killed in these wars than the rest of the world combined and Africa has the highest number of Refugees and IDPs. Conversely Africa has the highest number of troops under UN command (74%) while Developed states troops contribution for UNPKO has declined significantly to a mere 6% since 1999. This has been prompted by the notion that still lingers in most Western National Capitals that Africa should solve its own problems. The contribution by most Western world countries in Multinational PKO has rapidly grown compared to UN-Commanded operations.

Regional Arrangement PKO have been on the rise since the 1990s, while there has also been another emerging model of PKO - the Bi-lateral arrangement between states such as Norway and Sir Lanka where UN is not seen as an appropriate actor in the peace making process.

Notable also is an increase in the so called the *Coalition of the willing* where intervention by single state with symbolic contribution by other states have occurred without authorization by the UN. Similarly there is a growing role of Non-State Actors (NSA), particularly NGOs where in some cases, some NGOs go beyond their mandate and conduct activities that are purely mandated to the Mission. For example in Aceh Mission, Henri Dunant Center(HDC), observed and facilitated implementation of peace agreement; which was in violation of the UN Mandate in Aceh. This necessitates the formulation of UN policy regarding involvement of NSA.

Private military Companies (PMCs) are on the increase in most Missions. In most cases their role is controversial. However there is less controversy over Private Military Armies contracted by some Governments for clear cut objectives. The UN has in the past given clear guidance that no PMC should engage in activities that involve use of Force, other than those authorised and supervised by the UN. There has been exponential increase in the civilian dimension in PKO. The civilian tasks and mandate have increased as a result of the changes in conflict patterns. The roles have gone beyond providing assistance to a full governing authority as was the case in East Timor (UNTAET). This has called for the requirement of civilian with a wide range of skills to manage non-military tasks such as Human Rights (HR), gender, child soldiers, Children Associated with Armed Conflicts (CAAC) policies and Humanitarian Affairs (HA) coordination etc. There is also an increase in Transitional Administration Mission since the first one in Namibia (UNTAG) in the 90s. Their roles have been steadily increasing culminating in the UNMIK and UNTAET where the UN had full governing authority. These types of missions have a large civilian component compared to the Traditional PKO.

5.4   Influence by the International Community on Emerging Models
5.4.1 United States of America

The USA is a major player in shaping the peacekeeping operations in Africa. The current Obama Administration has clearly stated that the US will support UN missions particularly in Africa. The Administration is fully aware of the devastating effects fragile states can pose beyond their borders and to the US National Security. The US, other than being the biggest financial contributor to Peacekeeping has always provided Strategic Airlift to most peacekeeping Forces. The US policies are expansive and assertive and are shaping the evolution of foreign policies and structures in Europe, China, Middle East and beyond creating both opportunities and challenges for peacekeeping. It cannot therefore be taken for granted when developing alternative models of peacekeeping.

5.4.2 *European Union and China*

I have chosen to talk about these two Donors because they present competing models of Peacekeeping in as well as the sphere of influence in Africa. The European Union (EU) is another contributor to the UN peacekeeping fund. It has supported a number of missions particularly in Africa since the formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Currently the EU is supporting over 6 missions (DRC, Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia and Guinea). It is a key supporter of the AU's Security Policy and provides funding through the African Peace Fund. They are a major donor in Africa where they provide more than half of the International Aid to Africa. The EU is also key partner in the promotion of good governance, Human Rights and Democracy in the continent. Conversely, China is an emerging Donor in Africa which has became another player in Africa. Although a late entrant, in participating in peacekeeping mission as from 2007, it has over 1800 peacekeepers. China has increased its Diplomatic presence in Africa through dialogue with African states and regional organizations, particularly the African Union (AU).Despite having similar objectives, they are promoting an alternative model of peacekeeping in Africa. Their perceptions of preconditions for peace are divergent. The EU model is based on the promotion of Sovereignty pooling and the idea of Human Rights and good governance, while China model on the other hand is based on the principle of equality among Sovereign States and on the idea that economic development is a precondition for peace. It is quite evident that the two powers are competing for recognition by the African leaders.

The reaction of the African leader and the AU seem in some case to be contradictory. Though the Chinese model seems more attractive to the African leaders the AU structures are modelled in line with the EU structures and norms. We may also discuss other partners in peacekeeping and their influence in the emerging alternative models of peacekeeping in Africa.

5.5   Alternative Models of Peacekeeping Operations

The foregoing discussion was intended to create an awareness of the changing nature of conflicts and the impact they have on the types and models of future peacekeeping. Future models of UN peacekeeping missions will be influenced by some of the imperatives and dictates discussed here amongst others. The changes will largely be dependent on the political, economic, socio-cultural and security environmental shifts. I wish to highlight some of the critical ones that I feel will greatly influence evolvement of alternative models in peacekeeping. These include:

a.   The current models of peacekeeping operations will continue, particularly for the ongoing missions. The Traditional model is unlikely to change as they have been going on for a long time and the security environment has stabilized unless a relapse of gains already made leading to recurrence of the conflict.

b.   Most Regional arrangements or Multinational models of peacekeeping are also unlikely to change. If any change is to occur it will be dependent on the situation on the ground. Should there be a political, economic, socio-cultural or security shift, then the model may experience a change dictated by the area of change, be it political or economical or otherwise. Due to AU and Regional organization resources constraint, the UN and other partners will continue to support African peacekeeping, though at reducing levels but culminating to "Hybrid" missions.

c.   The model that is likely to experience a major change is the Coalition of the willing. The Geopolitical environmental changes are likely to be caused by the shifting national interests of the developed world and the changing international relations in the various Regions of the world, which may cause a shift in the nature and types of intervention by Coalition forces.

d.   Another major dictate that has emerged and is present in a number of missions like Somalia, Chad and Mali, is the presence of Terrorist organizations, with or without affiliation to other international terrorist organizations like Al Qaida. Future missions will need to consider the inclusion of Counter Terrorist measures in their alternative models of peacekeeping. The ability of these terrorist to export violence to other neighbouring nations such as; Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti by "Al Shabaab" will need to be addressed in the mandates. Similarly the "Boko Haram" in Nigeria are currently attacking targets in neighbouring countries in West Africa.

e.   The impact created by the lack participation of western world nations in African peacekeeping operations will need to be addressed. Africa needs to consider expediting the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), particularly the African Standby Force (ASF) component,   through which it can carry out interventions in conflict zones when the International community may not be willing or is unable to intervene. This will reduce the number of "Coalition of the willing" interventions and increase the legitimacy of African forces in such interventions.

f.   The alternative model will need to address the emergence of Private Military Companies (PMC) and regulate the activities as well as those of International Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs), NGOs, Individual Organizations and other players in the mission.

g.   The alternative model should develop mechanism to address the coordination of the international effort by the international community, partners and other players in the mission. This will eradiate the current competition amongst the major donors and creates synergy in the mission.

h.   The alternative model should focus more on the protection of civilians due to the changing nature of conflicts. It should also consider a much larger civilian component to address mandate tasks that are purely civilian. The military should engage in those tasks that win the hearts and minds of the civilian population.

i.   Africa must address the resources constraint gap which is likely to increase due to inconsistency by the partners in peace. African Nations needs to develop capacity for both Force Multipliers and Force Enablers including logistics due to this inconsistency caused by demands by other Regions of the world.

5.6   Other Alternative Models of Peacekeeping

There may be circumstances that warrant a peacekeeping model, but should not be used as a default option. Circumstances may dictate that a peacekeeping mission is unnecessary or not feasible. There may be other appropriate alternative methods that can be tailored to fit that particular political or operational context. There may be a need to deploy predominantly civilian or unarmed military which have been used in previous UN missions. These may include a mission specifically tailored for mediation, a civilian or military monitoring and inspection or verification mission with a protection force over the horizon and thirdly missions that focus on training and support factions, incorporating all the three components of a mission. There may be another category of Preventive deployment as was once used in Macedonia which was exceptional.

6.   Conclusion

The 'alternative models in peacekeeping' is a wide subject that I may not have even scratched the top of the subject given time limitations. I have only provided the food for thoughts. Some of the issues raised need to be considered further as they may be critical in improving our responses to complex emergencies and resolve our disputes in African in a more efficient and effective manner.

Part of the Audience, Amani Lecture, August, 2014

7. Changing Dimensions of International Peacekeeping in Africa with Particular focus on upcoming transitions in peacekeeping operations

Dr Bennet Khamis Kenyi

A paper presented on changing dimensions of international peacekeeping in Africa with particular focus on upcoming transition in peacekeeping operations.

This paper will provide background information about peacekeeping operations in Africa, with emphasis on some of the successful ones and those which have been problematic. The upcoming transition will put more focus on Mali and Somalia. To start with, International peacekeeping deployments to Africa have reached a pivotal moment. After a period of multiple large-scale deployments to respond to crises in the 1990s, multilateral peacekeeping in Africa is entering a period of change and contraction driven by a number of factors, including changes in conflict trends, the need for fiscal austerity in countries that typically finance the bulk of peacekeeping deployments, the recognition that this heavy footprint model of peacekeeping has not worked in supporting the development of a strong political process in some states, and finally, driven by the first three changes, the development of a broader range of tools to respond to crises.

7.1 Background Information

Peace operations in Africa have increased in complexity in terms of goals, approaches, and actors. Actors on the ground include not only UN military, police, and civilian representatives, but also state contingents from regional organizations (African Union, ECOWAS, IGAD), humanitarian and development NGOs, and occasionally private security firms. This paper examines the tensions among these various actors in terms of differences in organizational goals and cultures. Particular emphasis is given to the tensions between military and police and between military and civilian actors. These tensions make it more difficult to successfully organize integrated missions in the field.

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa's relatively more powerful states have been increasingly asked to provide peacekeeping forces to assist their weaker neighbours embroiled in civil war. Supporting this trend, a variety of Sub-regional, regional and international bodies have facilitated the deployment of troops from these stronger countries such as Nigeria, Senegal or Uganda on the ground in African states in crisis. I ask if this contemporary trend of "African solutions to African problems" is enough to manage conflict and confront state fragility on the continent.

The international community finds it convenient to argue for the regionalization of peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Africa. But what kinds of "African solutions" are being provided? In recent years, we have seen more activist states with strong militaries come to dominate interventions on the continent. Has this type of Africanization of intervention helped people in need or does it further strong state interests both on the continent and abroad? In addressing this question, this paper looks at nineteen fragile African civil conflict wrecked states between 1989 to 2010 in which another African state(s) intervened with its own armed forces, either as part of a multilateral grouping or unilaterally. The overall objective of this paper is to arrive at a better understanding of the critical actors that are increasingly being called upon in managing peacekeeping operations to assist fragile states on the continent during the period of transition.

7.2   Regional and Sub- regional Peacekeeping in Africa

The scope, decision, and the implementation of peacekeeping missions requires balancing interests of international, regional, and national actors. This paper seeks to evaluate the development of peacekeeping operations of both Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) based on previous interventions. It draws on the ECOWAS missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau and SADC operations in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to evaluate the strength of the mechanisms for intervention. Some of the questions posed are: What accounts for greater successes of one organization over another? What are the impacts for regional peacekeeping mechanisms emanating from these cases? How do the degree and scope of coordination affect regional peacekeeping institutions?

It has to be noted that peacekeeping interventions can sometimes lead to conflicts among participating states themselves, states and organizations, and even among organizations. In order to maximize the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and to create best practices with forward-looking implications, regional international peacekeeping regimes, once operational, require the on-going development of norms and procedures. Thus, as institutions, peacekeeping arrangements evolve over time through strengthening or atrophying in their capacity to resolve conflicts. Both horizontal cooperation and conflict and vertical cooperation and conflicts impact peacekeeping ventures. The successes and failures of specific operations in turn, affect the future shape of ECOWAS and SADC operations and intervention. The most effective missions require both horizontal and vertical coordination and conflict minimization for regime development and peacekeeping success on the ground.

7.3   Lessons from Burundi, Darfur and Somalia

The history of the practice of traditional peacekeeping first arose from the missions authorized and primary implemented by the United Nations (UN). The actors, mandate and missions have significantly changed and expanded since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Regional organisations such as the AU, ECOWAS, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) are more involved in peace operations. Their mandates have also evolved from merely observing peace (notably, the UN Emergency Force in Egypt (UNEF 1), the first UN Peacekeeping operation) to more complex operations requiring extensive civilian protection. Such expansion in the mandate of peace support operation has led to scholarship on both the conceptual linkages and contestations with Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In Africa, the traditional UN dominance in peace support operations is rapidly being replaced with leadership of the AU in the deployments of various operations in the continent. The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU led to a more interventionist normative and institutional arrangements.

7.4   Negotiating Influence and Autonomy with External Powers

The question of African ownership and Africanization of peace operations has been the subject of a growing literature. So far, the attention has been mainly put on the political and legal dimensions of this phenomenon. Questions addressed have revolved around the following issues: is the increased participation of African actors good news? Are they in a better position to solve African conflicts compared to international actors? What is the legal basis for their action? Which autonomy is granted to them by chapter VIII of the UN Charter?

The dependence on African initiatives over international assistance in peacekeeping in the continent has certainly been noted, but the diverse and recurrent manifestations of this situation in the African personnel's everyday practices have not been systematically assessed. Through an historical perspective, going from OAU operations in Chad to African interventions in Central African Republic (CAR) and AU initiatives in Darfur and Somalia, this paper will first describe the continuity of Africa's material dependence over non-African actors in the field of security, and more particularly multilateral interventions. It will also tackle more recent debates around the reinforcement of African capabilities and resources, including the establishment of an African standby force and the debate at the UN Security Council regarding the possibility to fund regional initiatives through UN assessed contributions

7.5   Collective Conflict Management in Action

This paper will provide a critical analysis of the variety of military operations conducted by external actors in Somalia between 2006 and 2012. The principal operations were carried out by Ethiopia, Kenya and the AU, as well as a coalition of countries which conducted various maritime operations aimed at ending piracy off the Somali coastline. None of them were examples of traditional peacekeeping but were instead variants of peace enforcement. The AU's largest and longest running military operation, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is this paper's primary focus because it involved so many different actors: while the AU and UN provided the authority for the mission, two African states (Uganda and Burundi) provided the bulk of the troops, while the US, the EU, the UN and several other states provided essential equipment and training as well as logistical and financial assistance. AMISOM deployed to Mogadishu in early 2007 lacking adequate resources, troop numbers and a supportive political framework, and facing a growing popular insurgency. Yet by early 2012, AMISOM had adapted to these challenges to make major military gains and become Somalia's longest running peace operation. With an authorized strength of over 17,000 soldiers, AMISOM has been tasked with, among other things, countering insurgents beyond Mogadishu, VIP protection, security sector reform, supporting political dialogue and reconciliation, as well as maritime security tasks.

The multiple actors involved in these military operations raised important challenges particularly those related to the development of a political strategy, strategic coordination, and military effectiveness. In terms of impacts, while the various military operations all made some dent in the Al-Shabaab insurgency, none of them succeeded in defeating the rebels, creating a durable and inclusive peace process, or establishing a legitimate and effective government in Somalia.

7.6   One Country Two system: Case of Sudan

In 1983, the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was founded in the South to fight for self-determination. A full-fledged peace and wealth-sharing agreement was reached in 2005 with the government in Khartoum. A large UN Mission, United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had been deployed after Resolution 1590 was passed in 2005 to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement during the six years transitional period. Due to the ambiguity of its mandate, it however faced difficulties in protecting civilians. While the North-South conflict had started to be considered resolved, another full-scale conflict started to erupt in the North Western part of Sudan which is the size of France, Darfur. The crisis had the potential to be "Southern Sudan speeded up". The AMIS peacekeeping mission of the African Union in Darfur did not reach the numbers required by its mandate to protect civilians.

Eventually, in 2007 the UN and AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) force was set up as a hybrid force. The international community pushed to extend the UNMIS mandate to the Darfur region to have one single operation. Yet this became impossible when the Sudanese government made it clear that it would only accept a mission with a strong "African" component and had a say on which nationalities it was ready to accept in the mission. The mission could not easily keep peace in an on-going conflict situation.

In the 2011 January 9th referendum, Southern Sudanese voters massively decided for secession. Resolution 1996 (2011) established the UNMISS, a new mission to help establish peace and security in South Sudan for an initial period of one year on the basis that "security and development are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable peace". Last, another less known mission, UN Interim Stabilization Force in Abyei (UNISFA), was deployed in the contested border region of Abyei, composed only of an Ethiopian contingent since mid-2011. The question will be whether the three very different peacekeeping missions in Sudan (UNAMID, UNMISS, UNISFA) are together able to address challenges of the post-secession context.

7.7   International Peace Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The conflict in the DRC which unfolded in the mid-1990s has not only been referred to as "Africa's world war" in which more than 5 million people have lost their lives since 1998, untold numbers became refugees and millions were injured, raped, and orphaned, but it has also provoked massive interventions by the international community. However, and despite the large budget expended by numerousness actors, no sustainable peace has so far been established in the DRC and especially in the country's eastern provinces.

The reasons for the apparent failure of the international peace building efforts are mainly located in material constraints and the lack of political will, coordination problems between and among actors and the imposition of liberal values. Furthermore, the relationship and the prevalent power disparity between the external interveners and the local counterparts, the so-called intervened upon, is more and more identified as an obstacle. This approach is motivated by the understanding that although international peace operations are understood as an important instrument of the international community to prevent, contain or manage violent conflicts, they are not uncontested and it is highly disputed whether and to what extent they contribute to establishing peace in former conflict areas. This means that the impact of peace operations on the ground still remains largely unknown. In other words, there is little knowledge to what extent and through which particular measures international peace operations bring about positive changes in conflict environments such as eastern Congo.

7.8   The Government of Sudan's Reaction to Deployment in Darfur

The responses of the government of Sudan to the deployment of robust peacekeeping missions on its territory have also to be looked at more critically. It contrasts Khartoum's acquiescence to UNMIS, deployed in 2005 after signing a peace agreement with the rebels from South Sudan, with its resistance against the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur. On the basis of Sudanese press reports as well as interviews with decision-makers in Khartoum, the paper goes beyond the usual explanations and looks at the normative dimension of the government's responses to robust peacekeeping. It thus argues that the infusion of the debate about peacekeeping in Darfur with responsibility to protect (R2P), language created a backlash from a government that perceived its sovereignty as being undermined. However, the attempt to conjure up anti-interventionist solidarity from international allies as well as from within the Sudanese political class ultimately failed, and the government was forced to accept the deployment of a hybrid peacekeeping mission, UNAMID.

In spite of this, since the deployment of UNAMID, Khartoum has continued to put operational and political obstacles, essentially preventing the mission from fulfilling its mandate. Thus, the paper aims to make sense of the politics of peacekeeping in Sudan, and, more generally, it seeks to shed light on situations when peacekeeping missions become agents of the R2P norm in a context of host government resistance against it.

7.9   The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan UNMISS is one of the most ambitious operations so far in the history of the UN in terms of local level peacebuilding. UNMISS is aiming to establish 35 County Support Bases (CSBs) that shall be a platform and a portal for early peacebuilding activities. The CSBs are part of a very ambitious plan to further strengthen the presence of national authorities on the local level. Based on a principle of equality between international peacekeepers and national authorities, each of the CSBs will co-locate local authorities with the UN, sharing the same standards of buildings, internet access and facilities.

They will also facilitate access for other partners within and outside the UN system, including civil society organisations (CSOs). As such, the CSBs are carrying a great promise to the local population that the mission will be wise to heed. Unless their presence can be paralleled with service delivery and real peace dividends for local populations, they will result in anger and loss of confidence in both peacekeepers and local authorities. They will thus be a prism through which it may be possible to follow and measure to which degree the international community and the government in Juba is able to despite the trust and confidence needed to achieve 'real' peacebuilding from the ground up in South Sudan.

7.10   The Evolving Response of the International Community to the Situation in Mali

The institutional and security crises in Mali have prompted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to authorize, at the end of March 2012, the planning for the standby force deployment in what has been coined the ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA). The context surrounding discussions about the mission has been fraught with misunderstandings, tensions and contradictions between ECOWAS, as well as, to a lesser extent, the AU and the UN, on the one hand, and the transitional Malian authorities, on the other.

This paper explores the enactment of the principle of subsidiarity between the AU and ECOWAS on a difficult terrain, in the midst of the conflicting interests of West African states, of other states in the region, and of extra-continental powers. If ever deployed, this peace support operation will be the first ECOWAS mission since Liberia and Sierra Leone, some 20 years ago, to engage in a peace support operation of the type the AU is currently waging in Somalia. This phenomenon, in turn, buttresses arguments that a doctrine of peace operations led by African actors with a specific understanding of the use of force which harks back to earlier operations in West Africa, is currently emerging on the continent in an attempt to face the ongoing complex security challenges.

7.11   Regional Intervention and Peacekeeping in the DRC and Somalia

Peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa have changed significantly since the first large operation during the Congo crisis in 1960-1964. Apart from shifts in the nature and setup of UN peacekeeping, the remarkable move from the principle of non-intervention to "non-indifference" in Africa itself and the emerging African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) have attracted much attention. This paper argues that despite this new setting there is also a continuity of interventions by African powers in conflicts outside the UN or AU frameworks. More importantly, such interventions by individual states have occurred side by side with internationally mandated missions in two central theatres of armed conflict: Somalia and the DRC. Both are the centerpiece of a regional conflict formation with non-state armed groups, but also state forces operating across borders on a regular basis.

In Somalia, the establishment of the AMISOM was meant to replace Ethiopian military involvement, but the neighbour's forces have repeatedly intervened after an official withdrawal in 2009. Furthermore, Kenya directly intervened in Somalia after October 2011 and only got approval from the AU later, followed by the plan to incorporate Kenyan forces into AMISOM. Both countries' stated intention was to fight armed

groups, mainly Al-Shabaab, and to secure stability along their borders. Similarly, the Eastern DRC has time and again seen military interventions by neighbouring Rwanda based on an agreement between the Congolese and the Rwandan Presidents after November 2008. Military action was directed against the remaining Rwandan Hutu rebel group FDLR in Eastern Congo where most of the forces of the UN peacekeeping (and now stabilization) mission in the country are deployed since 1999. There have also been joint operations of Congolese and Ugandan forces against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in 2009. The establishment of a multinational force under an AU umbrella to hunt down the LRA was launched in March 2012.

In both cases, the interventions had two key characteristics: they overall took place with the agreement of the affected country, in Somalia of the Transitional Federal Government, and the operations were not part of the international missions, but also not directed against them. Even if the first point eases concerns under international law, the consequences in political and military terms are largely unknown. Questions can also be asked about whether parallel operations by international missions and individual powers have functioned as a division of labour or rather undermined each other due to different interests and strategies? How have the different players interacted and adapted to the changing setting? Why has this diverse picture of interventions occurred in Central and East Africa in contrast to West Africa, another main theatre of conflict where responses to crises and conflict have been more coherent?

7.12 Conclusions

In the last few years, the UN peace operations were once more said to be at the crossroads, prompting extensive reviews and analyses in the academia as well as within the UN system. These have mainly focused on the UN's overstretched capacities, including equipment, finance and personnel, the effectiveness of UN operations and their grappling with new and ambitious concepts, namely the protection of civilians. There are indications that UN peace operations face a new and perhaps less expected challenge. The UN faces increasing resistance by the host countries that the UN is seeking to assist, especially, it seems, in the stages of a peace operation that focuses on post-conflict peace-building.

In recent years, the governments of Burundi and DRC have pushed through the reduction of peacekeeping personnel or forced the wholesale withdrawal of peace operations despite the concerns of the UN. The case of Chad is similar. The peacekeepers there have a very restricted mandate, but at the request of the Chadian government, the mission was terminated in 2010. Recently, in Sierra Leone, the government of Sierra Leone was strongly suspected to have asked the UN to withdraw its head of mission, perceived to be too critical and intrusive by the Sierra Leonean government.

It remains to be seen whether these examples signal a trend that will be emulated by the governments of other countries where there have been interventions. But this trend highlights a problem that has not been given due attention by academic observers and the UN: the consent of a host government to UN peace-building cannot be taken for granted. Much of the debate on peacekeeping are related to mandate implementation, notably of how to consolidate a fragile peace process, always presuming that all the main stakeholders agree to what the UN freely offers as 'outside assistance'. The emerging question is whether there is a new hostility to UN missions in weak African states? Have African governments become more assertive and sovereignty-minded? Or is the refusal or withdrawing of consent by host governments a backlash and response to ever more intrusive and longer UN peace operations, deemed by policy-makers to be necessary to win the peace? What should and can the UN do if the assistance they offer in support of peace consolidation is rejected by their putative national 'partners'; especially when the countries in question continue to face serious post-conflict challenges?

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8.   United Nations doc. A/50/230 Comprehensive Review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in All their aspects. Report of the Special committee on peacekeeping operations, 22June 1995.

8.   Plenary Contributions

8.1.1 Questions

1)   How can Africa overcome western dependence on donors in peacekeeping and how committed are African countries to deployment such as in Mali and Somalia?

2)   How has the changing nature of peacekeeping with respect to peace enforcement in Somalia in formed AMISOM and the proposed UN Takeover?

3)   Can the bilateral peacekeeping model be taken as aggression?

4)   Why do Africans focus too much on colonialism a historical episode that passed many years ago?

5)   Why do Africans prefer simplistic solutions to complex African problems?

6)   Why can't Africa raise the resources to support peacekeeping through proper management of re sources

7)   Are civil society organizations given space in monitoring peace agreements?

8)   African victimhood narrative is over beaten, what is the difference between White oppressor and a Black oppressor?

9)   Why have we not yet developed a proper system of managing natural resources such as oil?

10)   How do we handle the Western/China competition in Africa?

11)   What is the role of ideology in the future of peacekeeping in Africa?

12)   How was religion playing a part in the conflict in Somalia and how did KDF respond?

13)   What is the role of conflict prevention in peacekeeping?

14)   Why is conflict natural?

15)   Where are we now in international peacekeeping?

16)   What do we mean by peacekeeping capacity? Who does not have the capacity in Africa; Govt? Military? or Civilians?

8.1.2 Responses

•   The Somalia conflict is complex with multiple actors such as; criminal/terrorists/clans/governments/warlords/elders

•   The terrorism challenges in Somalia requires rethinking peacekeeping strategic approach, operations and tactics

•   It has already been established that Al Shabaab and Boko Haram are collaborating in training

•   Western countries are reluctant to fund missions that are not under UN or their own outfit

•   Legitimacy breeds consent, therefore missions that are UN sponsored are more preferred

•   The past/colonial history cannot be forgotten, it has a bearing on the present

•   Deconstructing the colonial mind is necessary to safeguard sovereignty - ability to decide what is good for you

- African's should also take responsibility for the conflicts in Africa
- Commitment of the leadership, well trained leaders, knowledgeable policy makers are necessary so that they can promote national interests while making decisions
- Education and media propagate Western values at the expense of African values, culture and traditions, which is detrimental to African interests
- There is disparity between leaders commitment to common good and individual leaders pursuing selfish interests
- Complex problems require to be simplified in order to devise appropriate response mechanisms
- KDF respects the culture and religion of the Somali people and jointly with Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) isolates extremists and radical religious groups
- Good leadership, governance and management of resources in Africa is what it takes for the continent to manage its peacekeeping missions
- AMISOM has been a success courtesy of KDF, yet other actors are taking advantage of this outcome to influence post conflict state building in Somalia
- AU Peace fund cannot fund a single mission adequately
- AU Missions are funded poorly by the UN in comparison to UN missions, such as AMISOM in comparison to MONUSCO
- Civil society participation in peacekeeping is an evolving dynamics and future missions will have more civilian involvement due to the needs of Human Rights, Humanitarian Aid, Gender and Child welfare
- Preventive deployment is a necessary tool of PSO but it is rarely adopted due to lack of international exposure.

Participants in a Question and Answer Session

9. Director's Closing Remarks

"Ladies and Gentlemen, I take the podium once again to express my appreciation and that of the entire Centre for your attendance to this Amani Lecture, and for participating in the deliberations with enthusiasm.

This lecture is has not only been a learning experience for all of us but an enjoyable one. We have gained insights on contemporary issues related to Peace and Peacekeeping in the continent.

We, as a Peace Support Operations research and training Centre, are committed to organize Amani Lectures quarterly and we look forward to seeing as many of you as possible again in future. We thank you for your commitment to peace in Africa and wish you well in all your endeavours.

I wish to thank our partners and sponsors most sincerely and to appreciate their support in the various activities undertaken by IPSTC. I also thank and congratulate our speakers for leading us so ably in our discussions and hope to continue working with you in advancing the course of peace in Africa.

I now welcome you to take a commemorative group photograph at the lawn outside this hall and there after interact at the cocktail we have prepared for you in our Peace Banda. I now wish to declare the 1st IPSTC Amani Lecture in 2014 officially closed."

THANK YOU ALL

10. ANNEXES

10.1. ANNEX 1 Amani Lecture Programme

"Changing Dimensions of International Peacekeeping in Africa"

21st August, 2014
IPSTC, Karen

TIME	ACTIVITY	ACTION
13:00 – 14:00	Arrival	**Caroline Gatimu** **Joseph Mbugua**
14:00- 14:05	**Welcome Address**	**Brig Robert Kabage** **Director IPSTC**
14:05-14:10	Introduction of discussion topic and guest Speakers	**Prof. Timothy Gatara** Senior Researcher, IPSTC Moderator
14:10-14:25	Strengthening the International Community's Engagement in Conflict and Post-Conflict Countries in Africa	**Prof. Macharia Munene** United States International University
14:25- 14:40	Alternative Models of Peacekeeping	**Maj. General (Rtd) Simon N Karanja** Former Deputy Force Commander AMISOM
14:40 -14:55	Expected Transitions in Peacekeeping Operations	**Dr. Bennett Khamis Kenyi** Information Analyst- UNMISS
14:55 – 15:55	Plenary Discussion	**Prof. Timothy Gatara** Senior Researcher IPSTC Moderator
15:55- 16:00	Closing Address	**Brig Robert Kabage** Director IPSTC
16:00 – 16:10	Group Photo	**WO1 Maina**
16:10	Cocktail at the Peace Banda	**Joan**

10.2 ANNEX 2   List of Participants

Registration List
AMANI LECTURE (IPSTC)
21ST AUGUST 2014

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